Keystone Doctrine Development in Three Commonwealth Navies
The History and Significance of Keystone Doctrine Development within the Canadian Navy, the Royal Australian Navy and the Royal New Zealand Navy

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Introduction

Over the course of their histories, most Commonwealth navies have acquired reputations for their aversion to written doctrine. Yet these reputations have been only partly earned, as these navies have, since their inaugurations, maintained a plethora of written doctrine designed to guide their actions at the tactical level. Commonwealth navies have traditionally referred to their tactical level doctrine as ‘procedural manuals’, ‘fighting instructions’ or ‘fleet orders’ rather than ‘doctrine’, and it is this practise that has tended to create an erroneous perception (particularly amongst army officers) that navies have not historically had any doctrine at all.

Above the tactical level, however, it is true that Commonwealth navies have traditionally been doctrine-adverse. Michael Codner, for example, noted that during the early 1990s Royal Navy (RN) commanders worried that higher level doctrine would be ‘inherenly prescriptive’ and that its publication would limit commanders’ freedom of action. In several Commonwealth navies, this perception of doctrine designed to provide guidance above the tactical level has recently, if gradually, shifted. The result of this attitudinal shift has been the production by several Commonwealth navies of doctrine manuals designed to provide guidance at the operational and, even more significantly, at the military-strategic level.

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1 Doctrine is defined by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) as: ‘fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of objectives’. Beyond this, the definition of doctrine is discussed in more detail in the first section of this paper. [No Author], NATO-Russia Glossary of Contemporary Political and Military Terms, Brussels: NATO-Russia Joint Editorial Working Group, undated but promulgated online on 8 June 2001, accessed 20 December 2008, <https://www.nato.int/docu/glossary/eng/index.htm>, p. 77.


4 These terms are defined in the first section of this paper.
This paper examines the history and significance of the foremost military-strategic level doctrine manuals – what are often referred to as keystone doctrine manuals – produced by the Canadian navy, the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN). Prior to the undertaking of a detailed analysis of keystone doctrine development within each of these navies, the first of two background sections briefly discusses precisely what is meant by the term ‘keystone doctrine’. The second background section then summarises several key maritime strategic theoretical concepts, which are worthy of overview because each has been prominently included in the keystone doctrine manuals produced by the navies studied.

Subsequently to these background sections, the bulk of this paper is dedicated to the conduct of an analysis of keystone doctrine development within each of the navies studied. Although structured chronologically, discussion of keystone doctrine development within each navy focuses on three areas: factors that were influential during the production of each keystone doctrine manual; the intended and actual effects each manual had following its release; and the significance of the content of each manual. In conclusion, each of these three focal areas is explicitly examined, in order to determine the nature, role and significance of the keystone doctrine manuals produced by each of the navies studied.

Keystone Doctrine Defined

The first problem encountered when studying doctrine development is definitional. This problem arises not only because of the sheer volume of publications that have been labelled ‘doctrine’, but also because the term has represented very different things to different people at different times. Originally derived from the Latin word doctrina, meaning ‘teaching, body of teachings, or learning’, the term doctrine was first used by members of the Catholic Church in reference to the beliefs taught by the Church.5 Today, the term can be used to refer to any collective set of teachings, including those of armed forces. As Paul Johnston observed: ‘[i]t is possible to extend this original concept to include any teaching that is commonly accepted by its followers, or by a nation or military’s followers, as a guide to practice.’6 Beyond this basic definition, there has been a great degree of debate about the precise nature of military doctrine.7 Notwithstanding this debate, there has been general agreement about a few of the key aspects of the nature of military doctrine. For example, it is widely understood that ‘doctrine is what is written down’,8 that it constitutes ‘an officially approved teaching based on accumulated experience’,9 and that it ‘is usually institutional in focus and internal in nature’.10

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7 The term ‘military doctrine’ as used herein refers collectively to the doctrine produced by navies, armies and air forces, as well as to that produced by armed forces jointly.
8 Johnston, ‘Doctrine is not Enough’, p. 30.
Beyond this limited agreement about what doctrine is, there has also been much agreement about what doctrine is not. First, there has been general agreement that doctrine is not the same as strategic policy, although it has often been observed that there should be a symbiotic relationship between the two.\(^{11}\) Second, it is generally agreed that ‘military thought and doctrine are not synonymous’, because ‘[t]he first is personal, the latter institutional’.\(^{12}\) Third, it has been contended that because doctrine is officially approved and institutional in nature, it differs from concepts and principles, which are not.\(^{13}\)

From these generally agreed upon ideas about what military doctrine is and is not, it is possible to distil a basic notion of what exactly constitutes military doctrine. In essence, military doctrine is an officially sanctioned, formalised and written expression of institutionally accepted ideas about what militaries do and how they do it. That doctrine is produced by militaries themselves is one of the most important factors separating it from other bodies of literature, such as strategic policy and military theory.

This definition of military doctrine is similar to that promulgated by most Commonwealth navies, including the three studied, although each has used slightly different terminology. Uniquely amongst the navies studied, the Canadian navy has not promulgated its own definition of doctrine. Instead, it defers to the definition given within Canadian Forces joint doctrine, which itself is identical to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) definition of doctrine (see below).\(^{14}\) The RAN’s definition of doctrine was taken directly from a 1993 Australian joint doctrine manual. It defined doctrine as: ‘the body of thought on the nature, role and conduct of armed conflict…[which] contains, among other things, the fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of national objectives’.\(^{15}\) The RNZN defined doctrine as: ‘the fundamental philosophy concerning the employment of force. It is a body of primary concepts about war that guides the application of power in combat’.\(^{16}\)

The reason for this definitional similarity is that each of the navies studied has based its definition of doctrine on that promulgated by NATO, which is that doctrine is ‘fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is


\(^{13}\) Holley, ‘Concepts, Doctrines, Principles’.


Due to its vagary, the NATO definition of doctrine can be applied to most written documents militaries produce, provided they purport to provide guidance by way of discussing ‘fundamental principles’. Within the armed forces of Australia, Canada and New Zealand, this basic concept of doctrine has been further elaborated upon by way of the division of doctrine manuals into categories based on the ‘level of conflict’ the principles a particular manual contains are designed to guide. Generally, it is accepted that there are three levels of conflict: tactical, operational and strategic. Brief definitions of each level follow, along with descriptions of the nature of the doctrine designed to provide guidance at each.

Tactical: At the tactical level, small-scale military engagements and battles are planned and executed, and military force is applied directly against enemy forces to achieve victory at a particular time and place. At the tactical level, doctrine tends to be the most prescriptive, and procedural manuals, fighting instructions and fleet orders have traditionally been written to provide guidance at this level.

Operational: At the operational level, military undertakings such as campaigns (which require more time and space than tactical encounters) are planned and conducted, with the aim of translating strategic objectives into a series of tactical successes. Hence, operational planning encompasses the provision and sustainment of logistics and administrative support, as well as the manoeuvre of tactical units. Doctrine written to provide guidance at this level of conflict ‘is more about creating a framework within which to prepare, plan and conduct operations…rather than procedures on “how to fight”’.

Strategic: The strategic level of conflict is often divided into two sub-levels, the national (or grand) strategic level and the military-strategic level. At the national strategic level, governments determine overarching defence strategies and policies that have military as well as other aspects. At the military-strategic level, militaries develop institutional strategies to enable them to implement the military aspects of national strategies. Doctrine designed to

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17 [No Author], NATO-Russia Glossary of Contemporary Political and Military Terms, p. 77. In the case several Commonwealth navies, including the Canadian navy, the RAN and the RN, the NATO definition of doctrine has been adapted for use jointly across the armed forces of the country in question, then adopted from joint doctrine for use within the navy in question.


19 The RAN has adopted the terms ‘philosophical’, ‘application’ and ‘procedural’ to describe the levels of its doctrine, although these terms roughly align with the military-strategic, operational and tactical levels of conflict. SPC-A, RAN Doctrine 1, p. 7.


21 SPC-A, RAN Doctrine 1, pp. 7-8.


provide guidance at the military-strategic level tends to be more abstract and philosophical in nature than doctrine designed to provide guidance at the other levels of conflict, establishing fundamental principles to guide the application of military force in pursuit of national strategic objectives.\textsuperscript{24}

Given the hierarchical nature of military organisations, it is unsurprising that they have organised their doctrine into hierarchies, wherein discussion within lower manuals on the hierarchy has to conform to discussion in higher manuals. In most Commonwealth navies, including the three studied, military-strategic level doctrine has been placed at the top of the doctrine hierarchy and tactical level doctrine at the bottom. The doctrine manual at the pinnacle of the hierarchy is usually referred to as ‘keystone’ doctrine. As stated within RAN doctrine, keystone doctrine ‘stands at the summit of naval doctrinal effort’.\textsuperscript{25} Furthermore:

It not only serves to educate and motivate personnel and improve their understanding of the roles and functions of their services, but can be used to inform those within government and the wider community of the ways in which military force can be applied by the nation in exercising its national power.\textsuperscript{26}

Due to the scope and significance of keystone doctrine manuals, they constitute the focus of the analysis within this paper.

The Conceptual Foundations of Keystone Naval Doctrine

When compared to the sheer volume of land-focused strategic theories that have been advanced over the years, maritime strategic theories are relatively sparse. Indeed, the first written theories of modern maritime strategy were not published until the latter part of the nineteenth century and the evolution of maritime strategic theory is largely the story of a small group of prominent theorists.\textsuperscript{27} Of these theories, several are worthy of brief discussion here because many have been prominently included in the keystone doctrine of the Commonwealth navies studied.

Key among earlier conceptual developments are ‘command of the sea’, ‘sea control’, ‘sea denial’ and ‘power projection’. The first concept, command of the sea, exists where one state (or a group of allied states) has naval superiority to the extent that an opponent simply cannot use the sea at all.\textsuperscript{28} Generally, it is accepted that command of the sea is brought about by the total destruction of the enemy’s naval forces, although as \textit{RAN Doctrine 1} noted, command of the sea is difficult to achieve in the modern environment owing to asymmetric threats and technology such as mines, torpedoes, aircraft and long-range missiles.\textsuperscript{29}

\begin{itemize}
  \item Canadian Forces Experimentation Centre, \textit{CFJP-01 Canadian Military Doctrine}, pp. 1.2-1.3.
  \item SPC-A, \textit{RAN Doctrine 1}, p. 9.
  \item SPC-A, \textit{RAN Doctrine 1}, p. 9.
  \item Julian S. Corbett, \textit{Some Principles of Maritime Strategy} [originally published 1911], London: Brassey’s, 1988, pp. 91-106.
  \item SPC-A, \textit{RAN Doctrine 1}, p. 38.
\end{itemize}
As a result of this situation, sea control, sea denial and power projection are arguably more useful concepts in the contemporary world. The difference between sea control and sea denial is subtle. Sea control is obtained when a state has a monopoly over the use of an area of the sea for a period of time, whereas sea denial is obtained by denying an enemy state use of an area of the sea for a period of time. Power projection refers to the ability of navies to influence events ashore through the application of combat power, either directly (such as by naval gunfire directed against targets ashore), or through the amphibious insertion of land forces.

How each of these concepts fits within the scope of activities undertaken by the navies studied in this paper is perhaps best explained by two more recent theorists. The first of these theorists is Ken Booth, whose discussion of the roles of navies is fundamental in explaining the spectrum of activities undertaken by modern navies, including those studied. His model (shown in Figure 1, below) divides naval tasks into three categories – diplomatic, policing and military – centred on the use of the sea.

![Figure 1: The Booth Model (original version)](image)

A further breakdown is undertaken within each of the categories and Booth offers a detailed analysis of the many options navies offer to strategic policy-makers. In their first role (diplomacy), navies are a useful foreign policy tool and the presence of warships can be used to reassure or reinforce allied governments, deter potential aggressors, manipulate the decisions of foreign governments, or simply enhance a state’s prestige. In their second role (policing, or what is alternatively referred to by some as ‘constabulary’ operations), navies contribute to the protection of national sovereignty, assist in state-building and peacekeeping missions, and are vital in enforcing state, maritime and international law. In their third role,

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30 SPC-A, RAN Doctrine 1, p. 39.
31 SPC-A, RAN Doctrine 1, p. 43.
32 Ken Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy, New York: Holmes & Meier, 1979, pp. 15-25.
33 Source for Figure 1: Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy, p. 16.
34 Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy, pp. 18-20.
35 Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy, pp. 17-18.
navies provide states with military power in the ‘traditional’ sense, acting as a vital component of national military strength.  

The second more recent theorist whose work is of particular utility in explaining how the various maritime strategic theories summarised above fit within the scope of activities undertaken by the navies studied is Eric Grove. In addition to updating Booth’s discussion of the roles of navies, Grove established a comprehensive ‘typology for navies’. Taking into account ‘factors such as the types of forces deployed, the sophistication of their equipment and level of afloat support as well as mere numbers of vessels’, Grove divided the world’s navies into nine ranked categories.

The first rank, which Grove termed ‘major global force projection navy – complete’, consists of navies ‘capable of carrying out all the military roles of naval forces on a global scale’. Due to the array of capabilities a navy requires in order to be included in this rank, Grove determined that the US Navy was the only navy that warranted inclusion within it (although almost twenty years has elapsed since Grove made this determination, the current capabilities of the US Navy mean that its inclusion in this rank remains unchanged). At the other end of his typology, Grove labelled the ninth rank ‘token navies’, asserting that these navies usually consist of ‘a formal organisational structure and a few coastal craft but little else’.

From the perspective of this study, Grove’s typology is useful for two reasons. First, the ranking of a particular navy is indicative of the extent to which it is likely to be able to generate and maintain conditions such as sea control and sea denial. Second, the different ranking of the navies studied allows their overall capabilities to be quickly contrasted to one another. Grove’s assessment was that the Canadian navy and RAN both fit within the fourth rank – what he termed ‘medium regional force projection navies’, able to project a significant amount of naval force into an ocean basin adjoining their countries of origin. The RNZN, on the other hand, was assessed as being in the fifth rank – an ‘adjacent force projection navy’ capable of projecting a limited amount of naval force well away from the shoreline of its country of origin.

It must be noted, however, that ranking navies according to Grove’s model is not as straightforward as it may at first appear. Much has changed in the twenty years since Grove’s

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36 Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy, pp. 20-24.
38 Regarding the typology for navies, Grove’s work was based on, and substantially developed, the earlier works of other theorists, principally Morris and Haines. Grove, The Future of Sea Power, p. 237. See also: M. A. Morris, Expansion of Third World Navies, London: Macmillan, 1987; and S. W. Haines, ‘Third World Navies: Myths and Realities’, Naval Forces, April 1988.
43 Grove, The Future of Sea Power, p. 239.
.typology was developed, and his assessment is now out of date in a few key areas. Furthermore, the ranking of a particular navy depends on how one interprets its capabilities. In its own discussion of Grove’s model, for example, the Canadian navy concluded that it and the RAN are rank three navies (what Grove termed ‘medium global force projection navies’). In justifying this conclusion, the Canadian navy asserted that it and the RAN ‘consistently demonstrate a determination to exercise [their limited range of naval capabilities] at some distance from their home waters, in cooperation with other Force Projection Navies’. While it is possible that this discrepancy has come about because Grove did not foresee the roles the Canadian navy and RAN would play in the 1991 Gulf War and subsequently in the Persian Gulf, it is equally as likely that the discrepancy was due to slight definitional differences.

For the purposes of the discussion undertaken within this paper, the exact ranking of individual navies within Grove’s typology is largely irrelevant. What is more important is the position of each navy relative to the others. Regardless of which of the aforementioned assessments one agrees with, what is important is that both place the Canadian navy and RAN in the same rank, with the RNZN ranked below them.48

Keystone Doctrine Development in the Canadian Navy

Throughout the Cold War the Canadian navy’s focus was primarily on its military role. This focus was a direct result of the navy’s designated role within NATO as an anti-submarine warfare (ASW) specialist navy, although it has a legacy dating to the Second World War, when the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) was involved in the protection of trans-Atlantic shipping convoys from attack by German submarines. The RCN’s ASW capabilities were maintained during the early years of the Cold War, although it was not until the late 1950s that ASW began to emerge as a primary role.

This shift in focus primarily occurred for two reasons. The first was the changing nature of the threat posed by the Soviet Navy. Under the leadership of Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy from 1955 to 1985, soviet submarine production increased dramatically. As Tom Frome observed:

44 The most obvious of these is his inclusion of the Soviet Navy in the second rank; it is now clear that its successor, the Russian Navy, is not capable of operating on a scale that would warrant its inclusion as a rank two navy, despite a recent ‘resurgence’ in Russian naval power. Grove, The Future of Sea Power, pp. 237-238. On recent developments regarding Russian naval power and the Russian Navy, see: Lee Willett, ‘The Navy in Russia’s “Resurgence”’, RUSI Journal, Vol. 154, No. 1 (February 2009), pp. 50-55.


48 Although Leadmark did not discuss where it would have positioned the RNZN, it is clear from its description of each rank that the RNZN would not have been ranked as highly as the Canadian navy and RAN.


The Soviet Navy was not a balanced fleet like the US Navy. It boasted a massive nuclear and conventional submarine capability. Between 1949 and 1972, the Soviet Navy developed 24 new classes of submarine. By 1980 the Soviet Union deployed 280 nuclear and nuclear ballistic missile carrying submarines. Three-quarters of the Soviet submarine fleet was nuclear powered. But the Soviet Navy lacked aircraft carriers, while the surface fleet suffered from vastly deficient air protection. The size and potency of the submarine fleet was, however, sufficient to cause a reorientation of force structures in most Western navies.  

For the Canadian navy, this reorientation accelerated during the late 1960s due to the unification of the Canadian Forces (CF). This was largely because of the acquisition ‘carrot’ the (then) Defence Minister, Paul Hellyer, dangled in front of the navy in an attempt to convince the admiralty to accept unification – most of the acquisitions offered were designed primarily for ASW.  

The second factor influencing the decision to reorientate the Canadian navy’s role to ASW was budgetary constraints. Since the navy did not have the resources to make a substantial contribution to NATO defence of the Atlantic across the spectrum of maritime warfare, the provision of a highly specialised ASW force enabled the Canadian navy to provide a worthwhile contribution in at least one area. It also (by coincidence) ensured the navy’s primary focus remained on the military role identified by Booth.  

In the early 1990s, the collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequent end of the Cold War triggered a period of strategic uncertainty for the Canadian navy, along with bringing its specialist ASW role into question. Cuts to the defence budget, particularly in 1989, led to the cancellation of many modernisation and acquisition programs that had been approved for the navy as recently as the 1987 Defence White Paper. Furthermore, the collapse of the Soviet Union initially left the navy without any strategic policy guidance, although it has since been observed that its fleet structure ensured it was flexible enough to adapt to the post-Cold War operational environment. Despite a declaration that naval assets would be more evenly distributed between the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, a Defence Policy Statement, released in 1992, did little to alleviate the uncertainty this situation created. Instead, it determined that in

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52 In 1968, the previously separate RCN, Canadian Army and Royal Canadian Air Force were unified into a single service, the Canadian Forces. Although unification has since had many effects on the structure, role and culture of each of the environmental elements of the CF, these are not discussed in detail herein. For an overview of unification and its consequences, readers are encouraged to see: Desmond Morton, A Military History of Canada: From Champlain to Kosovo (4th ed.), Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1999, pp. 247-254.

53 Milner, Canada’s Navy, pp. 247-248.

54 Despite the navy’s ASW capabilities it must be noted that the remainder of the fleet’s capabilities were obsolete by the early 1980s and there were serious concerns within the navy about ‘rust-out’ of the fleet. Milner, Canada’s Navy, pp. 279-280.


the future the navy would be required to ‘maintain versatile, general-purpose maritime forces’ capable of undertaking a variety of roles both close to Canada and abroad.\(^57\)

Shortly afterwards, the growing number of peacekeeping operations (which had increased from 13 in 1988 to 18 in 1992)\(^58\) led some to question why Canada needed to prepare for traditional warfighting at all. Furthermore, the expression of such views had on occasion been accompanied by the calling into question of the need for naval forces all together.\(^59\) It was against this unfavourable backdrop that the Canadian navy became the first of the three navies studied to produce a keystone doctrine manual, releasing *The Naval Vision: Charting the Course for Canada’s Maritime Forces* in May 1994.\(^60\)

The catalyst for the production of this doctrine manual was the election of the Chrétien Government in late 1993. When Chrétien came to power, his government did not have an established defence policy (beyond the desire to cut costs). Shortly after his election, Chrétien began a strategic policy review process, which eventually culminated in 1994 with the release of a Defence White Paper.\(^61\) As part of this review, each of the three services was asked to express its views about the future direction Canadian strategic policy should take. In light of the unfavourable nature of the prevailing political environment, the navy acted to both justify its existence and to shape the review’s outcome in its favour. *The Naval Vision* constituted a crucial part of this effort. As one retired Canadian Navy Commodore noted, *The Naval Vision* was intended to explain the Canadian navy’s role to the public ‘at a grade twelve level’. It was squarely (and intentionally) focused on winning over to the navy’s cause the members of the Special Committee of the Senate and House of Commons that had been charged with undertaking the Chrétien government’s strategic policy review.\(^62\)

Despite this intent, production of what eventually became *The Naval Vision* was already underway prior to the 1993 election. At the time of the election, however, the requirement for a keystone doctrine manual had not yet been identified and the project’s intended outcome was merely to update the navy’s *Maritime Development Plan*, an internal planning document that had been circulated from time-to-time, most recently during the 1980s. As the navy responded to the Chrétien government’s election and subsequent strategic policy review, the

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59 As Chief of the Land Staff, (then) Lieutenant General Hillier argued that ‘[t]he reality of the emerging security environment suggests that it is unlikely that the CF will be called upon to fight in “blue skies or blue waters”, and the overall value to our country of equipping to do so would be minimal compared to the impact of providing precision land effects’. Although this argument was made in 2003, similar opinions had been expressed a decade earlier. R. J. Hillier, *Strategic Capability Investment Plan – Land Effect*, Ref. No.: 3136-5 (CLS), Ottawa: Office of the Chief of the Land Staff, 26 June 2003, p. 4.


62 Information obtained during an interview conducted by the author on 31 May 2007 with two senior Canadian navy officers (records on file with author).
need for a much wider-ranging, military-strategic level publication was identified and the project was expanded, bringing about production of The Naval Vision.\footnote{63 Information obtained during an interview conducted by the author on 25 August 2008 with a senior Canadian navy officer, supplemented by email correspondence received on 18 March 2009 (records on file with author).}

As a result of the circumstances and timing of its release, The Naval Vision is unique amongst the keystone doctrine manuals studied, since it was not influenced by doctrine developments in allied countries.\footnote{64 The Canadian navy was the only navy studied to have released its doctrine before the RN, and within only months of the US Navy. While the RN did not release a keystone doctrine manual until 1995, the US Navy had released its own keystone manual in March 1994. See: USN Doctrine Command, United States Naval Doctrine Publication 1: Naval Warfare, Washington DC: Department of the Navy, March 1994; By Command of the Defence Council, BR 1806: The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine (1st ed.), London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1995.} Even though it was released in close temporal proximity to the US Navy’s Naval Warfare, the two documents are substantially different. Simply written and straightforward to read, The Naval Vision was divided into three parts. The first provided an overview of the navy’s recent activities; the second explained the strategic rationale for maintaining naval forces; and the third set forth the Canadian navy’s vision for the twenty-first century. Although the final chapter of the US Navy’s Naval Warfare examined the US Navy’s vision for the twenty-first century, this is where the similarities between it and the Canadian navy’s The Naval Vision ended.\footnote{65 Reading the two documents in conjunction, what stands out the most is that Naval Warfare was more abstract and theoretical throughout. This may be because its target audience was not politicians. Instead, its aim was to explain how the USN worked in a joint environment, and its target audience was the USN itself, along with the other branches of the US armed forces. John B. Hattendorf (Ed.), US Naval Strategy in the 1990s: Selected Documents, Newport Papers No. 27, Newport: Naval War College Press, September 2006.}

The release of The Naval Vision was accompanied by the emergence of a uniquely Canadian trend, which has been characterised by the couching of keystone doctrine manuals as ‘strategy’ or ‘reference documents’, rather than as ‘doctrine’. This is especially true of the navy’s first two keystone doctrine manuals, and in their case one of the reasons for this is their early release dates compared to other navies and other branches of the CF – during the late-1980s and early-to-mid-1990s, doctrine above the tactical level was still stigmatised as dogma by many Canadian naval officers.\footnote{66 For example, see: P. Richard Moller, ‘The Dangers of Doctrine’ in: [No Editor], Maritime Security Working Paper No. 5, Halifax: Dalhousie University, December 1996, pp. 57-71.} Avoiding the term ‘doctrine’ in turn avoided much of the stigma that the use of the term would have attracted.

Regardless of their terminology, the Canadian navy’s keystone publications are clearly doctrinal. This is confirmed by their content, which has always contained a discussion of the ‘fundamental principles’ that guided the navy at the time of their release, and they always established a conceptual direction for the navy, within the framework of a national strategy. This is significant because both of these factors align with the definition of doctrine since established within Canadian joint doctrine,\footnote{67 Canadian Forces Experimentation Centre, CFJP-01 Canadian Military Doctrine, p. 1.1.} as well as with the definition of doctrine used within this paper. Furthermore, each of the keystone publications discussed herein, including The Naval Vision, have been regarded as doctrine by several Canadian navy officers, and have been subsequently referred to as such.\footnote{68 This assertion is based on a series of interviews conducted with Canadian naval officers in May/June 2007 and July/August 2008 (records of all interviews on file with author).}
Overall, the impact of *The Naval Vision* on strategic policy formulation is questionable. Although it has been asserted that the publication of the manual led to the navy ‘winning’ the interservice funding battle for the few years after its release (since the army and air force had no similar ‘vision’ or mission statement to fall back on),\(^{69}\) it is not directly mentioned in the 1994 Defence White Paper.\(^{70}\) However, there are parts of the White Paper that align with *The Naval Vision*; among these a brief discussion of ‘operational maritime forces’ is particularly notable.\(^{71}\) Furthermore, the few naval acquisitions approved within the White Paper all align with discussion in the third section of *The Naval Vision*, although whether there is a direct connection between the two documents or whether the alignment is merely a coincidence remains unclear. Regardless of its impact on strategic policy, *The Naval Vision* remains an easy to read guide to the Canadian navy’s position and institutional strategy during the early 1990s.

Despite the limited respite signalled by the release of the 1994 Defence White Paper, the Canadian political climate and strategic policy situation during the mid-1990s continued to be characterised by a high degree of strategic uncertainty. Furthermore, several years of post-Cold War defence spending cuts meant that no major capital purchases were approved for the navy until nearly a decade after the conclusion of the Cold War.\(^{72}\) As a result of this situation, the development of the Canadian navy’s second keystone doctrine manual, *Adjusting Course: A Naval Strategy for Canada*, released in April 1997,\(^{73}\) was closely linked to the navy’s attempt to generate renewed funding for its acquisitions program. In particular, the navy was attempting to generate political support for the purchase of a new submarine fleet to replace its *Oberon* Class submarines,\(^{74}\) which had been purchased during the 1960s and had become obsolete by the early 1990s.\(^{75}\)

Initial attempts to find a replacement for the *Oberon* Class had failed following the Mulroney Government’s 1987 decision to acquire nuclear rather than diesel-electric submarines. A few years after the release of the 1987 Defence White Paper, which had announced the nuclear submarine purchase,\(^{76}\) it was determined that the nuclear option was too costly and the project fell by the wayside entirely.\(^{77}\) Following the election of the Chrétien Government in 1993,
renewed navy lobbying re-opened the door for the possible acquisition of a diesel electric replacement for the Oberon Class. Importantly, the 1994 Defence White Paper endorsed the acquisition on conditional terms:

It [is] also recommended that, if it should prove possible in the current environment of military downsizing around the world to acquire three to six modern diesel-electric submarines on a basis that was demonstrably cost-effective (i.e., that could be managed within the existing capital budget), then the Government should seriously consider such an initiative.

Despite this conditional endorsement, the project soon stalled again and, as a result, it took the Canadian navy another four years of unduly protracted but ultimately successful lobbying before the acquisition of a replacement submarine fleet was finalised in April 1998.

The eventual purchase of the Upholder Class diesel-electric submarines from Britain was a hard-won funding victory for the Canadian navy. As Peter Haydon observed about post-1994 White Paper developments, ‘[m]uch of the delay was a simple function of the need for submarines not having enough political support in Canada despite the new defence policy decision’. Michael Craven has since expanded on this observation, noting that ‘[f]rom 1994 until the summer of 1997, significant departmental effort was expended educating Cabinet and Canadians as to the rationale for replacement submarines’. As part of this effort, ‘[a] series of documents drafted for government consideration stressed common themes’ about the relevance and utility of submarines. Adjusting Course constitutes one of these documents and a major intention underlying its publication was the provision of a comprehensive justification of the navy’s roles, in support of its acquisition programs.

Reading Adjusting Course in light of this situation, it is unsurprising that the doctrine tends to read in places as though it were a 39-page justification for the Upholder purchase. This is most obvious in the conclusion, where it is stated bluntly that: ‘[i]n the near term, the most serious problem is represented by the aging submarine force. Submarines provide a unique capability that cannot be adequately replaced by other platforms’. While the exact extent to which Adjusting Course was responsible for the eventual purchase of the Upholder Class cannot be determined, it is likely that the doctrine at least formed part of the navy’s overall strategy to bring about the purchase.

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78 Bush, ‘The Victoria-class Submarine Program’, pp. 4-5. Although a section of The Naval Vision discussed the role and importance of submarines, this was limited in length and scope and did not form a major part of the document. Hence, in shaping the Chrétien Government’s strategic policy review’s conclusions about the benefits of submarines, it is likely that lobbying on the part of naval personnel and other interested parties had a much greater influence than doctrine.


80 Once purchased, the Upholder Class submarines were re-designated the Victoria Class by the Canadian navy, although the two names have occasionally been used interchangeably. To avoid confusion, the submarines are only referred to within this paper as Upholder Class.


83 Information obtained during an interview conducted by the author on 31 July 2008 with a senior Canadian navy officer (records on file with author).

84 Maritime Force Development Cell, Adjusting Course, p. 38.
Beyond this objective, *Adjusting Course* also undertook a more general discussion about the links between navies and foreign policy. This set the tone for subsequent keystone doctrine manuals produced by all three navies studied because it included a discussion of the concepts of sea control and sea denial.\(^\text{85}\) It also touched on the roles of navies developed by Booth, discussing the navy’s role in protecting Canada’s sovereignty, the conduct of naval diplomacy and the utility of naval power projection, although Booth was not credited and his model was not included (instead, *Adjusting Course* provided a table that summarised the navy’s roles and missions, which loosely corresponded to Booth’s model).\(^\text{86}\) The extent to which the content of *Adjusting Course* was influenced by the keystone doctrine of other navies is unclear. Although RN doctrine was referred to in the glossary of *Adjusting Course*, it was not referred to within the text itself.

Just as *The Naval Vision* was considered by some to be overly simplistic, others have asserted that *Adjusting Course* swung the pendulum too far the other way. Indeed, it attracted an unusually high level of public criticism, particularly from British commentators. For example, when contrasting it with the RN’s 1995 keystone doctrine manual, *BR 1806: Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine*, one RN officer observed about the Canadian publication that ‘[t]here are shades of doctrine here, though at a much less “fundamental” level than our own BR 1806’.\(^\text{87}\)

In a particularly scathing critique, Eric Grove took this argument one step further by stating:

> This is a rather curious publication in many ways. It seems to be an in-house Naval paper but it is clearly intended to achieve the laudable objective of putting the Canadian “naval case” to a wider audience. In this it succeeds, but only up to a point. Its good intentions are marred somewhat by some needless errors of analysis that weaken it significantly and give the document the feel of a slightly below-average postgraduate thesis.\(^\text{88}\)

Additionally, Grove made numerous further criticisms, for example that ‘[t]here are serious problems with the discussion of naval diplomacy’, ‘[t]he document gives the general impression of being badly staffed’, ‘[t]he authors seem confused as to the basic dynamics of warship design’ and ‘[t]he discussion of threats to naval forces is particularly disappointing’.\(^\text{89}\) His critique led to a rebuttal by Canadian scholar Peter Haydon, who asserted that:

> In reading Grove’s full commentary one could get the impression that his rather condescending criticism of *Adjusting Course* is merely a form of scolding the “colonials” for not following mother’s advice. He really seems concerned that the Canadian Navy had the audacity to engage in independent naval thought.\(^\text{90}\)

Importantly, Haydon’s rebuttal indicates that allied naval doctrine – British in particular – had little influence during the development of *Adjusting Course*.

\(^\text{86}\) Maritime Force Development Cell, *Adjusting Course*, pp. 30-34.  
Despite the limited academic debate it generated, there is little evidence that *Adjusting Course* was an effective tool for generating widespread public support for the Canadian navy. The role it played as part of the navy’s case in support of the *Upholder* purchase aside, *Adjusting Course* appears to have been of only limited utility to the navy, particularly once the *Upholder* purchase had finally been made. Furthermore, there were some who felt that *Adjusting Course* had failed to adequately explain the Canadian navy’s *raison d’être* to the public. As Haydon observed:

> Ideally, the public expression of support, in both the ‘grand’ and the naval strategies, should be a political statement, or, as in long-established maritime states…be an entrenched part of the national character. Unfortunately, a Canadian maritime ‘character’ does not exist…If the politicians cannot, or will not, produce the necessary statement entrenching the navy as part of the national fabric, the naval and maritime communities must take the necessary steps to gain public support.\(^{91}\)

In an assessment of *Adjusting Course*, he concluded that:

> At the moment it presents a good argument but is not a complete strategy because it does not adequately answer the question: ‘What function does the navy perform which obligates Canadian society to assume responsibility for its maintenance?’ Moreover, *Adjusting Course* is a strategic orphan because it is not tied to an overarching national strategic vision free of the constraints of today’s short-term political imperatives and locked tightly on the future of this country in the longer term.\(^{92}\)

In June 1998, the release of *Shaping the Future of the Canadian Forces: A Strategy for 2020* (usually referred to simply as *Strategy 2020*) provided the first such ‘strategic vision’ since the 1994 Defence White Paper.\(^{93}\) Following the release of *Strategy 2020*, Vice Admiral Maddison, then Chief of the Maritime Staff, ordered the Directorate of Maritime Strategy to begin work on a new publication that was designed to fit within the vision established within *Strategy 2020*. The new publication, *Leadmark: The Navy’s Strategy for 2020*, was released in June 2001.

The link to *Strategy 2020* was evident throughout *Leadmark*, the foreword to which noted that ‘*Leadmark* is a critical link to the capability-based planning framework set in place by *Strategy 2020*’.\(^{94}\) Others have also noted the influence *Strategy 2020* had during the development of *Leadmark*, which was substantially broader and more considered than the development of its predecessors. As the manual’s initial author, Richard Gimblett, recalled, at the outset of the development of *Leadmark*: ‘[w]e had a general concept of what the naval strategy [*Leadmark*] should look like – basically, look a lot like *Strategy 2020*…something of about 20 to 25 page synopsis of where the navy was going to go over the next 20 years was generally it’. However, once research began into the exact content and structure the navy’s strategy should have, the scope of the task rapidly expanded. The result was that ‘*Leadmark* was suddenly becoming more than a one-man, twenty-page writing assignment…we started developing the idea of a team concept’.\(^{95}\)


\(^{92}\) Haydon, ‘“Adjusting Course”…A Strategic Orphan?’, p. 3.


\(^{94}\) G. R. Maddison, ‘Foreword’ in: [No Author], *Leadmark*, p. i.

\(^{95}\) Interview Transcript: Richard H. Gimblett, Canadian War Museum Oral History Project, Interview Control Number: 31D 4 GIMBLETT R. Interview conducted at Ottawa, 7 January 2004, p. 19.
It was at this point in its development that *Leadmark* began to move away from being an organisational strategy. Rather, it developed into the Canadian navy’s most comprehensive keystone doctrine manual yet released at the time of writing of this paper. Eventually, the core writing team was expanded to include three mid-level and one senior naval officer and a civilian academic.96 Early drafts were widely circulated both within and outside of the navy for feedback, and the process was further enhanced by the development of related academic conference papers and commentaries.97 In addition to this feedback, *Leadmark* was influenced by allied keystone doctrine manuals, particularly those produced by the US Navy and RN, and by the operational experience of members of its writing team.98 However, *Strategy 2020* remained the key catalyst underlying the production of *Leadmark* and its influence was particularly prominent.

Following a discussion about its relationship to strategic policy and the force development process, *Leadmark* comprehensively elaborated the roles of navies. In undertaking this elaboration, it is noteworthy that *Leadmark* drew heavily on both the Booth model (see Figure 2) and Grove’s typology for navies. It also drew on the work of several other prominent maritime strategic theorists, and provided definitions of sea control, sea denial and maritime power projection, amongst other concepts.99 Interestingly, it developed the concept of ‘middle power’ naval roles and responsibilities to a far greater extent than any of the other keystone naval doctrine manuals studied, which may have been due to the concepts prominence in academia at the time *Leadmark* was developed.100 Regardless of the reasons for its inclusion, the discussion of ‘medium power naval strategy’ provided an interesting means for facilitating the development of a Canadian concept of naval strategy.

In its final part, *Leadmark* established a naval strategy for 2020. Although the strategy was deliberately broad and succinct (totalling only two paragraphs), it nonetheless served to link the document to its original intent, which was to develop a naval strategy that aligned with *Strategy 2020*.101 In this sense *Leadmark* was a success, although importantly its doctrinal style ensured that it constituted a well-balanced military-strategic treatise that was more broadly relevant than a strategy alone could have been.

Indeed, *Leadmark* was far more effective than its predecessors in achieving the goal of promoting awareness of the Canadian navy’s roles and in establishing a military strategy for the navy. This is because it avoided the pitfalls of both of its predecessors – it was comprehensive and easy to understand, but not overly simplistic – and because it was more widely and prominently distributed. As a result, *Leadmark* was highly successful in making

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96 Interview Transcript: Richard H. Gimblett, Canadian War Museum Oral History Project. This is also noted in the ‘acknowledgements’ section of *Leadmark*. See: [No Author], *Leadmark*, p. 176.

97 A conference held at the University of Calgary in March 2001 was fundamental in the conceptual development of *Leadmark*. Although a footnote within *Leadmark* observed that the conference proceedings were due to be published as a book in 2002, this did not come to pass. Instead, a second collection of study papers written to assist in the development of *Leadmark* was published by Dalhousie University. See: Edward L. Tummers (Ed.), *Maritime Security in the Twenty-First Century*, Maritime Security Occasional Paper No. 11, Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, 2000.

98 Interview Transcript: Richard H. Gimblett, Canadian War Museum Oral History Project.

99 [No Author], *Leadmark*, pp. 28-49.

100 Interview Transcript: Richard H. Gimblett, Canadian War Museum Oral History Project.

101 [No Author], *Leadmark*, pp. 168-169.
an impact in the public realm, even though it attracted the occasional criticism. As one retired Canadian navy Lieutenant Commander recalled, Leadmark temporarily gave the navy the edge it required to secure funding for its priorities ahead of the army and air force, precisely because at the time Leadmark was released neither of the other services had an equivalent ‘glossy publication you could give to a politician’.

The maritime strategy Leadmark established was also highly versatile. As its release date was only three months prior to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against New York and Washington DC, there was some concern in the wake of these attacks that subsequent events had rendered Leadmark prematurely redundant. However, this concern was unfounded. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Canadian navy commenced Operation Apollo in the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf, which resulted in the highest operational tempo in its recent history. As Gimblett later wrote, ‘the experience of operation Apollo has been to validate the strategy described in Leadmark’.

Nonetheless, some within the navy still felt the need to demonstrate that the navy was responding proactively to the events of September 11, 2001. The result was the development of what was described as ‘an additional chapter’ to Leadmark.

Securing Canada’s Ocean Frontiers: Charting the Course from Leadmark (SCOF) was released in May 2005.

Figure 2: The Booth Model – Canadian Navy Version

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Securing Canada’s Ocean Frontiers: Charting the Course from Leadmark (SCOF) was released in May 2005.

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102 Shadwick, ‘The Leadmark Chronicles’, p. 75.
103 Information obtained during an interview conducted by the author on 1 June 2007 with a senior Canadian navy officer (records on file with author).
104 Source for Figure 2: [No Author], Leadmark, p. 34.
106 Information obtained during an interview conducted by the author on 1 June 2007 with a senior Canadian navy officer (records on file with author).
108 This publication is frequently informally referred to within the Canadian navy as ‘son of Leadmark’. [No Author], Securing Canada’s Ocean Frontiers: Charting the Course from Leadmark, Ottawa: Directorate of Maritime Strategy, 2005.
As SCOF was released shortly after the publication of a report on defence policy that constituted part of the Martin Government’s 2005 *International Policy Statement* (IPS),\(^{109}\) the opportunity was taken to incorporate into SCOF a brief discussion of the national strategy the IPS established.\(^{110}\) While this gave SCOF some additional depth, overall it remained little more than a validation of *Leadmark*. In the introduction, it noted that ‘[j]ust as the Canadian experience of Operation Apollo served to validate many of *Leadmark*’s strategic tenets, the Global War on Terrorism also confirmed many of its predictions’.\(^{111}\)

Although most of SCOF was dedicated to an elaboration of the argument that *Leadmark* continued to be relevant, there was some limited ‘new’ discussion about ‘emerging naval missions’.\(^{112}\) Although Grove’s typology for navies was not mentioned, SCOF contained an updated derivative of the Booth model,\(^{113}\) and it was noted that ‘the prevailing [pre-September 11, 2001 terrorist attack] strategic context skewed the construct towards the more purely military roles and functions. The future security environment…demands a restoration of balance to the triangle’.\(^{114}\) Given that the end of the Cold War and subsequent operations during the 1990s had already shifted the Canadian navy’s focus away from the military role and towards a more even balance of tasks, this assertion seems strange. It was most likely made, therefore, to provide an additional justification for the planned purchase of sealift and multi-purpose ships, which had been outlined in the IPS but which had not yet been funded at the time of SCOF’s release.\(^{115}\)

Like *The Naval Vision* and *Adjusting Course*, the overall impact of SCOF has been questionable. As Gimblett observed, ‘the doc [SCOF]…has never really developed traction. Others on the naval staff tell me they keep returning to LM [*Leadmark*] for any substantiation required in development of other staff work, or in the academic community to explain some naval concept’.\(^{116}\) Because SCOF was written as a supplement to *Leadmark*, rather than as an update or replacement, at the time of writing of this paper *Leadmark* continues to maintain its primacy as the Canadian navy’s keystone doctrine manual.


\(^{111}\) [No Author], *Securing Canada’s Ocean Frontiers*, p. 4.

\(^{112}\) [No Author], *Securing Canada’s Ocean Frontiers*, pp. 19-29.

\(^{113}\) The derivative of Booth’s model included in SCOF was labelled ‘Canadian naval roles and functions for the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century’. [No Author], *Securing Canada’s Ocean Frontiers*, p. 18.

\(^{114}\) [No Author], *Securing Canada’s Ocean Frontiers*, p. 18.

\(^{115}\) Shortly after taking office in January 2006, the Harper Government approved C$2.1 billion for the purchase of three ships, although this purchase was subsequently cancelled as this funding was not sufficient. The Canadian navy has instead investigated the possibility of purchasing of two new fuel-tankers and a transport ship. Glenn A. Crowther, ‘Editorial: Canadian Defence Policy – A Breath of Fresh Air’, *Strategic Studies Institute Newsletter*, July 2006, pp. 1-2; David Pugliese, ‘Navy Looks into Buying Fuel Tankers; Earlier Plans for Multi-Role Vessels Ran Aground’, *National Post*, 28 August 2008, p. A6.

\(^{116}\) Email correspondence with Lieutenant Commander (Ret) Richard Gimblett CD PhD, 4 July 2007.
Keystone Doctrine Development in the Royal Australian Navy

The RAN navy released its own keystone doctrine manual, *RAN Doctrine 1: Australian Maritime Doctrine*, in October 2000. The late release to this manual (in comparison to the Canadian navy’s 1994 release of its first keystone doctrine manual) was due to a combination of factors, both internal and external to the RAN. Internally, members of the RAN Maritime Studies Program (MSP) were interested in writing a keystone doctrine manual as early as 1993; however, they failed to generate support for the idea for several reasons. These varied over time and included objections from senior officers on the grounds that doctrine would be ‘too prescriptive’, and a frequent turnover of MSP members, especially the Director General. It was only during the last few years of the 1990s that this situation began to change.117

Furthermore, attempts by members of the MSP to gain support for the production of a keystone doctrine manual were also likely to have been indirectly influenced by external events, which merit discussion at this juncture. Following the release of Australia’s 1987 Defence White Paper, the RAN had maintained a position of priority in Australian strategic policy for most of the 1990s. The 1987 Defence White Paper, which had accorded priority to the destruction of enemy forces in the ‘sea and air gap’ to Australia’s north, had given ‘high priority to maritime (naval and air) forces capable of preventing an adversary from substantial operations in that area’.118 Despite the prevailing environment being characterised by funding constraints, the fleet was to be expanded from twelve to ‘sixteen or seventeen’ major surface ships and the purchase of six submarines was also approved. Yet the 1987 Defence White Paper did not give specific details about the nature or origin of any potential future threat to Australia. As a result, the RAN was compelled to prepare for several contingencies. A key concern from the mid-1970s to the late-1980s was increasing Soviet naval activity in both the Pacific and Indian oceans.119 Beginning in the mid-1980s India expanded and modernised its navy, an endeavour that was accompanied by an attempt to increase its profile in the Indian Ocean. For some within the RAN this presented a significant additional security challenge, although fears eventually dissipated.120 In addition to these ‘traditional’ naval threats, the RAN participated in several international exercises that focused on warfighting scenarios. Most prominently these included exercises held under the auspices of the Five Power Defence Agreement (FPDA) and Exercise Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC), a major multinational naval exercise hosted biennially by the US Navy.121 The overall result of these exercises, combined with the need to address potential inter-state security threats and implement the naval role prescribed by Australian national strategy, was a major focus within the RAN on the military role of navies.

117 Information obtained via email correspondence received on 21 May 2008 from staff of the Sea Power Centre – Australia (records on file with author).
The 1990s brought about a gradual balancing of the RAN’s planning focus, beginning after the 1991 Gulf War. As Frame noted, ‘[a]s the RAN would be contributing to the enforcement of trade sanctions against Iraq for the next decade, the 1990s saw a shift in focus from war-fighting to a range of “peace operations”’. The changing training emphasis was accompanied by growing budgetary constraints, which further curtailed the RAN’s ability to train for its traditional warfighting role, since less funding was available to conduct exercises. This is not the say that the RAN ceased to prepare for warfighting altogether. Rather, during the early-1990s the RAN’s focus shifted towards a more balanced mix of training for the military, diplomatic and policing roles identified by Booth.

Contrary to the Canadian navy, the RAN did not suffer from a lack of strategic guidance during the early-to-mid-1990s. If anything, the update to Australia’s national strategy espoused within a Force Structure Review, published in 1991, was useful to the RAN as it established that the Australian Defence Force (ADF) may have been required to provide military assistance to countries in the South Pacific if required. This had the effect of clarifying the range of tasks the RAN may have potentially been called upon to perform, enabling it to train accordingly. Furthermore, defence of the sea and air gap to Australia’s north remained the primary focus of Australian national strategy under the Hawke and Keating Governments, ensuring that the RAN maintained a position of prominence within strategic policy.

By the late 1990s, however, the government’s funding priorities had begun to shift away from the RAN, a shift that greatly accelerated following the ADF’s deployment to East Timor in 1999. Over the next few years, the RAN found itself rapidly de-prioritised and government publications such as From Phantom to Force: Towards a More Efficient and Effective Army did much to swing the funding pendulum away from the RAN. The changing situation (which further shifted following the Howard Government’s initiation of a Defence Review in June 2000) led many within the RAN to feel increasing pressure to justify the

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122 Frame, No Pleasure Cruise, p. 281.
125 The Hawke Government was in office from 1983 to 1991; the Keating Government from 1991 to 1996.
organisation’s activities to the Australian public. As a result, receptiveness to the production of a keystone doctrine manual rapidly grew within the RAN, and many of the objections and barriers faced by members of the MSP during the 1990s seem to have disappeared.

Related to these changes in attitude were changes to key appointments, including a new Director General of the MSP, (then) Captain James Goldrick (appointed in January 1999) and a new Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral Shackleton (appointed July 1999). Although Shackleton’s predecessor, Vice Admiral Chalmers, had initiated the production of a keystone doctrine manual in early 1999, Shackleton proved to be highly supportive. The primary author, however, was Captain Goldrick. Due to an emergency posting back to sea, little of the actual writing was undertaken until early 2000, although the document was produced fairly quickly after this. Once Captain Goldrick had completed a draft, it was widely circulated for comment, including to overseas experts. Following a partial re-drafting to incorporate the feedback Captain Goldrick had received, the doctrine was then approved by Vice Admiral Shackleton prior to its release in October 2000.

Interestingly, RAN Doctrine 1 contained a short ‘note on sources’ that had been referred to during its development. As had been the case with Leadmark, the content of RAN Doctrine 1 was influenced by RN doctrine. Furthermore, RAN Doctrine 1 drew on the RNZN’s 1997 publication Maritime Doctrine for the Royal New Zealand Navy, which it credited as ‘an excellent book, more apt for New Zealand’s situation and less derivative than it may have appeared to many’. The works of several maritime strategic theorist were also consulted during the writing of RAN Doctrine 1, as was US Navy doctrine, although the latter’s influence was ‘less direct’.

The content of RAN Doctrine 1 was well developed. Divided into twelve chapters, it sought to explain ‘how the Royal Australian Navy thinks about, prepares for and operates in peace and conflict’. This it did quite well, examining the concept of ‘doctrine’ itself, Australia’s maritime environment, the nature of armed conflict and ongoing themes in Australian strategic policy. (Cleverly, it focused on trends over time and avoided discussing specific strategic policy documents, something which has resulted in its ongoing relevance over a

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128 In the development of its doctrine, the RAN’s key goals were to identify how it was different to other navies and to make the wider community more aware of what it actually did. Information obtained during an interview conducted by the author on 23 August 2007 with staff of the Sea Power Centre – Australia (records on file with author).


130 Information obtained via email correspondence received on 29 April 2008 from a senior RAN officer (records on file with author).

131 SPC-A, RAN Doctrine 1, pp. 129-130.

132 By the time RAN Doctrine 1 was published, the RN’s keystone doctrine manual, BR 1806, was up to its second edition. Furthermore, RAN Doctrine 1 noted the influence of the ‘old’ version of BR 1806, editions of which had been released in 1948, 1958 and 1969. SPC-A, RAN Doctrine 1, p. 129. See also: By Command of the Defence Council, BR 1806: British Maritime Doctrine (2nd ed.), London: The Stationary Office, 1999.

133 SPC-A, RAN Doctrine 1, p. 129.

longer timeframe than most other naval doctrine studied). It then provided a detailed discussion of maritime strategic and operational concepts, including sea control, sea denial and command of the sea. In this discussion it drew heavily on many prominent maritime strategic theorists. Although Grove’s typology for navies was not discussed, an overview of maritime operations drew heavily on the Booth model and Grove’s subsequent refinements, and RAN Doctrine 1 itself substantially developed its own derivative of the model (see Figure 3).

In its latter chapters, RAN Doctrine 1 offered a justification for the RAN’s fleet structure, explaining the importance of maritime logistics, and providing a brief overview of the role of the RAN’s many types of ships. This discussion appears to have been dually motivated by the desire to explain the RAN’s activities to the public and by the desire to justify its funding requirements to government, although this latter motivation is not directly mentioned anywhere in the doctrine; rather, it is the impression one gets from reading the text. In its final chapter, RAN Doctrine 1 briefly examined the future requirements of Australian maritime forces, although discussion was limited to general trends. As with its discussion of themes in Australian strategic policy, this vagary helped maintain the document’s relevance over a longer timeframe.

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135 SPC-A, RAN Doctrine 1, chap. 1-4.
137 Source for Figure 3: SPC-A, RAN Doctrine 1, p. 57.
138 SPC-A, RAN Doctrine 1, chap. 9-10.
139 SPC-A, RAN Doctrine 1, chap. 12.
The ongoing applicability of *RAN Doctrine 1* over a longer timeframe than most other naval doctrine was convenient for the RAN, which has not yet (at the time of writing of this paper) released an updated edition. This was largely due to the RAN’s high operational tempo, and plans to revise *RAN Doctrine 1* as early as 2007 fell through because the RAN was unable to allocate an officer to its doctrine writing position. This problem was eventually rectified, however, and at the time of writing of this paper an updated edition is currently under production and due for release in early 2010.140

Despite the delay in the production of an updated edition of *RAN Doctrine 1*, the RAN’s doctrinal development did not come to a total halt following the publication of the first edition. Overall, *RAN Doctrine 1* was very well received both within the Australian naval community and by the public, and in March 2005 a supplemental publication, *RAN Doctrine 2: The Navy Contribution to Australian Maritime Operations*, was released.141

*RAN Doctrine 2* was intentionally developed as a supplement to expand on discussion in the latter part of *RAN Doctrine 1*, especially its ninth and tenth chapters. As Vice Admiral Ritchie noted in the foreword to *RAN Doctrine 2*: ‘[w]here *Australian Maritime Doctrine* focuses on the strategic rationale for and components of maritime operations, the purpose of this volume is to examine in greater detail the operational capabilities, and indeed limitations, of our Navy’.142 This intent was made even clearer in the introduction, which stated: ‘*[RAN Doctrine 2]* could be considered to address the general questions: *What is each principal element of the RAN, and how does each operate?*’ [emphases in original].143

As a member of the Sea Power Centre – Australia’s staff later explained, the RAN frequently receives enquiries from the media and public along the lines of ‘what do your submarines actually do?’ *RAN Doctrine 2* was written as a public reference the RAN could refer to when answering such questions, and it is intended for both Navy internal use as doctrine and also to provide a platform for public relations and international engagement. As such it is less ‘doctrinal’ per se that the conceptually-focused *RAN Doctrine 1*. Unlike *RAN Doctrine 1*, each chapter of *RAN Doctrine 2* was written by subject matter specialists from within the relevant area of the RAN, under the direction of Captain Richard McMillan (then Director of the Sea Power Centre – Australia), who was also the lead writer. Because of this, the publication of *RAN Doctrine 2* occurred following an extensive review process to ensure consistency between chapters.144

The content of *RAN Doctrine 2* is divided into chapters that each discuss a particular capability (such as command and control or personnel) or the role of a particular type of naval platform (such as patrol boats, submarines, surface combatants and naval aviation). Of note, discussion in the introduction briefly addressed Australian strategic policy developments since 2000, although it is clear from this discussion that *RAN Doctrine 2* was influenced more

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140 Information obtained during an interview conducted by the author on 23 August 2007 with staff of the Sea Power Centre – Australia (records on file with author), supplemented by a telephone conversation on 6 July 2009 between the author and Sea Power Centre – Australia staff.


144 Information obtained during an interview conducted by the author on 23 August 2007 with staff of the Sea Power Centre – Australia (records on file with author).
by existing maritime strategic theory than by developments in Australian national strategy. As such, a brief overview of Australia’s 2000 Defence White Paper was quickly passed over, with discussion moving on to summarise the roles of navies as established by the Booth model, before tying these in with recently developed operational concepts such as network-centric warfare and effects-based operations.\textsuperscript{145}

Overall, \textit{RAN Doctrine 2} succinctly answered the questions it posed for itself, and at the time of writing of this paper it continues to provide the RAN with a useful public relations tool. Because of this focus, however, its utility as a military-strategic or operational level doctrine manual is severely limited, and \textit{RAN Doctrine 1} continues to constitute the RAN’s keystone doctrine manual.

**Keystone Doctrine Development in the Royal New Zealand Navy**

One month prior to the Canadian navy’s April 1997 publication of \textit{Adjusting Course}, the RNZN had by coincidence published its own keystone doctrine manual, \textit{Maritime Doctrine for the Royal New Zealand Navy}.\textsuperscript{146} Considerably longer and more philosophical than either of the Canadian navy’s keystone doctrine manuals that were published during the 1990s, \textit{Maritime Doctrine} provided a comprehensive examination of the philosophies underlying sea power and its many uses. Its production, however, was motivated by similar factors to the Canadian manuals, particularly \textit{The Naval Vision}. Similarly to the keystone doctrine manuals produced by both of the other navies studied, \textit{Maritime Doctrine} was not produced in a vacuum; hence, a brief overview of the broader political and strategic circumstances that surrounded its production is warranted.

During the Cold War the RNZN, despite being included in Grove’s typology for navies as a rank five navy, nonetheless maintained a focus on its military role. Although resource constraints had resulted in a debate developing during the 1960s and 1970s over whether New Zealand needed a ‘blue water’ navy capable of combat operations, this debate was resolved, at least for the coming decade, by a 1978 Defence Review. By determining that ‘the maritime security of New Zealand demanded that the RNZN continue to be a combat force, albeit one impaired by the reduction in the number of its major warships to three only’ (the RNZN had previously deployed six frigates), the Review established the ongoing prominence of warfighting as the primary task of the RNZN.\textsuperscript{147} Like the RAN, during the 1970s and 1980s the RNZN participated in several multinational exercises with a warfighting focus, most notably as part of New Zealand’s FPDA commitments.\textsuperscript{148}

In New Zealand, the ‘ANZUS Crisis’ caused much strategic policy uncertainty during the late 1980s and early 1990s.\textsuperscript{149} The Crisis began in early 1985 when the newly-elected Lange Government, in accordance with its anti-nuclear policy, refused a US request that a US Navy

\textsuperscript{145} SPC-A, \textit{RAN Doctrine 2}, pp. 6-11.

\textsuperscript{146} [No Author], \textit{Maritime Doctrine for the Royal New Zealand Navy}, Wellington: Royal New Zealand Navy, March 1997.


\textsuperscript{148} McGibbon (Ed.), \textit{The Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History}, p. 162.

\textsuperscript{149} The Australia-New Zealand-United States (ANZUS) security co-operation treaty was signed in 1951. [No Author], \textit{The ANZUS Treaty: Security Treaty Between Australia, New Zealand and the United States}, signed in San Francisco, 1 September 1951.
warship capable of carrying nuclear weapons be granted permission to dock in a New Zealand port. In summary, the subsequent Crisis involved three years of diplomacy and negotiations on the part of Australia, New Zealand and the US in an ultimately futile attempt to maintain the ANZUS Treaty. By the late 1980s, the US had effectively severed its ANZUS connections with New Zealand, opting instead for the continuation of a bilateral defence relationship with Australia.

For the RNZN, the main implication of the ANZUS Crisis was its official barring from participation in multinational exercises that also involved the US Navy. Despite this, however, the RNZN continued to conduct most of its other activities in the region unabated. Furthermore, New Zealand’s 1987 Defence White Paper, the culmination of a lengthy review of New Zealand’s national strategy that had commenced following the onset of the ANZUS Crisis, highlighted several areas in which the RNZN would be required to play a leading role. These included the possibility of sea raids against New Zealand, interference with trade routes, harassment of merchant shipping and infringements of New Zealand’s exclusive economic zone. The subsequent 1991 Defence White Paper was less specific, although it did list several defence priorities which would require the use of naval forces. Paradoxically, through a period of national strategic uncertainty within New Zealand, strategic policy provided clear guidance to the RNZN about its actual and potential roles.

Hence, the aspect of the upheaval that adversely affected the RNZN was not related to a lack of strategic policy guidance. Instead, it was brought about by substantial budget cuts that were made during the early 1990s. Establishing naval tasks within Defence White Papers was one thing. Providing the fleet structure and covering the operating costs to enable the RNZN to achieve these tasks was another. Between 1990 and 1994, when New Zealand’s strategic policy had recently generated a need for the RNZN to shift its training focus away from its military role and towards a more balanced mix of the roles identified by Booth, the New Zealand defence budget was slashed by 23 percent. Between 1991 and 1996, the only new acquisition authorised was a much-needed sealift ship, HMNZS Charles Upham. Even this purchase was not without controversy, and the ship was described by one commentator as ‘a passable imitation between a lemon and a white elephant’. As a result of the fiscal constraints, RNZN capabilities substantially deteriorated during the early and mid-1990s and

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the lack of acquisitions led to it operating an increasingly obsolescent fleet. It was on the heels of this period that work commenced on the production of *Maritime Doctrine*.

*Maritime Doctrine* is an example of the influence that senior officers can have on doctrinal development. In this case it was Rear Admiral Jack Welch, then Chief of Naval Staff, who was most directly responsible for the development of *Maritime Doctrine*. Apparently, the impetus underlying his direction that the RNZN produce a keystone doctrine manual began with his attendance at a conference in Wellington in December 1995. The conference, titled ‘New Zealand’s Maritime Environment and Security’, was significant because it was effectively the first at which interested parties from shipping, trade, economics, law, fishing, minerals, science, environment, tangata whenua [indigenous New Zealanders], government and defence came together under one roof, to share perceptions about New Zealand’s maritime circumstances and security.

Rear Admiral Welch presented a paper at the conference, which addressed the role of the RNZN in the defence of New Zealand and its interests. His paper also discussed the roles of navies and gave an overview of several of the concepts discussed above, including sea control and sea denial, which would later be discussed in greater detail in *Maritime Doctrine*. Importantly, because of the conference Welch identified what he considered to be a deficiency within the RNZN and the community more broadly – debate about the role of the RNZN. His introduction to *Maritime Doctrine* indicates his intent to use doctrine as a means of rectifying this deficiency:

> [D]espite such a fundamental interest in the sea, maritime issues are the subject of so little debate in this country. We have no maritime doctrine, and the concepts of sea power are unknown to all but a few…[Maritime Doctrine] is intended to inform and to generate debate.

Beyond its intention of generating public debate, the content of Maritime Doctrine indicates that parts of it were written in response to strategic policy (and the period of severe fiscal restraint that was still drawing to a close at the time it was published).

In terms of its content, *Maritime Doctrine* was divided into nine chapters (including a conclusion). Unique amongst the naval doctrine studied, *Maritime Doctrine* discussed the levels and principles of warfare in detail, two areas traditionally more akin to army doctrine than to naval doctrine. Beyond this, the philosophical and conceptual discussion it contained was more typical – a chapter was dedicated to discussing the maritime environment, another to the elements and characteristics of sea power, and a third to ‘sea

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157 Information obtained during an interview conducted by the author on 26 April 2007 with staff of the Centre for Strategic Studies – New Zealand (records on file with author).


160 Information obtained during an interview conducted by the author on 26 April 2007 with staff of the Centre for Strategic Studies – New Zealand (records on file with author).

161 Jack Welch, ‘Introduction’ in: [No Author], *Maritime Doctrine for the RNZN*, p. 4. Note that the first part of this introduction is reproduced verbatim from the paper Admiral Welch presented in Wellington in 1995.

162 [No Author], *Maritime Doctrine for the RNZN*, pp. 12-13, 18-23.
power strategies’, including sea control, sea denial, maritime power projection and maritime presence and support. Discussion of these concepts drew on several prominent maritime strategic thinkers, including Corbett, Mahan, Gorshkov and Till. The more recent works of Booth and Grove were notably absent from discussion, although the naval roles Booth established were elaborated in some detail. Keystone doctrine produced by the RN was also influential and Maritime Doctrine cited the 1995 edition of BR 1806 several times.

In chapters seven and eight, discussion was linked to New Zealand’s strategic policy and force structure, in particular to the 1991 Defence White Paper. The White Paper, which had established that New Zealand required only a ‘credible minimum’ defence force, had failed to define exactly what was meant by the term. As a result, Maritime Doctrine discussed the concept in detail in relation to naval forces, and despite its explicit support for the concept, Maritime Doctrine can be interpreted as an appeal for funding for what the RNZN considered to be ‘credible minimum’ force structure. Given the tight fiscal circumstances in which Maritime Doctrine was written, this appeal is understandable. In conclusion, the RNZN’s appeal for funding was reinforced, Maritime Doctrine arguing that ‘naval power must be a significant component of the nation’s overall military posture’.

Overall, Maritime Doctrine presented a detailed account of the RNZN’s organisational strategy and raison d’être at the time of its publication. Following its release, however, it was not superseded, updated or supplemented. Consequently, at the time of writing of this paper it remains the only keystone doctrine manual produced by the RNZN. The lack of a revised edition was most likely due to the departure of Rear Admiral Welch from the position of Chief of Naval Staff – following his retirement the impetus underlying the production of keystone doctrine in the RNZN seems to have simply disappeared. This is a pity because Maritime Doctrine was a well-developed document. Indeed, several parts of it remain relevant and if appropriately updated to reflect the much-changed national strategic environment in New Zealand, a revised edition would no doubt provide a useful treatise on New Zealand’s current maritime security environment and on the current strategic direction of the RNZN.

Conclusion: The Significance of Keystone Naval Doctrine Development

Throughout its examination of keystone doctrine development in the Canadian navy, RAN and RNZN, this paper has focused on three areas: the factors that were influential during the production of each keystone doctrine manual; the intended and actual effects each manual had following its release; and the significance of the content of each manual. In each of these three areas it is possible to draw several overarching themes, which together reveal much about the nature, role and significance of keystone doctrine within the navies studied.

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163 [No Author], Maritime Doctrine for the RNZN, chap. 3-5.
164 [No Author], Maritime Doctrine for the RNZN, chap. 6.
165 Perhaps the best evidence of the influence BR 1806 had on the development of Maritime Doctrine was that the layout of the chapters in Maritime Doctrine mimicked the layout of the chapters in the 1995 edition of BR 1806.
166 MOD, The Defence of New Zealand 1991, p. 89.
167 [No Author], Maritime Doctrine for the RNZN, chap. 7-8.
168 [No Author], Maritime Doctrine for the RNZN, p. 100.
169 Information obtained during an interview conducted by the author on 26 April 2007 with staff of the Centre for Strategic Studies – New Zealand (records on file with author).
Regarding the factors that were influential during the production of each keystone doctrine manual, four key influences have remained prominent in all three navies studied. These four influences were the role of individual officers, sometimes in senior positions but more often as members of doctrine writing teams or as individual authors; the influence of keystone doctrine manuals produced by allied navies, particularly the RN; the operational experiences of the navies studied and their allies; and the role of navies within the prevailing national strategy.

The relative influence of these four factors did, however, vary between navies as well as between individual keystone doctrine manuals. These variances occurred due to the broader political environment in which each manual was produced, with factors such as acquisition programs (or lack thereof), changes in the naval roles prioritised within different strategic policy documents, public relations concerns and the personalities and agendas of key individual officers all contributing to the complex and fluid nature of this environment. Despite variations in the relative influence of each of these four factors, all four were nonetheless influential to a greater or lesser extent in the development of all of the keystone doctrine manuals studied, with the exception of *The Naval Vision*, which was not influenced by keystone doctrine manuals produced by allied navies due to its relatively early release date.

The intended and actual effects of their keystone doctrine manuals present another similarity between the navies studied. Specifically, each navy used keystone doctrine as a mechanism for explaining how it contributed to achieving its country’s national military strategy. To this end, the content of keystone doctrine manuals established ‘what is essentially a conceptual framework distilling wisdom from the corpus of work on maritime strategic theory’, in order to explain what navies had to offer to strategic policymakers and governments at a foundational level. The reason the navies studied used their keystone doctrine for this purpose was most likely cultural, although this in itself has several important dimensions.

The first of these was that the navies studied all suffered due to public ignorance about what they did and why. As Haydon observed: ‘[b]ecause the majority of Canadians do not understand or even recognise the maritime dimensions of their country, naval programs seldom enjoy public or political support’. Although this was written about Canada, a similar assertion could be made about Australia and New Zealand. In an attempt to rectify this situation, one of the intended effects of keystone naval doctrine was the generation of public awareness about what navies did and why they did it.

The second important dimension of naval culture in the three navies studied was caused by high relative importance of platforms such as warships, submarines and helicopters. To a much greater extent than army operations, and at least on par with air force operations, naval operations could be said to be platform-driven. The impact this platform-driven culture had on doctrine development in the navies studied was that it led to an emphasis within doctrine on explaining the role and importance of fighting platforms.

Closely linked to this was the most important intended role of keystone naval doctrine – the generation of political and strategic policy support for the acquisition and maintenance of naval platforms. In some cases this intended effect was quite obvious, with the direct link

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171 Haydon, “‘Adjusting Course’…A Strategic Orphan?”, p. 1.
between the production of *Adjusting Course* and the Canadian navy’s campaign to bring about the *Upholder* Class submarine purchase being the most prominent example. In most cases, however, this intent manifested itself more subtly. In addition to generating public awareness about how navies contributed to achieving strategic policy goals, doctrine was also intended to generate awareness among strategic policymakers, who would ultimately decide on acquisitions and funding for the maintenance of existing platforms.

Aside from the factors already discussed an important enabler of this intent underlying keystone naval doctrine development was the fairly consistent nature of the naval operations undertaken by the three navies studied. As outlined in the second section of this paper, naval operations have always fit into the three categories identified by Booth – diplomatic, policing and military.\(^{172}\) This has remained consistent even though the training emphasis has shifted over time. Furthermore, every time a ship ‘goes to sea’, even if only for training purposes, the situation is nonetheless operational, if only because of the unpredictable and potentially dangerous nature of the oceans in which navies operate. Finally, naval operations are inherently flexible, and on a single voyage a warship is capable of undertaking several missions, each of which may fall under the auspices of any of the different naval roles identified by Booth. The result of this combination of factors is that keystone naval doctrine can afford to focus primarily on shaping national strategic rather than operational level events.

As briefly mentioned above, the content of keystone naval doctrine manuals established ‘what is essentially a conceptual framework distilling wisdom from the corpus of work on maritime strategic theory’.\(^{173}\) For the navies studied, the incorporation of the academic discourse into keystone doctrine has provided a convenient means of enabling doctrine to fulfil its intended role of explaining what navies have to offer strategic policy-makers and governments. Excellent examples of this occurrence are the discussion of Grove’s typology for navies in Canadian navy keystone doctrine and the incorporation of derivatives of the Booth model into both Canadian navy and RAN keystone doctrine. Discussion of other academic concepts, including command of the sea, sea control, sea denial and maritime power projection, was also prominently featured within the doctrine of all three navies.

Beyond the influence of existing academic works about naval strategic theory, individual officers in key positions, as well as the content of keystone doctrine manuals produced by allied navies, both played a key role in shaping the content of naval doctrine. In the case of individual officers, their work as members of doctrine writing teams directly influenced the content of doctrine manuals, although the support of senior individual officers, such as the presiding Chief of Navy/Chief of Naval Staff, was also fundamental to the successful initiation, production and distribution of keystone doctrine.

The influence of keystone doctrine manuals produced by allied navies was the result of historic factors (the culture of all three navies studied is derived from that of the RN) as well as more pragmatic and contemporary concerns. These concerns are generally related to the nature of naval operations, which necessitate that allied navies work together frequently and at all levels of conflict. As a result of this requirement, allied naval operations often blend into one (as in the Persian Gulf, where RAN and Canadian navy ships frequently support US Navy-led fleets). Yet the influence of keystone doctrine manuals produced by allied navies

\(^{172}\) Grove’s typology for navies is, in turn, a useful mechanism for determining the *scale* on which each of the navies studied could reasonably be expected to perform operations within each of these categories.

has, to date, remained ad hoc and informal. Although each of the navies studied participated in formalised interoperability forums, the most prominent of which was the Australia-Canada-New Zealand-United Kingdom-United States maritime interoperability organisation (commonly known as AUSCANZUKUS), these forums focused on command, control, communication and computer technology (C4) interoperability, rather than on naval keystone doctrine development.\textsuperscript{174}

On the whole, this paper has shown that keystone naval doctrine provided an important tool that the Canadian navy, RAN and RNZN used to pragmatically promote their interests. It did this by offering both policy makers and the general public an explanation of the importance of the role navies played in fulfilling strategic policy goals. Yet in the process of achieving this goal, keystone naval doctrine has come to play an even more important role, one in which it defines and explains how the application of naval power fits within the framework of both national strategy and maritime strategic theory.