RAN Reading List
Classical Maritime strategy
Strategy is defined as the art and science of developing and employing instruments of national power in a synchronised and integrated fashion to achieve theatre, national, and/or multinational objectives. While the scientific study of military strategy developed from the experience of the Napoleonic wars, especially with the writings of Clausewitz, maritime strategy was not treated in such a disciplined manner until the later part of the 19th century. The classical maritime strategists identified the fundamentals of sea power from detailed studies of historical parallels. The classical maritime strategists derived the basic concepts that have evolved into modern naval and maritime doctrine. Although much has changed since some of these strategists wrote, the fundamentals of maritime strategy have not significantly changed. This section also includes more recent reassessments of classical maritime strategy based upon such historical precedents.
The Influence of Seapower upon History 1660-1783
by Alfred T. Mahan
published by Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1890 (numerous later reprints)
Authorship is not something that has often been attempted by naval officers and there are not many books written by naval officers as there are by their contemporaries in the army and air force. The chief problem this causes is that it is difficult to promote the nature and use of naval power to those outside naval service. In spite of this Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan USN was one of the first people to have published a case for the utility of maritime power. Though there are several other important maritime strategists who were Mahan's contemporaries, it was his work that captured the imagination of the widest audience. The Influence of Seapower upon History was one of the most widely known books of the late l9th and early 20th centuries. It described the crucial role played by the Royal Navy in Britain's rise to world power, extolling the virtues of maritime power in lengthy though sometimes memorable fashion. Mahan's thesis was that commerce was fundamental to maritime power, and that the best way to threaten and/or defend it was to engage the enemy's most powerful forces in decisive battle. There have been many people who have disagreed with almost all portions of Mahan's work; however, Mahan was crucial in opening up the subject to serious and widespread consideration, and while much of the criticism of his work is justified, other portions have remained influential to this day.
Some Principles of Maritime Strategy
by Julian S. Corbett
published by Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1988 (numerous reprints)
Some Principles of Maritime Strategy was first published in 1911, the result of lectures Corbett gave to the Naval War College during the preceding decade. It did not gain the wide acceptance of Mahan's earlier work; indeed there was a considerable reaction against Corbett's ideas and influence within, and without, the Royal Navy. Though Corbett agreed with Mahan on the importance of the sea as a means of communication, he did not support the Mahanian idea that 'decisive battle' was the paramount means to
achieve control of the sea and to secure the sea lanes of communication. This ran counter to the Royal Navy's Nelsonian tradition and the cult of the offensive. The fact that Corbett was a civilian did not help either; many naval officers displayed an unfortunate view that only they could truly appreciate naval strategy. Corbett believed that decisive battle was difficult to orchestrate, as an inferior enemy would most likely not accept the engagement unless there was no alternative: if the objective of maintaining communications could be achieved without battle then there was no reason to seek battle for its own sake. There is further divergence in Mahan's and Corbett's views on the ultimate objectives of maritime power. Whereas Mahan argued strongly for the decisive nature of seapower, Corbett viewed it as a means to an end which was found ashore. This was based on the fact that man lived on land and not the sea. It will be a question of fundamental importance to maritime forces to see whether this will remain true in an era of increased national jurisdiction over the high seas. Some Principles of Maritime Strategy did have failings; most significantly its denigration of the convoy as a valid means of trade protection. Nonetheless it remains one of the seminal works on maritime strategy and is highly recommended.
Statesmen and Sea Power
by Herbert Richmond
published by Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1946
Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond was one of the most influential naval strategists in the 20th century. Statesmen and Seapower was based on a series of lectures delivered at Oxford University in 1943. It is a superb exposition on the uses of sea power by the Royal Navy over a period of 500 years. Perhaps the most famous quotation from this book is 'Command of the sea is the indispensable basis of security, and whether the instrument which exercises that command swims, floats or flies is a mere matter of detail.' This is a superb example of breadth of vision uninhibited by service rivalries and is an excellent starting point for any consideration of the future shape of maritime war.
Strategic Theories
by Raouel Castex, (translated by Eugenia Kiesling)
published by Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1994
Military historian Eugenia Kiesling offers, in the first English translation, the essence of France's most important modern naval strategist Admiral Raoul Castex. His original five-volume study, Theories Strategiques, written between 1931 and 1939, is presented as a one-volume abridgement in a very readable translation. Castex's ideas are relevant today for smaller navies which do not have the economic strength to maintain sea control in the manner of a naval superpower. The application of strategic manoeuvre remains relevant to modern naval warfare, and has been used albeit in a modified form as a tenet of Australia's approach to warfare.
The Development of Naval Thought: Essays by Herbert Rosinski
by B. Mitchell Simpson III published by Naval War College Press, Newport, 1977
Herbert Rosinski was a member of staff at the German Naval Staff College until 1936 when he left for England to escape persecution under the Nazi regime. After that he held a variety of positions in England and the United States writing on various aspects of contemporary military affairs and strategy. This collection of his essays concentrates on the writings on Mahan and Corbett. The essays examine conflict between states, the purpose of such conflict and relationships between tactics, strategy and logistics. Of particular note is the essay on 'German Theories of Sea Warfare', which examines the questions of what is the objective of sea power if sea control cannot be obtained. Rather than the theories of sea control derived from predominant navies such as the RN and USN, examination of German naval thought may be more relevant to Australia's Navy if it has to operate without a 'great and powerful friend'.
The Leverage of Sea Power: The Strategic Advantage of Navies in War
by Colin S. Gray published by Macmillan, New York, 1992
The Leverage of Seapower examines grand strategy in ten case studies, starting with the Persian invasion of Greece in 480-479 BC and ending with the Cold War. The basic contention is that a nation whose natural strength is based in seapower, such as Britain or the United States, has an advantage over a land-based power such as Germany or the USSR. This is not an automatic advantage, rather one which stems from the flexibility gained from the successful use of the sea. It is not an argument for the dominance of seapower to the exclusion of land or air power, as all forms of power must be successfully combined to construct a truly successful grand strategy. This book examines the different natures of various forms of power and their intrinsic advantages and disadvantages.
Maritime Supremacy and the Opening of the Western Mind: Naval Campaigns that Shaped the Modern World, 1588-1782
by Peter Padfield published by Pimlico, London, 2000 and
Maritime Power and Struggle for Freedom: Naval Campaigns that Shaped the Modern World 1788-1851
by Peter Padfield published by John Murray, London, 2003
Charting a similar course to Mahan, Corbett and Paul Kennedy among others, Peter Padfield is the latest researcher to explore the strategic advantages of maritime power, mercantilist capitalism and liberal societies. Where Mahan and Corbett explored Britain's history to draw global strategic conclusions, and Kennedy focused on the economic context of Britain's rise and decline, Padfield sets himself a dual challenge: exploring the societies of the opposing maritime and continental nations, and analysing the significant
naval battles of three centuries and the commanders who fought them. The result of this research is his claim that liberal western beliefs now dominate the globe because of the maritime dominance of, successively, the Dutch, British and American societies that refined and ultimately exported the structures and methods that had gained each that dominance. The first volume covers the period from the Spanish Armada through to the development of Dutch maritime supremacy and its decline in favour of Britain. The second covers the British mastering of France and the developing rivalry between Britain and the United States. To the student of naval history, these narratives cover the reasonably familiar grounds of the political and strategic considerations of governments, to detailed descriptions of the tactical manoeuvring at sea. What will be new to many is the coverage of the foundations and mores of each society, including for example the details and psychological influences of the Dutch Golden Age and the French Revolution, to the scientific basis of the significant technologies that enabled both societal and military growth. These books cover a broad canvas in very bold strokes - from the gun deck to the cabinet room via the treasury, the law court, the market, foundry and drawing room. They are a fluent blend of facts and ideas that deserve to be read and considered by all military professionals.
Origins of the Maritime Strategy: the Development of American Naval Strategy 1945-1955
by Michael A. Palmer
published by Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1990
During the 1980s and 1990s, the United States Navy's strategy was outlined in 'The Maritime Strategy of the 1980s', '...From the Sea' and 'Forward...from the Sea' and subsequently they were received as new ways in which the USN approaches conflict. To some extent that is true, but more than providing new ideas, they demonstrate a consistency in some fundamentals of naval planning: control of the sea is but a means to an end ashore achieved by balanced forces and forward deployment. That we consider these recent publications to be almost revolutionary is a demonstration of a short term corporate memory. The strategic situation facing the United States and Australia is not completely dissimilar from that which existed in the late 1940s and 1950s. Origins of the Maritime Strategy discusses the background to, and development of, the US Maritime Strategy in the decade after the WWII. It is a reminder that despite the apparent pace of change many constants remain, a fact, which could be of considerable benefit to strategic planning today.
The Seapower of the State
by Sergei G. Gorshkov published by Pergamon Press, Oxford, 1979
During the 1960s and 1970s the Russian Soviet Navy adopted a policy of rapid maritime expansion, aiming to create powerful blue water fleets capable of extending Soviet naval power across all the world's oceans. Admiral Gorshkov's book, The Seapower of the State, (translated from the Russian edition) attempts to detail Russian strategic thinking at the time. Once again the influence of Mahan may be seen, as perhaps one should expect when we are dealing with a major naval power seeking to achieve a form of naval supremacy. The Russian failure to achieve this aim during the 1980s tends to highlight the close linkage that is evident between sea power, economic power, social structures and politics. Also see Gorshkov's Red Star Rising at Sea, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1974.
Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age
edited by Geoffrey Till published by St. Martin's Press, New York, 2nd edn., 1984
This book provides excellent coverage of most issues involved in maritime strategy. It covers classical maritime theory, the writings of most of the major theorists, discussion of the constituents of maritime power and the role of maritime power in various contingencies in war and peace. Despite being two decades old Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age is essential reading.
Makers of Modern Strategy: from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age
edited by Peter Paret published by Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1986
More has been written on the subject of military strategy than anyone should have to read. Makers of Modern Strategy is a remedy for that problem. It is an excellent production, examining most of the major theorists who have dealt with the use of force as a tool in international relations. The book is not light reading, but this should not discourage those who wish to know more about the subject. Naval warfare does not receive detailed attention, despite an essay on Mahan; however, this is to some extent the result of the long term reticence on the part of proponents of sea power rather than intentional bias from the editors. Despite this, Makers of Modern Strategy is an essential part of any serious examination of military strategy.
