Keystone Doctrine Development in Five Commonwealth Navies: A Comparative Perspective

by Aaron P Jackson
KEYSTONE DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT IN FIVE COMMONWEALTH NAVIES: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
KEYSTONE DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT IN FIVE COMMONWEALTH NAVIES: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

by Aaron P Jackson
The Sea Power Centre - Australia was established to undertake activities to promote the study, discussion and awareness of maritime issues and strategy within the Royal Australian Navy, the Department and Defence and civil communities at large. Its mission is:

- to promote understanding of sea power and its application to the security of Australia’s national interests
- to manage the development of RAN doctrine and facilitate its incorporation into ADF joint doctrine
- to contribute to regional engagement
- contribute to the development of maritime strategic concepts and strategic and operational level doctrine, and facilitate informed forces structure decisions
- to preserve, develop, and promote Australian naval history.

A listing of Centre publications may be found at the back of this volume.

Comments on this volume or any enquiry related to the activities of the Centre should be directed to:

Director

Sea Power Centre - Australia
Department of Defence
PO Box 7942
Canberra BC ACT 2610
AUSTRALIA

Email: seapower.centre@defence.gov.au
Website: www.navy.gov.au/spc
Dr Aaron P Jackson is a Doctrine Desk Officer at the Australian Defence Force Joint Warfare Doctrine and Training Centre. In this appointment he contributes to the development of Australian Defence Force joint doctrine in the executive (J0), operations (J3), planning (J5) and training (J7) series. He is also an active member of the Australian Army Reserve and a graduate of the Royal Military College of Australia. An infantry officer, he is currently posted to 2nd/17th Battalion, The Royal New South Wales Regiment.

In 2010 Aaron was appointed as Honorary Visiting Scholar in the Department of International Relations at Flinders University, South Australia. He holds a PhD in International Studies and articles he has written have previously been published in Australia, Canada and New Zealand. This monograph is partly based on the fifth chapter of his PhD dissertation.
# Contents

About the Author  v  
Abbreviations  ix  

**Introduction**  
1. Keystone Doctrine Defined  1  
2. The Conceptual Foundations of Keystone Naval Doctrine  9  
3. The Canadian Navy  15  
4. The Indian Navy  31  
5. The Royal Australian Navy  45  
6. The Royal New Zealand Navy  55  
7. The South African Navy  61  
8. Conclusion  67  

Index  73  
Sea Power Centre - Australia Publications  79
## Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADF</td>
<td>Australian Defence Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANZUS</td>
<td>Australia-New Zealand-United States (usually used in reference to the security co-operation treaty signed by these three countries in 1951)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASW</td>
<td>Anti-Submarine Warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUSCANNZUKUS</td>
<td>Australia-Canada-New Zealand-United Kingdom-United States maritime command, control, communications and computer interoperability organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CF</td>
<td>Canadian Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEZ</td>
<td>Exclusive Economic Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMNZS</td>
<td>Her Majesty’s New Zealand Ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IN</td>
<td>Indian Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOR</td>
<td>Indian Ocean Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPS</td>
<td><em>International Policy Statement</em> (Canada)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSP</td>
<td>Maritime Studies Program (Australia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAN</td>
<td>Royal Australian Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCN</td>
<td>Royal Canadian Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIMPAC</td>
<td>Exercise RIM OF THE PACIFIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIN</td>
<td>Royal Indian Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMA</td>
<td>Revolution in Military Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RN</td>
<td>Royal Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RNZN</td>
<td>Royal New Zealand Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSA</td>
<td>Republic of South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAN</td>
<td>South African Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SANDF</td>
<td>South African National Defence Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPC-A</td>
<td>Sea Power Centre – Australia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Over the course of their histories, most Commonwealth navies have acquired reputations for their aversion to written doctrine. Yet these reputations have been only partly earned, as these navies have, since their inaugurations, maintained a plethora of written doctrine designed to guide their actions at the tactical level. Commonwealth navies have traditionally referred to their tactical level doctrine as ‘procedural manuals’, ‘fighting instructions’ or ‘fleet orders’ rather than ‘doctrine’, and it is this practise that has tended to create the erroneous perception (particularly amongst army officers) that navies have not historically had any doctrine at all.¹

Above the tactical level, however, it is true that Commonwealth navies have traditionally been doctrine-adverse. Michael Codner, for example, noted that during the early 1990s Royal Navy (RN) commanders worried that higher level doctrine would be ‘inherently prescriptive’ and that its publication would limit commanders’ freedom of action.² In several Commonwealth navies, this perception of doctrine designed to provide guidance above the tactical level has recently, if gradually, shifted. The result of this attitudinal shift has been the production by several Commonwealth navies of doctrine manuals designed to provide guidance at the operational and, even more significantly, at the military-strategic level.³

This paper examines the history and significance of the foremost military-strategic level doctrine manuals – often referred to as keystone doctrine manuals – produced by five Commonwealth navies. These navies are the Canadian navy, the Indian Navy, the Royal Australian Navy, the Royal New Zealand Navy and the South African Navy. The RN does not form part of this study, although its doctrine has significantly influenced each of the five Commonwealth navies discussed.⁴ Prior to undertaking a detailed analysis of keystone doctrine development within each of these five navies, the first of two background chapters discusses precisely what is meant by the term ‘keystone doctrine’. The second background chapter then summarises several key maritime strategic theories, which are worthy of overview because each features prominently in the keystone doctrine manuals produced by the navies studied.

Subsequently to these background chapters, the bulk of this paper is dedicated to the conduct of an analysis of keystone doctrine development within each of the navies studied. Although structured chronologically, discussion of keystone doctrine development within each navy focuses on three areas:

- Factors that were influential during the production of each keystone doctrine manual.
- The intended and actual effects each manual had following its release.
• The significance of the content of each manual.

In conclusion, each of these three focal areas is explicitly examined, in order to determine comparatively the nature, role and significance of the keystone doctrine manuals produced by the navies studied.

Notes


3. These terms are defined in the first section of this paper.

1. Keystone Doctrine Defined

The first problem encountered when studying doctrine development regards actually defining the term doctrine. This problem arises not only because of the sheer volume of publications that have been labelled ‘doctrine’, but also because the term has represented very different things to different people at different times. Originally derived from the Latin word *doctrina*, meaning ‘teaching, body of teachings, or learning’, the term ‘doctrine’ was first used by members of the Catholic Church in reference to the beliefs taught by the Church.¹ Today, the term can be used to refer to any collective set of teachings, including those of armed forces. As Paul Johnston observed, ‘this original concept has been adopted by militaries to describe the body of concepts and precepts which they teach’.²

Beyond this basic definition, there has been a great degree of debate about the precise nature of military doctrine.³ Notwithstanding this debate, however, there has been general agreement about a few key aspects. For example, it is widely understood that:

- ‘Doctrine is what is written down’⁴
- it constitutes ‘an officially approved teaching based on accumulated experience’⁵
- it ‘is usually institutional in focus and internal in nature’.⁶

Beyond this limited agreement about what doctrine is, there has also been much agreement about what doctrine *is not*. First, there has been general agreement that doctrine is not the same as strategic policy, although it has often been observed that there should be a symbiotic relationship between the two.⁷ Second, it is generally agreed that ‘military thought and doctrine are not synonymous’, because ‘the first is personal, the latter institutional’.⁸ Third, it has been contended that because doctrine is officially approved and institutional in nature, it differs from concepts and principles, which are not.⁹

From these generally agreed upon ideas about what military doctrine is and is not, it is possible to distil a basic notion of what exactly constitutes military doctrine. In essence, military doctrine is an officially sanctioned, formalised and written expression of institutionally accepted ideas about what militaries do and how they do it. That doctrine is produced by militaries themselves is one of the most important factors separating it from other bodies of literature, such as strategic policy and military theory.

This definition of military doctrine is similar to that promulgated by most Commonwealth navies, including the five studied. Uniquely amongst these navies, the Canadian navy has not promulgated its own definition of doctrine. Instead, it defers to the definition
given within Canadian Forces joint doctrine. This definition, as well as the definition of doctrine given by the South African Navy, is identical to the NATO definition of doctrine discussed below. The Royal Australian Navy’s definition of doctrine states that ‘military doctrine contains the fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of national objectives’. The Indian Navy offers two definitions of doctrine, first stating that ‘doctrine is a framework of principles, practices and procedures, the understanding of which provides a basis for action’, then observing that ‘doctrine is also defined as the fundamental principles by which military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives’. Finally, the Royal New Zealand Navy defines doctrine as: ‘the fundamental philosophy concerning the employment of force. It is a body of primary concepts about war that guides the application of power in combat.’

The reason for this definitional similarity between the five navies studied is that each has based its definition of doctrine on that promulgated by NATO, which is that doctrine is ‘fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application’. Although this definition has been kept intentionally vague, probably so as to enable different militaries the flexibility to apply it as they deem necessary, it is the definition used throughout this paper due to its general applicability to all of the navies studied.

Due to its vagary, the NATO definition of doctrine can be applied to most written documents militaries produce, so long as they purport to provide guidance by way of discussing ‘fundamental principles’. To clarify the intended function of each doctrine manual, this basic concept of doctrine can be further elaborated upon by way of the division of doctrine into categories based on the ‘level of conflict’ the principles a particular manual contains are designed to guide. Generally, it is accepted that there are three levels of conflict:

- Tactical.
- Operational.
- Strategic.

Brief definitions of each level follow, along with descriptions of the nature of the doctrine designed to provide guidance at each.

**Tactical:** At the tactical level, small-scale military engagements and battles are planned and executed, and military force is applied directly against enemy forces to achieve victory at a particular time and place. At the tactical level, doctrine tends to be the most prescriptive, and procedural manuals, fighting instructions and fleet orders have traditionally been written to provide guidance at this level.

**Operational:** At the operational level, military undertakings such as campaigns (which require more time and space than tactical encounters) are planned and conducted, with
the aim of translating strategic objectives into a series of tactical successes. Hence, operational planning encompasses the provision and sustainment of logistics and administrative support, as well as the manoeuvre of tactical units. Doctrine written to provide guidance at this level of conflict ‘is more about creating a framework within which to prepare, plan and conduct operations … rather than procedures on “how to fight”’.19

**Strategic:** The strategic level of conflict is often divided into two sub-levels, the national (or grand) strategic level and the military-strategic level. At the national strategic level, governments determine overarching defence strategies and policies that have military as well as other aspects. At the military-strategic level, militaries develop institutional strategies to enable them to implement the military aspects of national strategies.20 Doctrine designed to provide guidance at the military-strategic level tends to be more abstract and philosophical in nature than doctrine designed to provide guidance at the other levels of conflict. It establishes fundamental principles to guide the application of military force in pursuit of national strategic objectives.21

Given the hierarchical nature of military organisations, it is unsurprising that they have organised their doctrine into hierarchies, wherein discussion within lower manuals on the hierarchy has to conform to discussion in higher manuals. In most Commonwealth navies, including the five studied, military-strategic level doctrine has been placed at the top of the hierarchy and tactical level doctrine at the bottom. The doctrine manual at the pinnacle of the hierarchy is usually referred to as ‘keystone’ doctrine. As stated within the first edition of *Australian Maritime Doctrine: RAN Doctrine 1*, keystone doctrine ‘stands at the summit of naval doctrinal effort’.22 Furthermore:

> It not only serves to educate and motivate personnel and improve their understanding of the roles and functions of their services, but can be used to inform those within government and the wider community of the ways in which military force can be applied by the nation in exercising its national power.23

Due to the scope and significance of keystone doctrine manuals, they constitute the focus of the analysis within this paper.
Notes

3. The term ‘military doctrine’ as used herein refers collectively to the doctrine produced by navies, armies and air forces, as well as to that produced by armed forces jointly.
14. NATO-Russia Glossary of Contemporary Political and Military Terms, NATO-Russia Joint Editorial Working Group, Brussels, undated but promulgated online on 8 June 2001, <www.nato.int/docu/glossary/eng/15-main.pdf > (20 December 2008), p. 77. In several Commonwealth navies, including the Canadian navy, the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and the Royal Navy, the NATO definition of doctrine has been adapted for use jointly across the armed forces of the country in question, then adopted from joint doctrine for use within the navy in question.
16. The RAN has adopted the terms ‘philosophical’, ‘application’ and ‘procedural’ to describe the levels of its doctrine, although these terms roughly align with the military-strategic, operational and tactical levels of conflict. Royal Australian Navy, Australian Maritime Doctrine (2nd edn), p. 3.
2. The Conceptual Foundations of Keystone Naval Doctrine

When compared to the sheer volume of land-focused strategic theories that have been advanced over the years, maritime strategic theories are relatively sparse. Indeed, the first written theories of modern maritime strategy were not published until the latter part of the nineteenth century and the evolution of maritime strategic theory is largely the story of a small group of prominent theorists. Of these theories, several are worthy of brief discussion because they feature prominently in the keystone doctrines of the Commonwealth navies studied.

Key earlier conceptual developments are ‘command of the sea’, ‘sea control’, ‘sea denial’ and ‘maritime power projection’. The first concept, command of the sea, exists where one state (or a group of allied states) has naval superiority to the extent that an opponent simply cannot use the sea at all. Generally, it is accepted that command of the sea is brought about by the total destruction of the enemy’s naval forces, although as Australian Maritime Doctrine: RAN Doctrine 1 notes, command of the sea is difficult to achieve in the modern environment owing to asymmetric threats and technology such as mines, torpedoes, aircraft, submarines and long-range missiles.

As a result of this situation, sea control, sea denial and maritime power projection are arguably more useful concepts in the contemporary world. The difference between sea control and sea denial is subtle. Sea control is obtained when a state has a monopoly over the use of an area of the sea for a period of time, whereas sea denial is obtained by denying an enemy state use of an area of the sea for a period of time. Maritime power projection refers to the ability of navies to influence events ashore through the application of combat power, either directly (such as by naval gunfire directed against targets ashore) or through the amphibious insertion of land forces.

How each of these concepts fits within the scope of activities undertaken by the navies studied in this paper is perhaps best explained by two more recent theorists. The first of these theorists is Ken Booth, whose discussion of the roles of navies is fundamental in explaining the spectrum of activities undertaken by modern navies, including those studied. His model (see Figure 1) divides naval tasks into three categories centred on the use of the sea:

- Diplomatic.
- Policing.
- Military.
A further breakdown is undertaken within each of the categories with Booth presenting a detailed analysis of the many options navies offer to strategic policy-makers. In their first role, diplomacy, navies are a useful foreign policy tool and the presence of warships can be used to reassure or reinforce allied governments, deter potential aggressors, manipulate the decisions of foreign governments, or simply enhance a state’s prestige.8 In their second role, policing, or what is alternatively referred to by some as ‘constabulary’ operations, navies contribute to the protection of national sovereignty, assist in state-building and peacekeeping missions, and are vital in enforcing state, maritime and international laws.9 In their third role, military, navies provide states with military power in the ‘traditional’ sense, acting as a vital component of national military strength.10

Another recent theorist whose work is of particular utility in explaining how the various maritime strategic theories summarised above fit within the scope of activities undertaken by the navies studied is Eric Grove. In addition to updating Booth’s discussion of the roles of navies, Grove established a comprehensive ‘typology for navies’.11 This typology divided the world’s navies into nine categories by taking into account ‘factors such as the types of forces deployed, the sophistication of their equipment and level of afloat support as well as mere numbers of vessels’.12
The first rank, which Grove termed ‘major global force projection navy – complete’, consists of navies ‘capable of carrying out all the military roles of naval forces on a global scale’. Due to the array of capabilities a navy requires in order to be included in this rank, Grove determined that only the United States Navy warranted inclusion within it. At the other end of his typology, Grove labelled the ninth rank ‘token navies’, asserting that these navies usually consist of ‘a formal organisational structure and a few coastal craft but little else’.

From the perspective of this study, Grove’s typology is useful for two reasons. First, the ranking of a particular navy is indicative of the extent to which it is likely to be able to generate and maintain conditions such as sea control and sea denial. Second, the different ranking of the navies studied allows their overall capabilities to be quickly contrasted to one another. Grove’s assessment was that the Canadian navy, the Indian Navy (IN) and the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) fit within the fourth rank – what he termed ‘medium regional force projection navies’, able to project a significant amount of naval force into an ocean basin adjoining their countries of origin. The Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) and South African Navy (SAN), on the other hand, were assessed as being in the fifth rank – what Grove labelled an ‘adjacent force projection navy’, capable of projecting a limited amount of naval force well away from the shoreline of its country of origin.

It must be noted, however, that ranking navies according to Grove’s model is not as straightforward as it may at first appear. Much has changed in the 20 years since Grove’s typology was developed, and his assessment is now out of date in a few key areas. Furthermore, the ranking of a particular navy depends on how one interprets its capabilities. In its discussion of Grove’s model, for example, the Canadian navy concluded that it and the RAN are rank three navies (what Grove termed ‘medium global force projection navies’). In justifying this conclusion, the Canadian navy asserted that it and the RAN ‘consistently demonstrate a determination to exercise [their limited range of naval capabilities] at some distance from their home waters, in cooperation with other Force Projection Navies’. While it is possible that this discrepancy has come about because Grove did not foresee the roles the Canadian navy and RAN would play in the 1990-91 Gulf War and subsequently in the Persian Gulf, it is equally as likely that the discrepancy was due to slight differences in the application of definition.

For the purposes of the discussion undertaken within this paper, the exact ranking of individual navies within Grove’s typology is largely irrelevant. What is more important is the position of each navy relative to the others. Regardless of which of the aforementioned assessments one agrees with, what is important is that both place the Canadian navy and RAN in the same rank, with the RNZN and SAN ranked below them. The IN, which is currently undergoing a period of rapid expansion, still fits within roughly the same rank as the Canadian navy and RAN. It is possible that the IN will move up at least one rank within the next decade, however, as several major assets that it currently has on order are delivered.
Notes


14. Although almost 20 years has elapsed since Grove made this determination, the current capabilities of the United States Navy mean that its inclusion in this rank remains unchanged.


18. The most obvious of these is his inclusion of the Soviet Navy in the second rank; it is now clear that its successor, the Russian Navy, is not capable of operating on a scale that would warrant its inclusion as a rank two navy, despite a recent ‘resurgence’ in Russian naval power. Grove, *The Future of Sea Power*, pp. 237-8. On recent developments regarding Russian naval power, see Lee Willett, ‘The Navy in Russia’s “Resurgence”’, *RUSI Journal*, vol. 154, no. 1, February 2009, pp. 50-5.


22. Although *Leadmark* did not discuss where it would have positioned the IN, RNZN or SAN, it is clear from its description of each rank that the RNZN and SAN would not have been ranked as highly as the Canadian navy and RAN.

23. Major assets that are expected to be delivered to the IN over the next decade include a nuclear powered submarine capability and two additional aircraft carriers. These acquisitions are discussed in more detail in the section of this paper that addresses doctrine development in the IN.
Throughout the Cold War the Canadian navy’s focus was primarily on its military role. This focus was a direct result of the navy’s designated role within NATO as an anti-submarine warfare (ASW) specialist navy, although it has a legacy dating to World War II, when the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) took part in the trans-Atlantic convoys that protected shipping from attack by German submarines.1 The RCN’s ASW capabilities were maintained during the early years of the Cold War, although it was not until the late 1950s that ASW began to emerge as a primary role.2

This shift in focus primarily occurred for two reasons. The first was the changing nature of the threat posed by the Soviet Navy. Under the leadership of Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy from 1955 to 1985, Soviet submarine production increased dramatically. As Tom Frame observed:

The Soviet Navy was not a balanced fleet like the US Navy … It boasted a massive nuclear and conventional submarine capability. Between 1949 and 1972, the Soviet Navy developed 24 new classes of submarine … By 1980 the Soviet Union deployed 280 nuclear and nuclear ballistic missile carrying submarines. Three-quarters of the Soviet submarine fleet was nuclear powered. But the Soviet Navy lacked aircraft carriers, while the surface fleet suffered from vasty deficient air protection. The size and potency of the submarine fleet was, however, sufficient to cause a reorientation of force structures in most Western navies.3

For the Canadian navy, this reorientation accelerated during the late 1960s due to the unification of the Canadian Forces (CF).4 This was largely because of the acquisition ‘carrot’ then Defence Minister Paul Hellyer dangled in front of the RCN in an attempt to convince the Canadian Naval Board to accept unification – most of the acquisitions offered were designed primarily for ASW.5

The second factor influencing the decision to reorientate the Canadian navy’s role to ASW was budgetary constraints. Since the navy did not have the resources to make a substantial contribution to NATO defence of the Atlantic across the spectrum of maritime warfare, the provision of a highly specialised ASW force enabled the Canadian navy to provide a worthwhile contribution in at least one area.6 Coincidentally, it also ensured the navy’s primary focus remained on the military role identified by Ken Booth.

In the early 1990s, the collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequent end of the Cold War triggered a period of strategic uncertainty for the Canadian navy, along with bringing its specialist ASW role into question. Cuts to the defence budget, particularly in 1989, led to the cancellation of many modernisation and acquisition programs that

3. The Canadian Navy
had been approved for the navy as recently as 1987 in that year’s Defence White Paper, *Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada*.7 Furthermore, the collapse of the Soviet Union initially left the navy without any strategic policy guidance, although it has since been observed that its fleet structure ensured it was flexible enough to adapt to the post-Cold War operational environment.8 Despite a declaration that naval assets would be more evenly distributed between the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, a 1992 Defence Policy Statement did little to alleviate the climate of uncertainty. Instead, it determined that in the future the navy would be required to ‘maintain versatile, general-purpose maritime forces’ capable of undertaking a variety of roles both close to Canada and abroad.9

Shortly afterwards, the growing number of peacekeeping operations (which had increased from 13 in 1988 to 18 in 1992) led some to question whether Canada needed to prepare for traditional warfighting at all.10 Furthermore, the expression of such views had on occasion been accompanied by the calling into question of why Canada needed to maintain naval forces.11 It was against this unfavourable backdrop that the Canadian navy became the first of the five navies studied to produce a keystone doctrine manual, releasing *The Naval Vision: Charting the Course for Canada’s Maritime Forces* in May 1994.12

The catalyst for the production of this doctrine manual was the election of the Chrétien Government in late 1993. When Jean Chrétien came to power, his Government did not have an established defence policy (beyond the desire to cut costs). Shortly after his election, Chrétien began a strategic policy review process, which eventually culminated with the release of the *1994 White Paper on Defence*.13 As part of this review, each of the three Services was asked to express its views about the future direction Canadian strategic policy should take. In light of the unfavourable nature of the prevailing political environment, the navy acted to both justify its existence and to shape the review’s outcome in its favour. *The Naval Vision* constituted a crucial part of this effort. As one retired Canadian navy commodore noted, *The Naval Vision* was intended to explain the Canadian navy’s role to the public ‘at a grade twelve level’.14 It was squarely (and intentionally) focused on winning over to the navy’s cause the members of the Special Committee of the Senate and House of Commons that had been charged with undertaking the Chrétien Government’s strategic policy review.15

Despite this intent, production of what eventually became *The Naval Vision* was already underway prior to the 1993 election. At the time of the election, however, the requirement for a keystone doctrine manual had not yet been identified and the project’s intended outcome was merely to update the navy’s Maritime Development Plan, an internal planning document that had been circulated from time-to-time, most recently during the 1980s. As the navy responded to the Chrétien Government’s election and subsequent strategic policy review, the need for a much wider-ranging, military-
strategic level publication was identified and the project was expanded, bringing about production of The Naval Vision.\textsuperscript{16}

As a result of the circumstances and timing of its release, The Naval Vision is unique amongst the keystone doctrine manuals studied, since it was not influenced by doctrine developments in allied countries.\textsuperscript{17} Even though it was released in close temporal proximity to the United States (US) Navy’s doctrine, Naval Doctrine Publication 1: Naval Warfare, the two documents were substantially different. Simply written and straightforward to read, The Naval Vision was divided into three parts. The first provided an overview of the navy’s recent activities; the second explained the strategic rationale for maintaining naval forces; and the third set forth the Canadian navy’s vision for the 21st century. Although the final chapter of Naval Warfare examined the US Navy’s vision for the 21st century, this is where the similarities between it and the Canadian navy’s The Naval Vision ended.\textsuperscript{18}

The release of The Naval Vision was accompanied by the emergence of a uniquely Canadian trend: the couching of keystone doctrine manuals as ‘strategy’ or ‘reference documents’, rather than as ‘doctrine’. This is especially true of the navy’s first two keystone doctrine manuals, and in their case one of the reasons for this is their early release dates compared to other navies and other branches of the CF – during the late 1980s and early to mid-1990s, doctrine above the tactical level was still stigmatised as dogma by many Canadian naval officers.\textsuperscript{19} Much of this stigma was avoided by not actually using the term ‘doctrine’.

Regardless of terminology, the Canadian navy’s keystone publications are clearly doctrinal. This is confirmed by their content, which has always contained a discussion of the ‘fundamental principles’ that guided the navy at the time of their release, and they always established a conceptual direction for the navy, within the framework of a national strategy. This is significant because both of these factors align with the definition of doctrine since established within Canadian joint doctrine, as well as with the definition of doctrine used within this paper.\textsuperscript{20} Furthermore, each of the Canadian navy’s keystone publications discussed herein, including The Naval Vision, have been regarded as doctrine by several Canadian navy officers, and have been subsequently referred to as such.\textsuperscript{21}

Overall, the impact of The Naval Vision on strategic policy formulation is questionable. Although it has been asserted that, since the army and air force had no similar ‘vision’ or mission statement to fall back on, The Naval Vision’s publication led to the navy ‘winning’ the inter-Service funding battle for the few years after its release, it is not directly mentioned in the 1994 White Paper on Defence.\textsuperscript{22} However, there are parts of the 1994 White Paper on Defence that align with The Naval Vision; notable among these is a brief discussion of ‘operational maritime forces’.\textsuperscript{23} Furthermore, the few naval acquisitions approved within the 1994 White Paper on Defence all align with discussion in the third section of The Naval Vision, although whether there is a
direct connection between the two documents or whether the alignment is merely a coincidence remains unclear. Regardless of its impact on strategic policy, *The Naval Vision* remains an easy to read guide to the Canadian navy’s position and institutional strategy during the early 1990s.

Despite the limited respite signalled by the release of the 1994 White Paper on Defence, the Canadian political climate and strategic policy situation during the mid-1990s continued to be characterised by a high degree of strategic uncertainty. Furthermore, several years of post-Cold War defence spending cuts meant that no major capital purchases were approved for the navy until nearly a decade after the conclusion of the Cold War. As a result of this situation, the development of the Canadian navy’s second keystone doctrine manual, *Adjusting Course: A Naval Strategy for Canada*, released in April 1997, was closely linked to the navy’s attempt to generate renewed funding for its acquisitions program. In particular, the navy was attempting to generate political support for the purchase of a new submarine fleet to replace its Oberon class submarines, which had been purchased during the 1960s and had become obsolete by the early 1990s.

Initial attempts to find a replacement for the Oberon class had failed following the Mulroney Government’s 1987 decision to acquire nuclear rather than diesel-electric submarines. A few years after the release of 1987’s *Challenge and Commitment*, which had announced the nuclear submarine purchase, it was determined that the nuclear option was too costly and the project fell by the wayside entirely. Following the election of the Chrétien Government in 1993, renewed navy lobbying re-opened the door for the possible acquisition of a diesel-electric replacement for the Oberon class. Importantly, the 1994 White Paper on Defence endorsed the acquisition on conditional terms:

> It [is] also recommended that, if it should prove possible in the current environment of military downsizing around the world to acquire three to six modern diesel-electric submarines on a basis that was demonstrably cost-effective (i.e., that could be managed within the existing capital budget), then the Government should seriously consider such an initiative.

Despite this conditional endorsement, the project soon stalled again and, as a result, it took the Canadian navy another four years of unduly protracted but ultimately successful lobbying before the acquisition of a replacement submarine fleet was finalised in April 1998.

The eventual purchase of the Upholder class diesel-electric submarines from Britain was a hard won funding victory for the Canadian navy. As Peter Haydon observed about post-1994 White Paper on Defence developments, ‘much of the delay was a simple function of the need for submarines not having enough political support in Canada despite the new defence policy decision’. Michael Craven has since expanded
on this observation, noting that ‘from 1994 until the summer of 1997, significant departmental effort was expended educating Cabinet and Canadians as to the rationale for replacement submarines’. As part of this effort, ‘a series of documents drafted for government consideration stressed common themes’ about the relevance and utility of submarines.32 Adjusting Course constitutes one of these documents and a major intention underlying its publication was the provision of a comprehensive justification of the navy’s roles, in support of its acquisition programs.33

In light of this situation, it is unsurprising that Adjusting Course tends to read in places as though it were a 39-page justification for the Upholder purchase. This is most obvious in the conclusion, where it is stated bluntly that ‘in the near term, the most serious problem is represented by the aging submarine force. Submarines provide a unique capability that cannot be adequately replaced by other platforms.’34 While the exact extent to which Adjusting Course was responsible for the eventual purchase of the Upholder class cannot be determined, it is likely that the doctrine at least formed part of the navy’s overall strategy to bring about the purchase.

Beyond this objective, Adjusting Course also undertook a more general discussion about the links between navies and foreign policy. This set the tone for subsequent keystone doctrine manuals produced by all five navies studied because it included a discussion of the concepts of sea control and sea denial.35 It also touched on the roles of navies developed by Booth, discussing the navy’s role in protecting Canada’s sovereignty, the conduct of naval diplomacy and the utility of naval power projection, although Booth was not credited and his model was not included (instead, Adjusting Course provided a table that summarised the navy’s roles and missions, which loosely corresponded to Booth’s model).36 The extent to which the content of Adjusting Course was influenced by the keystone doctrine of other navies is unclear. Although Royal Navy (RN) doctrine was referred to in the glossary of Adjusting Course, it was not referred to within the text itself.

Just as The Naval Vision was considered by some to be overly simplistic, others have asserted that Adjusting Course swung the pendulum too far the other way. Indeed, it attracted an unusually high level of public criticism, particularly from British commentators. For example, when contrasting it with the RN’s 1995 keystone doctrine manual, BR 1806: The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine, one RN officer observed about the Canadian publication that ‘there are shades of doctrine here, though at a much less “fundamental” level than our own BR 1806’.37

In a particularly scathing critique, Eric Grove took this argument one step further by stating:

This is a rather curious publication in many ways. It seems to be an in-house Naval paper but it is clearly intended to achieve the laudable objective of putting the Canadian ‘naval case’ to a wider audience.
In this it succeeds, but only up to a point. Its good intentions are marred somewhat by some needless errors of analysis that weaken it significantly and give the document the feel of a slightly below-average postgraduate thesis.\textsuperscript{38}

Additionally, Grove made numerous further criticisms, for example that:

There are serious problems with the discussion of naval diplomacy … the document gives the general impression of being badly staffed … the authors seem confused as to the basic dynamics of warship design … [and] the discussion of threats to naval forces is particularly disappointing.\textsuperscript{39}

His critique led to a rebuttal by Canadian scholar Peter Haydon, who asserted that:

In reading Grove’s full commentary one could get the impression that his rather condescending criticism of \textit{Adjusting Course} is merely a form of scolding the ‘colonials’ for not following mother’s advice. He really seems concerned that the Canadian Navy had the audacity to engage in independent naval thought.\textsuperscript{40}

Importantly, Haydon’s rebuttal indicates that allied naval doctrine – British in particular – had little influence during the development of \textit{Adjusting Course}.

Despite the limited academic debate it generated, there is little evidence that \textit{Adjusting Course} was an effective tool for generating widespread public support for the Canadian navy. The role it played as part of the navy’s case in support of the \textit{Upholder} purchase aside, \textit{Adjusting Course} appears to have been of only limited utility to the navy, particularly once the \textit{Upholder} purchase had finally been made. Furthermore, there were some who felt that \textit{Adjusting Course} had failed to adequately explain the Canadian navy’s \textit{raison d’être} to the public. As Haydon observed:

Ideally, the public expression of support, in both the ‘grand’ and the naval strategies, should be a political statement, or, as in long-established maritime states … be an entrenched part of the national character. Unfortunately, a Canadian maritime ‘character’ does not exist … If the politicians cannot, or will not, produce the necessary statement entrenching the navy as part of the national fabric, the naval and maritime communities must take the necessary steps to gain public support.\textsuperscript{41}

In an assessment of \textit{Adjusting Course}, he concluded that:

At the moment it presents a good argument but is not a complete strategy because it does not adequately answer the question: ‘What function does the navy perform which obligates Canadian society
to assume responsibility for its maintenance? Moreover, Adjusting Course is a strategic orphan because it is not tied to an overarching national strategic vision free of the constraints of today’s short-term political imperatives and locked tightly on the future of this country in the longer term.42

In June 1999, the release of Shaping the Future of the Canadian Forces: A Strategy for 2020 (usually referred to simply as Strategy 2020) provided the first such ‘strategic vision’ since the 1994 White Paper on Defence.43 Following the release of Strategy 2020, Vice Admiral Paul Maddison, then Chief of the Maritime Staff, ordered the Directorate of Maritime Strategy to begin work on a new publication that was designed to fit within the vision established within Strategy 2020. The new publication, Leadmark: The Navy’s Strategy for 2020, was released in June 2001.

The link to Strategy 2020 was evident throughout Leadmark, the foreword to which noted that ‘Leadmark is a critical link to the capability-based planning framework set in place by Strategy 2020’.44 Others have also noted the influence Strategy 2020 had during the development of Leadmark, which was substantially broader and more considered than the development of its predecessors. As the manual’s initial author, Richard Gimblett, recalled, at the outset of the development of Leadmark:

We had a general concept of what the naval strategy [Leadmark] should look like - basically, look a lot like Strategy 2020 … something of about 20- to 25-page synopsis of where the navy was going to go over the next 20 years was generally it.45

However, once research began into the exact content and structure the navy’s strategy should have, the scope of the task rapidly expanded. The result was that ‘Leadmark was suddenly becoming more than a one-man, 20-page writing assignment … we started developing the idea of a team concept’.46

It was at this point in its development that Leadmark began to move away from being an organisational strategy. Rather, it developed into the Canadian navy’s most comprehensive keystone doctrine manual yet released. Eventually, the core writing team was expanded to include three mid-level naval officers, one senior naval officer and one civilian academic.47 Early drafts were widely circulated both within and outside of the navy for feedback, and the process was further enhanced by the development of related academic conference papers and commentaries.48 In addition to this feedback, Leadmark was influenced by allied keystone doctrine manuals, particularly those produced by the US Navy and RN, and by the operational experience of members of its writing team.49 However, Strategy 2020 remained the key catalyst underlying the production of Leadmark and its influence was particularly prominent.

Following a discussion about its relationship to strategic policy and the force development process, Leadmark comprehensively elaborated the roles of navies. In
undertaking this elaboration, it is noteworthy that Leadmark drew heavily on both the Booth Model (see Figure 2) and Grove’s typology for navies. It also drew on the work of several other prominent maritime strategic theorists, and provided definitions of sea control, sea denial and maritime power projection, amongst other concepts.\textsuperscript{50} Interestingly, it developed the concept of ‘middle power’ naval roles and responsibilities to a far greater extent than any of the other keystone naval doctrine manuals studied, which may have been due to the concept’s prominence in academia at the time Leadmark was developed.\textsuperscript{51} Regardless of the reasons for its inclusion, the discussion of ‘medium power naval strategy’ provided an interesting means for facilitating the development of a Canadian concept of naval strategy.

In its final part, Leadmark established a naval strategy for 2020. Although the strategy was deliberately broad and succinct (totalling only two paragraphs), it nonetheless served to link the document to its original intent, which was to develop a naval strategy that aligned with Strategy 2020.\textsuperscript{53} In this sense Leadmark was a success, although importantly its doctrinal style ensured that it constituted a well-balanced military-strategic treatise that was more broadly relevant than a strategy alone could have been.
Indeed, *Leadmark* was far more effective than its predecessors in achieving the goal of promoting awareness of the Canadian navy’s roles and in establishing a military strategy for the navy. This is because it avoided the pitfalls of both of its predecessors – it was comprehensive and easy to understand, but not overly simplistic – and because it was more widely and prominently distributed. As a result, *Leadmark* was highly successful in making an impact in the public realm, even though it attracted the occasional criticism.\(^5^4\) As one retired Canadian navy officer recalled, *Leadmark* temporarily gave the navy the edge it required to secure funding for its priorities ahead of the army and air force, precisely because at the time *Leadmark* was released neither of the other Services had an equivalent ‘glossy publication you could give to a politician’.\(^5^5\)

The maritime strategy *Leadmark* established was also highly versatile. As its release date was only three months prior to the 11 September 2001 New York and Washington DC terrorist attacks, there was some concern in the wake of these attacks that subsequent events had rendered *Leadmark* prematurely redundant. This concern was unfounded, however. Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the Canadian navy commenced Operation APOLLO in the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf, which resulted in the highest operational tempo in its recent history. As Gimblett later wrote, ‘the experience of Operation Apollo has been to validate the strategy described in *Leadmark*.\(^5^6\) Nonetheless, some within the navy still felt the need to demonstrate that the navy was responding proactively to the events of 11 September 2001.\(^5^7\) The result was the development of what was described as ‘an additional chapter’ to *Leadmark*.\(^5^8\)

As *Securing Canada’s Ocean Frontiers* was released shortly after the publication of a report on defence policy that constituted part of the Martin Government’s 2005 *International Policy Statement* (IPS), the opportunity was taken to incorporate a brief discussion into *Securing Canada’s Ocean Frontiers* of the national strategy the IPS established.\(^6^0\) While this gave *Securing Canada’s Ocean Frontiers* some additional depth, overall it remained little more than a validation of *Leadmark*. In its introduction, it noted that ‘just as the Canadian experience of Operation Apollo served to validate many of *Leadmark*’s strategic tenets, the Global War on Terrorism also confirmed many of its predictions’.\(^6^1\)

Although most of *Securing Canada’s Ocean Frontiers* was dedicated to an elaboration of the argument that *Leadmark* continued to be relevant, there was some limited ‘new’ discussion about ‘emerging naval missions’.\(^6^2\) While Grove’s typology for navies was not mentioned, *Securing Canada’s Ocean Frontiers* contained an updated derivative of the Booth Model (see Figure 3). It was noted that:

> The prevailing [pre-11 September 2001 terrorist attack] strategic context skewed the construct towards the more purely military roles and functions. The future security environment … demands a restoration of balance to the triangle.\(^6^3\)
Given that the end of the Cold War and subsequent operations during the 1990s had already shifted the Canadian navy’s focus away from the military role and towards a more even balance of tasks, this assertion seems strange. It was most likely made, therefore, to provide an additional justification for the planned purchase of sealift and multipurpose ships, which had been outlined in the IPS but which had not yet been funded at the time Securing Canada’s Ocean Frontiers was released.65

Like The Naval Vision and Adjusting Course, the overall impact of Securing Canada’s Ocean Frontiers has been questionable. In the words of one Canadian navy officer:

The doc [Securing Canada’s Ocean Frontiers] … has never really developed traction. Others on the naval staff tell me they keep returning to LM [Leadmark] for any substantiation required in development of other staff work, or in the academic community to explain some naval concept.66

Since Securing Canada’s Ocean Frontiers was written as a supplement to Leadmark, rather than as an update or replacement, at the time of writing of this paper Leadmark continues to maintain its primacy as the Canadian navy’s keystone doctrine manual.
This is unlikely to be the case for very much longer, however, as the Canadian navy is planning to release a new keystone doctrine manual by mid-2010. According to one of its authors, the new manual:

Is at heart a strategic communications document, rather than a force development document, with Canada’s parliamentarians intended as the primary audience. It will be a much shorter document than its predecessors.67

For this reason, the new doctrine manual may have more in common with The Naval Vision and Adjusting Course than it will with Leadmark.

Although at the time of writing of this paper a draft of the new doctrine manual is not yet publically available, it is known that the new manual will espouse similar themes to those discussed in a speech delivered in March 2010 by Chief of the Maritime Staff, Vice Admiral Dean McFadden.68 In this speech, Vice Admiral McFadden advocated a quintessentially global approach to Canadian maritime strategy, asserting that ‘the strategic organizing principle for the application of Canadian seapower in this maritime century is to defend the global system both at and from the sea’. Furthermore:

The Government charges the Canadian Forces to defend Canada, to defend North America and to contribute to international peace and security. The navy has vital roles to play in each of these enduring pillars of defence policy. Defending the global system, both at home and abroad, is fundamental to all three.69

It will be interesting to see the extent to which this global approach to Canada’s maritime strategy will be reflected in the Canadian navy’s forthcoming keystone doctrine manual.
Notes


4. In 1968 the previously separate RCN, Canadian Army and Royal Canadian Air Force were unified into a single Service, the CF. Although unification has since had many effects on the structure, role and culture of each of the environmental elements of the CF, these are not discussed in detail herein. For an overview of unification and its consequences, readers are encouraged to see Desmond Morton, *A Military History of Canada: From Champlain to Kosovo* (4th edn), McClelland & Stewart, Toronto, 1999, pp. 247-54.

5. Milner, *Canada’s Navy*, pp. 247-8. The RCN ceased to exist on February 1, 1968 as a result of unification. On this date it was officially replaced by the maritime element of the Canadian Forces, which is today referred to as the ‘Canadian navy’ by convention. The title RCN is used herein when discussion refers to the period before February 1, 1968, and the term ‘Canadian navy’ is used in reference to the post-1968 period. The word ‘navy’ is not capitalised in the latter term as this term is not an official title.

6. Despite the navy’s ASW capabilities it must be noted that the remainder of the fleet’s capabilities were obsolete by the early 1980s and there were serious concerns within the navy about ‘rust-out’ of the fleet. Milner, *Canada’s Navy*, pp. 279-80.


11. As Chief of the Land Staff, (then) Lieutenant General Rick Hillier argued:

   The reality of the emerging security environment suggests that it is unlikely that the CF will be called upon to fight in ‘blue skies or blue waters’, and the overall value to our country of equipping to do so would be minimal compared to the impact of providing precision land effects.

   Although this argument was made in 2003, similar opinions had been expressed a decade earlier. RJ Hillier, *Strategic Capability Investment Plan - Land Effect*, ref. no.: 3136-5 (CLS), Ottawa: Office of the Chief of the Land Staff, 26 June 2003, p. 4.


14. Information obtained during an interview conducted by the author on 31 May 2007 with two senior Canadian navy officers (records on file with author)


16. Information obtained during an interview conducted by the author on 25 August 2008 with a senior Canadian navy officer, supplemented by email correspondence received on 18 March 2009 (records on file with author).


18. Reading the Canadian navy’s *The Naval Vision* and the US Navy’s *Naval Warfare* in conjunction, what stands out the most is that the latter was more abstract and theoretical throughout. This may be because its target audience was not politicians. Instead, its aim was to explain how the US Navy worked in a joint environment, and its target audience was the US Navy itself, along with the other branches of the US armed forces. John B Hattendorf (ed), *US Naval Strategy in the 1990s: Selected Documents*, Newport Papers no. 27, Naval War College Press, Newport, September 2006.


21. This assertion is based on a series of interviews conducted with Canadian naval officers in May/June 2007 and July/August 2008 (records of all interviews on file with author).


28. Bush, ‘The Victoria-class Submarine Program’, pp. 4-5. Although a section of The Naval Vision discussed the role and importance of submarines, this was limited in length and scope and did not form a major part of the document. Hence, in shaping the Chrétien Government’s strategic policy review’s conclusions about the benefits of submarines, it is likely that lobbying on the part of naval personnel and other interested parties had a much greater influence than doctrine.


30. Once purchased, the Upholder class submarines were re-designated the Victoria class by the Canadian navy, although the two names have occasionally been used interchangeably. To avoid confusion, the submarines are only referred to within this paper as Upholder class.


33. Information obtained during an interview conducted by the author on 31 July 2008 with a senior Canadian navy officer (records on file with author).

34. Maritime Command, Adjusting Course, p. 38.


42. Haydon, “Adjusting Course”…A Strategic Orphan?, p. 3.


46. Richard H Gimblett, Canadian War Museum Oral History Project.

47. Richard H Gimblett, Canadian War Museum Oral History Project. This is also noted in the ‘acknowledgements’ section of Leadmark. See Canadian Forces, Leadmark, p. 176.

48. A conference held at the University of Calgary in March 2001 was fundamental in the conceptual development of Leadmark. Although a footnote within Leadmark observed that the conference proceedings were due to be published as a book in 2002, this did not come to pass. Instead, a second collection of study papers written to assist in the development of Leadmark was published by Dalhousie University. See Edward L Tummers (ed), Maritime

49. Richard H Gimblett, Canadian War Museum Oral History Project.
50. Canadian Forces, Leadmark, pp. 28-49.
52. Canadian Forces, Leadmark, p. 34.
55. Information obtained during an interview conducted by the author on 1 June 2007 with a senior Canadian navy officer (records on file with author).
57. Information obtained during an interview conducted by the author on 1 June 2007 with a senior Canadian navy officer (records on file with author).
59. This publication is frequently informally referred to within the Canadian navy as ‘son of Leadmark’. Canadian Forces, Securing Canada’s Ocean Frontiers: Charting the course from Leadmark, Directorate of Maritime Strategy, Ottawa, 2005.
61. Canadian Forces, Securing Canada’s Ocean Frontiers, p. 4.
63. Canadian Forces, Securing Canada’s Ocean Frontiers, p. 18.
64. Canadian Forces, Securing Canada’s Ocean Frontiers, p. 18.
65. Shortly after taking office in January 2006 the Harper Government approved C$2.1 billion for the purchase of three ships, although this purchase was subsequently cancelled as this funding was not sufficient. The Canadian navy instead investigated the possibility of purchasing two new fuel tankers and a transport ship, before the project for a multipurpose ship was reinvigorated under the rubric ‘joint support ship’ in mid-2009. The project had once again run into financial difficulties by the end of the year, however. At the time of writing this paper it has again stalled, perhaps indefinitely. Glenn A Crowther, ‘Editorial: Canadian Defence Policy – A Breath of Fresh Air’, Strategic Studies Institute Newsletter, July 2006, pp. 1-2; David Pugliese, ‘NavyLooks into Buying Fuel Tankers; Earlier Plans for Multi-Role Vessels Ran Aground’, National Post, 28 August 2008, p. A6; David Pugliese, ‘Hoping to Shake Loose the Backlog: Canadian Industry Awaits Progress on Delayed Programs’, Defense News, 14 December 2009 <www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4417467> (6 February 2010).
66. Information obtained via email correspondence received on 4 July 2007 from a senior Canadian navy officer (records on file with author).
67. Information obtained via email correspondence received on 31 March 2010 from a senior Canadian navy officer (records on file with author).

68. It is noteworthy that Vice Admiral Dean McFadden’s official biographical statement reads in part that:

   He was as well, Director of Maritime Strategy on the Maritime Staff, and led development of the Navy’s current strategy document, which is called *Leadmark*. It is perhaps indicative of a return to his naval roots that this document will be updated for the new century during his watch as [Chief of the Maritime Staff].

   Although work on the new manual began before Vice Admiral McFadden’s appointment as Chief of the Maritime Staff, a member of the writing team observed that his previous experience ‘drove his interest in *Leadmark* in a very personal/direct way’. It is therefore likely that the new manual will reflect Vice Admiral McFadden’s personal experience to a relatively high degree, and hence it is also noteworthy that he has served in more joint commands than any other general/flag officers currently serving in the Canadian Forces, and that his service includes high-level domestically-as well as externally-focused command appointments. 


69. Dean McFadden, speech delivered to the Conference of Defence Associations 73rd Annual General Meeting, held in Ottawa, 3-5 March 2010 (copy of transcript on file with author).
4. The Indian Navy

Since Indian Independence in 1947, the intellectual development of the Indian Navy (IN) has progressed in three somewhat vague, yet ultimately distinct, phases. The publication in 2004 of the first edition of the IN’s keystone doctrine manual, *INBR 8: Indian Maritime Doctrine*, constituted a significant expression of the third phase. Yet the emergence of this phase, and the development of the doctrine manual itself, did not occur in a vacuum. A brief overview of the major facets of each phase is therefore given below, in order to inform subsequent discussion about the development of *Indian Maritime Doctrine*.

The first phase of the IN’s intellectual development began at Independence and lasted until approximately the mid-1960s. During this phase the fledgling IN was intellectually as well as physically shaped by its origins as the Royal Indian Navy (RIN), and by the close initial association it had with the Royal Navy (RN).1

Immediately following the partition of India and Pakistan, the IN found itself in a position of relative strength, with the existing fleet having been divided in a way that gave India approximately twice the number of fleet units as Pakistan.2 Despite this position of strength, however, the IN was immediately affected by several problems that resulted from partition. Key among these was major personnel challenges that had resulted from the ethnic composition of the RIN prior to Independence.3 The root of this problem was that the RIN ‘was ethnically mixed to a degree unheard of in most other areas of society, but it was not ethnically balanced’.4 This unbalance was most notably manifested in several Muslim-dominated skilled and technical positions, and in the Hindu-dominated officer corps. As a result, both the Indian and Pakistan navies suffered several manning problems immediately following partition.5

In an attempt to overcome this and other problems, the IN turned to the RN for support. The RN’s initial response was to provide the IN with the services of several flag officers, as well as to support Indian attempts to purchase some of the additional surface vessels the IN desired. Beyond this, however, the extent of naval cooperation was soon limited by political differences between the British and Indian governments. At the heart of the difference was a dissonance between the British desire that the IN (similarly to the Royal Canadian Navy, Royal Australian Navy and Royal New Zealand Navy) contribute to implementing an overarching allied naval defence plan, and the emerging Indian policy of non-alignment.6 Although these differences caused noticeable disruptions to the acquisition of desired Indian naval purchases, the ongoing presence of RN flag officers within the IN during the early years after Independence nonetheless ensured a strong RN influence during the first phase of the IN’s intellectual development.7
By the late 1950s the strategic situation facing the IN was beginning to change due to both external and internal factors. Externally to India, the naval dynamics of the Indian Ocean region (IOR) were changing. To India’s west, the significance of Pakistan’s attempts to formalise its alliance with the Western powers, in particular the United States (US), had been increasing for several years. In 1954 these attempts saw fruition with Pakistan entering into three separate alliance arrangements, the most significant being a mutual assistance pact with the US. American naval assistance to Pakistan greatly increased following the signing of the pact, substantially narrowing the tactical advantage the IN had hitherto enjoyed. Concurrently, to India’s east, the Indonesian Navy was beginning to benefit from Indonesia’s increasing links with the Soviet Union. As a result of these twin developments, Indian naval superiority in the IOR was facing its first serious challenge from local competitors.

The IN’s response to this challenge was substantially limited by two additional external factors. The first was the fallout from India’s dismal 1962 border war with China. In the wake of this war India’s military priority quickly became addressing the substantial problems identified within the Army and Air Force as a result. The second factor was the international political climate during the 1960s, which increasingly frustrated the IN’s attempts to make new acquisitions during a period of fiscal restraint. A key problem was that America was hesitant to supply the IN, as it did not want to encroach on an area it regarded as traditionally British territory, while at the same time reductions in the strength of the RN meant that Britain was no longer able to supply the IN with the acquisitions it desired. The (perhaps inevitable) result was the Indian decision in 1965 to begin negotiations with the Soviet Union for the supply of naval hardware.

Internally, the IN was progressively solving the manning problems caused by partition. Several specialist trade and technical schools were opened in India during the 1950s and, significantly for the Navy’s future intellectual development, the repatriation of sub-lieutenant training, which had been necessarily outsourced to the RN since Independence, was entirely completed by 1956. By the mid-1960s this growth in domestic training had resulted in greatly diminished cultural links between the IN and the RN as ‘a generation of officers who had received their training wholly within India was coming to maturity’. Importantly for the intellectual development of the IN, ‘the fact that these officers were not inculcated in Royal Navy concepts meant that they sought their own’.

These internal and external factors combined to bring about the second phase of IN intellectual development, which ran from the mid-1960s to the early 1990s. In the words of James Goldrick:

The decision to ‘Go Soviet’ and [the Chief of Naval Staff] Vice Admiral Chatterji’s accession marked the point at which the Indian Navy began to develop wholly indigenous concepts for naval development. This attitude was forced to some extent by the requirement to operate the
Soviet built ships and deal with the Soviets themselves. While the Russians were friendly on a personal level … India was given little or no access to operational doctrine.¹⁹

Strategically, the result of the IN’s second phase of intellectual development was a reprioritisation that, by the end of the 1970s, had cemented the Navy’s priorities as coastal defence, the defeat of the Pakistan Navy in the event of war, the defence of India’s offshore territories, the ability to conduct sea denial operations within India’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and the protection of India’s maritime trade routes.²⁰

Throughout this phase the Indian Government’s role in the non-aligned movement and its declaration of an Indian Ocean ‘zone of peace’ served to isolate the Navy internationally.²¹ Although this stance resulted in an ongoing lack of access to foreign operational doctrine, it also served to encourage the ongoing development of indigenous naval thinking. Finally, the clarity and focus of IN intellectual development also advanced significantly as a result of the Navy’s role in India’s 1971 war with Pakistan.²²

The international strategic upheaval of the early 1990s catapulted the IN into its third phase of intellectual development. As with the transition from the first to second phases, the transition to the third phase was also a result of the convergence of a plethora of internal and external factors.

Although the IOR began to play a prominent role on the world stage after the Soviet Union’s 1979 invasion of Afghanistan, this prominence greatly increased following the end of the Cold War. Beginning with the 1990-91 Gulf War, the subsequent enforcement of sanctions against Iraq and more recently the US-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, have given cause for an ongoing and substantial US Navy presence in the IOR.²³ Unlike during the Cold War, when the relationship between India and the US was frustrated by India’s non-aligned stance and acquisitions of Soviet equipment, the global security environment since 1991 has brought about renewed cooperation between India and the US.²⁴ This has been especially prominent in the realm of naval activities. Indeed, by 2002, naval cooperation between India and the US had grown to the extent that the IN assisted in providing security for US shipping in the Malacca Strait. In 2005 this cooperation was further expanded when the US and Indian navies conducted their first combined exercise.²⁵

Enabling this growth in cooperation has been a major change in Indian Government policy since the conclusion of the Cold War. This change has involved the abandonment of India’s long-standing position of non-alignment and its substitution with a more pragmatic approach to alliance (and security) relationships. This change was succinctly summarised by C Raja Mohan, who stated that, ‘India has moved from its past emphasis on the power of argument to a new stress on the argument of power’.²⁶ Underlying this change appears to be two factors, the first being the Indian Government’s realisation that no matter how much it might want too, it is not going to be able to keep other
powers from pursuing their own interests in the IOR. The second is a shift in national consciousness brought about by a growing sense among Indians that India is on the path to international 'great power' status. With this has come an increased political emphasis on national prestige.

Importantly from a naval perspective, the shifting Indian national consciousness has helped bring about a mass attitudinal change towards the IN. This change has been facilitated by the increasingly popular perception that a powerful navy is one of the key indicators of both a country’s prestige and its great power status. Furthermore, this changing perception has been accompanied by the election of the Atal Behari Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh administrations (in office from 1998-2004 and from 2004 onwards, respectively), both of which have been broadly supportive of Indian naval expansion. Unsurprisingly, the growing level of popular support has had a significant fiscal impact on the Navy, as summarised by David Scott:

>The Indian Navy’s allocation of the Defence Budget rose from $7.5 billion for the years 1997-2001 to $18.3 billion for 2002-2007. Its service-share of the Defence Budget, having fallen to 11.2 per cent in 1992-93, saw its first real increase in 1998-99 to 14.5 per cent. A clear ‘momentum’ had been established by 2004, in terms of increasing naval expenditure … The 2007-8 Defence Budget saw another increase; the Indian Navy allocated 18.26 per cent. Twenty per cent seems achievable.

This increased budgetary allocation has allowed the Navy to embark on an ambitious ship-building and acquisitions program, prominent among which is the purchase of a second aircraft carrier and a renewed effort to domestically develop a third aircraft carrier and a nuclear-powered submarine capability.

The changing popular attitude towards the Navy has also been accompanied by an acute rise in Indian public interest in the IOR. This in turn has facilitated an increased regional role for the IN. Examples of activities undertaken as a result of this increased role are:

- the Navy’s ongoing provision of security within the Maldives’ EEZ following the signing of a bilateral security pact between India and the Maldives in 2009
- undertaking multilateral naval exercises with a range of countries including the US, South Africa and Brazil
- the provision of security assistance to Mozambique during the World Economic Forum held there in June 2004.

Another significant change in India’s strategic circumstances that has taken place since the end of the Cold War regards its perceived external security threats. During the first and second phases of its intellectual development, the IN emphasised the prominence of the threat Pakistan posed to Indian maritime security. In the past decade, however,
the IN’s strategic emphasis has shifted away from security competition with Pakistan and towards hedging against a possible Chinese naval threat to India’s broader interests in the IOR and beyond, which has brought about much speculation that India and China may emerge as major naval rivals during the coming decades.37

Finally, the regional security situation has changed as a result of India and Pakistan’s 1998 nuclear tests.38 India’s subsequent promulgation of a doctrine for the use of nuclear weapons emphasised a ‘no first use’ policy and established India’s resolve to develop a credible deterrence capability, based on a ‘triad of aircraft, mobile land-based missiles and sea based assets’.39 Although this doctrine has had ramifications for all three of India’s Services, for the Navy it has been particularly important, since it has provided ongoing justification for the funding of an expensive nuclear submarine development program.40

In response to these converging strategic changes the IN’s priority has become transitioning from a brown water navy to a blue water one.41 The ongoing attempt to achieve this transition is the dominant focus of the third phase of the IN’s intellectual development, and (unsurprisingly) Indian Maritime Doctrine constitutes a significant component of this attempt.

Somewhat inauspiciously, the personnel involved in the development of the first edition of Indian Maritime Doctrine were either unable to be contacted or were unwilling to participate in the collection of data for this study. Fortunately, however, many of the problems that this situation could have caused have either been overcome or avoided. This has been achieved by the conduct of an analysis of the manual that takes into consideration the IN’s aforementioned strategic circumstances, as well as existing statements that several senior officers have made publically about both the manual specifically and the Navy’s institutional strategy more generally. Once read with these considerations in mind, several of the Navy’s motivations for developing Indian Maritime Doctrine become somewhat self-evident.

Divided into 11 chapters, the first edition of Indian Maritime Doctrine appears at first glance to be little more than a grab-bag of assorted military buzzwords, with most of its chapters divided into short sections and sub-sections with each tending to expound a different concept. In addition to concepts such as sea control, sea denial and maritime power projection, which have often been included in the keystone doctrine manuals of other navies, the myriad of less common concepts discussed within Indian Maritime Doctrine included the so-called revolution in military affairs (RMA), the principles of war and manoeuvre.42 Read in light of the profound strategic upheaval that has taken place within India as well as within the IOR more broadly over the past few decades, however, the discussion of this plethora of concepts becomes more understandable, perhaps even justifiable.
Some concepts, such as the RMA and manoeuvre, appear to have been included in response to the Indian Army’s *Cold Start War Doctrine*, which was released at around the same time as *Indian Maritime Doctrine*. In the sections defining these and a few other concepts, discussion appears to be deliberately juxtaposed to the Army’s definitions of the same terminology. For example, in the section titled ‘Manoeuvre’, *Indian Maritime Doctrine* states that:

Manoeuvre is an important concept to armies, wherein it has been contrasted with attrition as a style of warfare. This distinction is largely irrelevant in the maritime context because maritime forces do not have a choice between manoeuvre and other styles of warfare – they are always moving and manoeuvring to gain advantage.

This deliberate juxtaposition with Army doctrine and concepts was later emphasised by Vice Admiral Verghese Koithara, who declared that ‘the maritime doctrine has a twofold function. It is addressed to the Navy as well as to the other services’. Despite the subtle pedagogic allusion of this declaration, however, the Navy’s precise motivations for including conceptual definitions that explicitly juxtaposed their Army equivalents remain unclear.

Several other concepts, as well as several areas of discussion relating to India’s changing strategic circumstances, appear to have been included to explain the Navy’s rationale for its drive to become a blue water force. This is especially true of Chapters 5 and 6, which discuss ‘geo-strategic imperatives for India’ and ‘India’s maritime interests’, although the case for transitioning to a blue water navy is also subtly evident in most other parts of the manual.

Contrary to what one suspects was its developer’s intent, discussion within the manual becomes noticeably less subtle wherever it addresses the acquisition of nuclear submarines. Intended to eventually constitute the Navy’s component of India’s triad of strategic nuclear deterrent capabilities, India’s project to develop a nuclear submarine capability was mired in a period of prolonged delays at the time the first edition of *Indian Maritime Doctrine* was being written. Just as the Canadian navy developed its 1997 doctrine manual, *Adjusting Course: A Naval Strategy for Canada*, as part of its attempt to secure the *Upholder* class diesel-electric submarine purchase, it is possible that the IN’s decision to develop *Indian Maritime Doctrine* was, at least in part, influenced by a perceived need to justify the necessity of nuclear submarines to those outside of the Navy itself.

Unlike *Adjusting Course*, however, *Indian Maritime Doctrine* also presented strong arguments for the acquisition of several other capabilities, such as a second aircraft carrier. It is therefore highly unlikely that advancing the development of a nuclear submarine capability was the IN’s only motive for the production of *Indian Maritime Doctrine*; indeed it may not even have been the primary motive. This difference between
*Adjusting Course* and *Indian Maritime Doctrine* reflects the different strategic contexts in which each manual was written. In the Canadian navy’s case, the purchase of Upholder class submarines alone was considered to constitute a significant acquisitions victory, whereas in the IN’s case a broader expansion of capabilities probably appeared achievable.

The case for purchasing nuclear submarines was also the aspect of *Indian Maritime Doctrine* that initially drew the most attention from external commentators, to the extent that several early critiques of the manual focused their analysis almost exclusively on this aspect of it. Although the majority of these early critiques were journalistic in nature, in the long term the manual was analysed more comprehensively as the subject of several academic papers. The combined volume of journalistic and academic analyses has resulted in *Indian Maritime Doctrine* being the most publically scrutinised of all the keystone doctrine manuals examined in this study. This relatively high level of attention is most probably due to the IN’s rapidly expanding regional role, combined with the increasing prospect of Indian accession to international great power status over the coming decades.

In addition to its case for acquiring a nuclear submarine capability, several of the academic critiques of *Indian Maritime Doctrine* also tended to focus on the significance of two other aspects of the manual’s content. These aspects were its assessment of the consequences of changing geopolitics within the IOR, and the significance of the Navy’s attempt to explain the importance of transitioning into a blue water force. In one analysis, David Scott also asserted that *Indian Maritime Doctrine*:

> Set the benchmark for India’s current ‘Mahanian Vision’. It put forward the need for a sea-based nuclear deterrent. It also revised the naval posture, moving it away from one of coastal protection to a more assertive competitive strategy for dominating the Indian Ocean Region … In classic Mahanian style the *Indian Maritime Doctrine* focused on the need to control ‘choke points, important islands and vital trade routes’ … naval diplomacy was pinpointed as one of the primary tasks of the Indian Navy during peacetime. It was, in effect, ‘a sort of mini “Monroe Doctrine”, to safeguard India’s interests in the Indian Ocean’.52

Although the works of Alfred Mahan do appear to have had a significant influence, they were not cited in *Indian Maritime Doctrine*’s short bibliography.53

However, the works of other maritime strategic theorists such as Sir Julian S Corbett and Ken Booth were cited and also appear to have influenced the content of the manual. Although a diagrammatical representation of the Booth Model was not included, *Indian Maritime Doctrine* asserted that ‘navies continue to function along a triangular grid with the military role underpinning two complementary roles - the politico-diplomatic and the constabulary’.54 These roles were elaborated upon briefly in Chapter 9, and
Interestingly the existence of a fourth role – the benign application of maritime power for non-military tasks such as search and rescue and humanitarian aid delivery – was also briefly discussed.55

In the three years following its release the first edition of *Indian Maritime Doctrine* was accompanied by the development of two related documents: the *Maritime Capability Perspective Plan* and *Freedom to Use the Seas: India’s Maritime Military Strategy*. 56

The relationship between these documents and *Indian Maritime Doctrine* was later summarised by then Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Sureesh Mehta, who is worth quoting at length:

> Recognising the imperatives of this day and age, we are very conscious of the need to provide a firm intellectual and theoretical foundation upon which the edifice of a resurgent Indian Navy … would be built. This ‘foundation’ comprises three keystone documents. The first is the unclassified ‘Maritime Doctrine’ which, in its current form, is essentially a ‘doctrinal primer’, meant for the lay audience but useful to an informed one as well. The second is the ‘Maritime Capability Perspective-Plan’ which is a classified blueprint for the development of the force-levels of the Navy. The final segment of the ‘trilogy’, entitled ‘India’s Maritime Strategy’, is available in both a ‘classified’ as well as an ‘unclassified’ format. These three documents represent the triumvirate of current naval thinking and their publication marks three extremely important milestones along the developmental path, being travelled upon by the Indian Navy.57

The *Maritime Capability Perspective Plan* was distributed internally in 2005, while *Freedom to Use the Seas* was released publically in May 2007.

In the words of the document itself, *Freedom to Use the Seas* has ‘three major facets’, these being ‘a strategy for force employment in peace; a strategy for force employment in crisis/conflicts, and a strategy for force build-up’.58 To this end, a large portion of the strategy was dedicated to elaborating upon some of the elements previously discussed in *Indian Maritime Doctrine*. Specifically, India’s broad range of interests in the IOR, the need for energy security and the range of tasks the Navy could be expected to perform were all discussed in great detail (with the discussion of naval tasks alluding to the Booth Model throughout).59 To these areas of discussion was added a historic overview, with the ‘strategy for force build-up’ establishing the IN’s acquisition and development priorities over a 15 year timeframe.60

Interestingly, the case for the acquisition or development of particular platforms, especially nuclear submarines, was far less prominent in *Freedom to Use the Seas* than it had been in *Indian Maritime Doctrine*. This is not to say that such discussion was absent from *Freedom to Use the Seas*; on the contrary, the roles and utility of several
different platforms were revisited on several occasions. However, this discussion was more subtle than it had been in *Indian Maritime Doctrine* and was also better integrated with the surrounding text. This difference may therefore indicate little other than that *Freedom to Use the Seas* was better written and structured than *Indian Maritime Doctrine*, although it is noteworthy that when *Freedom to Use the Seas* was being written Indian submarine development was no longer mired in major delays.

Finally, there is some ambiguity as to the precise nature of the relationship between *Indian Maritime Doctrine* and *Freedom to Use the Seas*, primarily because the latter document (uncharacteristically) offers a somewhat muddled dialogue in this regard. Specifically, there is a definitional conflict in Chapter 1, which indicates that maritime strategy is a subset of joint military strategy, grand strategy and, ultimately, national policy, and then, a few pages later, states that maritime strategy is derived from maritime doctrine, which is a direct subset of national policy. Fortunately, this confusion is, to an extent, resolved by the explicit assertion that *Freedom to Use the Seas* ‘will compliment these two publications [Joint Doctrine – Indian Armed Forces and Indian Maritime Doctrine] to provide the contextual framework for the employment of forces in a specified timeframe’. This statement also confirmed that *Freedom to Use the Seas* was not doctrinal, as doctrine (as defined by the IN) does not explicitly address specific timeframes.

Although the IN has produced a second edition of *Indian Maritime Doctrine*, which was publicly released in hard but not soft copy in August 2009, this edition was not yet available in Australia at the time of writing of this paper. This edition also appears to have been subjected to much less public scrutiny than its predecessor. One of the few available reviews was published in the 2010 edition of *The Military Balance*:

> In August 2009 the [Indian] navy updated its maritime doctrine for the first time in nearly six years … The document focuses on the spectrum of conflict, India’s maritime environment and interests, and the application of maritime power. The latter chapter incorporates new constabulary missions for the navy, including counter-terrorism and anti-piracy operations. For the first time, it is stated that India’s maritime forces could be deployed on specific counter-terrorism missions ‘both independently and as cooperative endeavours with friendly foreign naval and coast guard forces’.

In another brief review, which was published in *The Hindu* newspaper, it was observed that the inclusion of this newfound focus on counter-terrorism was the result of the expanded coastal security role the IN had been given in the wake of the Mumbai terrorist attack on 26 November 2008.
The review in *The Hindu* also observed that the new manual included a discussion of the principles of war, the types of platforms the IN would require to achieve the tasks allocated to it, and ‘a chapter on concepts of maritime power’. It also stated that:

> The chapter on India’s maritime environment has been revamped to large extent [sic] … A new chapter on Naval Combat Power has been added underlining the ever changing demands on three critical components – conceptual, physical and human – in the context of rapid changes in technology and consequently tactics.

Unfortunately, the review did not provide further details about any of these sections of the new manual.

Finally, and most interestingly, the review in *The Hindu* asserted that:

> The latest document makes a conscious effort to move forward from the commonalities of maritime thought as applicable to most seafaring nations and addresses India and its Navy’s specific concepts, concerns and development.

Frustratingly, the review again offered no further details. Without access to a copy of the manual itself, any further discussion herein of these Indian-specific concepts or how they stand in contrast to the more general maritime strategic theories discussed in the first edition of *Indian Maritime Doctrine* would be purely speculative. For this reason, further discussion about the second edition of *Indian Maritime Doctrine* will be left for future debate.

Notes


8. The mutual assistance pact between Pakistan and the US was signed on 19 May 1954. The other two treaties were the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty signed in Manila on 8 September 1954 and the Turco-Pakistani Agreement of Friendly Cooperation signed on 19 February 1954. The latter of these was a precursor to the Baghdad Pact, which came into effect in 1955. Goldrick, *No Easy Answers*, p. 27. See also: Munir Hussain, ‘Pak-Turkey Relations: On the Common Ties’, *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations*, vol. 7, no. 2 & 3, summer and fall 2008, <www.ciaonet.org/journals/tjir/v7i2/f_0007406_6319.pdf> (25 May 2010).


13. This fiscal tightness was brought on by the other Services assuming a position of funding priority over the Navy. As S Nihal Singh observed: ‘Defense allocations were doubled in 1963 to 4.5% of GNP [gross national product] primarily to expand and modernize the Army’. S Nihal Singh, ‘Why India goes to Moscow for Arms’, *Asian Survey*, vol. 24, no. 7, July 1984, p. 713.


27. ‘Great powers’, simply defined, are ‘the most powerful states in the international system’. They are of critical importance within the international system because ‘their massive reserves of resources allow them to be disproportionately active in diverse fields of international behaviour. They are not only the most powerful, but are also the most active of international actors’. Douglas Lemke, ‘Great Powers’ in Martin Griffiths (ed), Encyclopedia of International Relations and Global Politics, Routledge, New York, 2006, pp. 349-52.


38. For an overview of the history of India’s nuclear policies, see Rajesh M Basrur, ‘India’s Nuclear Policy’ in Daniel P Marston & S Sundaram (eds), A Military History of India and South Asia: From the East India Company to the Nuclear Era, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2007, pp. 186-95.


41. Technically, a brown water navy is designed to provide coastal defence and conduct operations close to shore, whereas a blue water navy is designed to conduct sustained operations over 200nm from shore. Politically, a blue water navy constitutes an important component of a state’s power projection capabilities. Scott, ‘India’s Drive for a “Blue Water” Navy’, pp. 1-2.


43. For a summary of the strategic implications of the Indian Army’s Cold Start War Doctrine, see Subhash Kapila, India’s New ‘Cold Start’ War Doctrine Strategically Reviewed, South Asia Analysis Group Paper no. 91, 4 May 2004, <www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers10/paper991.html> (29 January 2010). Regarding the relative release dates of these two manuals, it is
noteworthy that a classified version of *Indian Maritime Doctrine* was first distributed on 25 April 2004, three days before the release of the Army’s *Cold Start War Doctrine*. The unclassified version of *Indian Maritime Doctrine* was not publicly released until June, however. In the absence of access to a copy of the classified version, one can only speculate about whether the sections that appear to address issues raised by the new Army doctrine were included in this version or added subsequently.

44. Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence (Navy), *INBR 8*, p. 88.
46. Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence (Navy), *INBR 8*, chaps. 5-6.
47. Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence (Navy), *INBR 8*, pp. 61, 81, 95, 107, 110.
51. Scott, ‘India’s “Grand Strategy” for the Indian Ocean’, pp. 112-3. The idea of an Indian version of the ‘Monroe Doctrine’ was elaborated in Holmes and Yoshihara. Named after 19th century US President James Monroe, who promulgated it in 1823, the Monroe Doctrine declared that any future European attempts to colonise territory in the Americas would be viewed in Washington as acts of aggression against the US. As Holmes and Yoshihara observed:

> The United States of Monroe’s day, like newly independent India, positioned itself as the leader of a bloc of nations within a geographically circumscribed region, resisting undue political influence – or worse – from external great powers.

52. Scott, ‘India’s “Grand Strategy” for the Indian Ocean’, pp. 112-3. The idea of an Indian version of the ‘Monroe Doctrine’ was elaborated in Holmes and Yoshihara. Named after 19th century US President James Monroe, who promulgated it in 1823, the Monroe Doctrine declared that any future European attempts to colonise territory in the Americas would be viewed in Washington as acts of aggression against the US. As Holmes and Yoshihara observed:

> The United States of Monroe’s day, like newly independent India, positioned itself as the leader of a bloc of nations within a geographically circumscribed region, resisting undue political influence – or worse – from external great powers.

53. Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence (Navy), *INBR 8*, pp. 139-41.
55. Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence (Navy), *INBR 8*, chap. 9, also p. 51 (fn. 3).
58. Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence (Navy), *Freedom to Use the Seas*, p. 3.
60. Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence (Navy), *Freedom to Use the Seas*, chaps. 2 & 8.
61. For a typical example, see Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence (Navy), *Freedom to Use the Seas*, p. 76.
62. India’s first domestically built nuclear submarine was launched in July 2009, two years after the release of *Freedom to Use the Seas*. The submarine, at the time of writing of this paper, is still undergoing trials and testing, and is not expected to enter operational service for at least another two years. Peter Crail & Eben Lindsey, ‘India Launches First Nuclear Submarine’, *Arms Control Today*, September 2009, <www.armscontrol.org> (18 March 2010); ‘Two More Years for Arihant Induction’, *Asian Age*, 7 February 2010, <www.asianage.com> (11 March 2010).
64. Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence (Navy), *Freedom to Use the Seas*, p. 3.
68. ‘Maritime Doctrine makes Subtle Changes in Principles of War’.
69. ‘Maritime Doctrine makes Subtle Changes in Principles of War’.
70. ‘Maritime Doctrine makes Subtle Changes in Principles of War’.
5. The Royal Australian Navy

The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) released its own keystone doctrine manual, *Australian Maritime Doctrine: RAN Doctrine 1*, in October 2000. The timing of the release of this manual was due to a combination of factors, both internal and external to the RAN. Internally, members of the RAN Maritime Studies Program (MSP) were interested in writing a keystone doctrine manual as early as 1993. However, they failed to generate support for the idea for several reasons, which varied over time. These included objections from senior officers on the grounds that doctrine would be ‘too prescriptive’, as well as frequent turnover of MSP members, especially the Director General. It was only during the last few years of the 1990s that this situation began to change.¹

Furthermore, attempts by MSP members to gain support for the production of a keystone doctrine manual were also likely to have been indirectly influenced by external events. Following the release of Australia’s 1987 Defence White Paper, *The Defence of Australia 1987*, the RAN had maintained a position of priority in Australian strategic policy for most of the 1990s. *The Defence of Australia 1987*, which had accorded priority to the destruction of enemy forces in the ‘sea and air gap’ to Australia’s north, had given ‘high priority to maritime (naval and air) forces capable of preventing an adversary from substantial operations in that area’.² Despite the prevailing environment being characterised by funding constraints, the fleet was to be expanded from 12 to ‘16 or 17 major surface combatants’.³ Also approved was the purchase of six submarines.

Yet *The Defence of Australia 1987* did not give specific details about the nature or origin of any potential future threat to Australia. As a result, the RAN was compelled to prepare for several contingencies. A key concern from the mid-1970s to the late 1980s was increasing Soviet naval activity in both the Pacific and Indian oceans.⁴ In the mid-1980s, Indian naval expansion and modernisation was also viewed by some within the RAN as a significant additional security challenge, although such fears eventually dissipated.⁵

In addition to these ‘traditional’ naval threats, the RAN participated in several international exercises that focused on warfighting scenarios. Most prominently these included exercises held under the auspices of the Five Power Defence Arrangements and Exercise RIMPAC, a major multinational naval exercise hosted biennially by the United States (US) Navy.⁶ The overall result of these exercises, combined with the need to address potential security threats and implement the naval role prescribed by Australian national strategy, made the military roles of navies a major focus within the RAN.
The 1990s brought about a gradual balancing of the RAN’s planning focus, beginning after the 1990-91 Gulf War. As Tom Frame noted:

As the RAN would be contributing to the enforcement of trade sanctions against Iraq for the next decade, the 1990s saw a shift in focus from war-fighting to a range of ‘peace operations’.7

The changing training emphasis was accompanied by growing budgetary constraints, meaning less funding was available to conduct exercises. This further curtailed the RAN’s ability to train for its traditional warfighting role.8 This is not the say that the RAN ceased to prepare for warfighting altogether. Rather, during the early 1990s the RAN’s focus shifted towards a more balanced mix of training for the military, diplomatic and policing roles identified by Ken Booth.

Contrary to the Canadian navy, the RAN did not suffer from a lack of strategic guidance during the early to mid-1990s. If anything, the update to Australia’s national strategy espoused within Force Structure Review, published in 1991, was useful to the RAN as it established that the Australian Defence Force (ADF) may be required to provide military assistance to countries in the South Pacific.9 This had the effect of clarifying the range of tasks the RAN may be called upon to perform, enabling it to train accordingly. Furthermore, defence of the sea and air gap to Australia’s north remained the primary focus of Australian national strategy under the Hawke and Keating governments, ensuring that the RAN maintained a position of prominence within strategic policy.10

By the late 1990s, however, the government’s funding priorities had begun to shift away from the RAN, a shift that greatly accelerated following the ADF’s deployment to East Timor in 1999. Over the next few years, the RAN found itself rapidly de-prioritised and government publications such as From Phantom to Force: Towards a More Efficient and Effective Army did much to swing the funding pendulum away from the RAN.11 The changing situation, which further shifted following the Howard Government’s initiation of a Defence Review in June 2000, led many within the RAN to feel increasing pressure to justify the organisation’s activities to the Australian public.12 As a result, receptiveness to the production of a keystone doctrine manual rapidly grew within the RAN, and many of the objections and barriers faced by members of the MSP during the 1990s seem to have disappeared.

Related to these changes in attitude were changes to key positions, including the appointments of then Captain James Goldrick, RAN, as Director General of the MSP in January 1999 and Vice Admiral David Shackleton, RAN, as Chief of Navy in July 1999.13 Although Shackleton’s predecessor, Vice Admiral Donald Chalmers, RAN, had initiated the production of a keystone doctrine manual in early 1999, Shackleton proved to be highly supportive. The primary author, however, was Captain Goldrick. Due to an emergency posting back to sea, little of the actual writing was undertaken until early
2000, although the document was produced fairly quickly after this. Once Captain Goldrick had completed a draft, it was widely circulated for comment, including to overseas experts. Following a partial re-drafting to incorporate the feedback received, the doctrine was then approved by Vice Admiral Shackleton prior to its release in October 2000.\textsuperscript{14}

Interestingly, \textit{Australian Maritime Doctrine} contained a short ‘note on sources’ that had been referred to during its development.\textsuperscript{15} As had been the case with Canada’s \textit{Leadmark: The Navy’s Strategy for 2020}, the content of \textit{Australian Maritime Doctrine} was influenced by RN doctrine.\textsuperscript{16} Furthermore, \textit{Australian Maritime Doctrine} drew on the Royal New Zealand Navy’s 1997 publication \textit{Maritime Doctrine for the Royal New Zealand Navy}, which it credited as ‘an excellent book, more apt for New Zealand’s situation and less derivative than it may have appeared to many’.\textsuperscript{17} The works of several maritime strategic theorists were also consulted during the writing of \textit{Australian Maritime Doctrine}, as was US Navy doctrine, although the latter’s influence was ‘less direct’.\textsuperscript{18}

The content of \textit{Australian Maritime Doctrine} was well developed. Divided into 12 chapters, it sought to explain ‘how the Royal Australian Navy thinks about, prepares for and operates in peace and conflict’.\textsuperscript{19} This it did quite well, examining the concept of ‘doctrine’ itself, Australia’s maritime environment, the nature of armed conflict and ongoing themes in Australian strategic policy. Cleverly, it focused on trends over time and avoided discussing specific strategic policy documents, something which resulted in its ongoing relevance over a longer timeframe than most other naval doctrine manuals studied.\textsuperscript{20} It then provided a detailed discussion of maritime strategic and operational concepts, including sea control, sea denial and command of the sea. In this discussion it drew heavily on many prominent maritime strategic theorists. Although Eric Grove’s typology for navies was not discussed, an overview of maritime operations drew heavily on the Booth Model and Grove’s subsequent refinements, and \textit{Australian Maritime Doctrine} itself substantially developed its own derivative of the model (see Figure 4).\textsuperscript{21}

In its latter chapters, \textit{Australian Maritime Doctrine} offered a justification for the RAN’s fleet structure, explaining the importance of maritime logistics and providing a brief overview of the role of the RAN’s many types of ships.\textsuperscript{22} This discussion appears to have been dually motivated by the desires of explaining the RAN’s activities to the public and justifying its funding requirements to government. This latter motivation is not directly mentioned anywhere in the doctrine, rather, it is the impression one gets from reading the text. In its final chapter, \textit{Australian Maritime Doctrine} briefly examined the future requirements of Australian maritime forces, although discussion was limited to general trends.\textsuperscript{23} As with its discussion of themes in Australian strategic policy, this vagary helped maintain the document’s relevance over a longer timeframe.
Following the positive reception *Australian Maritime Doctrine* received within both the Australian naval community and the public, a companion publication, *The Navy Contribution to Australian Maritime Operations: RAN Doctrine 2*, was released in March 2005. The *Navy Contribution to Australian Maritime Operations* was intentionally developed as a supplement to expand on discussion in the latter part of *Australian Maritime Doctrine*, especially in Chapters 9 and 10. As Vice Admiral Chris Ritchie, RAN, noted in the foreword to *The Navy Contribution to Australian Maritime Operations*:

"Where *Australian Maritime Doctrine* focuses on the strategic rationale for and components of maritime operations, the purpose of this volume is to examine in greater detail the operational capabilities, and indeed limitations, of our Navy."
This intent was made even clearer in the introduction, which stated *The Navy Contribution to Australian Maritime Operations* ‘could be considered to address the general questions: *What is each principal element of the RAN, and how does each operate?*’

As a staff member of the Sea Power Centre – Australia (SPC-A) later explained, the RAN frequently receives enquiries from the media and public along the lines of ‘what do your submarines actually do?’ *The Navy Contribution to Australian Maritime Operations* was written as a public reference the RAN could cite when answering such questions, and it is intended for both internal Navy use and also to provide a platform for public relations and international engagement. As such it is less ‘doctrinal’ *per se* than the conceptually-focused *Australian Maritime Doctrine*. Unlike *Australian Maritime Doctrine*, each chapter of *The Navy Contribution to Australian Maritime Operations* was written by subject matter specialists from within the relevant area of the RAN, under the direction of lead writer Captain Richard McMillan, RAN, then Director of the SPC-A. Because of this, the publication of *The Navy Contribution to Australian Maritime Operations* occurred following an extensive review process to ensure consistency between chapters.

The content of *The Navy Contribution to Australian Maritime Operations* is divided into chapters that each discuss a particular capability, such as command and control and personnel, or the role of a particular type of naval platform, such as patrol boats, submarines, surface combatants and naval aviation. Of note, discussion in the introduction briefly addressed Australian strategic policy developments since 2000, although it is clear from this discussion that *The Navy Contribution to Australian Maritime Operations* was influenced more by existing maritime strategic theory than by developments in Australian national strategy. As such, a brief overview of *Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force*, Australia’s 2000 Defence White Paper, was quickly passed over, with discussion moving on to summarise the roles of navies as established by Booth, before tying these in with recently developed operational concepts such as Network Centric Warfare and effects-based operations.

Overall, *The Navy Contribution to Australian Maritime Operations* succinctly answered the questions it posed for itself, and at the time of writing of this paper it continues to provide the RAN with a useful public relations tool. Because of its focus, however, its utility as a military-strategic or operational level doctrine manual is severely limited, and *Australian Maritime Doctrine* continues to constitute the RAN’s keystone doctrine manual.

The ongoing applicability of the first edition of *Australian Maritime Doctrine* over a longer timeframe than most other doctrine manuals studied was therefore convenient for the RAN, which did not commence production of an updated edition until early 2008. Plans to revise *Australian Maritime Doctrine* as early as 2007 fell through as the RAN was unable to allocate an officer to its doctrine writing position. This was largely due to the RAN’s high operational tempo.
The second edition of *Australian Maritime Doctrine* – which went to print in March 2010 – was developed as an update to, rather than a replacement for, the first edition. Crediting the earlier contribution of now Rear Admiral Goldrick, the acknowledgments section of the second edition essentially admitted that this approach to its development was a deliberate choice on the part of its authors. The development of an updated edition, rather than an outright replacement, should therefore be rightly viewed as a testament to the quality and durability of the first edition.
In light of this approach to the development of the second edition of *Australian Maritime Doctrine*, it is unsurprising that there were several similarities between it and the first edition. The updated version of the Booth Model featured in the second edition (see Figure 5) presents a good example of the similarities between the two editions since, despite some nuances in terminology, the underlying concepts and philosophies remained unchanged.\(^3\)\(^4\) In addition to minor changes of this nature, which can be found throughout the second edition, there were also a few noteworthy major differences between it and the first edition.

The first major difference was the prominence accorded to the discussion of human resources, which was moved from Chapter 8 of the first edition to Chapter 2 of the second. This was due to the launch in 2009 of the Chief of Navy’s New Generation Navy initiative, which had significant structural, cultural and leadership implications.\(^3\)\(^5\) It also increased the prominence of the RAN’s focus on human resource management, which led to suggestions that the chapter of *Australian Maritime Doctrine* that addressed this subject should be moved to the front of the manual.\(^3\)\(^6\) The second major difference was the inclusion of a new chapter entitled ‘The Legal Context’, which detailed the relationship between naval operations and international law.\(^3\)\(^7\) Finally, a chapter addressing the spectrum of operations was added, replacing a two page discussion of the spectrum of conflict that had featured in the first edition.\(^3\)\(^8\) Both of these changes were made in response to feedback received about the first edition.\(^3\)\(^9\)

---

**Notes**

1. Information obtained via email correspondence received on 21 May 2008 from staff of the SPC-A (records on file with author).
3. Department of Defence, *The Defence of Australia 1987*, p. 43
Keystone Doctrine Development in Five Commonwealth Navies


10. The Hawke and Keating governments were in office from 1983 to 1991 and 1991 to 1996 respectively.


14. Information obtained via email correspondence received on 29 April 2008 from a senior RAN officer (records on file with author).


28. Information obtained during an interview conducted by the author on 23 August 2007 with staff of the SPC-A (records on file with author).
30. Information obtained via email correspondence received on 26 March 2010 from staff of the SPC-A (records on file with author).
31. Information obtained during an interview conducted by the author on 23 August 2007 with staff of the SPC-A (records on file with author), supplemented by a telephone conversation on 6 July 2009 between the author and SPC-A staff.
36. Information obtained via email correspondence received on 26 March 2010 from staff of the SPC-A (records on file with author).
39. Information obtained via email correspondence received on 26 March 2010 from staff of the SPC-A (records on file with author).
One month prior to the Canadian navy’s April 1997 publication of Adjusting Course: A Naval Strategy for Canada, the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN), by coincidence, published its own keystone doctrine manual, Maritime Doctrine for the Royal New Zealand Navy. Considerably longer and more philosophical than either of the Canadian navy’s keystone doctrine manuals published during the 1990s, Maritime Doctrine for the Royal New Zealand Navy provided a comprehensive examination of the philosophies underlying sea power and its many uses. Its production, however, was motivated by similar factors to the Canadian manuals, particularly The Naval Vision: Charting the Course for Canada’s Maritime Forces. Similarly to the keystone doctrine manuals produced by the other navies studied, Maritime Doctrine for the Royal New Zealand Navy was not produced in a vacuum; hence, a brief overview of the broader political and strategic circumstances that surrounded its production is warranted.

During the Cold War the RNZN, despite being included in Eric Grove’s typology for navies as a rank five navy, maintained a focus on its military role. Although resource constraints had resulted in a debate developing during the 1960s and 1970s over whether New Zealand needed a ‘blue water’ navy capable of combat operations, this debate was resolved, at least for the coming decade, by a 1978 Defence Review. The review determined that warfighting would remain the primary task of the RNZN as:

The maritime security of New Zealand demanded that the RNZN continue to be a combat force, albeit one impaired by the reduction in the number of its major warships [from six] to three only.\(^1\)

Like the Royal Australian Navy, during the 1970s and 1980s the RNZN participated in several multinational exercises with a warfighting focus, most notably as part of New Zealand’s Five Power Defence Arrangements commitments.\(^2\)

In New Zealand, the ‘ANZUS Crisis’ caused much strategic uncertainty during the late 1980s and early 1990s.\(^3\) The crisis began in early 1985 when the newly-elected Lange Government, in accordance with its anti-nuclear policy, refused a United States (US) request that a US Navy warship capable of carrying nuclear weapons be granted permission to dock in a New Zealand port. In summary, the subsequent crisis involved three years of diplomacy and negotiations on the part of Australia, New Zealand and the US in an ultimately futile attempt to maintain the ANZUS Treaty.\(^4\) By the late 1980s, the US had effectively severed its ANZUS connections with New Zealand, opting instead for the continuation of a bilateral defence relationship with Australia.\(^5\)
For the RNZN, the main implication of the ANZUS Crisis was its official barring from participation in multinational exercises that also involved the US Navy. Despite this, however, the RNZN continued to conduct most of its other activities in the region unabated. Furthermore, New Zealand’s 1987 Defence White Paper, *Defence of New Zealand: Review of Defence Policy 1987*, the culmination of a lengthy review of New Zealand’s national strategy that had commenced following the onset of the ANZUS Crisis, highlighted several areas in which the RNZN would be required to play a leading role. These included the possibility of sea raids against New Zealand, interference with trade routes, harassment of merchant shipping and infringements of New Zealand’s exclusive economic zone. The subsequent 1991 Defence White Paper, *The Defence of New Zealand 1991: A Policy Paper*, was less specific, although it did list several defence priorities which would require the use of naval forces. Paradoxically, through a period of national strategic uncertainty within New Zealand, strategic policy provided clear guidance to the RNZN about its actual and potential roles.

Hence, the aspect of the upheaval that adversely affected the RNZN was not related to a lack of strategic policy guidance. Instead, it was brought about by substantial budget cuts that were made during the early 1990s. Establishing naval tasks within white papers was one thing, providing the fleet structure and covering the operating costs to enable the RNZN to achieve these tasks was another. Between 1990 and 1994, when New Zealand’s strategic policy had recently generated a need for the RNZN to shift its training focus away from its military role and towards a more balanced mix of the roles identified by Ken Booth, the New Zealand defence budget was slashed by 23 per cent. Between 1991 and 1996, the only new acquisition authorised was a much-needed sealift ship, HMNZS Charles Upham. Even this purchase was not without controversy, and the ship was described by one commentator as ‘a passable imitation between a lemon and a white elephant [sic]’. As a result of the fiscal constraints, RNZN capabilities substantially deteriorated during the early and mid-1990s and the lack of acquisitions led to it operating an increasingly obsolescent fleet. It was on the heels of this period that work commenced on the production of *Maritime Doctrine for the Royal New Zealand Navy*.

*Maritime Doctrine for the Royal New Zealand Navy* is an example of the influence that senior officers can have on doctrine development. In this case it was Rear Admiral Jack Welch, RNZN, then Chief of Naval Staff, who was most directly responsible for the development of *Maritime Doctrine for the Royal New Zealand Navy*. Apparently, the impetus underlying his direction that the RNZN produce a keystone doctrine manual began with his attendance at a conference in Wellington in December 1995. Entitled ‘New Zealand’s Maritime Environment and Security’, the conference was significant because it:

> Was effectively the first at which interested parties from shipping, trade, economics, law, fishing, minerals, science, environment, tangata
Whenua [indigenous New Zealanders], government and defence came together under one roof, to share perceptions about New Zealand’s maritime circumstances and security.\textsuperscript{12}

Rear Admiral Welch presented a paper at the conference, which addressed the role of the RNZN in the defence of New Zealand and its interests. His paper also discussed the roles of navies and gave an overview of several concepts such as sea control and sea denial, which would later be expounded upon further in \textit{Maritime Doctrine for the Royal New Zealand Navy}.\textsuperscript{13} Through the conference Welch identified what he considered to be a significant deficiency within the RNZN and the community more broadly – debate about the role of the RNZN.\textsuperscript{14} His introduction to \textit{Maritime Doctrine for the Royal New Zealand Navy} indicates his intent to use doctrine as a means of rectifying this deficiency:

\begin{quote}
Despite such a fundamental interest in the sea, maritime issues are the subject of so little debate in this country. We have no maritime doctrine, and the concepts of sea power are unknown to all but a few … \textit{[Maritime Doctrine for the Royal New Zealand Navy]} is intended to inform and to generate debate.\textsuperscript{15}
\end{quote}

Beyond its intention of generating public debate, the content of \textit{Maritime Doctrine for the Royal New Zealand Navy} indicates that parts of it were written in response to both strategic policy and the period of severe fiscal restraint that was still pervasive at the time of publishing.

The content of \textit{Maritime Doctrine for the Royal New Zealand Navy} was divided into nine chapters. In addition to discussing the levels and principles of war, it addressed several maritime strategic theories.\textsuperscript{16} A chapter was dedicated to discussing the maritime environment; another to the elements and characteristics of sea power; and a third to ‘sea power strategies’, including sea control, sea denial, maritime power projection, and maritime presence and support.\textsuperscript{17} Discussion of these concepts drew on the works of several prominent maritime strategic thinkers, including Sir Julian Corbett, Alfred Mahan, Sergei Gorshkov and Geoffrey Till. The more recent works of Booth and Grove were notably absent from discussion, although the naval roles Booth established were elaborated upon in some detail.\textsuperscript{18} Keystone doctrine produced by the Royal Navy (RN) was also influential as \textit{Maritime Doctrine for the Royal New Zealand Navy} cited the RN’s 1995 edition of \textit{BR 1806: British Maritime Doctrine} several times.\textsuperscript{19}

In Chapters 7 and 8, discussion was linked to New Zealand’s strategic policy and force structure, in particular to \textit{The Defence of New Zealand 1991}, which had established that New Zealand required only a ‘credible minimum’ defence force, yet had failed to define exactly what was meant by this term.\textsuperscript{20} As a result, \textit{Maritime Doctrine for the Royal New Zealand Navy} discussed the credible minimum concept in detail as it related to naval forces, and despite its explicit support for the concept, \textit{Maritime Doctrine for the Royal New Zealand Navy} can be interpreted as an appeal to fund what the RNZN considered
to be a ‘credible minimum’ force structure. Given the tight fiscal circumstances in which Maritime Doctrine for the Royal New Zealand Navy was written, this appeal is understandable. In conclusion, the RNZN’s appeal for funding was reinforced, with Maritime Doctrine for the Royal New Zealand Navy arguing that ‘naval power must be a significant component of the nation’s overall military posture’.

Overall, Maritime Doctrine for the Royal New Zealand Navy presented a detailed account of the RNZN’s organisational strategy and raison d’être at the time of its release. Since its release, however, it has not been superseded, updated or supplemented and remains, at the time of this paper’s writing, the only keystone doctrine manual produced by the RNZN. The lack of a revised edition was most likely due to the departure of Rear Admiral Welch from the position of Chief of Naval Staff, and following his retirement the impetus underlying the production of keystone doctrine in the RNZN seems to have simply disappeared. This is a pity because Maritime Doctrine for the Royal New Zealand Navy was a well-developed document. Indeed, several parts of it remain relevant and if appropriately updated to reflect the much-changed national strategic environment in New Zealand, a revised edition would no doubt provide a useful treatise on New Zealand’s current maritime security environment and on the current strategic direction of the RNZN.

Notes

3. The Australia-New Zealand-United States (ANZUS) security cooperation treaty was signed in 1951. The Governments of Australia, New Zealand and the United States, Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America, signed in San Francisco, 1 September 1951.


11. Information obtained during an interview conducted by the author on 26 April 2007 with staff of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand (records on file with author).


14. Information obtained during an interview conducted by the author on 26 April 2007 with staff of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand (records on file with author).


19. Perhaps the best evidence of the influence *BR 1806: British Maritime Doctrine* had on the development of *Maritime Doctrine for the Royal New Zealand Navy* was that the layout of the chapters in *Maritime Doctrine for the Royal New Zealand Navy* mimicked the layout of the chapters in the 1995 edition of *British Maritime Doctrine*. It must be observed, however, that despite the assertion by one New Zealand academic that *Maritime Doctrine for the Royal New Zealand Navy* plagiarised *British Maritime Doctrine*, a close reading of both texts reveals that this is simply not the case. Although there are several points akin to both manuals, they are no more similar to each other than they are to any of the other doctrine manuals studied herein.


23. Information obtained during an interview conducted by the author on 26 April 2007 with staff of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand (records on file with author).
Similarly to the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN), the story of South African Navy (SAN) doctrine development fits within a relatively short timeframe. This is due to the history of South Africa and its naval forces, the latter coming into existence in the first of many incarnations in 1922. Without going into details superfluous to this study, it is noteworthy that early South African naval doctrine:

- Was wholly imported and adapted from Royal Navy doctrine. It was only with the RSA’s [Republic of South Africa’s] withdrawal from the Commonwealth on 31 May 1961 that other foreign sources gained prominence in the development of doctrine locally.

Shortly after the RSA’s withdrawal from the Commonwealth its security forces became embroiled in a conflict in South West Africa (now Namibia), which progressively expanded first into a full-scale guerrilla war and then later into a conventional war. In all its forms, the conflict lasted for 23 years, from 1966 to 1988.

This conflict was dominated by the RSA’s land and air forces with the SAN playing a very minor role. As the conflict intensified and dragged on, resources were increasingly allocated to land and air forces instead of the SAN, which was eventually forced to change its entire mission as a result. As André Wessels later summarised:

- On 15 August 1980 … the Chief of the SAN made it clear that the frigate era of the SAN was virtually something of the past. The SAN had to adopt a new role: henceforth it would no longer defend the Cape sea-route in the interest of the West, but would concentrate on safeguarding the RSA’s harbours and coasts, in due course becoming a small-ship force.

By the end of the 1980s, the SAN had lost all of the large surface combatants that had constituted the bulk of its strength a quarter of a century earlier. It had, as a result, become a small navy, although one with enough combat power that Eric Grove ranked it, along with the RNZN, as an ‘adjacent force projection navy’, capable of limited power projection some distance from the RSA’s shoreline, but incapable of conducting substantial or sustained operations over any great distance.

Shortly after the conclusion of the conflict in South West Africa, the RSA went through a period of substantial domestic upheaval. The country’s infamous ‘apartheid’ policy rapidly collapsed following the legalisation of several previously banned political organisations in 1990, enabling South Africa’s first truly democratic election to be held in 1994. This election brought, for the first time, a predominantly black political party to power, and was rapidly followed by a series of even broader-ranging reforms. The military was by no means exempt from these reforms, and in April 1994 the South
African Defence Force ceased to exist, with the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) being formed to replace it. A series of defence policy initiatives and further reforms followed.

For the SAN, these reforms were undertaken alongside a budgetary allocation in perpetual decline through the mid-1990s. The budget cuts reached their zenith in the 1997 and 1998 fiscal years, during which the SAN suffered a 58 per cent cut to its operating budget. In the five years that followed, however, things slowly began to improve. On 20 August 1997, the parliament approved a Defence Review proposal to expand the size of the Navy to 25 hulls (plus a further 39 ‘harbour patrol vessels’), supplemented by 16 patrol aircraft and 5 helicopters. Importantly, four corvettes and four submarines were included in the new structure, foreshadowing an expansion of the SAN’s existing capabilities.

Delivery of these new acquisitions began in 2004 and was completed by 2008, although since the initial approval of their acquisition the size of the surface vessels was expanded from corvettes to frigates, and the number of submarines purchased was reduced to three. Regardless of these changes, delivery of the new acquisitions increased the SAN’s capabilities to levels unseen since the early 1980s. Alongside their delivery, the SAN’s role also underwent a major change, shifting away from an almost exclusive focus on coastal and harbour defence and towards a more proactive role in maritime security, and regional aid delivery and peacekeeping missions.

It was against this backdrop that the SAN’s keystone doctrine manual, SANGP 100: Maritime Doctrine for the SA Navy, was released in October 2006. According to the Chief of Navy’s foreword the manual was developed ‘under the auspices of the Director Naval Policy and Doctrine at Navy Office’, although the primary author was Captain Nick Snyman, who was appointed as Senior Staff Officer Doctrine within the Navy Office. The manual was developed over a period of approximately 18 months, and the timing of its development and release was closely related to the aforementioned political and strategic circumstances. This relationship was later confirmed by one of the manual’s authors, who asserted:

In the late 90s and early 2000s the SANDF transformed and various new high level documents were produced … It seemed a very good time to get our SAN manuals in order too. One of them was the ‘Maritime Doctrine of the SA Navy’.

Another senior SAN officer went into even more detail, stating that:

The SAN was on the threshold of acquiring new platforms, associated logistic infrastructure and processes. In being a navy in transition, it had to deal with being, essentially, three navies at once: past, present and future … SANGP 100 was really a matelot’s [sailor’s] chart for the course ahead.
Finally, the manual was also intended to explain, in a single volume, what the SAN’s mandate was, and how and why this mandate was executed. Although the manual was written with accessibility in mind for those outside of the Navy, some of its authors have indicated that it was primarily pitched internally, to both senior and junior officers.\(^\text{18}\)

The content of *Maritime Doctrine for the SA Navy* comprised of eight chapters, the first of which discussed the meaning and significance of ‘doctrine’ itself.\(^\text{19}\) Chapters 2 and 3 provided a background for those that followed, discussing the South African maritime environment and several maritime strategic concepts.\(^\text{20}\) These concepts included command of the sea, sea control, sea denial and maritime power projection.\(^\text{21}\) The Booth Model and the corresponding constabulary, diplomatic and military roles of navies were also discussed in some detail, with a diagrammatical representation being included (see Figure 6). This appears to have been derived from the versions contained in the first edition of *Australian Maritime Doctrine: RAN Doctrine 1* and *The Navy Contribution to Australian Maritime Operations: RAN Doctrine 2*.\(^\text{22}\)

![Figure 6: The Booth Model – South African Navy Version\(^\text{23}\)](image-url)
The manual’s most substantial chapter was Chapter 4. This chapter, entitled ‘The Application of Maritime Power in the South African Context’, tied the previous chapters’ discussion together by providing an overview of how the SAN’s assets were employed to achieve the tasks established in national strategic policy. Importantly, it asserted that ‘as no conventional military maritime threat against the RSA currently exists, most of the tasks that the SA Navy conducts are within the Diplomatic and Policing roles’. It also discussed the Navy’s military-strategic objectives, prior to discussing how each of the Navy’s different vessel classes contributed to achieving these objectives.

Chapters 5, 6 and 7 were substantially narrower in focus, each respectively detailing the Navy’s command and control processes, its human resource management and its logistic support. Finally, in Chapter 8, Maritime Doctrine for the SA Navy briefly discussed the SAN’s future requirements, highlighting the need for the acquisition of an amphibious capability, as well as the need to keep abreast of technological advances.

Following its release, Maritime Doctrine for the SA Navy seems to have had little, if any, impact. This is most likely due to its very limited distribution, which was almost entirely internal to the SAN. Despite this, one of the writing team members asserted that the manual has played an important, if occasional, role as both a dispute resolution mechanism when members of the SAN have disagreed over the organisation’s role, and as ‘a higher order manual that can be used as “top cover”’. Furthermore, the development of the manual appears to have generated a considerable level of debate within the SAN, although this petered out prior to the manual’s publication.

Despite its apparent lack of impact, however, there has been a general satisfaction within the SAN that the manual has achieved its intent, as it provides a clear, written statement of the Navy’s mandate that is readily available if required. Since its release in 2006 there has been no attempt to review it or to develop a subsequent edition. Instead, work has commenced on a maritime strategy document, to be titled Upholding the Freedom of Our Seas: The South African Navy’s Maritime Military Strategy. Development of this document is still in its early stages and is proceeding slowly.
Notes

15. This assertion was later confirmed by a member of the writing team. South African Navy, *SANGP 100*, p. 3; supplemented by information obtained via email correspondence received on 16 February 2010 from a senior SAN officer (records on file with author).

16. Information obtained via email correspondence received on 16 February 2010 from a senior SAN officer (records on file with author).

17. Information obtained via email correspondence received on 19 February 2010 from a senior SAN officer (records on file with author).

18. Information obtained via email correspondence received on 16 and 19 February 2010 from two senior SAN officers (records on file with author).


22. South African Navy, *SANGP 100*, pp. 33-6. In *Maritime Doctrine for the SA Navy*’s Foreword, Admiral J Mudimu asserted that the content had been influenced by the doctrine of several allied navies, and he specifically mentioned the Royal Navy, Royal Australian Navy and Indian Navy as particularly influential. This assertion, subsequently confirmed by information collected as part of this study, renders unsurprising this similarity between *Maritime Doctrine for the SA Navy* on one hand, and *Australian Maritime Doctrine: RAN Doctrine 1* and *The Navy Contribution to Australian Maritime Operations: RAN Doctrine 2* on the other. South African Navy, *SANGP 100*, p. 3, supplemented by information obtained via email correspondence received on 19 February 2010 from a senior SAN officer (records on file with author).


28. Information obtained via email correspondence received on 16 February 2010 from a senior SAN officer (records on file with author).

29. Information obtained via email correspondence received on 16 and 19 February 2010 from two senior SAN officers (records on file with author).

30. Information obtained via email correspondence received on 16 and 19 February 2010 from two senior SAN officers (records on file with author).

8. Conclusion

Throughout its examination of keystone doctrine development in the Canadian navy, Indian Navy (IN), Royal Australian Navy (RAN), Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) and South African Navy (SAN), this study has focused on three areas:

- The factors influential during the production of each keystone doctrine manual.
- The intended and actual effects each manual had following its release.
- The significance of the content of each manual.

In each of these three areas it is possible to determine several overarching themes, which together reveal much about the nature, role and significance of keystone doctrine within the navies studied.

Regarding the factors that were influential during the production of each keystone doctrine manual, four key influences have remained prominent in all five navies studied. These influences were:

- the role of individual officers, sometimes in senior positions but more often as members of doctrine writing teams or as individual authors
- the influence of keystone doctrine manuals produced by allied navies, particularly the Royal Navy (RN)
- the operational experiences of the navies studied and their allies
- the role of navies within the prevailing national strategy.

The relative influence of these four factors did, however, vary between navies as well as between individual keystone doctrine manuals. These variances occurred due to the broader political environment in which each manual was produced, with factors such as acquisition programs (or lack thereof), changes in the naval roles prioritised within different strategic policy documents, public relations concerns and the personalities and agendas of key individual officers all contributing to the complex and fluid nature of this environment. Despite variations in the relative influence of each of these four factors, all were influential to a varying extent in the development of all of the keystone doctrine manuals studied, with the exception of The Naval Vision: Charting the Course for Canada’s Maritime Forces into the 21st Century, which was not influenced by keystone doctrine manuals produced by allied navies due to its relatively early release date.  

The intended and actual effects of their keystone doctrine manuals present another similarity between the navies studied. Specifically, each navy used keystone doctrine
as a mechanism for explaining how it contributed to achieving its country’s national military strategy. To this end, the content of keystone doctrine manuals established ‘what is essentially a conceptual framework distilling wisdom from the corpus of work on maritime strategic theory’, in order to explain what navies had to offer strategic policymakers and governments at a foundational level. The reason the navies studied used their keystone doctrine for this purpose was most likely cultural, although this in itself has several important dimensions.

The first dimension is that the navies studied all suffered due to public ignorance about what they did and why. As Peter Haydon observed, ‘because the majority of Canadians do not understand or even recognise the maritime dimensions of their country, naval programs seldom enjoy public or political support’. Although this was written about Canada, a similar assertion could be made about Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and, despite a recent rise in Indian public interest in maritime affairs, India. In an attempt to rectify this situation, one of the intended effects of keystone naval doctrine was to increase public awareness about what navies did and why they did it.

The second important dimension of naval culture in the five navies studied was caused by high relative importance of platforms such as warships, submarines and helicopters. To a much greater extent than army operations, and at least on par with air force operations, naval operations could be said to be platform-driven. The impact this platform-driven culture had on doctrine development in the navies studied was that it led to an emphasis within doctrine on explaining the role and importance of fighting platforms.

Closely linked to this was the most important intended role of keystone naval doctrine – the generation of political and strategic policy support for the acquisition and maintenance of naval platforms. In some cases this intended effect was quite obvious, with the direct link between the production of Adjusting Course: A Naval Strategy for Canada and the Canadian navy’s campaign to bring about the Upholder class submarine purchase being the most prominent example. In most cases, however, this intent manifested itself more subtlety. In addition to increasing public awareness about how navies contributed to achieving strategic policy goals, doctrine was also intended to generate awareness among strategic policymakers, who would ultimately decide on acquisitions and funding for the maintenance of existing platforms.

Aside from the factors already discussed, an important enabler of this intent underlying keystone naval doctrine development was the fairly consistent nature of the naval operations undertaken by those navies studied. As outlined in Chapter 2, naval operations have always fit within the three categories identified by Ken Booth – diplomatic, policing and military. This has remained consistent even though the training emphasis has shifted over time. Furthermore, every time a ship goes to sea, even if only for training purposes, the situation is operational, if only because of the unpredictable and potentially dangerous environment in which navies operate. Finally,
naval operations are inherently flexible, and on a single voyage a warship is capable of undertaking several missions, each of which may fall under the auspices of any of the different naval roles identified by Booth. The result of this combination of factors is that keystone naval doctrine can afford to focus primarily on shaping national strategic rather than operational level events.

As briefly mentioned previously, the content of keystone naval doctrine manuals established ‘what is essentially a conceptual framework distilling wisdom from the corpus of work on maritime strategic theory’. For the navies studied, the incorporation of the academic discourse into keystone doctrine has provided a convenient means of enabling doctrine to fulfil its intended role of explaining what navies have to offer strategic policy-makers and governments. Excellent examples of this occurrence are the discussion of Eric Grove’s typology for navies in *Leadmark: The Navy’s Strategy for 2020* and the incorporation of derivatives of the Booth Model into Canadian navy, RAN and SAN keystone doctrine. Discussion of other maritime strategic theories, including command of the sea, sea control, sea denial and maritime power projection, was also prominently featured within the doctrine of all five navies.

Beyond the influence of existing academic works about naval strategic theory, individual officers in key positions, as well as the content of keystone doctrine manuals produced by allied navies, both played a key role in shaping the content of naval doctrine. In the case of individual officers, their work as members of doctrine writing teams directly influenced the content of doctrine manuals, although the support of senior individual officers, such as the respective navies’ presiding senior most officer, was also fundamental to the successful initiation, production and distribution of keystone doctrine.

The influence of keystone doctrine manuals produced by allied navies was the result of a mixture of historic factors and more pragmatic, contemporary concerns. Of primary historical importance is that the culture of all five navies studied is derived from that of the RN. Although the passage of time has resulted in the emergence of unique derivatives of this culture within each of the navies studied, the common foundation provided by this historical link is still evident in their operational practices, as well as in their conceptual and doctrinal leanings. In light of this commonality it is unsurprising that each of the navies studied has, during the formulation of its own keystone doctrine manuals, been influenced by the manuals previously released by the others, and especially by the RN itself.

Contemporary concerns are generally related to the nature of naval operations, which necessitate that allied navies work together frequently and at all levels of conflict. As a result of this requirement, allied naval operations often blend into one, for example in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea, where Canadian navy and RAN ships frequently support United States Navy-led fleets. Furthermore, combined naval exercises often
mirror this operational practise, as was the case during the combined exercise held by the Indian, South African and Brazilian navies in May 2008.7

Yet the influence of keystone doctrine manuals produced by allied navies has, to date, remained *ad hoc* and informal. Although the navies studied participated in formalised interoperability forums, for example the Australia-Canada-New Zealand-United Kingdom-United States Organisation (commonly known as AUSCANNZUKUS), these forums tended to focus on technical issues, such as command, control, communications and computer technology interoperability, rather than on naval keystone doctrine development.8

On the whole, keystone naval doctrine has provided an important tool that the Canadian navy, IN, RAN, RNZN and SAN have all used to pragmatically promote their interests. It has done this by offering policy makers, the general public and even naval officers themselves an explanation of the importance of the role navies play in fulfilling strategic policy objectives. Yet in the process of achieving this goal, keystone naval doctrine has come to play an even more important role, one in which it defines and explains how the application of naval power fits within the framework of both national strategy and maritime strategic theory.

Notes

1. The extent to which individual officers contributed during the development of *Indian Maritime Doctrine* is also unknown, as all those involved in the development of this manual were either not contactable or were unwilling to participate in the collection of data for this study. Despite this, it is still possible to conclude that several officers contributed to varying extents during its development. This is evidenced by Admiral Madhvendra Singh’s foreword, which stated ‘I would like to gratefully acknowledge the invaluable contribution of the large number of persons who have made this publication possible’. Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence (Navy), *INBR 8: Indian Maritime Doctrine* (1st edn), New Delhi, 2004, p. iv.
4. Even *SANGP 100: Maritime Doctrine for the SA Navy*, while almost exclusively aimed at SAN officers, was developed with accessibility by those outside of the Navy in mind.
5. Eric Grove’s typology for navies is, in turn, a useful mechanism for determining the *scale* on which each of the navies studied could reasonably be expected to perform operations within each of these categories.


Keystone Doctrine Development in Five Commonwealth Navies
Index

A

Adjusting Course: A Naval Strategy for Canada 18-21, 24, 25, 36-7, 55, 68
Afghanistan 33
aircraft carrier(s) 13 (n.23), 15, 34, 36
anti-piracy; see Piracy
anti-submarine warfare 15, 26 (n.6)
ANZUS Crisis 55-6, 58 (n.4)
ANZUS Treaty 55-6, 58 (n.3)
apartheid 61, 65 (n.7)
Arabian Sea 23, 69
Atlantic Ocean 15, 16
AUSCANZUKUS 70
Australia 39, 45-53, 55, 68
Australian Army 46
Australian Defence Force 46
Australian Maritime Doctrine: RAN Doctrine 1 (1st edn) 5, 45, 46-8, 49, 52 (n.16), 63, 66 (n.22)
Australian Maritime Doctrine: RAN Doctrine 1 (2nd edn) 9, 49-51

B

Booth Model, the 9-10, 19, 22, 23-4, 37, 38, 47-8, 50-1, 63, 69
Booth, Ken 9-10, 12 (n.1), 15, 19, 37, 46, 49, 56, 57, 68-9
BR 1806: The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine (all edns) 19, 27 (n.17), 52 (n.16), 57, 59 (n.19)
Brazil 34, 70
Britain 18, 19-20, 31-2
British Army 2 (n.2)

C

Canada 15-30, 36-7, 47, 68
Canadian air force 17, 23
Canadian army (post-unification) 17, 23
Canadian Army (pre-unification) 26 (n.4)
Canadian Defence Policy 1992; see Defence Policy Statement (Canada)
Canadian Forces 4, 15, 17, 25, 26 (n.4, n.5, n.11), 30 (n.68)
Canadian Naval Board 15
Canadian navy 1, 3, 6 (n.14), 11, 13 (n.22), 15-30, 31, 36-7, 46, 51-2 (n.6), 55, 67-70
Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada 16, 18
Chalmers, Vice Admiral Donald 46
Chatterji, Vice Admiral AK 32
China 32, 35
Chrétien Government (Canada) 16, 18, 28 (n.28)
Chrétien, Jean 16
Codner, Michael 1
Cold Start War Doctrine (Indian Army) 36, 42-3 (n.43)
Cold War, the 15-6, 18, 24, 33, 34, 55
command of the sea 9, 47, 63, 69
Corbett, Sir Julian 12 (n.1), 37, 57
counter-terrorism 39
Craven, Michael 18-9

D

Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force (Australia) 49, 52 (n.12)
Defence of Australia 1987, The 45
Defence of New Zealand: Review of Defence Policy 1987 56
Defence Policy Statement (Canada) 16
Defence Review (Australia, 2000) 46, 52 (n.12)
Defence Review (New Zealand, 1978) 55
Defence Review (South Africa, 1997) 62
Directorate of Maritime Strategy (Canada) 21

E

East Timor 46
effects-based operations 49
Exclusive economic zone 33, 34, 56
Exercise RIM OF THE PACIFIC 45, 51-2 (n.6)

F

fighting instructions 1, 2 (n.1), 4
Five Power Defence Arrangement 45, 55
fleet orders 1, 4
Force Structure Review (Australia) 46
Frame, Tom 15, 46

Freedom to Use the Seas: India’s Maritime Military Strategy 38-9, 44 (n.62)
From Phantom to Force: Towards a More Efficient and Effective Army (Australia) 46

G

Gimblett, Richard 21, 23
Global War on Terrorism; see Terrorism
Goldrick, Rear Admiral James 32, 46-7, 50
Gorshkov, Admiral Sergei 15, 57
Gray, Colin 12 (n.1)
Grove, Eric 10-1, 12 (n.11, n.14), 19-20, 57, 61
Grove’s typology for navies; see Typology for navies
Gulf War, the (1990-91) 11, 33, 46

H

Harper Government (Canada) 29 (n.65)
Hawke Government (Australia) 46, 52 (n.10)
Haydon, Peter 18, 20, 68
Hellyer, Paul 15
Hillier, Lieutenant General Rick 26 (n.11)
HMNZS Charles Upham 56, 59 (n.10)

I

INBR 8: Indian Maritime Doctrine (1st edn) 31, 35-9, 42-3 (n.43), 70 (n.1)
Leadmark: The Navy’s Strategy for 2020 (Canadian navy) 13 (n.22), 21-3, 24-5, 28-9 (n.48), 30 (n.68), 47, 69

levels of conflict 4-5, 6 (n.15, n.16), 69

M

Maddison, Vice Admiral Paul 21
Mahan, Alfred Thayer 12 (n.1), 37, 57
Malacca Strait 33
Maldives 34
Mandela, Nelson 66 (n.31)
manoeuvre 35-6

Maritime Capability Perspective Plan (Indian Navy) 38

Maritime Doctrine for the Royal New Zealand Navy 47, 55, 56-8, 59 (n.19)

Maritime Doctrine for the SA Navy; see SANGP 100: Maritime Doctrine for the SA Navy

maritime power projection; see power projection

Maritime Studies Program (Australia) 45, 46, 52 (n.13)
Martin Government (Canada) 23
McFadden, Vice Admiral Dean 25, 30 (n.68)
McMillan, Captain Richard 49
Mehta, Admiral Sureesh 38
Mohan, C Raja 33
Monroe Doctrine 37, 43 (n.52)
Moore, John 52 (n.12)
Mozambique 34
Mudimu, Admiral J 66 (n.22)
Mulroney Government (Canada) 18

N

Namibia; see South West Africa
NATO 4, 6 (n.14), 15
Naval Doctrine Publication 1: Naval Warfare (US Navy) 17, 27 (n.17, n.18)
Naval Vision: Charting the Course for Canada’s Maritime Forces, The 16-8, 19, 24, 25, 27 (n.18, n.22), 28 (n.28), 55, 67
Navy Contribution to Australian Maritime Operations, The: RAN Doctrine 2 48-9, 63, 66 (n.22)
Network Centric Warfare 49
New Generation Navy (Australia) 51
New Zealand 47, 55-9, 68
non-alignment 31, 33
nuclear deterrence 35, 36, 37
nuclear powered submarines 13 (n.23), 15, 18, 34, 35, 36-7, 38, 44 (n.62)
nuclear weapons 15, 35, 36, 42 (n.38), 55

O

Oberon class submarines 18
Operation APOLLO 23

P

Pacific Ocean 16, 45, 46
Pakistan 31, 32, 33, 34-5, 41 (n.8, n.22)
Pakistan Navy 31, 33
Persian Gulf 11, 23, 69

piracy 39
power projection 9, 19, 22, 35, 42 (n.41), 57, 63, 69
principles of war, the 35, 40, 57

R

Republic of South Africa 61, 64 revolution in military affairs 35-6
Richmond, Herbert 12 (n.1)
RIMPAC; see Exercise RIM OF THE PACIFIC
Ritchie, Vice Admiral Chris 48
Royal Air Force 2 (n.2)
Royal Australian Navy 1, 4, 6 (n.14, n.16), 11, 13 (n.22), 31, 45-53, 55, 66 (n.22), 67-70
Royal Canadian Air Force 26 (n.4)
Royal Canadian Navy 15, 26 (n.4, n.5), 31
Royal Indian Navy 31
Royal Navy 1, 2 (n.1, n.4), 6 (n.14), 19, 21, 27 (n.17), 31, 32, 47, 52 (n.16), 57, 61, 66 (n.22), 67, 69
Royal New Zealand Navy 1, 4, 11, 13 (n.22), 31, 47, 55-9, 61, 67-70
Russian Navy 12 (n.18)

S

SANGP 100: Maritime Doctrine for the SA Navy 62-4, 68 (n.22), 70 (n.4)
Scott, David 34, 37
sea control 9, 11, 19, 22, 35, 47, 57, 63, 69
sea denial 9, 11, 19, 22, 33, 35, 47, 57, 63, 69
Sea Power Centre – Australia 49, 52 (n.13)

*Securing Canada’s Ocean Frontiers: Charting the Course from Leadmark* (Canadian navy) 23-4, 29 (n.59)

Shackleton, Vice Admiral David 46-7

*Shaping the Future of the Canadian Forces: A Strategy for 2020; see Strategy 2020*

Singh, Admiral Madhvendra 70 (n.1)

Singh, Manmohan 34

Snyman, Captain Nick 62

South Africa 34, 61-6, 68

- Air forces 61
- Land forces 61

South African Army; see South Africa, Land forces

South African Defence Force 61-2

South African National Defence Force 62

South African Navy 1, 4, 11, 13 (n.22), 61-6, 67-70

South West Africa 61

Soviet Navy 12 (n.18), 15

Soviet Union 15-6, 32-3, 45

Special Committee of the Senate and House of Commons (Canada) 16

*Strategy 2020* (Canada) 21, 22

T

terrorism 23, 39

terrorist attacks(s); see terrorism

Till, Geoffrey 12 (n.1), 57

Timor Leste; see East Timor

typology for navies 10-1, 22, 23, 47, 55, 61, 69, 71 (n.5)

U

unification (of the Canadian Forces) 15, 26 (n.4, n.5)

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; see Soviet Union

United Kingdom; see Britain

United States, 27 (n.18), 32, 33, 34, 41 (n.8), 43 (n.52), 55

United States Navy 11, 12 (n. 14), 15, 17, 21, 27 (n.17, n.18), 33, 45, 47, 55-6, 69

*Upholder* class submarines 18-9, 20, 30 (n.28), 36-7, 68

*Upholding the Freedom of Our Seas: The South African Navy’s Maritime Military Strategy* 64, 66 (n.31)

US Navy; see ‘United States Navy’

V

Vajpayee, Atal Behari 34

*Victoria* class submarines 28 (n.30)

W

War on Terrorism; see Terrorism

Welch, Rear Admiral Jack 56-8, 59 (n.15)

Wessels, André 61

World Economic Forum 34

World War II 15

Symbols

*1994 White Paper on Defence* (Canada) 16, 17-8, 21
Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs

The Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs series consists of refereed publications containing original research on regional maritime issues.

No. 1 From Empire Defence to the Long Haul: Post-war Defence Policy and its Impact on Naval Force Structure Planning 1945–1955 by Hector Donohue

No. 2 No Easy Answers: The Development of the Navies of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka 1945–1996 by James Goldrick

No. 3 Coastal Shipping: The Vital Link by Mary Ganter

No. 4 Australian Carrier Decisions: The Decisions to Procure HMA Ships Albatross, Sydney and Melbourne by Anthony Wright

No. 5 Issues in Regional Maritime Strategy: Papers by Foreign Visiting Military Fellows with the Royal Australian Navy Maritime Studies Program – 1998 edited by David Wilson

No. 6 Australia’s Naval Inheritance: Imperial Maritime Strategy and the Australia Station 1880–1909 by Nicholas A Lambert

No. 7 Maritime Aviation: Prospects for the 21st Century edited by David Stevens

No. 8 Maritime War in the 21st Century: The Medium and Small Navy Perspective edited by David Wilson

No. 9 HMAS Sydney II: The Cruiser and the Controversy in the Archives of the United Kingdom edited by Peter Hore

No. 10 The Strategic Importance of Seaborne Trade and Shipping: A Common Interest of Asia Pacific edited by Andrew Forbes

No. 11 Protecting Maritime Resources: Boundary Delimitation, Resource Conflicts and Constabulary Responsibilities edited by Barry Snushall and Rachael Heath

No. 12 Australian Maritime Issues 2004: SPC-A Annual edited by Glenn Kerr

No. 13 Future Environmental Policy Trends to 2020 edited by Glenn Kerr and Barry Snushall

No. 14 Peter Mitchell Essays 2003 edited by Glenn Kerr

No. 15 A Critical Vulnerability: The Impact of the Submarine Threat on Australia’s Maritime Defence 1915–1954 by David Stevens

No. 17  *Australian Naval Personalities* edited by Gregory P Gilbert

No. 18  *ADF Training in Australia’s Maritime Environment* edited by Chris Rahman and Robert J Davitt

No. 19  *Australian Maritime Issues 2006: SPC-A Annual* edited by Andrew Forbes and Michelle Lovi

No. 20  *The Russian Pacific Fleet: From the Crimean War to Perestroika* by Alexey D Muraviev

No. 21  *Australian Maritime Issues 2007: SPC-A Annual* edited by Andrew Forbes

No. 22  *Freedom of Navigation in the Indo-Pacific Region* by Stuart Kaye

No. 23  *Asian Energy Security: Regional Cooperation in the Malacca Strait* edited by Andrew Forbes

No. 24  *The Global Maritime Partnership Initiative: Implications for the Royal Australian Navy* by Chris Rahman

No. 25  *Missing Pieces: The Intelligence Jigsaw and RAN Operations 1939–71* by Ian Pfennigwerth

No. 26  *A Historical Appreciation of the Contribution of Naval Air Power* by Andrew T Ross and James M Sandison with an introduction by Jack McCaffrie

No. 27  *Australian Maritime Issues 2008: SPC-A Annual* edited by Gregory P Gilbert and Nick Stewart

No. 28  *Presence, Power Projection and Sea Control: The RAN in the Gulf 1990–2009* edited by John Mortimer and David Stevens

No. 29  *HMAS Leeuwin: The Story of the RAN’s Junior Recruits* by Brian Adams

No. 30  *Maritime Capacity Building in the Asia-Pacific Region* edited by Andrew Forbes

No. 31  *Australia’s Response to Piracy: Legal Issues* edited by Andrew Forbes

No. 32  *Australian Maritime Issues 2010: SPC-A Annual* edited by Gregory P Gilbert and Michelle Jellett

No. 33  *Keystone Doctrine Development in Five Commonwealth Navies: A Comparative Perspective* by Aaron P Jackson
International Sea Power

The *Foundations of International Thinking on Sea Power* series consists of refereed publications containing original research, both historical and contemporary, on how various states perceive the necessity for, and the use of, sea power.

No. 1 *Ancient Egyptian Sea Power and the Origin of Maritime Forces* by Gregory P Gilbert

No. 2 *Japanese Sea Power: A Maritime Nation’s Struggle for Identity* by Naoko Sajima and Kyoichi Tachikawa

Working Papers

The *Working Paper* series consists of publications aimed at encouraging discussion on naval and maritime issues. They are not generally refereed.

No. 16 *Royal Australian Navy Aerospace Capability 2020–2030* by Robert Hosick

No. 17 *The New South Wales Reserve Naval Legal Panel – 40 Years of Service* by Members of the Naval Reserve Legal Panel (Limited distribution)


No. 19 *An Effects-Based Anti-Submarine Warfare Strategy* by Mark Hammond

No. 20 *Strength Through Diversity: The Combined Naval Role in Operation STABILISE* by David Stevens