Publication:Navy Engineering Bulletin March 2006/Manning the Fire Control Officers Position in ANZAC Class Ships - paper drafted for JOMSSC 22 Sep 05

Paper drafted for JOMSSC 22 Sep 05

BY LEUT MATT SEKULITCH

Scope.

This paper will discuss how the ANZAC Fire Control Officer's (FCO) position was created, the rank/rate prerequisites of the position and implications of these to the sustainability of the current scheme. The paper will then discuss how the introduction of the ANZAC Systems Engineering Officer (SEO) has affected the role of the FCO and Deputy Weapons Electrical Engineering Officer (DWEEO). Furthermore, as the ANZAC Class has matured, with seven of the eight ANZACs in service at the time of writing this paper, other issues will be discussed that give rise to the discussion point of whether or not the current rank/ rate combination for the FCO is appropriate.

AIM

The aim of this paper is to investigate whether the current rate/rate manning arrangement employed for the ANZAC FCO is appropriate and sustainable.

BODY

Background

ANZAC FCO Conception.

The requirements for manning the FCO position was established as a result of the initial concept of operations documentation, manning analysis and comparisons to existing RAN warships. The preferred philosophy was similar to the ex-RAN DDG Class of ship, where the Fire Control Systems Coordinator (FCSC) was of Lieutenant rank and WE stream. The role was actually undertaken by the SEO Missiles and SEO Guns, with the CPOETS (Tartar) as the alternative FCSC during Defence Watches. These personnel were deemed the ideal choice for the FCSC position due to the complexity of the combat system and the breadth of system knowledge required to operate and manage the combat system and associated weapons. Having said that, neither of the two officers were subject matter experts on all peripherals of the combat system and undertook a suite of courses totaling approximately four months, where as the CPOETS (Tartar) completed detailed operator/ maintainer courses on 70% of the entire combat system.

Based on this philosophy, the DWEEO and CPOET (C&A) assumed the role of the ANZAC FCO and were required to undertake detailed maintainer level courses totaling four and a half months.

Charge Qualification (CQ) Experience.

With the DWEEO conducting FCO duties, a new problem presented itself during Defence Watches in both states one and two; how was the DWEEO to conduct all other core duties and gain valuable CQ experience in the 12 hours of off-watch time? Initially this wasn't a problem as the first two ANZACs, HMA Ships ANZAC and ARUNTA, were operating in accordance with the concept of operations documentation thereby limiting the time spent in Defence Watches. However, as more ANZACs came on line and the role of ANZACs expanded to meet the changing world environment, DWEEOs were required to conduct more FCO duties and therefore were unable to gain valuable CQ experience.

Introduction of the SEO Billet.

The SEO billet was created as a direct result of decommissioning the DDG Class. As each DDG decommissioned the number of positions available at sea for WE officers to attain pre-CQ experience reduced by three; therefore, once the final DDG decommissioned, nine positions were removed from the training continuum. This created a bottleneck of positions available at sea for WE officers to gain pre-CQ experience.

The Directorate of Naval Personnel Requirements (Engineering & Logistics) (DNPR(E&L), the WE Category Sponsor, recognised a dire need to improve the CQ training pipeline. In 2001 the SEO billet was incorporated into the ANZAC scheme of compliment (SOC). This was trialed on ANZAC and ARUNTA with the intention to include the SEO position into the entire class by the end of 2002; however, this was never achieved and to this day only four of the eight ANZACs include the SEO within the SOC . An alternate solution was also considered on the FFG Class. This was a short term fix and on a small scale with only two FFG's employing the SEO. To this day this remains a 'caseby-case' option and has not been implemented class-wide .

Until recently, when a SEO job statement was developed, the exact employment profile of the SEO has been different from ship to ship. The 'ideal model' currently in use has the SEO undertaking the role of the FCO for 9-12 months. After which time the DWEEO posts off and the SEO now undertakes the role as the DWEEO for a further 9-12 months. During this time the DWEEO mentors the new SEO in their role as FCO. This model works effectively for existing ships but has proven difficult to implement with the crewing up of new ANZACs. In both cases however, both the DWEEO and SEO are required to conduct the identical suite of system courses.

An unavoidable follow on from the SEO/DWEEO combination is that ships now have a 'spare' officer. In nearly all cases where an SEO is embarked, the DWEEO becomes the Boarding Officer, and depending on the ship's mission the DWEEO could find him/herself no better off gaining pre-CQ experience than when undertaking the role as FCO.

Today, with attrition rates of WE officers high, DNPR(E&L) have indicated that not all ANZACs will include the SEO in the SOC. There are simply not the numbers of WE engineers coming through the system to provide all eight ANZACs with SEOs and DWEEOs.

Promotion Pre-requisite.

To compound matters further, during the period of all DDGs being decommissioned and only ANZAC and ARUNTA operational, DNPR(E&L) announced a revised promotion scheme for all WE & ME officers; gaining a CQ was now a mandatory prerequisite for promotion. Given the typical timeframe of two years required to gain a CQ on a major fleet unit, DNPR(E&L) now faced the prospect of WE officers entering the zone for promotion at the minimum four and a half year mark without a CQ; meaning many WE officers faced the very real prospect of being promoted as a six or seven year Lieutenant. It wasn't long before the retention of officers awaiting a DWEEO sea drive became a very real problem. This situation is under control at present, and is likely to be manageable with four ANZAC SEO and two as required FFG SEO positions.

Moot Points

Work Force Planning.

Prior to amending the rank level of the FCO position, consideration must be given to workforce planning and branch sustainability issues. First and foremost the role of the FCO must be clearly defined. Demonstration of a particular structure to sustain and grow personnel to meet the FCO positions must be considered before any decisions are made to alter current arrangements, including the rank and category chosen. Furthermore, detailed workforce planning could also assist planning for future trends, such when all eight ANZACs are in service and new Air Warfare Destroyers operational .

DNPR(E&L) has advised that most ranks are unsustainable unless more offsets are found or more bunks created at sea. For example, if the option was to amend the FCO position to a POET/LSET, as in the FFG situation and Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) FCO, then additional positions would be required to provide flexibility and growth. Creating additional billets for trained ET personnel also presents problems. At the time of writing this paper, ANZACs have no training bunks for inexperienced ET sailors to progress their competency logs. Although investigating the flow on effects of simply creating more billets is not the focus of this paper, substantial modeling would be required to ensure that solving one problem doesn't simply create another.

The RNZN successfully employs junior and senior sailors as the FCO on their ANZACs and has no problem growing personnel. The FFG Class successfully employs ABET, LSET & POET sailors to man their Fire Control (FC) consoles. Previously, the RAN utilised the FC branch, a member of the parent seaman branch, to act as one of the three FCO's on the FFG Class. The Royal Navy (RN) utilises LS Bosun's Mate equivalent sailors as their FCO safely and effectively, similar in concept to the RAN FC branch sailor . These statements question the ideal amongst modernists that the FCO role cannot be safely and effectively performed by anyone other than operatormaintainers and devolving FCO responsibilities to anyone other than senior sailors and officers is fraught with danger.

Following on with the RN model, the RN utilise the DWEEO as the Weapons Engineering Operations Room Manager (WEORM). With the Bosun equivalent manning the FCO console, the DWEEO is then employed as part of the Operations Room (Ops Room) Command team, improving commands situational awareness by directly monitoring defects and capability issues through the WE Electronic Casualty Control (ECC) organisation; not unlike the RAN ECC organisation.

Combat System Operator (CSO) branch sailors could successfully undertake the role of the FCO. The complexity of their training, including command and control orders, sound knowledge of the Action Information Organisation (AIO) and functional understanding of the ships sensors would provide a natural progression for a LSCSO to undertake the role of an FCO. One could ague the AIO knowledge of a Lieutenant seaman officer at the pre-Principal Warfare Officer (PWO) stage of their career would gain significant benefit from acting as the FCO, an analogy to the Ops Room experience gained by the Air Intercept Controller, or the former concept of the Assistant PWO.

If the role of the FCO were changed from the DWEEO/SEO and CPO(C&A), careful consideration must be given to the new personnel proficiency requirements. It would be reasonable to assume if both personnel were no longer required to undertake FCO duties and appropriate prerequisites allocated, then overall management of the entire WE Department and combat system would be significantly improved.

If the SEO role was removed from both FFGs and ANZACs then the flow on result would be insufficient billets for personnel to gain a CQ. An alternative would be to place Lieutenants on Mine Hunters, Hydrographic ships or Landing Platform Auxiliaries for 12 months and then on to an FFG or ANZAC for 12 months; this would ensure the necessary throughput of WE officers.

Training.

If the position were altered to the POET/LSET/ABET level, knowledge and experience would be retained and developed within the work area, as is the case with FFG Class. When the sailors are promoted, they pass their FCO experience and knowledge down to junior personnel. This provides a good mentoring role and helps retain corporate knowledge. This approach has proved to be a significant contributor to improved performance of the FFG operator maintainer situation.

Currently, the length of FCO training is long when compared to the time spent conducting FCO duties. With course length and possibly only 6-9 months in the role of FCO. The return on investment to the Commonwealth is poor with an at best ratio of 2:1 of time as FCO versus length of training. It could be argued that the associated training would assist DWEEOs and WEEOs in further sea and shore jobs, however it remains a highly inefficient and expensive training system for the specific FCO role.

Job Satisfaction.

There is no doubt job satisfaction impacts on all possible rate/rank combinations for the FCO position. For some combinations it would improve job satisfaction and moral, and in others it would be detrimental. This is the case with the CPOET(C&A) in the RAN ANZACs, where the role of FCO has received some negative feedback due to excessive Defence Watch operations. It is however, generally accepted as a positive contributor to job satisfaction for the DWEEO or SEO with respect to overall knowledge and appreciation of the systems within the department. This has also been the case for the RNZN with the POET/LSET model. For the FFG Class model, the feedback is generally considered as positive. The negative feedback associated with this model is associated with system up-time, supportability issues and not all billets being filled within the section. The later places additional pressure on the operator maintainer in off watch time when there are insufficient personnel to assist with defect rectification.

Command and Control.

The FCOs relationship to the command and control function of the ship is more integrated into the ANZAC case than in older classes, and as such, there is a need to closely examine any changes to rank/rate combination of the FCO. In the longer term, issues such as a second FC channel and Harpoon upgrade capability for the ANZAC combat system, careful consideration must be taken to ensure the FCO remains capable of effectively operating an expanded combat system.

FCO Competency.

The current situation does not provide any retention of corporate knowledge to the extent found in the FFGs Class and RNZN ANZACs. It could be argued that as technology advances, less technical knowledge is required to operate systems; however, it remains the case in ANZACs that a detailed knowledge of the combat system assists the operator, particularly in difficult conditions. The counter argument would be that operator experience would impart this knowledge. Which ever rate rank combination, the level of proficiency of the FCO is directly proportional to the performance of the combat system, and hence the effectiveness of the platform.

Casualty (CAS) modes of operation.

The ANZAC combat system is complex with various levels of casualty mode or redundancy. In hostile environments, the FCOs console would most likely be the first to be activated after a system reboot. If the system was degraded the FCO console would be needed to fire the weapons. It could be argued that for this reason alone, a senior person, i.e. an officer or a CPOET, is the preferred operator in such circumstances. Although it could also be argued that a LSET/ABET could effectively manage the system in a CAS mode and at this stage there is still limited quantifiable evidence to support this; however, if the FCO prerequisites were refined for the new rank/rate combination, it would be quite reasonable to suggest the role could be successfully managed in CAS mode. Changes to mindset and cultural barriers remain the greatest hurdle for this situation.

Weapons Safety.

The nature of the ANZAC combat system and the notion that the Vertical Launch System (VLS) system is in effect a loaded gun in terms of weapons safety impacts on the rank rate combination and experience of the FCO. The consequence of an ANZAC FCO error has far greater implications than with small arm weapons. To date no incidents have occurred on FFGs or RNZN ANZACs, and with substantial safeguards in place on ANZACs it would continue to be very unlikely that an accident would occur if the rank rate combination were changed. Similarly, with the FFG upgrade including a VLS modification, engaging targets with this system still resides with ABET/LSET & POET sailors; therefore, why couldn't the rank rate combination be altered safely to any combination other than what is currently employed on ANZACs. Issues regarding weapons safety still remains a change of mindset than any other issue.

CONCLUSION

In the current operational tempo and on ships without an SEO, it is evident with the DWEEO fulfilling the FCO role the time frame required to attain a CQ endorsement could be significantly impacted and this is clearly unsustainable. The introduction of the SEO improves the pre-CQ experience for the DWEEO providing he or she isn't utilised as the Boarding Officer; however, irrespective of this, the return of training investment to Navy for the DWEEO/SEO and CPOET (C&A) is poor.

The design of modern combat systems today is targeted at non technical personnel operating them and the ANZAC combat system resembles this. Other than the FCO role, all other positions are filled by non technical personnel operating an array of complex sensors onboard. Other Navy's as discussed above currently employ non technical personnel to fulfill the role of the FCO.

Offsets will need to be established what ever the preferred rank rate combination and it is clearly evident the Navy will need a change of mindset if non technical FCOs are the preferred choice. There are numerous options for FCO and they are as follows:

1. status quo - LEUT / CPOET,
2. change CPOET to POET (retain LEUT SEOs),
3. POET/LSET/ABET FCOs (RNZN model),
4. POET/LSET/ABET (FFG model),
5. LSBM (RN model), and
6. LSCSO.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In order to sustain the WE workforce and yet maintain the capability of the ANZAC Class, the following options are provided:

1. a. In the short term, maintain the status quo with only 4 ANZACs implementing SEOs. However careful consideration should be given to operational ANZACs where the tempo necessitates one and utilise the remaining four ANZACs prior to using the 2 FFG SEO billets.
2. b. Commission a study/working group to investigate the option of utilising RN model throughout the entire ANZAC class. That is, the DWEEO becomes the WEORM, the CPO(C&A) is removed from FCO duties and either allow the RNZN ET model, RN BM model or RAN LSCSO to undertake the FCO role.

1. 1. As part of this, an investigation would be needed into appropriate requisite training for the DWEEO and CPO(C&A) in their new role, and
   2. In order to sustain the throughput of WE officers, consideration should be given to implementing the SEO billet on the entire FFG Class.

NOTES:

1. Discussions: CMDR P. Scott (WE Category Sponsor) 12 Sep 05, LEUT Terry George SO SMN3/WOE 19 Sep 05 & LEUT Stu Waters PWO HMS NOTTINGHAM 20 Sep 05
2. Discussion with CMDR P. Scott (WE Category Sponsor) 12 Sep 05
3. Discussion with CMDR P. Scott (WE Category Sponsor) 12 Sep 05
4. Discussion Paper - CMDR S. O'Brien dated 15 Aug 03
5. LEUT Stu Waters PWO HMS NOTTINGHAM 20 Sep 05