Publication:Plan Blue 2006/Fundamental Inputs to Capability - Supplies
| 66. | a. | Future logistics systems must support deployed forces across a wide range of missions, in a range of threat environments at potentially long distances from Australia. |
| b. | Future Navy ships must be able to receive and respond to requests for logistic support from joint and coalition forces ashore. Future logistic systems must be able to effectively operate in fully operable and degraded modes using less people. | |
| c. | The risks associated with the supply [1] of Future Navy equipment by foreign Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) must be understood and where practicable mitigated via supply chain initiatives. | |
| d. | Future logistic systems must contribute to the control of Navy's operating costs. The supply chain must be shortened and inventories reduced. |
67. Deployed Sustainment. The future logistics system must remain capable of supporting a Joint Task Force (JTF) at potentially long distances from Australia. This must be achieved not only when a FOB and host nation logistic services are available, but also in the more complex circumstances where such bases are not available and forces ashore are being logistically supported from the sea. Systems that are interoperable with key allies and compatible with coalition operations will be a continuing requirement. Delivery systems must be able to generate the required operational tempo from the sources of supply, whether these are in Australia or overseas, to the Area of Operations (AO). When FOBs are available, the logistics system must be able to rapidly draw upon the logistic support services resident in a host nation and integrate them within the ADF's logistics system. However, past operations have demonstrated the fragility of depending upon a host nation to mount operations, thus future logistics systems must also be able to support deployed operations when a proximate FOB is not available. That is, logistic systems must be able to sustain a force fighting from the sea.
68. Such support could take the form of unique methods of storage so that the supplies required for the operational viability period can be carried within a Task Group (TG). Alternatively innovative delivery systems, possibly involving high-speed sealift or air dropping supplies into the sea for recovery by the TG, may be developed. It is likely that at-sea cargo storage and handling systems will be increasingly required to carry, identify and transfer supplies within and between the future JTF.
69. Interoperable Logistic Systems. The Future Navy must have a common logistics system that is transparent from shore to ship to the deployed AO, across the ADF and capable of integration with coalition logistics systems. The logistics system is to be fully networked to ensure there is an increased level of situational awareness to allow the network to deliver the stores to the end user. Navy must be able to make intelligent resource allocation decisions within all parts of the delivery system, from manufacturer through the warehouse to the Fleet. The Future Navy will be required to respond to logistic support requests from forces ashore. Navy and land force combat support elements at sea must have visibility of the land force's supplies and demands for resupply. Tracking the loading and storage of supported land and air forces' supplies will be an added complexity for the logistics system, particularly within the future amphibious and support ship classes.
70. The Future Navy, most likely through the use of Landing Helicopter Dock class ships, will conduct deployed operations in support of the nation's wider interests as part of an allied or coalition force. High levels of interoperability with key allied partners and the ability to operate with a broader range of coalition partners will be required. The connectivity and data transmission technologies that should be generated by network centric operations may provide opportunities to improve logistic systems.
71. Risks in OEM and Allied Logistic Support. The Future Navy will continue to depend on foreign OEMs for spares support for future platforms and weapon systems. Risk mitigation strategies must be in place to guard against a disruption to OEM supplies that could create a significant operational impact. For example, reserve stockholdings could be varied to mitigate this risk.
72. Although a desired aim, leveraging allied logistic support systems when deployed may not always be an option. Either high-risk supplies must be embedded within the deployed TG, or effective logistic systems developed to deliver the required supplies to the deployed warfighter in the area of operations. A potentially increased dependence on contractors to deliver supplies in combat zones also generates legal and operational risks that must be addressed. Key logistic system activities and functions that are high risk must be identified. Further discussion on the risks associated with contracted and OEM services is contained within the Support FIC.
73. A Cost-Effective Supply Chain. The logistic system must contribute to the cost effectiveness of operating the Future Navy, including an ability to improve accuracy and completeness of logistic data, reduce stockholdings, shorten supply chains, increase the use of common supplies and systems and determine the most appropriate use of contractors. Initiatives to contract out logistic services must balance issues such as the employment of contractors in combat zones. In doing so, the logistic system will have to meet demanding corporate governance standards.
Footnotes
- ↑ Supplies includes the 11 NATO classes of supplies including warehousing and reserves. For the purposes of this document, supplies also includes the logistic systems from acquisition of supplies, through warehousing and delivery systems to the end user.
