The Sea Power Centre - Australia was established to undertake activities to promote the study, discussion and awareness of maritime issues and strategy within the Royal Australian Navy, the Department of Defence and civil communities at large. Its mission is:

- to promote understanding of sea power and its application to the security of Australia's national interests
- to manage the development of RAN doctrine and facilitate its incorporation into ADF doctrine
- to contribute to regional engagement
- to contribute to the development of maritime strategic concepts and strategic and operational level doctrine, and facilitate informed force structure decisions
- to preserve, develop and promote Australian naval history.

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Foreword

The 2013 Sea Power Conference, the eighth in the biennial series, was brought forward to coincide with the International Fleet Review, celebrating one hundred years since the Fleet Unit entered Sydney Harbour.

The theme of the conference, held over 7 – 9 October 2013 at the Sydney Convention and Exhibition Centre, was Naval Diplomacy and Power Projection: The Utility of Navies in the Maritime Century. The rationale for the theme revolved around the idea that the 21st century will be a maritime as well as an Asian century, due to the pervasive nature of global sea trade and the predominantly maritime environment of the Indo-Pacific region. A natural follow-on from this are ideas on the utility of navies as tools of statecraft from both hard and soft power perspectives, as well as an emerging maritime school of strategic thought in Australia.

Fifteen presentations were delivered at the conference and are presented here in edited form. The first three papers are what has become the traditional speeches of the Service Chiefs, discussing not only the maritime issues facing Australia and how the three Services work together to deliver a maritime strategy for the Australian government, but also relevant issues concerning their respective Service.

The next two papers examine issues surrounding the ‘Asian maritime century’ and their implications for Australian defence planning. Professor Michael Wesley outlines the economic (and energy) issues associated with economic development and urbanisation before considering the impact of geography on strategic thinking in Asia. Mr Peter Jennings, with an extensive background in national security planning at senior levels within government, considers the strategic environment facing Australia as the Australian government begins developing its new Defence White Paper, but saliently provides useful advice on how such a policy document might be developed within current fiscal restraint.

As navies are the sin qua non in a maritime world the next two papers consider how they are used to provide smart power to ensure global security. Professor Thomas Mahnken discusses the flexibility of sea power, how navies have been employed in the past and might be employed in the future given changing security circumstances and advances in naval technology and weapons. This argument is buttressed by the paper from Admiral Cecil Haney, who discusses the roles, responsibilities and activities of the US Pacific Fleet as a tool to exercise smart power, and how, with allies and partners, acts to ensure good order at sea in the Pacific.
But navies will only be deployed by their governments to support foreign policy objectives, whether for direct national interests or for the common good. Professor James Holmes revisits Ken Booth’s trinity of naval roles to examine how the military, policy and diplomatic functions are exercised today, before focusing on the diplomatic function in general and international fleet reviews in particular as a means of peaceful engagement between navies. Admiral George Zambellas then outlines how the UK government uses the Royal Navy as part of its defence engagement strategy not just in response to national security issues but also for economic purposes.

The next two papers provide perspectives on regional engagement and power projection from two distinct vantage points: India and Southeast Asia. Professor C Raja Mohan considers the reorientation of India’s foreign policy (and thus its defence policy), its interests in the Indian Ocean and relations with the other rising Asian power, China. Dr Euan Graham offers smaller country perspectives by considering the issues facing the Southeast Asian states, where importantly they do not necessarily have the same security issues or speak as one voice through ASEAN.

How and why governments develop their defence policies are usually shrouded in secrecy but Australia has always been quite transparent in aspects of its policies. The next two papers from previous Australian Ministers for Defence outline their government’s perspectives on defence policy, their ideas on the roles and structures of the Navy, and the utility provided to governments by having flexible and balanced naval forces.

The final two papers consider issues relevant to encouraging a maritime school of strategic thought in Australia; a debate which emerged in defence and national security circles during white paper development throughout 2012 and 2013. Professor Paul Dibb, long involved in defence policy making while in government service, details some fundamental concerning Australia’s strategic environment, how these should drive the future force structure of the ADF and the more problematic financial issues facing the government and thus the Department of Defence. Professor Sarah Percy examines how navies are currently engaged on non-traditional security tasks around the world, how they have interacted (including with law enforcement agencies) before providing advice on how navies (and by implication, governments) must incorporate these activities into strategic policy.

The mix of perspectives in this book provides a natural follow on to the proceedings of the 2012 Sea Power Conference, which explored the theme of The Naval Contribution to National Security and Prosperity. Taken together, the two themes are an important contribution to the maritime strategic debate which is maturing in Australia.

Captain Justin Jones, RAN
Director, Sea Power Centre - Australia
May 2014
## Abbreviations

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADF</td>
<td>Australian Defence Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>AEW&amp;C</td>
<td>Airborne Early Warning and Control</td>
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<td>ADMM+</td>
<td>ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus</td>
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<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
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<td>ARF</td>
<td>ASEAN Regional Forum</td>
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<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<td>DDG</td>
<td><em>Hobart</em> class destroyer</td>
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<td>EAS</td>
<td>East Asia Summit</td>
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<td>EUNAVFOR</td>
<td>European Union Naval Force</td>
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<td>FPDA</td>
<td>Five Power Defence Arrangements</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>HADR</td>
<td>Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief</td>
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<td>HMAS</td>
<td>Her Majesty’s Australian Ship</td>
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<td>HMNZS</td>
<td>Her Majesty’s New Zealand Ship</td>
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<td>HMS</td>
<td>Her Majesty’s Ship</td>
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<td>IFC</td>
<td>Information Fusion Centre</td>
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<td>IFR</td>
<td>International Fleet Review</td>
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<td>IORA</td>
<td>Indian Ocean Rim Association</td>
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<td>ISC</td>
<td>Information Sharing Centre (ReCAAP)</td>
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<td>ISR</td>
<td>Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance</td>
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<tr>
<td>IUU</td>
<td>Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported (fishing)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LHD</td>
<td><em>Canberra</em> class amphibious ship</td>
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<td>LOSC</td>
<td><em>United Nations Law of the Sea Convention 1982</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>LPD</td>
<td>Landing Platform Dock (amphibious ship)</td>
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<td>MEAO</td>
<td>Middle East Area of Operations</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NZ</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
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<td>RAAF</td>
<td>Royal Australian Air Force</td>
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<td>RAN</td>
<td>Royal Australian Navy</td>
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<tr>
<td>ReCAAP</td>
<td>Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia</td>
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<td>RIMPAC</td>
<td>Rim of the Pacific (exercise)</td>
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Ray Griggs

I am pleased that for the third sea power conference in a row we kick off the conference with what is becoming the traditional Service Chiefs session. I welcome my friend and colleague Lieutenant General David Morrison, the Chief of Army and Air Vice-Marshal Mel Hupfeld, the Air Commander who is representing the Chief of Air Force, Air Marshal Geoff Brown who is unavoidably detained by other duties.

This session is important from an Australian perspective because it reinforces the fundamentally joint approach that we take to the profession of arms. Last year we had a similar session at the Chief of Army’s conference which further underscored this joint approach. But to me it is the ability of our serving members, particularly our younger members, who attend these conferences to hear directly from the three Service Chiefs together that powerfully underlines how serious the Chief of Defence Force and the senior leadership of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) are about the joint endeavour.

For our many international visitors, thank you for coming to Australia, to Sydney and for attending the Sea Power Conference. To my counterparts and their personal representatives, I thank you for making the journey and the time that you have been able to devote to this conference - not only is it a long way but with the International Seapower Symposium in Rhode Island in the same month it makes the commitment to this conference and the International Fleet Review (IFR) activities even more appreciated. Due to IFR activities which continue this week, the time I would normally have to engage one on one is considerably diminished and I appreciate your understanding in this regard.

The theme of the conference this year is Naval Diplomacy and Maritime Power Projection: the Utility of Navies in the Maritime Century. The opportunity to bring forward the conference to coincide with the IFR was one we could not pass up and I am particularly pleased that we made this decision.

In so many ways, the strength of the international presence here is the best tangible demonstration of this conference theme. Whether a nation has sent a ship, an aircraft or a delegation, our activities here are a practical demonstration of naval diplomacy.

Some of the value is evident to all, like the exercises which have gone before and which will follow the International Fleet Review. These activities further our ability to cooperate in the pursuit of good order at sea. I would particularly like to acknowledge the success of the first ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus) Maritime Security Expert Working Group field training exercise that
was held in and around Jervis Bay this time last week; 11 ships and 13 countries participated in the activity. The expert working group has been co-hosted by Australia and Malaysia for the last couple of years; I thank my Malaysian counterpart Admiral Aziz Tan Sri it has been a pleasure to work so closely with Mdm Suriani and your team in what has been a very productive period as co-hosts taking the working group from inception to a major field training activity in such short order.

And while events such as the International Fleet Review are naval diplomacy writ large with fair dollops of pomp, pageantry and ceremony, they serve much more than an historical or commemorative purpose. Just as there was specific messaging in reviews in the past, today I think the international nature of this review reinforces one of our most fundamental maritime security messages - maritime security is an inherently cooperative and collaborative venture. We cannot protect our ability to trade on our own; it is a genuine team effort.

Of course you do not always need a fleet review to achieve this. We can see the same elements at work when a patrol boat visits a minor port, or two ships conduct a passage exercise together. The aggregate effect of such activities goes towards building habits of cooperation which we can apply for mutual national benefit. So thank you all for attending, because our practical demonstration of naval diplomacy on a grand scale is made up of the effort of each and every nation and navy which is represented.

I think it is worthwhile setting out what naval diplomacy is, to ask what distinguishes it from other forms of diplomacy and then to examine how it fits in with and supports a nation’s overall diplomatic effort.

For me, at its most fundamental, naval diplomacy springs from the common bond amongst mariners. These common bonds do not replace or overtake national allegiance, but a shared understanding of the marine environment offers different ways of engaging, different ways of viewing a subject. Through this, we can offer alternative paths to understanding and cooperation. Of course communication in and of itself is not the answer to all difficulties, but it is most certainly an essential requirement to resolving problems.

Many of the customs, understandings and freedoms on which we depend for the exercise of naval diplomacy date from the age of sail, when the commanding officer of a ship was in many ways left to fend for himself while conducting his mission. Communications were slow, a ship’s captain may not have known that conflict between two countries had either concluded or broken out and this at times had some undesirable outcomes!

The modern incarnation is much more complex. The ubiquity of modern communication enables innumerable relationships and channels of communication around the world, not least through a professional diplomatic corps. As a result, successful modern naval diplomacy is a tool in the broader conduct of a nation’s diplomatic effort. In that sense, maritime forces remain a very practical expression of a nation’s willingness and ability to be involved in a region.

This idea of giving practical expression to a nation’s policy direction is important. It distinguishes good intentions and substantive action. This enables maritime forces to be one of the primary tools nations employ in difficult circumstances, whether that be humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, surveillance and enforcement, or the threat or ultimate projection and use of maritime power.

By virtue of their routine deployments, navies can help form habits of cooperation and understanding with neighbours, partners and allies. They are directly and immediately responsive to the direction of government through their ministers. I think it will be very interesting to hear from two former Australian Ministers for Defence on their employment of the Navy as a diplomatic tool later in the conference.

While naval diplomacy has a great history, I do not think we can afford to simply assume it will continue on indefinitely in its current format. The way humanity uses the maritime environment is changing and national desire for maritime trade and resources is expanding.
Figure 1 is an unashamedly Australian-centric perspective of the Indo-Pacific. It shows the key arteries of the maritime global trading system in our region and I think it has helped focus Australian strategic thought on the importance of this broader regional construct in relation to our security and prosperity.

So, what are the changes? Nations are increasingly looking to the sea for additional food and energy resources. For example, according to the Food and Agriculture Organization, the worldwide production of farmed fish has just overtaken that of beef. Fish farming, offshore oil and gas and more recently, alternative energy production such as wind and wave, have led to an extension of permanent human infrastructure into the maritime environment. The wind farm arrays in the North Sea are prominent examples and the ‘floating offshore production and storage’ concept is being taken to a new level with floating liquid natural gas plants. There is one under construction now, likely to be the first one in the world to enter service when it is deployed off the north Western Australian coast in 2017, which will reportedly be 488m long and displace about 600,000 tonnes.

If it is not a resource a nation can produce or extract for itself, then it is to the sea and to the global maritime trading system that nations will look. For example the cost of transporting a shirt from its place of manufacture to point of sale is estimated at approximately one cent, a figure I find quite remarkable. Effectively, the location of where something is produced, be it the finished product or a component, is increasingly less important, because the cost of transporting it where it needs to go is almost trivial. Even if this cost estimate is out by one or even two orders of magnitude, the point remains. As a result, our economies are as intimately linked as they ever have been; the influence of the global maritime trading system is all pervasive.

The reliability of the system means that companies carry less and less inventory. So interruptions to their global, just-in-time supply chains have an enormous impact, and those interruptions can occur almost anywhere around the world.

These are global trends, with many aspects of them expressed forcefully in the Indo-Pacific. The shift of strategic interest and weight to this region, this maritime region, will only reinforce the trends. For me, this huge increase in humanity’s maritime interests and footprint leads to three immediate conclusions.

First, I think we need to re-examine the basis of our strategic thinking. While the likes of Mahan, Corbett, Richmond, Cable, Booth and others provide a good basis, I do not think they offer a complete understanding of the challenges we face into the future, nor do I think it is reasonable to expect that they should. In the Australian context, this re-examination is centred on the emerging notion of a Maritime School of Strategic Thought, to counter the continentalist and expeditionary schools of thought that have dominated Australian strategic thought for some time. Shifting our basic strategic cultural pre-disposition in Australia is not simple and it is something I know that the Chief of Army will focus on, so I will not steal his thunder.
Second, as we have all recognised for many years, and as I have touched on already, it is beyond the capacity of any nation to unilaterally protect its maritime interests because of the nature of the maritime global trading system. Certainly it can be done some of the time and in some specific locations, but just as certainly not everywhere and all of the time. Maintaining good order at sea is fundamentally a collective and cooperative activity. That means we have to work together, which is to me the basis for naval diplomacy.

Third, as nations seek to make more intensive use of marine resources, maritime forces are likely to be at the forefront of regulating that use. Good order at sea may well require a larger and more specific body of knowledge; a rules-based order which enables all nations to benefit will inevitably need maritime forces which can observe and enforce this order. This will involve the effective conduct of a mix of constabulary and diplomatic tasks.

I think the idea of modern naval diplomacy being a far more integrated activity is something we should pursue in greater detail. Australia, like many nations, has been on a journey to build joint forces. In an operational warfighting sense, I think we have achieved much success. Indeed, the whole is so evidently greater than the sum of the parts I think we must look at how we build on this concept in the constabulary and diplomatic arenas.

We need to look at ways in which we can achieve joint diplomatic effects. Certainly for Australia, as we contemplate the imminent arrival of the Canberra class amphibious ships (LHD), we have the opportunity to integrate Army and Air Force capabilities to achieve these outcomes. I think there is good precedent for this. The whole-of-government approaches typified by organisations like the Australian Civil-Military Centre, borne of our experiences of the last ten years or so, are indicative of our capacity to routinely coordinate the efforts of several agencies. Our new construct for border protection is another example of this.

I would like to expand a little on the idea of integrated naval diplomacy, or perhaps just simply integrated military diplomacy. The program in front of us is, of course, very navy- and maritime-centric. Underpinning much of the discussion of the various environmental-based strategies is this perception that these are either/or questions; and we somehow have to choose which is superior.

My message, and it is not just my message, is simply that we do not have to choose. Perhaps more accurately, we do not have to choose all the time. There will be times when we lead with sea, land, air or some combination. But we do not, indeed must not, choose to have only one or two. So these next few days will focus on naval and maritime, for which I make no apology, because it is vital to our nation’s security and prosperity. And to be really good in our domain, we need an extensive and sophisticated understanding of what can be achieved. But we also need that understanding of the other environments. We must not allow our enthusiasm for our maritime power, our naval diplomacy, to blind us into making a false choice. It is important, but it is not the only thing which is important and our approach must be sophisticated enough to countenance this. So we need to look at how we integrate our land and air forces into a naval diplomatic approach. I know it is not how we have understood naval diplomacy in the past, but that does not mean we cannot frame it this way in future. Being one-eyed might have worked for vice admirals in 1805, but it is not good in 2013. We do not have to choose.

I think there are other areas where the character of naval diplomacy may be changing and where we must prepare for the possibility of significant change. For instance, what will be the impact technological developments have on the use of navies for diplomatic ends?

The acceptance of naval forces in a diplomatic role is based on an almost unspoken understanding of their capabilities and the potential they represent. Changes in technology could upset that understanding. The current discussion over surveillance activities in exclusive economic zones is one example. But this could go much further. For example, if the extension of vital national infrastructure deeper into a nation’s maritime zones continues, how will that affect our understanding of innocent passage? Will nations seek to place conditions on access to areas around such infrastructure? The current restrictions are really very small and are mainly focused on safety of navigation. Is there potential that nations will seek to expand them and what implications will that have for naval diplomacy?

Another aspect of this whole discussion is the notion of concepts such as ‘smart power’ and ‘smart defence’ which we will also cover in the next few days. Smart defence, is in my view the force structure pairing to smart power. While it is often discussed in terms of Europe and NATO, I think it has much broader applicability and that we already have some excellent global examples. Just here in Australia, we have at least three examples of smart defence at a certain level. I would argue that the Anzac class frigate project with New Zealand and Germany’s Blohm and Voss is an example, as it played the strengths and requirements of each partner, pooling our collective resources to the benefit of all. A more recent example is the use of Australian sailors to help crew HMNZS Endeavour, where working together has created more capability than we could have achieved alone. The same has applied with the Royal New Zealand Navy providing specialist crews in our frigates deploying to the Middle East; it is a two-way street here.

Smart defence does not have to be just amongst near neighbours or traditional partners. I do not think it unfair to say that it is only in the last ten years that the navies of Spain and Australia have really got to know and understand each other. As we have done so, we have identified opportunities for smart defence. Most obviously amongst them has been the deployment of SPS Cantabria to Australia in 2013. From my perspective, it has been an outstanding success, not only providing an underway
replenishment capability when we required it, but providing us with an opportunity to familiarise ourselves with some of the systems we are about to acquire in the new Hobart class destroyers (DDG) and amphibious ships (LHD).

From a Spanish perspective, I think it has allowed them to test the extended deployment capability of this platform when they may not otherwise have been able to do so. To effectively have had a foreign sovereign warship operating as part of the RAN for nine months has been a ground breaking initiative. Many people have asked me how this worked. Well it does, it has actually been incredibly easy. The key was finding common cause, complementary capabilities and needs and the willingness to cooperate and collaborate.

I think all of these activities - smart defence, smart power, integrated naval diplomacy - need what has previously been described as that rare kind of imagination, which not only enables us to understand our current circumstances, but to plan for the future as well. I hope you will take the opportunity this conference affords, that I have posed a few questions to start you off and perhaps, just perhaps, sown the seed for some of that rare kind of imagination we need to plan for this maritime century.

Endnotes
2 See Justin Jones (ed), A Maritime School of Strategic Thought for Australia: Perspectives, Sea Power Series No 1, Sea Power Centre - Australia, Canberra, 2013.

Before proceeding, I want to congratulate the Chief of Navy and all ranks of the RAN on attaining that marvellous milestone in your service to the nation. Yet tempering that joy is the recognition that many of your ranks have also died during that service and it is imperative and most appropriate that we mark their sacrifice as well.

Despite some good natured rivalry, the bonds between our Services are deep and enduring, forged in the crucible of war with its shared perils and losses. Ray - on behalf of the Army, I salute you and the Navy team.

For reasons, which I intend to address, I believe that we as a nation sometimes fall prey to a collective amnesia about the extraordinary service of the Royal Australian Navy.

Over a century ago, the great sea power theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote eloquently of the silent, inexorable and invisible operation of the blockade which crushed the inards of Napoleon’s empire.

The achievements of our soldiers, enhanced, indeed perhaps even distorted by the ANZAC mythology, has, in my view, created a foundation narrative that has led to our nation accepting the fruits of our maritime security as a free public good. It is as invisible as Mahan’s blockade.

Our trade flows freely, our petrol stations are replenished, our supermarket shelves are full to meet our whims and our commerce flourishes. Yet, Australians collectively do not reflect on the enormous national investment involved in sustaining the maritime conditions for that happy state of affairs, nor do they consider overly that much of it is also underwritten by the United States as the leading global power of our era.

While many of Mahan’s insights are today of primarily historical value, his assertion that the oceans of the world constitute ubiquitous highways is so profoundly obvious as to conceal its genius, in much the same way that Clausewitz’s observation that war is the violent prosecution of policy now sounds self-evidently banal, having become conventional wisdom. That Australia is an island, albeit one of immense mass is equally as obvious. So our survival, even in peacetime, depends on the sea.

Yet, despite universal lip service to the innately maritime character of our geography, the Western civilisation that has grown here since European settlement has not, in my view, developed a deep, intrinsic link to that character.
As another maritime theorist, my friend Ray Griggs told the Australian Strategic Policy Institute in 2011, that a more appropriate wording in the first stanza of our national anthem may have been ‘girt by beach’ rather than ‘girt by sea’. He was pointing to the underdeveloped consciousness which should properly underscore mature, true sea mindedness in Australia. His point was well made and it concerns me every bit as much as it bothers him.

Our strategic culture, and the strategic policy which incubates in it, are the poorer for that cognitive failure, which is derived from a deeply entrenched continental mindset. Last week I conducted my military history conference, the theme of which was armies and maritime strategy. There I heard an insightful presentation from Professor Michael Evans, who I believe to be the most innovative and influential strategic thinkers currently working in Australia. He expounded on the lack of sea mindedness to which Ray alluded in that eloquent quip in 2011.

Evans described Australia as a maritime nation with a continental culture. His hypothesis was carefully arrived at through delving into the national psyche and soul. He analysed the narrative of the Australian settlement, and the degree to which we define ourselves as a ‘sunburnt country’. Scrutiny of the stories we tell ourselves about who we are, show a people pitted against a harsh, implacable and ultimately forbidding continental environment.

And so, while we revere the sacrifice of our diggers at Gallipoli in 1915, how many people really understand the naval and amphibious campaign which lodged us on what Chris Masters has termed ‘The Fatal Shore’? The digger legend is powerful, but it skews the way Australians view security, especially the wider contribution of this nation to the global order of the last century and our obligations to maintaining that benign order in this one.

Yet, this absence of pervasive oceanic consciousness, disguises the fact that European settlement of this Great Southern land was achieved by the leading maritime power of that era. Likewise, it ignores the reality that our security was initially founded in no small part on Great Britain and, later, on its liberal democratic successor the United States.

In plain language, our prosperity and role in the world is reliant on freedom of navigation and the unimpeded use of Mahan’s great highways which is guaranteed by the dominant maritime power of the day, at a most significant discount to the expenditure of our own national treasure.

The naval and military professionals in this room grasp this reality, but too few of our fellow citizens do as well. More worryingly, I fear the same may be true of many of those who seek to advise our policy makers.

However, this is not the counsel of despair. Australians are nothing if not pragmatic. Regardless of this myopia, our strategic practice has been intuitively shrewd. We have collaborated with the dominant liberal, democratic maritime power du jour since Federation and have benefited immensely from that choice.

Again, as I reflected on Michael Evans’ call to raise public consciousness about our maritime future in the rapidly growing, dynamically changing, Indo-Pacific region, I recalled former Prime Minister John Howard’s pithy, yet insightful, warning that Australia need not choose between its history and its geography.

Read in conjunction with Paul Keating’s similarly profound insight that Australia must seek its security in Asia rather than from Asia we can discern the rapid progress Australia has made from the aberrant years when we sought to secure Australia behind the moat of the so called sea-air gap.

There is a warning in this - that because of our lack of an oceanic mindset, we risk forfeiting all those other natural elements of maritime power with which we are lavishly endowed. However, as a soldier and capability manager I am optimistic about our current strategic focus. Here is why.

We have come a very long way since the strategic shock of 1999 in East Timor roused us from the torpor of the mindset of the ‘defence of Australia’, narrowly construed as continental defence. In that regard, I would demur from John Howard in a minor, though not purely semantic, manner. As he sagely argued, we need not make a false, binary choice between our European origins and Asian geography to achieve Paul Keating’s vision of security ‘in Asia.’ But we must choose our true history.

We need to recognise that despite the prodigious feats of arms of our soldiers, and the romance of the bush, our soldiers have never fought a battle on our continent. May that remain so. But as long as the gap between myth and reality in our national identity and ancillary strategic culture remains so great, we will struggle to achieve our potential as a second tier maritime power.

For that classification I am indebted to that fine strategic scholar Beatrice Heuser who would situate Australia among relatively sophisticated medium powers for whom local sea control, albeit for particular periods of time, is both possible and indeed a strongly desirable capability objective. However, area sea control is unachievable for us and it remains the monopoly of great naval powers.

Of necessity we can only collaborate with compatible major powers and contribute to good order at sea and achieve limited force projection in coalition with our allies.
We are well on the way to achieving that level of maritime capability in Australia with political support across the spectrum. That vision, of a seamlessly joint ADF, structured to implement a maritime strategy in the defence of Australia, through denial of the use of our land, sea and air approaches to our nation is correct. It is supported by the ADF senior leadership and is underpinned by a Defence Capability Plan which will put flesh on the bones of that vision.

Of course it will require a shift in national resources to fund and sustain it. And in the aftermath of our longest war, fought primarily in a land-locked country, we must take the intellectual lead in explaining this to the Australian public.

After all they must fund it, and provide their sons and daughters to serve in this joint force in an era when individual opportunity and self actualisation have reduced the appeal of military careers. That is why our deficit in oceanic consciousness has the potential to undermine our centre of gravity in the pursuit of professional mastery of joint maritime warfare.

Perhaps the thousands of proud Australians who cheered the arrival of that first flotilla 100 years ago understood better than we do the nexus between an actively engaged citizenship and maritime power than we do.

As senior advisers to the government, we must take a moral and professional lead in this. Moreover, we must be truly joint in our advocacy. As I have stated somewhat ad nauseam, Australia needs its ADF more than it needs its navy, army and air force and a joint maritime strategy is only as strong as its weakest Service. None of us can afford the dubious luxury of short term single-Service ‘wins’ at the expense of the coherence of our maritime capability.

Again, I have never been more optimistic as to our future notwithstanding the climate of austerity which is setting the tenor of our strategic debate. In my remaining time today I shall explain how Army’s modernisation axis of advance is inherently joint and postures us to play our role in our maritime strategy as described under extant strategic guidance.

In general, armies modernise by drawing lessons from their operations and calibrating their experience against history and the changing character of war as determined by technological change and politico-cultural trends. After a decade at war, and even longer on sustained operations across a diverse range of threat environments, against a range of foes, we have moved quickly to enhance our firepower, to digitise our sensor shooter links and better align our command and control systems to our higher joint-operational headquarters. Internally we have also better aligned our force generation cycles to strategic guidance.

We are in the midst of the most comprehensive re-equipment and modernisation program since the end of World War II. The end state will be an army that can generate combined arms effects in a joint coalition setting while surviving against either a peer competitor or a potent irregular enemy.

We are re-organising to field three standard multi-role medium weight combat brigades. We are shifting from a light infantry army to a light mechanised army deployable by sea rather than just air and capable of implementing the guidance of the government which decrees that we be able to deploy a battalion group for a contingency with our primary operating environment, while simultaneously sustaining a brigade group on operations in the immediate neighbourhood.

Plan BEERSHEBA rounds out the improvements begun in the wake of the 1999 East Timor crisis, which spawned that guidance and the derivative roles and tasks for the Army and ADF.

Significantly, the introduction of the Canberra class amphibious ships (LHD) will be a transformative development, as we develop an army component capable of ‘wet soldiering’.

The devil will be in the detail. The range of specialist skills, trades and employment codes to conduct even permissive entry operations is formidable. Delivering land effects from sea platforms is the most demanding military task that can be asked of a joint force. Few nations on earth can achieve it. We will soon be joining that elite club. But the price of admission is high and we need to bring our society with us if we are to achieve it. It requires a national commitment not an ADF plan.

There is much to be done. But as we reflect on the challenges that our remote nation overcame to fund, design and build that majestic fleet which steamed into this great harbour 100 years ago, we must surely conclude that we are capable of meeting any future challenge if we can muster even a portion of their resolve and patriotism.
I am very pleased to be able to represent the Chief of Air Force here today and to say a few words about the utility of Australian air power – as provided by the RAAF – in military diplomacy and power projection in what has been referred to as the maritime century.

First though, regarding the topic of this conference, it goes without saying that navies provide enormous utility in the maritime century. Naval diplomacy and the ability of navies to project power across the maritime domain are in my view two of the key planks of Australian national security strategy and policy. Our ability to shape and influence our security environment is fundamentally premised on our ability to interact with and shape our maritime domain, and navies are the prime means of doing so. Army and Air Force have vital roles to play in this strategy of course, but the overriding consideration is that we live, engage and operate in a maritime context.

I note in the booklet provided that outlines the conference program, a reference to the fact that

The 21st century has been described as a maritime century as much as it is an Asian Century; due to the pervasive nature of global sea trade and the predominantly maritime environment of the Indo-Pacific region.

I think we only need to look across the harbour to see ample evidence that the critical importance of the maritime environment is not lost on those countries with the capacity to engage in commerce, trade and diplomacy across the waves. If indeed we are in the early years of an ‘Asian century’, and for Australia we most certainly recognise that fact, then we are also most certainly in a century when the maritime domain may well be the defining environment.

Over the past two years or so, the Chief of Air Force has emphasised the point that the RAAF is very much alert to the fact that Australia’s strategic context is one defined by its maritime circumstance. He has, in a number of presentations, laid out the argument regarding Australia’s status as a maritime trading nation and the implications of this for an Air Force charged with contributing to the defence of that nation.

In fact, I think it is fair to say that all three Services have been alive to the fact that our present and future national security concerns are intimately and inextricably connected with the maritime environment and how we project power – both hard and soft – across the seas to protect and preserve our way of life.
Today, I would like to discuss with you how the RAAF sees its role in contributing to diplomatic initiatives both within our region and further abroad, and to outline the utility of credible, balanced and capable air power in projecting power across the maritime domain.

**Historic Background**

To begin, I am sure that it goes without saying that Air Force and Navy have shared, and continue to share, a very proud and close history of operating together for nearly a century. The character and form of that interaction and interoperability has changed and evolved over the years, but the spirit of cooperation, shared mutual respect and trust have endured.

I see that relationship only growing closer as our capabilities increasingly merge to be truly joint and our mission of shaping and influencing our immediate environment in the cause of providing for national defence grows more closely aligned.

The Air Force contribution to naval operations has historically been, and continues to be, realised through the four key air power roles of: intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR); strike; air mobility; and control of the air. These roles are enduring and fundamental to air power’s contribution to national security and they are terms that we use consistently, whenever we speak about Air Force and air power.

The reason for this is because these roles neatly sum up the utility of air power across the spectrum of operations. From humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to high-end warfighting they encapsulate what air power brings to national security. What is more, they underpin the ways and means Air Force interacts and operates with Navy. The names we give these roles may have changed over the years, but they reflect the core functions that air power has provided to military operations since military aviation was first developed as a significant form of warfare.

From the first control of the air mission launched from HMA Ships Sydney and Melbourne using British Sopwith Camels during a raid into Germany’s Heligoland Bight in June 1918, through the interwar years when Fairey Seaplanes were purchased to support RAN reconnaissance operations, air and sea power have cooperated to effectively project military power.

Throughout World War II, RAAF aircraft, flown by a combination of RAAF pilots and Navy observers and gunners, escorted Australian convoys, performed anti-submarine patrols, flew many thousands of hours on air-sea rescue tasks, conducted strikes on enemy vessels, and undertook long-range reconnaissance and surveillance operations in support of Australian and allied naval task forces.

The tradition of Air Force support to Australian naval operations continued through conflicts in Korea, Vietnam and during the long years of the Cold War.

Maritime surveillance and anti-submarine warfare, conducted by Sunderland and Catalina flying boats, Lincoln bombers, Lockheed Neptune and P-3B/C Orion maritime patrol aircraft, have been institutionalised elements of RAAF tasking for more than 70 years.

In addition, these aircraft, along with F-4 Phantoms, the F-111, and F/A-18 Hornets, continued to maintain a maritime strike capability, ready to contribute to any offensive or defensive tasks that the RAN may have been called upon to perform.

**Contemporary Contributions**

For much of that history, the focus was on military operations, often in response to contingencies that arose around the globe in which our national interests were somehow involved. Today, as the ADF involvement in Afghanistan begins its drawdown and the threat of major conflict appears hopefully rather more remote, our focus returns to more ‘local’ matters.

Maritime nations seldom enjoy respite from the relentless task of shaping and influencing the maritime commons upon which they are so vitally dependent. Australia is likewise pressed to be constantly vigilant and prepared to respond.

Wars, conflicts, contingencies and international strife are not the only things that can adversely affect the peaceful operation of the maritime domain. Illegal and dangerous activity can jeopardise good conduct at sea. Piracy; illegal fishing; people, weapons and drugs trafficking, to name just a few, all threaten to disrupt the efficient and harmonious use of the seas by all maritime nations.

Humanitarian and natural disasters likewise often call for a response that is either borne upon the sea or comes across it. In our immediate region this has frequently been the case.

All of these perturbations demand a response in which diplomacy and power projection of some form through the maritime domain is considered appropriate. Air Force plays a key role in many of these instances and most usually in conjunction with the Navy in a joint effort.

What fundamentally shapes the character of our response and perhaps constitutes the single greatest challenge to our national ability to shape and influence our maritime domain is the sheer vastness of that environment.

Sitting astride the two great southern hemisphere oceans, bordered to our north by the complex, populous and enormous archipelagic Asian landmass and with an extensive exclusive economic zone, Australia has responsibility for and interest in a vast maritime domain. Providing some form of power projection capability across this vastness is a very challenging task and one that again demands a truly joint, integrated and synchronised approach.
The RAAF plays an important role here - and it does so through the four key air power roles I alluded to earlier. I will use these roles to highlight the initiatives Air Force is undertaking and the capabilities we are acquiring to enhance our ability to project power and to shape and influence our environment in concert with Navy and Army.

Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance

Turning now then to the specific roles and capabilities that Air Force brings to the maritime environment I would like to begin by suggesting that perhaps one of the greatest contributions we make goes to the very heart of the challenge of the vastness of our maritime domain, it is the ISR capabilities that we can bring to bear. Gaining situational awareness of the operational environment, underpins all joint operations maritime and otherwise, and it drives our commitment to deliver timely ISR product; specifically through the Jindalee over the horizon radar, Wedgetail AEW&C aircraft and AP-3C maritime surveillance capabilities. The P-8 Poseidon, the planned replacement for the P-3C Orion under Project Air 7000, along with a high altitude, long endurance multi-role unmanned aerial system will continue to meet the increasing demands for maritime patrol and overwater ISR required for the security of Australia’s maritime approaches.

Knowing our environment demands we have the capabilities to sense and report on that environment and through the ISR capabilities we have, and have in train through the Defence Capability Plan, Air Force will significantly increase its contribution in this regard.

But I hasten to note that this environment is increasingly not just a physical one. The cyber and space domains and our ability to operate our networks in environments that might not offer us trusted information will be especially challenging.

Strike

While a considerable focus of this conference is on naval diplomacy, and rightly so, we cannot of course ignore the most consequential context in which we might have to project power and influence - that of major warfighting. I agree with the view that at the high end of conflict, Navy’s contribution to the defence of Australia will rely on its ability to control the seas through its capital ships and support vessels. Protection of these naval task force elements will be a priority mission for Air Force and we have long contributed to this task through our maritime strike capability.

From our early days with Sunderland flying boats through to the F-111, and present day Hornets/Super Hornets and AP-3C, we have demonstrated the capability to strike warships that threaten our naval task forces, sea lines of communication, or ability to gain sea control. Through the planned acquisition of the P-8 and Joint Strike Fighter we remain committed to this task.

In future highly contested environments, what we characterise as anti-access/area denial circumstances, protection of naval task forces will be critical and challenging. Our ability to conduct anti-surface strike in these environments will hinge on comprehensively integrated and harmonised operations, protected networks and potentially integrated air and missile defence and command and control arrangements whereby Air Force and Navy will have to work hand-in-hand from concept design to operational employment. It is a big challenge!

Anti-submarine warfare has been a mission of the RAAF since World War II and remains so today embodied in our AP-3C fleet. We recognise anti-submarine warfare as a true joint enterprise, encompassing the suite of capabilities open to the ADF.

Understandably, much of our attention over recent years has been in the Middle East Area of Operations (MEAO) and on surveillance of our northern approaches which has drawn our focus away from this vital task. We look to revitalise this mission and see its future involving networked Hobart class destroyers, Anzac and Adelaide class frigates with their MH-60 Romeo helicopters, and Collins class submarines working with P-3C/P-8 maritime patrol aircraft, and maritime unmanned aerial systems. These air assets will be supported by aerial refuelling tankers and space-based assets, as well as leveraging the electronic capabilities of the Wedgetail AEW&C.

The submarine remains a significant threat to the security of our maritime environment, thus our national prosperity. Anti-submarine warfare, as a joint endeavour, needs to be at the forefront of military priorities if our maritime strategy is to remain relevant.

Air Mobility

A cornerstone military activity of any operation across the spectrum of conflict is the ability to move people and equipment. The Navy has an unparalleled capacity in our Australian context to move a fighting force across large distances. The size and endurance of its vessels allow it to maintain a presence in the area of operations to conduct follow-on combat and sustainment activities. Air mobility through the C-17, C-130, KC-30 multi-role tanker transport and, in the future, the light tactical airlift capability provides Air Force with the ability to move people and equipment across large distances relatively quickly. Not only do the air power characteristics of speed and reach compliment the sea power traits of capacity and presence, they can work in harmony to increase the effectiveness of the other.

Time and again Air Force and Navy have worked together to deliver the right people, to the right place with the right equipment. Whether it was Operation FALCONER, where critical warfighting equipment from HMAS Manoora was transferred to RAAF C-130 for distribution around the MEAO; or the humanitarian aid sea-lifted by HMAS Kanimbla and airlifted by RAAF air mobility during Operation SUMATRA ASSIST in 2005.
In addition, RAAF air mobility has provided logistic support to RAN vessels all round the globe, whether it be the delivery of critical components to enable repairs, aero-medical evacuations, or just the routine movement of people and equipment. Sea and air power combine to generate the speed, reach, capacity and presence needed to support Australia’s national security interests.

Control of the Air

Control of the air is the cornerstone of all air power effects. We can control portions of the air in time to achieve our objectives, like security of a sea line of communication or an area of operation, but acknowledge that absolute command is neither practical nor usually warranted. Given the scale of our air and sea approaches and the size of our Navy and Air Force, a pragmatic approach to control of the air is necessary, and this is the approach we have taken.

Navy and Air Force understand the risks that enemy air action place on shipping, military or commercial, and on our submarines. This is why the Air Force is committed to the Joint Strike Fighter as the most effective control of the air capability available to Australia, and the Navy is committed to the Hobart class destroyer as the most lethal surface combatant Australia can acquire. The ability of Air Force to integrate, communicate and operate with them is a non-negotiable requirement. These capabilities will be even more critical to our ability to operate in environments that pose anti-access/area denial challenges.

Protection of a naval task force from enemy air requires a defence in depth approach. The destroyers will provide the inner core of the defensive perimeter with air power, through the Joint Strike Fighter, Super Hornet, Wedgetail AEW&C and P-8, providing an extended perspective and combat potency to neutralise potential airborne attacks.

Amphibious Operations

The introduction into service of two Canberra class amphibious ships (LHD) and HMAS Choules (LSD) will provide Australia with an important amphibious capability. Air Force will provide a significant contribution to this joint capability.

Currently Air Force is committing airspace controllers and possibly air liaison elements to be embarked on the LHD. If these vessels were to be deployed into an environment that is contested, the full range of Air Force capabilities would be required for the protection of the task force and support for an entry operation. That would be a non-trivial task and will require more hard work and planning.

Conclusion

To conclude: through the key air power roles of ISR, strike, air mobility, and control of the air, Air Force is continuing to evolve its force to support our national ability to project power through the maritime domain.

Every capability Air Force will be bringing on-line over this next decade will enhance its contribution to naval activities. From the Joint Strike Fighter, through to Wedgetail AEW&C, P-8 maritime patrol aircraft, KC-30 tankers, maritime unmanned aerial systems, and Vigilare integrated air defence command and control system, every emerging Air Force capability will increase our ability to support RAN operations.

RAAF air power is structured for both peace and conflict, and stands ready to support the full range of Navy’s contribution to Australia’s national security and prosperity. Australian national security rests on our ability to shape and influence our maritime context. The Navy plays a lead role here, finding only increased utility in the present maritime century. Air Force stands ready to enhance and support that utility and considers itself firmly onboard with Navy in the 21st century.
Every generation believes it is living through the most dangerous and turbulent decades in history. Variations on that phrase occur with striking regularity in the defence planning documents of Australia and many other countries, stretching back to before World War II. In what has become a process of inter-generational gloom rivalry, competing eras conceptions of risk and turbulence are compared, debated over - and ultimately left unresolved. The whole process, it strikes me, is rather pointless. All eras are beset by turbulence, uncertainty and risk. Whether one era is more uncertain, turbulent or risky than another is largely irrelevant - in each era it is the job of defence planners to assess risks and uncertainty as best they can, and assign responses and resources as best they can to addressing those. In the absence of an ability to apportion defence resources through time, each generation is obliged to use what resources it has to best offset risk and uncertainty in the present and foreseeable future.

Surely a more useful form of temporal comparison should be to ask: what is distinctive about the era we are entering? What are the new drivers of turbulence, uncertainty and change? How do these new factors challenge our strategic environment, and how best can we use our defence resources to respond to these? Of course, these questions give rise to different debates, over how new the changes actually are, and how challenging to the established order. But even these debates can generate productive avenues of thought and discussion for defence planning.

I contend that in the current period, the first quarter of the 21st century, is being shaped by two vectors of turbulence: the rapid enrichment and empowerment of Asia’s largest societies; and the rapid advance and spread of communications technologies. The future of both of these vectors is attended by significant uncertainties in trajectory, dynamics and consequences. But there is mounting evidence that each of these is generating new upside and downside risks for defence planners. While there are undoubtedly connections between both vectors, I will focus on the first and its impact on maritime strategy.

Wealth, Power and Turbulence

There are two predominant and opposed narratives concerning the rapid enrichment and empowerment of Asia’s largest societies. One is that all will be well, and that by mid-century, Asia will be a prosperous and peaceful continent; the other is that wealth and power will lead to competition and war, both hot and cold. But there are strong signs that the actual consequences of rapid empowerment and enrichment in Asia will be much more complex. There are three compelling reasons why I believe
that wealth and power changes in Asia will cause turbulence, but not necessarily lead to sustained conflict.

First, the overwhelming weight of history shows that economic growth is not secular, meaning that it cannot occur without affecting perceptions and beliefs. Wealth and power are two fundamental locators of a state’s roles and rights in international relations; those with more wealth and power invariably have a more expansive sense of their rights and prerogatives - and often of the moral rectitude of their actions - than those with less. Hence sudden shifts in wealth or power cannot but alter societies’ self-perceptions, expectations and beliefs. Asian societies’ recent histories of colonialism and domination, along with the deeply hierarchic logics of their social relations and worldviews, means that relatively sudden adjustments in wealth and power will acquire great significance in terms of rights, prerogatives and perceptions of justice.

Second, Asia’s economic growth has brought a rapid expansion in the external dependence and vulnerabilities of its societies. Industrialisation and urbanisation have created massive demand for energy, raw materials and consumer markets for rapidly growing economies. Between 1990 and 2007, China’s oil consumption tripled and India’s increased by over two-and-a-quarter times. The International Energy Agency estimates that by 2030, China’s energy thirst will have doubled again and India’s will have grown by two-and-a-half times. A second form of economic interdependence overlays the first, flowing from Asia’s enthusiastic participation in an increasingly sophisticated system of distributed manufacturing, or global production sharing. Research shows that in no other region has global production sharing advanced so far as in East Asia - to the extent that between 70 and 80 per cent of the growth in manufacturing in East and Southeast Asia have come from global production sharing. This makes the manufacturing sector in East and Southeast Asia - the rapidly expanding heart of these economies - highly vulnerable to disruptions to the supply chain in other countries. One recent study found that the March 2011 Fukushima disaster in Japan, which cut Japanese automobile production by 47.7 per cent and electrical component production by 8.25 per cent, also caused a 19.7 percent drop in Thai auto manufacturing, a 24 per cent drop in auto manufacturing in The Philippines, and a 6 per cent drop in Indonesian auto manufacturing; while affecting the electrical sectors on the Philippines by 17.5 per cent and Malaysia by 8.4 per cent.

Third, rapid wealth and power increases in Asia’s largest societies has raised the prospect that one or more of them can now contemplate regional dominance. Previously, during the second half of the last century, no Asian power was large or wealthy enough to realistically dominate all others or to challenge American power in the Pacific. Now China appears increasingly able to do both, a prospect that has stimulated a number of different reactions among its neighbours. In addition to this, the neat set of reinforcing trade, investment and security dynamics around the Pacific rim has been superseded by a growing bifurcation between states’ security interests and their economic connectivities. Most of China’s significant neighbours have been establishing strategic connections with each other and with the United States as a way of hedging against China’s growing power, while at the same time deepening their economic linkages with the Chinese economy.

The result is an escalating rivalry between the interdependent states of the Indo-Pacific. And this condition seems to be self-accelerating: interdependence leads to growing wealth, which leads to expanding expectations, which leads to growing rivalry. The stakes involved in such deep and complex interdependence mean that the rivalry cannot be brought to a head in a physical contest of arms that could jeopardise economic enrichment. At the same time, the rivalry and lack of trust among regional countries means that economic interdependence cannot drive the sort of political integration that has led to the creation of what Robert Cooper called ‘post-modern states’ in Europe.

The Psychology of Interdependence

In purely structural terms these three changes have resulted in two developments in Asia’s economic geography. The first is the pronounced geographic separation between Asia’s centres of consumption and Asia’s centres of production - particularly in minerals and energy. Asia’s industrialising and urbanising giants represent the greatest growth trajectory for demand for energy and minerals in the world, both today and into the foreseeable future. It is a demand growth that is both insatiable and structural - meaning that if the demand is not met with dependable supplies at sustainable cost it will threaten social, economic and political cohesion in Asia’s rapidly industrialising societies. Particularly in energy, there is only one source of sustainable supply in the world that can hope to meet the demand: West Asia’s hydrocarbon reserves. For many West Asian producers the demand for security provided by East and South Asia’s energy thirst is as structurally compelling: without continued robust demand for energy and reliable flows of export dollars, the stability of their own mostly autocratic societies would also be threatened.

The second development in Asia’s economic geography is the development of a region-wide manufacturing system, and the rapid end to the prospects of autarchic industrialisation - where all or most elements of manufacturing and consumption occur within a single national economy. With regional and global manufacturing becoming ever more footloose, this has made considerations of comparative advantage among countries and companies more fleeting and more fraught. China and several Southeast Asian countries have become increasingly worried about being caught in the ‘middle income trap’, where their cost of labour rises but the local manufacturing sector is unable to innovate up the value chain.

While both processes have undoubtedly led to rapid increases in power and wealth and modernisation of Asian economies, they have also been disconcerting for some. Particularly for countries with histories of self-sufficiency, import-substitution, and
autarchic policy settings, the sudden and irreversible expansion of their economic dependence on the outside world has led to increasing anxiety, particularly as the global economy seems to be gripped by periodic instability with increasing frequency. The combination of a sense of increasing vulnerability to flows and supplies located outside the country’s borders, with the growing strategic rivalries and competition touched off by China’s ascent, have led to a growing sense of strategic claustrophobia, particularly among Asia’s larger powers. This strategic claustrophobia manifests itself in the growing anxiety that rivals will play out their strategic designs by manipulating vulnerabilities and dependencies; and that the only way to counter this is to position one’s own country to be able to manipulate the vulnerabilities of its rivals.

Claustrophobia and Rivalry
The arrival of an era of rivalrous interdependence has led to some distinct changes in Indo-Pacific strategic dynamics. The first can be termed the ‘normalisation’ of Asian security. On gaining independence, most inherited colonial boundaries that included a great deal of diversity and rivalry, and many soon acquired communist insurgencies also. The result was ethnic and political instability, and a consequent preoccupation with domestic security in a way that crowded out serious external security preparation or competition.

Security spending in the Indo-Pacific has shifted decisively in favour of external security over the past decade. While few of those countries that in the past have been preoccupied with internal security would admit that their domestic concerns have completely resolved, the shift in favour of external security reflects intensified strategic competition in the region. Thus despite its internal security budget being larger than its military budget, China’s arms spending continues to grow strongly.

The growing strategic rivalry across the Indo-Pacific can be read from basic arms acquisition statistics. In 2012, it was reported that the period from 2007-11 saw a 200 per cent higher volume of arms transfers into Southeast Asia than there had been over the period 2002-06. This volume of imports was the highest since the end of the Vietnam War. Naval weapons formed the bulk of these purchases, with ships and maritime weapons accounting for 52 per cent of the total, and another 37 per cent accounting for weapons with a possible maritime role. A similar level and profile is evident in weapons acquisition intentions also.³

As a result, Asian countries on the whole are becoming more able to prosecute their own external security interests - and as ability grows, willingness follows closely. The Indo-Pacific is becoming a more militarised realm, with a greater number of consequential security actors. The options for both rivalries and coalitions have expanded, as have the chances of conflict occurring among militaries whose capabilities exceed their doctrine or maturity.

Another change appears to be developing in strategic doctrine. The growing rivalries and capabilities in the region have coincided with wariness about direct confrontation and escalation, particularly of the sort that could disrupt the lucrative interdependencies of the region. A result of this reluctance has been a growing awareness of the options for ‘horizontal escalation’ - that is responding to confrontation in one location by threatening to exploit a rival’s vulnerabilities in another location. So, for example, a United States unwilling to risk a direct naval confrontation with China in the Taiwan Strait, could threaten to shut down the Strait of Hormuz to China-bound oil tankers. Or China, in order to build pressure on Japan over the Diaoyus/Senkakus islands, could start harassing Japanese ships in the South China Sea. Or India, under pressure from China on their mutual land border, could threaten to squeeze off access through the Andaman Sea to Chinese ships. Looked at from this perspective, the sudden flaring up of maritime territorial disputes looks much less like being driven by localised demands and rivalries, and much more about strategic positioning for the evolving rivalries across the Indo-Pacific.

Geography and Strategy
In the context of an increasingly contested maritime domain, the particular geographic features of Asia’s southern tier begin to take on particular strategic significance. At the heart of manipulable dependence lies Asia’s east-west energy trade: the disruption of no other commodity or supply could wreak such widespread damage as that of hydrocarbons. The physical properties of these energy commodities means the bulk of them must be transported along a concentrated and non-redundant sea route, from the Gulf, through the Indian Ocean, the Malacca Strait, and the South and East China seas.

As the weapons acquisition statistics in Southeast Asia attest, the sea along this singular corridor has become a symbol of vulnerability and opportunity for Asia’s jostling powers. As Calwell notes, the coast always exists as a potential frontier between belligerent states, with the scale and timing of the threat rarely being able to be anticipated or planned for:³ Calwell particularly notes the strategic advantages and disadvantages presented to maritime powers by two particular geographic features: peninsulas and bays. Peninsulas, he argues, by definition lack strategic depth; they are the very opposite of a land-based salient into enemy territory:

The salient land frontier does not necessarily place troops within the salient at a strategic disadvantage; because they may be in a position to strike; and there are two different directions in which they can strike. But an army in a salient girt by the sea cannot from the nature of the case strike if the enemy has command of the sea...
Bays, on the other hand, offer a completely different set of advantages:

As, in time of war, the frontier of that nation which enjoys the maritime control is the coast line of the enemy, it follows that when the coast line takes the shape of a giant gulf or bay, the army of the power dominating the sea can strike either to the left hand or to the right, while the adversary is compelled to divide his forces. 9

With these observations in mind, it is necessary to suggest another way of thinking about Asia’s maritime geography than control of sea lines of communication or chokepoints. The threat to close a particular chokepoint has two disadvantages: it offers at best a short term strategic advantage; and it is likely to be undiscriminating, inconveniencing rivals and allies at the same time. One must also keep in mind Corbett’s observation that ‘the most common situation in naval war is that neither side has the command [of the sea]; that the normal position is not a commanded sea, but an uncommanded one.’ 9 Particularly in a situation with several rising rivalrous naval powers, it is more likely that they will try to strive for enduring political and strategic preponderance over key geographic features of maritime Asia, and to forestall the preponderance of their rivals.

From this perspective, there are six alluring possibilities for preponderance that offer themselves to Asia’s jostling powers. Conveniently, these divide into three bays and three peninsulas. The three bays are the Arabian Sea, the Bay of Bengal, and the South China Sea. The geography of bays interacts with power and the strategic imagination of rising powers in peculiar ways. Bays are enclosed bodies of water that engage the territorial imagination - one can imagine ‘owning’ a bay much more easily than one can imagine ‘owning’ a sea or an ocean. Maritime Asia’s three bays are historical trade hubs with abundant historical - and therefore contemporary civilisational - overlays. Before European conquest, Asia’s maritime trade route was neatly divided into three ‘circuits’, each with a different pattern of monsoonal trade winds. The South China Sea circuit was dominated by Chinese traders, the Bay of Bengal by Indian traders, and the Arabian Sea by Arabs. It is not hard to see why these bodies of water might so engage the romantic and strategic imagination of these peoples. Each of these bays is subject to territorial disputes and expansive great power sovereignty claims. Each is bordered by one big and several smaller claimants; with the United States as the anxious guarantor of the maritime commons in the background. Each bay is attended by complex politics and strategy around its egress and ingress points: does control of a bay confer or negate control of a chokepoint? Does control of a chokepoint confer or negate control of a bay?

The three peninsulas are the South Asian peninsula, the Indo-Pacific peninsula, and the West Pacific peninsula. Peninsular geography also interacts with power and the strategic imagination in peculiar ways: it constrains, concentrates, funnels and bundles power. Strategic shifts in one part of a peninsula are likely to cascade through to its other parts. Peninsulas tend to be strategically stable if dominated by a single set of strategic interests; but once a contrary strategic interest gains hold, they become extremely unstable. Two of the Indo-Pacific’s peninsulas - the South Asian and West Pacific - hold the key to India’s and China’s strategic claustrophobia. Each is held in full or part by rival entities; each contain parts of India’s and China’s historic sense of wholeness; each are sites of strategic footholds by major rivals. For China to gain control of the West Pacific peninsula; or for India to become supreme on the South Asian peninsula, would represent major advances in their regional and global power capabilities. The Indo-Pacific peninsula, running from northern Thailand through the Malay Peninsula and the Indonesian archipelago to northern Australia, is just as crucial: as the land divide between the Indian and Pacific oceans, it is a vital frontier between American power and Indian and Chinese ambitions. Any one or combination of powers that gained supremacy over the Indo-Pacific peninsula would hold the key to the broader Indo-Pacific.

**Conclusions**

Three peninsulas and three bays; to find a Mackinderian formula, *the peninsulas hold the key to the bays; the bays hold the keys to the peninsulas.* So, for example, the further expansion of Chinese influence down the Indo-Pacific peninsula will further split ASEAN solidarity, allowing the continuing advance of Beijing’s claims in the South China Sea. Creeping Chinese control over the South China Sea brings it closer to its goals in the West Pacific peninsula - what Chinese strategists call the First Island Chain - including by ramping up the pressure on territorial disputes with Japan in the East China Sea. If India is able to draw Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka into its own growth dynamic, and thereby neutralise them as strategic concerns, it can build influence in the Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal. India’s growing presence in the Bay of Bengal and into the Malacca Strait can act as a counter to Chinese control over the Indo-Pacific peninsula - and even into the South China Sea. China’s ability to establish a permanent presence in the Arabian Sea - perhaps at Gwadar - will decisively counter India’s position in the South Asian peninsula and the Arabian Sea.

Arguably, this geopolitical perspective on Asia’s future raises more questions than it answers. Many of these developments are nascent. Big unknowns abound. To what extent will the United States be able to maintain maritime supremacy against the naval build-ups of so many southern tier states? What are China’s and India’s abilities to build geopolitical influence on the peninsulas, while establishing supremacy over the bays? To what extent will peninsular and littoral states forge a strategic common purpose or be divided and dominated by their giant neighbours?

For Australia, there are some clear implications. First and foremost, we must get used to the fact that we are an integral part of the Indo-Pacific peninsula, and cannot escape the escalating competition for it. Second, we must stop thinking tactically
and start thinking strategically about the region. Instead of priority relationships as the foundation of our foreign and defence policies, we need to think in terms of three bays and three peninsulas. The outcome in each will have profound implications for us, and we need to think hard about all possible permutations. Third, neither multilateralism nor bilateralism will provide a way forward. The great powers will - and already are - using the region’s institutions as instruments in their rivalry. Staking our future on Asia’s institutions being able to mitigate this scale of rivalry will be a mistake. Neither will cultivating good bilateral relations with the major powers be enough. A small player like Australia risks being ignored and played off by the bigger powers. Instead, we need to find a flexible, plurilateral approach to the region, in which we place an equal or even greater emphasis on building common cause and understanding with countries closer to our own size.

Be it in the bays or the peninsulas, it is the choices of medium sized and small states that will hold the key. These are our natural caucus group - and we should pour resources into a deepening continuing engagement with them over the fates and dynamics of the peninsulas and bays. In particular, we need to build our strategic relations with the peninsular swing states, Japan and Indonesia, helping shape and bolster their strategic visions for the peninsulas and bays. One thing is for certain: the Asian century will almost certainly not be benign for Australia if we continue to be strategically naïve about how rapid economic growth affects security dynamics. But by thinking geopolitically about Asia as a whole - its northern and its southern tiers; its bays and peninsulas - we can survive and prosper in the Asian century.

Endnotes

7 Calwell, Military Operations and Maritime Preponderance, p. 266.
8 Calwell, Military Operations and Maritime Preponderance, pp. 266-267

Released on 3 May, the 2013 Defence White Paper always seemed destined to have a short shelf-life.1 At its release we knew that the government led by Julia Gillard was heading for a 14 September election date. The opinion polls suggested that an Australian Labor Party defeat was likely so it seemed inevitable that the white paper would be overturned very quickly. In fact the document had an even shorter life than was anticipated in May. Kevin Rudd’s return to the leadership had three key impacts on defence policy. First, Minister for Defence Stephen Smith announced his plan to retire from politics at the election; he stayed on as, in effect, a caretaker minister. Second, Rudd gave every indication during his second short tenure as prime minister that he preferred the policy settings of his own white paper released in 2009.2 Third, the election was brought forward by a week to 7 September.

In effect, no Australian Defence White Paper has had as short a run as an expression of government policy as the 2013 version. It may become a collector’s item, but only as a model of how not to do policy. The new Abbott-led government has committed to produce another Defence White Paper within 18 months, so we can expect a policy release towards the middle of 2015. What is likely to survive from the 2013 policy into the 2015 version?

I would argue that there is unlikely to be too many changes in the early strategic overview and international security chapters of the next white paper - with one exception, and that is on the language used around China. In most other respects there will be little for the new government to disagree with on international policy settings.

The 2013 White Paper’s Strategic Perspective

The 2013 Defence White Paper articulated what we had known for some time was an intent to pivot the Australian Defence Force (ADF) back to closer engagement in our region. The document made a strong statement of intent to deepen relations with Indonesia and reinvest in defence cooperation with Papua New Guinea. It also pointed to a rapidly growing strategic relationship with Japan and to the potential for closer cooperation with Tokyo on industry matters. In terms of regional engagement, these three relationships have shown, in different ways, the fastest growth in defence cooperation. This will certainly continue under an Abbott-led government.

It was welcome that the 2013 Defence White Paper took a broad approach to thinking about Australia’s strategic interests, but the language stressing continuity between it on the one hand and the Asian Century white paper and National Security Strategy on the other should not be believed.3 Of these three, the Defence
White Paper reflected by far the most sophisticated approach. More needs to be
done to think through the idea of an ‘Indo-Pacific strategic arc’, but the 2013 paper
presented a more realistic way to think about our interests than the approach of the
Asian Century white paper, which is to emphasise a narrow set of relationships with
a limited number of countries. By contrast, the Defence White Paper had sensible
things to say about Australia’s strategic interests in Africa and the Middle East, and
on the importance of strategic engagement with countries in Europe, Latin America
and elsewhere. The term ‘Indo-Pacific strategic arc’ is likely to remain, not least
because the new government’s foreign and defence ministers are from Western
Australia. More importantly the term catches a clear and uniquely Australian
strategic reality: the country faces both oceans and our economic well-being relies
on the peaceful flow of commerce between these oceans.

Unlike the national security strategy, the Defence White Paper had a more hard-
edged view of risks to regional security which is, frankly, more grown up in its
approach. It was pleasing to see the statement finally tackling (and dismissing) the
tired shibboleth of having to choose between China and the United States. Neither
wants us to choose, nor is it in our strategic interests to do so.

The US alliance relationship received a more substantial treatment than it did in the
Asian Century white paper. Judgements about the longevity and value of America’s
strategic role in the Asia-Pacific have clearly been examined and the right conclusion
reached; that the alliance remains central to Australian interests. It was a pity that
the Defence White Paper did not take the opportunity to speed up cooperation with
the US on Marine Corps and air force deployments, but that is something we should
expect the new government to pursue. There were also positive statements about
opportunities for new cooperation in areas of space, what I think is a new term in
‘cyber power’ and on ballistic missile defence. Again, the Abbott-led government
will likely expand these areas of activity where finances allow.

On force posture matters, the Defence White Paper reprised much of the ground
covered in the ADF Posture Review study of 2012. It was a major positive that
no decisions have been taken to permanently deploy ADF assets to the north and
northwest - something of a pet-theme for Western Australian politicians on all sides
of politics - but the decision to undertake facilities improvements on the Cocos
Islands, Darwin and RAAF Base Tindal are welcome.

It was welcome that the Defence White Paper took seriously the need to plan for
defence engagement in the region. The 2009 Defence White Paper put too much
emphasis on force planning for 2030. Of course long-term force structuring
decisions are essential, but so too is the need for Australia to seek to shape and
influence its strategic environment in 2013, 2014 and every year up to that point.
Early and sustained Australian involvement in building trusting relations with our
friends and neighbours is a vital part of securing our long-term strategic interests.

All told, the strategic positioning of the ADF in the Defence White Paper represented
a sensible approach. Much of this regional engagement activity is low cost but high
value and represents the right focus for Defence. The budget picture however,
remains poor for Defence, notwithstanding a small injection of funding to pay for
the Growler electronic warfare aircraft acquisition. As I wrote at the time, this was a
Defence White Paper fitted for but not with money. The new government will have
to revisit that situation. The choice remains the same: we will have to spend more
or trim planned acquisitions.

My one point of reservation about the international security aspects of the 2013
Defence White Paper was on its treatment of China; which reversed course on much
of the substance and some of the rhetoric of the 2009 Defence White Paper. The
language on China was sensibly softened, because the aim of white papers should
not be to create enmity. A more positive caste was put on prospects for regional
security, one that helpfully (for the government) made the case for lower planned
levels of defence spending. The 2013 Defence White Paper sets out a very different
strategic world view from the 2009 version. As I described it in Security Challenges:

The reader was left wondering how a government could produce two such
Century White Paper. The answer, of course, is that the shift from Kevin Rudd
to Julia Gillard had brought fundamental changes to Australia’s strategic
policy. The Asian Century statement was a decisive policy rejection of the
2009 White Paper’s more pessimistic assessment of the prospects for regional
security. Through the 2012 statement Julia Gillard put her personal stamp on
the government’s external policies. This was the White Paper which Gillard
‘owned’, and in it she distanced herself from Rudd’s legacy, weakening the
case for higher levels of defence spending.

The new government will have to re-think the language it adopts on China. The
2013 White Paper swung the pendulum too far in the opposite direction of the more
hawkish 2009 White Paper. It remains the case that the growth of Chinese military
capabilities coupled with a more assertive use of Chinese diplomacy in the East
and South China seas worries many countries in the region. The next white paper
needs to capture that sense of concern without exaggerating the risks to Australia,
or exaggerating our capacity to shape regional security.

Defence Policy Challenges for the New Government

What challenges will the new government face in developing its own defence white
paper over the next 18 months? Tony Abbott’s announcement during the election
campaign that ‘within a decade … defence spending will be 2 per cent of GDP’
is welcome, but will be very challenging to deliver. Mark Thomson calculates that
lifting defence spending from the present 1.67 per cent of gross domestic product
A key message for future governments here is that steady spending growth is the only sensible way to plan long-term acquisitions of ships, submarines, aircraft, weapons and bases. More important even than the promise of increased spending is the hope that this money is spent wisely. The need is for governments to plan more carefully so they can spend on defence more wisely. Governments should pause long enough to ask how each proposed defence project really addresses Australia’s strategic needs.

Defence policy settings are simply not credible in maintaining that a budget that has sustained current and planned cuts of up to $30 billion since 2009 can deliver all of the ‘core’ planned defence capabilities. There is a price to be paid in keeping this fiction, which is that governments will commit to long-term projects the full costs of which are not now apparent but will certainly exceed projected defence spending levels. The only way to avoid being locked into unsustainable long-term spending commitments is for a future government to perform the unpalatable task of increasing defence spending, or cutting future capability plans.

Just as important as the content of new policy is the means by which that policy is developed. Although discussing process can be eye-glazing to all but a few hardy souls in the policy business, the reality is that good processes make good policy. I suggest four steps the government should take to improve the quality of defence policymaking processes for white papers: first, the government should set out how it will produce a new defence white paper; second, government should commit to a public and external review of defence capability in advance of a new white paper; third, the government should aim for greater clairty in defence budgeting; finally, government should set some rules around defence and media engagement.

**Improving policymaking processes**

Turning to my first recommendation, how should the government improve policymaking processes for the next white paper? I suggest that their approach should be to emphasise a strong commitment to what could be called the ‘five Cs’: base work on classified assessments; use Cabinet as a direction-setting forum; make choices; consult widely within official circles; and finally, engage the broader community.

The first ‘C’ - using classified assessments as the basis for decision making is a critical way to focus government on the difficult and hard-edged judgements about strategic developments. Equally, governments need access to realistic assessments about the strengths and weaknesses of ADF capabilities. In both cases it may not be advisable to make such assessments public. The unclassified white paper statement explains policy to a wide audience, but it should only be the final stage of a more thorough going review. The second ‘C’ - Cabinet’s deep involvement is important to make sure that key ministers have the opportunity to talk issues through and decide on outcomes to which they will commit. In 2000 and 2009, the National Security Committee of Cabinet met several times to consider strategic trends, force structure options and budget trade-offs. Endorsing a public white paper at the end of this process should be the least onerous of Cabinet’s tasks.

The third ‘C’ is for choices - the real policy purpose of white papers is to force choices on decision makers about defence priorities. The 2013 White Paper failed this test because of reluctance on the part of government to acknowledge the cumulative impact of spending cuts and deferrals. That situation is unlikely to be sustainable for the next white paper. When it comes to defence, Cabinet should work on the basis that a choice delayed is a choice not made.

The fourth ‘C’ is for consultation within the wider group of agencies and government departments known as the national security community. One of the successes of the last decade has been to strengthen a whole-of-government approach to national security, for example in enhancing counter-terrorism strategies and in linking defence, development and policing interests in Afghanistan, Solomon Islands and Timor-Leste. Consultation can slow policymaking down, but a new defence white paper would benefit from a stronger focus in this area. This is particularly so because of a deeper focus on using defence to engage more deeply with countries in our region, and in a range of operations other than war.

The final ‘C’ in developing a good quality white paper process stands for ‘community’. White papers can play an important role to educate community thinking on defence and to build support for policy by asking the community for their views. A discussion paper issued in advance of a white paper - as happened in 1999 and 2008 - can help to define the right policy areas for community debate, shape international perceptions about the purpose of the work, and lay the ground for a favourable reception of a new white paper. A key part of consultation should also be with the business community - defence industry and wider - who will be a critical part of delivering capability. This needs to be a genuine discussion, not simply one way transmission from Canberra to the rest of the country.
An external review of defence capability

My second suggestion for the new government is that they should commission an independent review of Australia’s defence capabilities in advance of releasing a new defence white paper. It would not be the first time such a study was undertaken. In 1985, the then Minister for Defence, Kim Beazley, commissioned Paul Dibb to undertake a defence capability review.4 Dibb’s remit was broad. He was asked to ‘review the content, priorities and rationale of defence forward planning in the light of the strategic and financial planning guidance endorsed by the government’ and ‘to advise on present and future force capabilities and on the present and future balance between resource elements such as manpower, activities, operating stocks, facilities and equipment.’

Dibb made clear in his report that he could find no clear strategic explanation for why Defence was (at the time) built around a 12 destroyer Navy, three squadrons of combat fighters, six regular Army battalions, and so on. A generation later the author of a new defence capability review would face a similar problem.

The value of the Dibb Review was that it was independent and made it possible to cut through long-standing rivalries between the military and civilian parts of Defence, and between the three Services. In 2013 Defence is genuinely a much more joint organisation than in 1986, but one cannot be naïve about the fact that a study forcing difficult choices between military capabilities is almost impossible to be generated inside the agencies that have to take the cuts. The Dibb Review also set out a solid base for making disciplined judgements about equipment acquisitions. The rather narrowly cast ‘defence of Australia’ policy set out in 1986 would necessarily be altered in 2013-14 to have a stronger regional focus and an even deeper alliance connection with the United States. A new review would have to address a more complicated international environment and a larger set of relations with friends and neighbours.

Finally the Dibb Review gave the government of the day an arms-length assessment of what it needed to do in defence; helped shape the public debate and build a consensus around the outcomes adopted in the 1987 Defence White Paper.5 It was a model of good policymaking and one well worth adopting by a new government.

Budgeting and public handling

On defence budgeting a future government should commit itself early and publicly to lift the standard of commentary in the next white paper on long-term budget issues. It is difficult to escape the charge that the budget chapters in both the 2009 and 2013 defence white papers set out to conceal more than they revealed about future budget intentions. The aim should be to return to a long-term budget projection for defence that looks ahead 20 years to cover the life of major capital equipment projects. The candour of the budget chapter in the next white paper will be a critical benchmark of how seriously the document should be taken.

A final suggestion for the next white paper is for the government to commit to launching the document by means of a statement to Parliament. This would have the benefit of allowing a sustained Parliamentary debate, engage Members and Senators and require Minister’s to explain their policy settings in detail. Such an approach was once the norm for governments making major new policy announcements. Regrettably the last two white papers have been launched at highly orchestrated media events. One rough rule of thumb which could be applied is that the bigger the launch the less there is to the statement.

Conclusion

The 2013 Defence White Paper demonstrated some old verities of policymaking. First, policies are unlikely to last for very long if they lose their key sponsors. Second, the policy outcomes are only as good as the processes which produced them. Third, policy without money is a weak and imperfect product. That said the document made a contribution which will last in its use of the term ‘Indo-Pacific strategic arc’ and its strategic policy settings are likely to be echoed in the 2015 white paper. The Abbott-led government has the opportunity to build on the statement, keeping the language and policy initiatives it values and adding its own perspective on defence policy settings. The best approach would be for the government to be more disciplined in its policy development work over the next 18 months and also to find a realistic way to balance available funding with its strategic aspirations.

Endnotes

This paper explores the application of naval power across the spectrum of conflict. It argues that although the contribution of sea power to victory in war has been widely studied, the effectiveness of navies in shaping, deterring and reassuring remains an under-examined topic. That is a critical deficit, because it represents so much of what navies do. Moreover, navies have historically adopted different force structures and postures for peacetime and wartime missions. Since the end of World War II, however, the peacetime structure and operations of major navies, particularly those of the US Navy, have mirrored their wartime employment. For a number of reasons, including the spread of precision weaponry, long-term resource constraints, and the growing cost of naval combatants, this pattern may have to change. Responding to the emerging political, fiscal, and operational environment will require serious rethinking of naval force structure and posture.

The Flexibility of Sea Power

Navies are inherently flexible instruments of national power. Among their most important attributes are their combination of mobility and persistence. Naval forces offer persistent presence in a region without the need to acquire basing rights or occupy hostile territory. Although air forces are more mobile, they lack the ability to remain on station for long periods of time without considerable support. Ground forces are persistent and can possess great tactical mobility, but lack the inherent strategic mobility of naval forces.

Navies are also useful across the spectrum of conflict. In peacetime, they are capable of demonstrating presence, shaping the behaviour of other actors, reassuring allies, and deterring aggression. They are also useful instruments of peacetime competition. Finally, they provide the ability to respond rapidly to crises as well as wage war.

Naval forces have been central to US strategy in the Asia-Pacific region for over a century. The US Navy has shown the flag and protected American lives and property in Pacific waters since the mid-19th century. The United States has used its navy to shape the behaviour of other states, as it has done on numerous occasions to enforce international norms of behaviour such as enduring freedom of navigation. The US Navy has also acted to ensure the free flow of goods, services, and information across the Pacific. This has undergirded economic growth and prosperity, lifting millions out of poverty and serving as the midwife of globalisation. Forward deployed naval forces have also given the United States the ability to respond rapidly to disasters,
such as the 26 December 2004 tsunami in Southeast Asia and the Tohoku earthquake tsunami leading to the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident in 2011, and crises, such as the 1995-96 Taiwan Straits crisis and more recent efforts by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to coerce Republic of Korea.

The Navy has also served as a deterrent. Throughout the Cold War and up to the present day, one of the central missions of forward-deployed naval forces has been that of deterring aggression. The Navy has also played a role in reassuring our allies in the face of attempts at coercion. Last, but certainly not least, the US Navy has served as a powerful instrument in war. The Navy played a leading role in the Pacific Theatre in World War II and an important supporting one in the Korean and Vietnam wars.

Scholars have paid varying attention to the different roles of naval forces. The role of sea power in grand strategy has long been the topic of study, and Alfred Thayer Mahan stands out as one of the earliest and in many ways the best theorist of grand strategy. Mahan wrote persuasively about the deep interconnection between geography, society, economic systems, and military power. Similarly, scholars have studied the role of navies in war, and in particular how they can produce operational and strategic effects.

The role that navies play in other parts of the conflict spectrum is less well understood. This is in part because presence, deterrence, and reassurance are as much psychological as they are physical. In these cases, naval forces are meant to influence the decision making calculus of the international community, competitors, and allies, respectively. Naval presence serves as an expression of strategic attention. In the case of the United States, the deployment of naval forces is a reflection of the importance that Washington attaches to a particular region. However, there has been precious little empirical research to determine what is needed to demonstrate presence, how much presence is enough, or for that matter whether there is such a thing as too much presence. There is also little data to determine what attributes of naval forces are most effective in demonstrating presence.

The purpose of deterrence is to convince potential aggressors that aggression will fail to yield anticipated benefits or that it will meet with disproportionate retaliation that will render it counterproductive. Deterrence theory holds that the effectiveness of a deterrent threat is a function of capability, credibility, and communication. However, whereas capability is (at least partially) material, credibility and communication depend crucially on the perceptions of a particular competitor under a particular set of circumstances. These can hardly be assumed. In fact, history contains cases where adversaries, far from being dissuaded, were actually emboldened by moves that were meant to deter. It is worth remembering that President Franklin Roosevelt ordered the US Pacific Fleet moved to Pearl Harbor as a deterrent to Japanese aggression. Japanese commanders, by contrast, saw the concentration of the Fleet in Hawaii as giving them a chance for a surprise attack that would cripple the US Navy and crush American will.

Reassurance is the converse of deterrence. It seeks to convince an ally that it will be supported in the face of coercion or aggression. Like deterrence, the success of reassurance is crucially dependent upon perceptions of US capability and resolve. However, we have only a tenuous understanding of what it is that allies look to in order to be reassured.

Deploying and Employing Naval Forces

Historically, navies have adopted different methods of deploying and employing naval power across the spectrum of conflict. These modes of organisation and operation send powerful signals to friend and foe alike about how a nation views sea power and the range of naval missions.

The first approach can be termed periodic deployment. Most maritime powers base their navies in home or nearby waters on a day-to-day basis. They deploy their navies only periodically and then for a particular purpose, such as naval diplomacy, disaster response, crisis response, or combat, but their navies are principally based in home waters on a day-to-day basis.

A second approach that maritime powers have adopted is to differentiate their force structure and posture between forces and operations aimed at peacetime presence and those tailored to fighting and winning wars. Britain over the 18-20th centuries and the United States prior to World War II tended to rely upon small combatants such as frigates to show the flag and coerce adversaries; they kept their capital ships concentrated in home waters to train and prepare for a decisive fleet battle.

A third approach involves deploying forward capital ships and using them as instruments of presence, deterrence, and reassurance as well as war. This is an approach that the Royal Navy adopted periodically over the 19-20th centuries, and it is the approach that the United States has followed since World War II. The United States position in Asia has rested on a set of alliances, ground and air forces deployed on allied and US territory, and forward-deployed naval forces. The United States has deployed ground and air forces on allied territory in Japan and Republic of Korea and on US territory (Hawaii, Alaska, and Guam) to reassure allies and deter adversaries. It has also routinely deployed US Navy carrier strike groups and expeditionary strike groups in the western Pacific Ocean to demonstrate US presence, reassure, and deter.

Significantly, the United States approach to demonstrating its presence, reassuring allies, and deterring aggressors mirrors its concept of operations in wartime. That is, the United States uses its most powerful naval assets, its carrier strike groups, as instruments of peacetime presence, assurance, and deterrence. In time of war, these forward-deployed naval forces would serve as instruments of power projection.
The Changing Security Environment

Several trends, including the spread of precision weaponry, long-term constraints on defence spending, and cost growth in naval combatants portend a major shift in the operating environment that navies will face in peace as well as in war.

First, the spread of precision weaponry is rendering naval surface forces increasingly vulnerable. Guided weapons have a long history in naval warfare. Although guided weapons were first used by Germany against the United States in World War II, it was the US that took the lead in developing precision weapons in the decades that followed. For many, the 1991 Gulf War represented the true emergence of precision warfare, and the United States and other major powers embraced precision weaponry in the decade that followed. Throughout the 1990s, the combination of stealth and precision-guided munitions gave the United States the ability to strike adversaries from the air with near impunity. Air and sea power coupled with precision-guided munitions appeared to offer the ability to coerce Iraq, intervene in the Balkans, and retaliate against terrorist groups while avoiding the difficult decisions associated with a sustained commitment of ground forces.

Despite - or, in fact, because of - America’s success in embracing the precision strike revolution, a growing number of actors are acquiring precision-guided munitions, as well as the vital supporting capabilities needed to wage precision warfare, including commercial sources of imagery, precision navigation and timing, and upgraded command and control. Moreover, states are developing the ability to counter US precision strike capabilities by hardening, concealing, and dispersing their forces and infrastructure.

A growing number of actors are acquiring precision-guided munitions. These include not only US allies, but also competitors such as China, which has made a major investment in precision strike. Unconstrained by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which prevents the United States and Russia from deploying land-based intermediate-range missiles, China has become the world leader in precision-guided ballistic missiles. According to unclassified Department of Defense estimates, China has deployed more than 1000 precision-guided conventional ballistic missiles opposite Taiwan. Moreover, it is fielding an anti-ship ballistic missile capable of striking ships at sea up to 1500km from China and may in the future field a precision-strike system with intercontinental range. Nor are states any longer the only actors in the precision strike revolution. For example, Lebanese Hezbollah used anti-tank guided missiles and anti-ship cruise missiles against Israeli forces in its 2006 war with Israel.

The spread of precision strike weapons is likely to have dramatic consequences for the United States. As noted above, since the end of World War II, the United States has based its defence strategy on a combination of forward-based forces to deter adversaries and reassure allies and friends and the projection of power from those bases and the continental US to defeat foes in wartime. The spread of precision strike systems will call that formula into question.

US bases are increasingly under threat of precision strike systems. For example, some bases in the western Pacific Ocean are now within range of Chinese precision-guided conventional ballistic missiles; others will come in range as China deploys longer-range weapons. Over time, the vulnerability of these bases will undermine the deterrence of aggressors and reassurance of allies.

The threat to US forward bases, in turn, calls into question the model that the United States has relied on for power projection in recent decades. Without access to ports and airfields in Saudi Arabia and across the Persian Gulf region, for example, it would have become considerably more difficult for the US-led coalition to eject Iraqi forces from Kuwait in 1991. A future campaign against an adversary armed with precision-guided missiles, rockets, and mortars may more closely resemble the World War II invasions of Normandy and Iwo Jima than the relatively unopposed attacks on Iraq and Afghanistan.

The growth and diffusion of precision strike systems could affect naval forces in peacetime as well as war. To the extent that US military power in general and power projection in particular, has underpinned global norms, the emergence of anti-access capabilities could undercut world order. For example, the development and diffusion of anti-access systems could undermine the principle of freedom of navigation. There is a danger that the vulnerability of US forces, and responses to it, will undermine the credibility of the American commitment to Asia. This is compounded by the fact that alternatives for demonstrating US presence, such as the littoral combat ship, possess limited military capability, whereas some of the most potent strike platforms, such as nuclear attack submarines, may have limited value as instruments of presence and reassurance due to their inherent stealthiness.

A second trend involves long-term pressure on defence budgets in advanced industrial states arising out of limited economic growth and increasing demands for social spending. Although the debate over defence spending in the United States has been on full display, it is but one instance of a much broader phenomenon. Naval budgets across the world are under pressure, and will continue to be.

The defence budget squeeze is multiplied by a third trend, the long-term growth in the cost of navies. Personnel costs have increased, and will continue to increase, as navies have to recruit, train, and retain skilled sailors. Similarly, the cost of naval combatants has risen with the incorporation of new technology. Although individual naval combatants possess increasing capability, navies are able to afford fewer
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of them. Because capability is being concentrated in fewer and fewer platforms, the relative value of naval combatants is going up. In addition, naval combatants represent increasingly lucrative targets that leaders may be reluctant to put at risk. Importantly, a naval combatant, no matter how powerful, can only be in one place at one time. The ability of naval forces to demonstrate presence, and potentially to deter and reassure, may therefore diminish over time.

Implications for Naval Force Structure and Force Posture

Taken together, these trends portend a shift in the environment in which navies will operate. Preserving the flexibility of naval forces in this new environment will require changes to both naval force structure and force posture, including greater specialisation between forces for keeping the peace and those for fighting wars.

First, there is a need to develop new approaches to presence. For the United States, for example, this may involve moving away from carrier strike groups and toward networks of capable surface ships as the most visible symbol of US presence. The United States should also continue to bolster its submarine fleet in the Pacific and think creatively about ways to use undersea forces as instruments of presence, deterrence and reassurance.

Second, the United States and its allies need to enter into a serious dialogue on extended deterrence and reassurance. The shift in the operational environment described above, and the shift in force structure and force posture to accommodate it, should be an opportunity to strengthen deterrence and reassure allies and friends.

Third, there is a need to change the character of its forward-deployed forces to make them more survivable and hence credible. The United States and its allies should, for example, harden and diversify their bases in the region. These should be balanced between bases on sovereign US territory, such as Hawaii and Guam, and those on allied territory, such as Japan and Republic of Korea. Bases on US territory guarantee access, whereas those on allied territory provide extended deterrence and reassurance.

Finally, the United States and its allies should increase their ability to strike at a distance in the face of growing anti-access threats. By bolstering the ability to strike precisely at a distance, they will not only strengthen deterrence, but also force competitors to increase their investments in active and passive defences. Investments in defensive capabilities represent resources that will not be available for offensive arms.

This is a challenging time for navies across the world, but also an exciting one. Navies will be, if anything, more important to national and international security than in the recent past. Making that so, however, will require deep thinking and difficult choices; time to get started!

Endnotes

It is an honour to be amongst so many maritime professionals gathered here today and while I would like to thank the hosts and the conference organisers for putting together this excellent program, I also want to thank, in particular, the chiefs of navies that are here and for them working with me over my tenure as Commander US Pacific Fleet.

This program offers a unique opportunity to meet as maritime and naval leaders, operators, practitioners, colleagues, all of whom understand the need to work together on important issues related to our maritime security and stability. But before I get too far along here, I would like to thank Vice Admiral Ray Griggs and his team for just such a splendid International Fleet Review and all the navies that participated in that review. Well done to all.

I am here today to speak to you about the roles of our navies that play in supporting maritime security in this region and throughout the world. It is a role that is critical to our nations, individually and collectively.

I will cover the following points. First, the importance of our collective maritime security in this Indo-Asia-Pacific region, also, how we have been addressing the challenges we face in this vibrant world we live in. Third, the opportunities we have to improve as we continue to work together in the future. And finally, I will address our US rebalance strategy.

Today, as we live in a globalised world where our economies are more and more interconnected and interdependent, while many nations represented here rely on the freedom of the seas to obtain the resources from their exclusive economic zones; all nations are relying on the sea for the transportation of energy, goods and commodities. Shipping on the open seas carries the bulk of all trade between nations and we can ill afford any disruption to their movement. Freedom of the seas has been key to the economic prosperity we have all shared since the conclusion of World War II and is key to our continued success in the future. Our navies play a significant role in ensuring the freedom of the seas by maintaining security and stability in the maritime domain.

As you know, more than 90 per cent of international trade, and half of the oil used in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region is seaborne. Figure 1 shows the tremendous volume of trade that flows along key sea lanes. The yellow lines represent the routes where greater than 5000 container ships transit each year. In recent times, we have seen the flow of up to US$5.3 trillion annually in global trade through the South China Sea, and US$1.3 trillion in US trade through the Malacca Strait.
So clearly, the United States has an interest in this area, just as every nation in attendance here today. That is why it is so important that the navies in this region continue to work together towards the important goal of maintaining that security at sea for prosperity ashore. However, we do live in an uncertain world where stability and security in the maritime domain can be threatened by man-made crises or natural disaster.

Today the lives and livelihoods of so many can be threatened, sometimes in an instant. We have to deal with tensions related to resources and territorial claims; the unpredictable behaviour by belligerent or irrational nation states; and partition between developing nations vying to assert their influence in a range of non-state actors and transnational threats. Those are man-made problems we face. Consider what nature can do to affect the flow of trade in regions with typhoons, such as the ones we are dealing with today, earthquakes, volcanoes, and, of course, tsunamis.

To effectively address these security challenges, it requires our collaboration, cooperation and strengthening of mutual trust, friendships, alliances and partnerships. We work at this every day. Just consider all that we do in the region together.

Our navies and coastguards have been working together to ensure stability and security, enabling an opportunity for continued economic prosperity. This, of course, involves sailor-to-sailor interactions at all levels as we work to ensure stability by conducting humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, maritime security, deterrence and, of course, if deterrence fails, power projection.

During my tenure as Commander US Pacific Fleet, I have been thoroughly impressed with the tremendous capabilities of your navies and the professionalism of your sailors. But I know we can all appreciate that sometimes the potential challenges we face in this region can surpass the ability of any one nation to address them alone. That is why it is so important to have interoperable capability with our allies, our partners and our friends, so that we are able to prepare for crisis and, if required, we can respond accordingly.

Today the US Navy conducts exercises and training events with over 20 allies, partners and friends in this region, to increase partnership capabilities to address uncertainty in the region. This is something we clearly put a high value on and I look forward to continuing that in the future. But the question is - can we take it up a notch? Can we do more together to ensure the future security in the maritime domain? Are we doing the right things? Are we doing the right things right?

It is important to ensure credible interoperability between our navies. Of course, interoperability here means more than a commonality between our technologies. It also involves a deeper understanding and acceptance of our many different and unique cultures, our operational doctrine and our individual nation’s political sensitivities, just to list a few. To improve in these areas, it requires us to continue to work together and even now we are planning for the future.

As an example, I am delighted to see that so many have been willing to participate in the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise series. Last year was the largest in the RIMPAC history with over 22 nations participating. We expect RIMPAC 2014 to be another history making exercise. By demonstrating our ability to unite as a fully interoperable coalition of navies, we can more effectively ensure security and stability that is so important to all of us here. This takes commitment on the part of everyone who has a stake in the security in this region.

Four days ago I was in Hawaii, then I flew to Japan, then I flew here; I was looking down at a lot of ocean throughout those flights. The point is not to complain, rather to demonstrate something you all know, which is that the Pacific is about a half of the planet. At 500kt it took about 10.5 hours to get to Japan, and as you know, travelling by ship at 15-20kt it will take about 10 days. Given the size of the Pacific and where we need to be, you can see why it is so important for our ships to be deployed forward to those areas of consequence throughout the region. It is also important for your ships to be out and about in the region where their presence can act as a deterrent to criminal activity and mischief and they can minimise their response time to crises as well. Of course, it is important to have the right presence for the right reasons.
Though we all have many interests related to this important region, we must also remain mindful that security and stability is the cornerstone to shared prosperity and peace. From maritime security to cyber security, from the high seas to the exclusive economic zones, the United States is committed to fostering a rules based regime of relationships that respect international law and international norms. This includes a healthy respect for adherence to international law, including important mandates of customary international law, such as the freedom of navigation access and use of the seas as evidenced by the *United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982*.

The United States remains fully committed to peacefully resolving regional disputes with respect to territory and the maritime regimes that are always derived from land territory. We remain committed to the goal of achieving a code of conduct with respect to these issues. It is the responsibility of our nations to demonstrate and reinforce our united commitment to establish international norms.

While our forces can surge to respond to any crisis, it takes trust and cooperation for us to effectively confront crises together. Of course, you cannot surge trust and cooperation, it takes time and effort to build it. As an example, consider the effects of trust and cooperation between the United States and Japan, when the US surged forces to help in the wake of that unprecedented earthquake, tsunami and nuclear crisis of 2011. Our two nations have been working together to build that level of trust and cooperation for over 60 years.

Of course, we have been working just as long with many of our allies and partners in the region and have built that same level of trust and cooperation with them, but there is more that can be done by reaching out to other nations and engaging them as well.

The PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP operation is a great example of the type of mission that helps partner and host nations start to build trust and cooperation. In 2012 they had the model ‘prepare and calm’ to respond in crises. Working together with our allies and our partners and friends and non-government organisations in PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP does just that.

Here is another example of a multilateral success. Over the past decade, we have seen significant decreases in ‘piracy’ incidents in the Malacca Strait where the Malacca Strait Patrols through the combined efforts of Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia proved that by working together we can address any challenge. I am hopeful that we can translate these successes into combined efforts in other areas of concern.

Today, we are looking to find more opportunities to work together in multilateral engagements so that we can further increase trust and cooperation in the region. As an example, our Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training exercises have traditionally been bilateral, but today we are putting emphasis on our desire to improve these exercises and make them more multilateral where it makes sense.

During the last seven decades, since the end of World War II, the nations of this region have shown their resilience by not only rebuilding but thriving. Just look at the changes to several key cities in the Indo-Asia-Pacific over the last 70 years as they have grown and prospered. This is a trend that we hope to continue to see far, far into the future. The US rebalance of the Indo-Asia-Pacific region reflects our understanding of just how important this vibrant region is now and will be in the future.
Some 40 fighting ships and 20 tall ships from the RAN and foreign sea services have converged on Sydney this week to mark the centennial of the entry of the RAN ‘fleet unit’ to this city - a port call that signified its arrival as an independent navy. This International Fleet Review represents an endeavour of sizable magnitude for Australia, our host nation. Why convene such an event at such expense? It is worth asking what the Australian government, the Navy, and the larger society stand to gain from this gathering. We might also ask what the nations that have dispatched vessels to mark this occasion hope to accomplish by doing so. Far from being a simple gesture of goodwill or an excuse to hoist a pint with fellow mariners, this is a venture in naval - or, better, maritime - diplomacy. International politics pervades it, sending an undercurrent through our camaraderie.

What dynamics are at work here, and what do various stakeholders want out of taking part? Like all military enterprises, fleet reviews take place in specific strategic settings. They are shaped by and help shape those settings. This event is inextricably tied to diplomacy and strategy in the 21st century Indo-Pacific, the world’s most economically vibrant yet politically volatile theatre. This congress of ships and seafarers is part of each country’s maritime strategy for Asia. How will the Sydney International Fleet Review figure into strategic interactions in the Indo-Pacific?

The Value of Great Books

Classic works help scholars and practitioners gain purchase on complex topics such as this. A great book is one that benefits readers afresh with every reading. It is rich in substance. Such a work, moreover, exhibits a timeless quality. Economist Friedrich Hayek once observed that without a theory, the facts are silent. A classic work helps commentators and practitioners make sense of the facts around them across years and decades, informing decisions and actions despite potentially revolutionary changes in the international order, individual societies, bureaucratic organisation, and technology. Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War meets that lofty standard. The classical Greek historian immodestly, but aptly, bills his History as a ‘possession for all time’. Carl von Clausewitz’s On War and Sun Tzu’s The Art of War qualify as well. That is why strategists study this canon centuries after the authors shuffled off their mortal coils.

I am not quite ready to pronounce Ken Booth’s treatise Navies and Foreign Policy (1977) a possession for all time. Few works surpass the Thucydidean benchmark. But it does possess enduring value for those who go down to the sea in ships. This
is deliberate. Booth refuses to survey current affairs, prescribe policy, or examine specific hardware. Doing so would anchor his analysis and findings in the 1970s, giving them a musty if not antiquarian feel. The abstract, theoretical approach, by contrast, supplies readers with tools of lasting value, helping us sort out matters relating to the sea. As the author proclaims, ‘it’s not what you do, it’s the way you think about it’.2 The insights found in Navies and Foreign Policy remain evergreen decades hence, helping us parse alternative policies and courses of action. Posterity will judge whether they are insights for all time.

Let us use Booth’s ‘trinity’ of military, police, and diplomatic functions as a compass rose for exploring the purposes our navies and our nations are pursuing at this International Fleet Review, and for situating the review in today’s geopolitical context. What do seagoing nations want in the Indo-Pacific theatre? As Booth observes, the object of maritime policy is ‘to attempt to use the sea for one’s own purposes, while being in a position to attempt to prevent others from using it in ways which are to one’s disadvantage’.8 This puts a competitive twist on maritime affairs. It also implies that the geometry of nautical cooperation and competition could take many shapes. Using the sea for positive aims could mean pursuing one’s aims unilaterally or working alongside friendly forces. Keeping antagonists at bay likewise could mean discouraging a single adversary from taking some action, or degrading or breaking a hostile coalition.

Let us not avert our eyes from permanent realities such as these. Despite all the pageantry and lofty words surrounding them, fleet reviews are not wholly about nurturing international camaraderie and collaboration. They serve domestic as well as international, competitive as well as cooperative purposes. And there is nothing wrong with that. Like all exercises in naval diplomacy, such gatherings are about conveying power and purpose to different audiences. Diplomacy, that is, is about communicating convincingly enough to persuade interlocutors of one thing or another, whether the message involves deterrence, coercion, or reassurance.

Being frank about the interplay between our navies - and marine corps, coastguards, and naval auxiliaries - and foreign policy will help us glimpse how our sea services and our nations may interact with one another at this time of flux in the Indo-Pacific.8 In so doing, we can put this week’s events to fullest use, fostering amity to the degree possible while reducing the prospects for needless competition or conflict.

Booth’s Naval Trinity

It seems strategy comes in threes. Thucydides portrays fear, honour, and interest as the prime movers driving human actions.3 There is the Clausewitzian ‘remarkable trinity’ among rationality, chance and creativity, and primordial passions.4 At the US Naval War College we supplement the trinity with a ‘triangle’ whose vertices are the people, the government, and the armed forces. Mahan founds his concept of sea power on the three pillars of commerce, bases, and ships.7 Ken Booth advances a workmanlike triad all his own. Seafaring states, writes Booth, employ the oceans as a medium for moving goods and people, projecting power for diplomatic or military purposes, and extracting natural resources. To assure their use of the seas, they build navies to execute military, police, and diplomatic functions, as shown in Figure 1.8

![Figure 1: Booth’s Trinity of Naval Roles](image)

- Negotiation from strength
- Manipulation
- Prestige
- Coastguard responsibilities
- Nation-building
- Balance-of-power functions
- Projection-of-force functions
component in both domains. Honing seamanship, martial excellence, and law-enforcement proficiency - turning the human factor to advantage - yields sea services adequate to their respective missions. After all, a widget is no better than its user.

Warriors and constables, then, are the executors of policymakers’ wishes in the nautical milieu. The diplomatic function is something different. It involves putting competent, well-equipped sea services such as navies and coastguards - instruments of foreign policy - to use for political gain in circumstances short of war.1 Diplomats and mariners employ these implements to convey messages, persuading the consumers of diplomatic communications to take or refrain from taking certain actions. That is why depicting the military, police, and diplomatic roles as the sides of an equilateral triangle misleads somewhat. It equates the tools, the sea services, with their user, the political leadership. In reality, politics and diplomacy stand apart. Naval and law-enforcement services are the implements - the enablers - that political leaders use to put policies and laws into effect.

The military and police functions, then, are less like coequal sides of a triangle and more like two struts helping hold up the maritime diplomatic edifice. With that caveat to Booth’s concept of a naval trinity, we turn to the three functions and their relationship to this International Fleet Review.

Military function

How do international fleet reviews intersect with the military function? What benefits do they bestow on the host nation and foreign participants? Booth situates the military function at the base of his triangle, on the sound logic that tactical, operational, and strategic effectiveness flows ultimately from a navy’s fighting power. Mariners can neither quash rival fleets, nor apprehend lawbreakers, nor exert diplomatic influence unless they possess the material capabilities and skill to use force effectively. For

...the essence of navies is their military character. Actual or latent violence is their currency. It is a navy’s ability to threaten and use force which gives meaning to its other modes of action. It derives its diplomatic impact from perceptions of its military character.10

Adequate hardware and operational proficiency are fundamental. Navies that cannot buttress the balance of power or project power onto foreign shores - the two subordinate tasks Booth assigns to the military function - accomplish little. This insight varies from country to country by such indices as a country’s size, location on the map, maritime or continental character, and dependence on the sea for security and prosperity. But the basic requirement for effectiveness and efficiency at arms applies to all sea services.

The variety of seafaring nations begets a variety of organisational schemes. Some navies operate across the globe, others mostly within contiguous waters, still others just offshore. How governments orchestrate the division of labour between navies and coastguards also differs from country to country. For instance, Booth classifies the US Coast Guard as a ‘para-naval’ service boasting frigate-sized cutters. It executes coastguard and nation building missions, the two subordinate functions Booth assigns to the police role.11 But it can also merge with or work alongside the US Navy in wartime, helping project power or sustain the naval balance. It executed the combat function as recently as the Vietnam War, when USCGC Gresham bombarded targets in Indochina while performing a variety of support missions.12 The US Coast Guard, in short, prides itself on being a fifth armed service rather than a purely constabulary body.13 Great powers have the luxury of fielding such para-naval forces.

By contrast, coastal defence navies spend most of their time, manpower, and resources discharging coastguard or nation building responsibilities. Small coastal states may discern few security threats emanating from the sea, notes Booth, or they may conclude that the national treasury cannot fund a fleet sufficient to meet those threats. Either way, small state navies often bear striking resemblance to coastguards.14 The asymmetries between the sea services represented here at Sydney will shape their interactions. Comprehending differences between organisational cultures and worldviews is part of learning how allies, friends, rivals, and third parties transact business in great waters - and, in turn, part of communicating with them smoothly and effectively.

International fleet reviews are mainly about the diplomatic function, then, but they can supply practical benefits in terms of knowing oneself and knowing others. Such gatherings can serve competitive purposes, for one thing. One sea service can take the measure of another. Strategist Edward Luttwak portrays ships, aircraft, and other implements of war as ‘black boxes’ whose combat performance is hard to foresee in peacetime.15 Visiting a foreign ship offers a chance to assess its material condition, an indicator of how well equipment may perform under stressful circumstances. It also lets visitors evaluate the standard of professionalism among the crew. Rust and slovenly housekeeping are bad signs. Steaming together in close quarters likewise provides an opportunity to assess ship handling, tactical proficiency, and morale. Fleet reviews thus help outsiders peek inside the black box. This is what Geoffrey Till terms ‘naval picture-building’.16 It helps naval commanders project how formidable a foe - or how valuable a friend - a foreign service may be.

Fleet reviews advance cooperative purposes. These are the purposes leaders tout. If held in conjunction with multinational exercises, they enhance interoperability, offering navies with unlike hardware, doctrine, and strategy the chance to work together in combined undertakings. Fashioning a multinational capability in peacetime makes sense, rather than trying to improvise it on the fly during the next natural disaster; a surge in piracy or weapons proliferation, or an act of aggression.

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Mariners bolster seamanship, martial excellence, and élan by spending time at sea, and lots of it. This applies to multinational fleets as well. Clausewitz portrays combat experience as the one lubricant that can reduce the friction impeding the workings of military organisations. Combined peacetime manoeuvres supply a partial substitute for battle experience. They help grease the gears for wartime or peacetime operations, letting seafarers from different navies acquaint themselves with foreign tactics, techniques, and procedures. Exercise TRITON CENTENARY, scheduled for two phases bracketing the festivities here in Sydney, is a case in point. The RAN advertises TRITON CENTENARY as a ‘significant opportunity for more than 20 nations to exercise warfare skills and encourage the exchange of professional maritime views’.

And so it is. Done properly, such manoeuvres give rise to tactical cohesion across sea services and across international frontiers. Governments exist to advance the national interest, in part through military and naval means. It stands to reason that they would convene fleet reviews to size up foreign navies, refine their own navies’ proficiency at basic combat functions, construct working relations with allies and potential partners, and impress prospective competitors.

**Police function**

Booth notes that his equilateral triangle need not be equilateral for all navies. Different coastal states have different priorities. The same holds for international fleet reviews. Most of the ships in Sydney are men-of-war that ply the high seas on traditional naval duties. The police side of Booth’s triangle, consequently, is shorter at this gathering than are the others. This is because, as the author points out, police services direct their efforts inward as much as outward. Coastguard responsibilities involve enforcing national laws in inland waters, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, and, to a lesser extent, in the exclusive economic zone. Constabulary forces also respond to natural and humanitarian disasters that strike littoral zones.

In this sense police fleets constitute a seaward extension of police and emergency services that keep order on land. As noted before, para-naval services such as the US Coast Guard are hybrid forces suited not just to constabulary work but to lower-end combat missions and to naval diplomacy vis-à-vis small-state navies. The terrestrial analogy would be a police force that boasts paramilitary capabilities and sometimes acts as an auxiliary to the regular military.

As noted before, the police function resembles the military function in that it is a policy tool reliant on material adequacy and human competency. Police forces exist mainly to defeat or manage non-state opponents. This is no small purpose. At its root, sovereignty means controlling territory within borderlines inscribed on the map or nautical chart. A navy or coastguard with sufficient assets and sufficient skill and verve to achieve its goals represents a token of sovereignty - and in turn of governmental legitimacy. This is more than a matter of honour or prestige, important though those intangibles are. A coastal state visibly able to discharge its sovereign responsibilities discourages outsiders from intervening in its affairs.

Yet police work can become entangled with power politics. The tug-of-war between China and rival claimants to islands, atolls, and waters in the South China Sea shows how the confluence of military and police functions can complicate and imperil the regional order. Police missions appear more politically charged in maritime Asia - and in particular in the South and East China seas - than elsewhere in the world. Booth alludes to such controversies, observing that a rising sea power may work with the established maritime order even while working to change that order in its own interest. (He also notes that an established sea power can push back hard, bringing the aspirant’s challenge to grief.)

However such competitions unfold, wicked problems clearly ensue where power politics, a precinct ruled by military power, intersects with law-enforcement duty, where the police function prevails. Depending on the beholder, efforts to marshal coalitions against apolitical non-state lawbreakers may look like efforts to build coalitions for traditional great power politics. Building capacity for constabulary missions builds capacity for combat missions. Consequently, suspicions commonly greet efforts to combat piracy, proliferation, and other scourges. China routinely objects to US-led constabulary exercises and operations in Southeast Asia.

**Naval Diplomacy and Maritime Power Projection**

Naval diplomacy, in short, is as critical in Booth’s constabulary domain as in the military domain. Great powers intent on law enforcement work face special challenges in explaining their purposes. The sea services represented in Sydney doubtless want to burnish their images for constabulary and military prowess in the eyes of friends, rivals, and bystanders alike. Yet the dual nature of warships works against diplomatic success. As Booth and Luttwak point out, the only difference between a major combatant conducting constabulary missions and a major combatant pursuing parochial interests is the intent of the policymakers directing its activities. Change the intent, and the ship’s character changes. Partner could morph into foe almost instantly.

How to disentangle the police from the military function in sceptical foreign eyes is a vexing question. This hints at an ambiguity in Booth’s trinitarian paradigm. As noted before, Booth depicts the military function - not the use of force as appropriate to the mission - as the core function of sea services, navies and coastguards alike. Concentrating on navy-on-navy competition masks important distinctions - law enforcement is different from combat, demanding different tactics, techniques, and procedures - while encouraging governments to think they can use these services interchangeably. Constabulary work, for instance, can be a lesser-included mission for high-end warships such as cruisers or destroyers. An Aegis destroyer, for instance, rescued the crew of the freighter MV *Maersk Alabama* from Somali pirates.
in 2009. But relying on such platforms could mean dispatching highly capable assets to sensitive waters - and thereby implanting a forward naval presence that coastal states could deem objectionable. The ship may be the message.

Great powers should design force packages to avoid broadcasting unintended messages. If the United States wants to orchestrate maritime security coalitions in the South China Sea, for instance, it should consider designating the US Coast Guard the lead service for this enterprise (and bulking up the service with additional vessels to fulfill this more ambitious slate of responsibilities). However impressive its medium- and high-endurance cutters are, the Coast Guard poses little threat to great power navies such as China’s. Its presence would arouse fewer misgivings in Beijing. Sending constabulary vessels to perform constabulary missions, then, would reduce misperceptions stemming from the dual character of warships, whereas dispatching guided-missile combatants signals that Washington is using constabulary duty as cover for preparations to fight.

The makeup of a task force, then, demands careful forethought to avoid sending unintended messages. Fleet reviews like this one, where sailors mingle with their counterparts from friendly, neutral, and rival sea services, furnish an opportunity to explain one’s purposes while dispelling worries about ulterior motives. One imagines Ken Booth would approve.

### Diplomatic function

Booth lists negotiation from strength, manipulation of international relationships in various settings, and accumulation of prestige as the three subordinate functions under navies’ diplomatic role. Negotiation from strength helps a government reassure or strengthen allies or friends under threat, signal business-as-usual in times of crisis, or telegraph resolve to deter adversaries or support one’s own policy. Its somewhat scurrilous connotations notwithstanding, manipulation means shaping relations within an alliance or coalition, gaining or increasing access to new countries, building up foreign navies to promote one’s own purposes, nurturing foreign dependence on one’s naval support, or mounting a standing demonstration of naval power in distant waters to justify taking an interest there. Prestige reassures constituents at home, projects a favourable image of one’s home country, and helps a navy impress foreign observers, whether friendly, ambivalent, or hostile.

In short, the diplomatic role is about communicating. It is about messaging and branding, to borrow some boilerplate from the business world. But moulding perceptions is a squishier and more diffuse task than diagrams depicting policymakers’ wielding military and police tools for political effect suggest. Cause and effect is not so simple. How to proceed? Like any foreign-policy enterprise, first of all, naval diplomacy cannot be stripped of its larger strategic context. Before undertaking any venture, Clausewitz advises statesmen and senior commanders to carefully weigh each contender’s political objectives, its strength and geographic situation, the capacity of its government, people, and military, and the likely impact of their actions on third parties able to influence the outcome. Clausewitz is referring to war, but his wisdom applies to peacetime endeavours as well. Booth rightly notes that naval commanders and diplomats must devise clear, cohesive strategy to extract political value from naval deployments.

What should such a strategy look like? Booth differentiates between power, connoting coercion, and influence, connoting benefits. Consider coercion. Coercion has a positive aim. It means convincing someone to do something he otherwise would not do. Clausewitz observes that there are three ways to win in wartime. One belligerent can crush the enemy armed forces or overthrow his regime, and thereby impose his will; convince the adversary he cannot win; or convince him he cannot win at an affordable cost. Outright defeat is not an option in peacetime diplomacy, but the other two mechanisms are. One party, that is, can convince another through public or private statements of purpose backed by judicious displays of force.

How does the perceptual process work in stressful times? To get at the mechanics of coercion, consider Henry Kissinger’s brief for how deterrence works. Deterrence has a negative aim; it means persuading someone to desist from some action. As Kissinger might put it, navies deter through a simple formula. He maintains that deterrence is a product of three variables: the physical capability to fulfil threats issued by political leaders, the leadership’s resolve to use that capability under certain circumstances, and the adversary’s belief in one’s capability and resolve. If an adversary believes we have the capability to fulfil our threats and are prepared to use it, then deterrence is likely. But recall that deterrence is a product of multiplication, not a sum. Deterrence goes to zero if any one of these factors is zero; it fails. The same might be said of coercion, when one party issues a threat to induce another to take some positive action, or of negotiation with allies, friends, or neutrals.

Kissinger’s formula applies not just to crisis diplomacy but to routine efforts to influence antagonists, allies, or other interlocutors. Fighting ships, naval aircraft, and armaments supply capability, driving that component of Kissinger’s equation above zero and bolstering one’s diplomatic strength. Visible resolve keeps the second variable above zero. Anaemic capability or waffling or inarticulate leadership, by contrast, damages one’s standing in the eyes of an unwilling adversary or sceptical friend, degrading one’s ability to persuade or dissuade. Whether another party is swayed depends, again, on whether its leadership believes the threat or promise. It also depends on what he has at stake. A government that sees valuable interests at stake may be prepared to accept the consequences of defying another. If so, deterrence or coercion falters.

What about granting benefits? While coercion and deterrence are mostly the gift of strong powers or alliances, any government may be able to bestow benefits.
Seafaring states fielding strong navies can offer extended deterrence or defence consonant with the military function. Lesser states can offer basing rights in important theatres, supply knowledge of the physical or human terrain, or fill in niche capabilities that the stronger partner’s navy lacks. Such benefits are insufficient in themselves to sustain partnerships or coalitions. Common interests and worldviews are the most dependable adhesives for such consortia. Still, partners prepared to exchange such benefits as they possess can put substance into working arrangements. Naval diplomacy means the artful use of physical capacity as well as effective communication.

**Naval Diplomacy in Sydney**

Which of Booth’s dynamics are at work here in Sydney? A comprehensive study is impossible with so many sea services represented here. Nonetheless, let us take a sample to help us think through the diplomatic climate. First consider this question through the eyes of Australia, the host nation. What do Australians want? The military role is in play. Like the rest of our navies, the RAN undoubtedly wants to reaffirm its prowess as a middleweight force able to project power and firm up the naval balance in the western Pacific and Indian oceans, the maritime theatres that matter most. Certain RAN programs are troubled, notably the fleet of Collins class diesel submarines. Defence budgets are under strain, as they are in many countries. Having operated alongside Australian sailors (albeit many years ago), however, I imagine the RAN reputation for competency is in scant danger.

The fleet review thus represents upkeep for Australia’s martial reputation. What about the diplomatic realm? Consolidating the nation’s standing within the US-Australia alliance, reassuring China that Australia is not a foe in the making, and showing fellow Asian powers such as Japan and India that it is a worthy partner must rank high on Canberra’s list of priorities for this maritime congress. Whether these goals can be reconciled in times of strife is an open question. But so long as great power competition remains low-key in the Indo-Pacific region, Canberra can expect that displaying a solid high-seas capability will reassure friends and allies while reminding potential antagonists, *sotto voce*, that the RAN constitutes part of a formidable alliance. Australian commanders and political leaders, accordingly, can use the fleet review to keep their options open. Rejuvenating Australians’ enthusiasm for seaborne pursuits, lastly, is a helpful by-product of a pageant such as this one.

Now let me be parochial and parse what the United States probably hopes to accomplish at Sydney. Strangely, the US Navy, the senior partner in the trans-Pacific alliance system, may be fretting more than the RAN or other navies over the basics - over reaffirming its reputation for battle readiness, efficacy at police work, and preponderant force structure. Sheer distance helps account for this. The American sea services have to surmount the tyranny of distance to operate in an increasingly contested Indo-Pacific. They need to prove anew that they can preserve the naval balance and project force in faraway expanses. They have to demonstrate capabilities and skills of a higher order than local maritime powers. Showing our current and prospective allies and partners, as well as potential opponents, that the sea services can uphold their commitments while assembling coalitions and partnerships to police the commons, is central to US maritime strategy.

In Booth’s lexicon, then, the US sea services must show that they can execute military and police functions in distant waters. Doing so helps Washington negotiate from strength in disputes around the South and East China seas, sustain and improve its standing within existing alliances and partnerships, marshal new working arrangements, and assure its reputation as the world’s predominant seafaring power retains its lustre. Negotiation from strength; manipulation of relations with allies, neutrals, and rivals; prestige - our delegation to the International Fleet Review may as well have used *Navies and Foreign Policy* as its diplomatic playbook!

We could repeat this exercise for each of the navies represented here, applying Booth’s analytical template - military, police, and diplomatic roles - to appraise each seagoing state’s motives and policies. Doing so would let us gaze through a glass darkly, glimpsing how interactions among disparate Asian sea powers may unfold not just here but in the coming years. China hopes to establish the People’s Liberation Army Navy as the next big thing in Asian sea power. Japan hopes to preserve the reputation of its Maritime Self-Defense Force as a modest-sized but world-class force able to defend the vast sea areas enfolding the archipelagic state. India wants to bolster the Indian Navy’s claim to blue-water status, both in maritime South Asia and, increasingly, in adjoining waters such as the South China Sea. Displaying the capacity to execute combat and police functions helps Asian governments negotiate confidently, shore up existing alliances, court new partners, dishearten and divide rival alliances and coalitions, accumulate national prestige, and manage perceptions among diverse audiences, foreign and domestic.

Naval diplomacy, finally, is by no means an exclusive preserve of big or even middle powers. The same basic acts of strategy are as necessary for coastal defence navies and their political masters as for ocean going fleets. Indeed, penetrating strategic thought is probably *more* important for middle and smaller powers. Because they cannot afford to throw resources at problems, they have to work smarter to get the most out of scarce means. Here I take issue with Booth, who contends that ‘it is only the greatest navies which have important foreign policy implications.’ Important for whom? His claim may be an artefact of an age when the US Navy, the Soviet Navy, and their chief allies were indeed the forces that mattered most. Whatever the case, naval power today is hardly the exclusive preserve of Washington, Tokyo, Beijing, or Delhi. Middle powers like Australia clearly believe they reap foreign policy benefits from convening gatherings such as this one. Smaller powers went to considerable expense and trouble to dispatch units to this gathering. They too clearly believe they stand to gain from such affairs.
And they are right. Competition and cooperation are relative things. Middle and small power navies assume greater importance in straitened circumstances such as these, when budgetary and force cutbacks may keep any one great power navy from policing the global commons or facing down hostile challengers. As mentioned before, lesser powers have more to offer than ships of war. They may enjoy geographic proximity to important theatres. They may field shore-based air or missile forces boasting sufficient range and combat punch to influence events at sea. They can open seaports and bases to allied forces. Coastal states also contribute by helping themselves. They can police their own geographic environs and, perhaps, take part in local, regional, or global consortia against piracy, weapons proliferation, or unlawful trafficking in harmful goods and substances. Effective law enforcement in littoral waters and skies spares outsiders part of the maritime security burden.

Indeed, as we survey our surroundings here at the International Fleet Review, it is worth mulling how the dynamics differ between fleet reviews hosted by smaller powers and those put on by great powers. The political configuration surrounding a fleet review also matters. A middle or smaller power that happens to be neutral may well conduct naval diplomacy differently than such a power that enjoys a durable alliance with a great power. The former would be eager to demonstrate its capacity for independent action, the latter to demonstrate its capacity to contribute to the allied cause. And so forth.

Ken Booth provides few answers to such questions, but he provides the right questions - as he claimed he would. Mission accomplished.

Endnotes
2 Ken Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy, Croom Helm, New York 1977, p. 9.
3 Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy, pp. 15-16.
4 Sea power is about more than fleets. The shore-based arm of sea power may include tactical aircraft, anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles, and short-range craft such as diesel submarines and fast patrol boats. The context for fleet reviews held under the shadow of one or more countries’ land-based weaponry clearly differs from the context for gatherings free of such latent menaces. For the sake of simplicity, nevertheless, I largely follow Booth’s lead here, excluding these implementations from the analysis.
8 Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy, pp. 15-17.
9 Booth exaggerates the idea that diplomacy is about shaping conditions short of war. There is no firebreak between peacetime and wartime diplomacy. Indeed, Clausewitz points out explicitly that political intercourse between the belligerents continues even after the shooting starts: ‘...war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means. We deliberately use the phrase ‘with the addition of other means’ because we also want to make it clear that war in itself does not suspend political intercourse or change it into something entirely different...Its grammar, indeed, may be its own, but not its logic.’ Clausewitz, On War, p. 605.
10 Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy, p. 16.
11 Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy, pp. 16-18.
14 Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy, p. 18.
17 Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy, p. 25.
18 Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy, pp. 16-17.
19 Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy, p. 23.
20 Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy, p. 105.
22 Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy, p. 27; Luttwak, Political Uses of Sea Power, p. 11.
25 Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy, pp. 18-19.
26 Clausewitz, On War, pp. 585-586.
27 Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy, p. 28.
28 Clausewitz, On War, p. 91.
33 Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy, p. 10.
I am delighted to be here today - not just because of the obvious draw of fabulous Sydney; or to escape from the cold, the rain, the greyness of the British autumn - no, I am delighted because it allows me to join in a great celebration, alongside so many others, to wish our historical maritime partner a very happy 100th anniversary of the Australian Navy’s arrival in Sydney. I say historical partner for another reason. Because, for those who may have forgotten, the RAN sailed the world under the Royal Navy’s White Ensign right up until 1967. 'Under One Flag' as it was then - we are still proud of that.

But more than that - I am delighted, because of the opportunity that this conference, and the other events this week, provide for all the navies of the world to come together, to share perspectives, and, as ever, to do good business. In fact, this conference and the Pacific 2013 Congress, and the International Fleet Review are all living, breathing examples of defence engagement in action. And that is my subject for today, because I have been invited to give you my take on UK defence engagement. I am sure many of my themes will resonate with you, because what I have to say has an enduring international flavour to it as well.

From my perspective, it is really timely and helpful that I have been asked to talk about UK defence engagement and the Royal Navy’s approach to it. Why? Because earlier this year, on 7 February 2013, the UK government published its *International Defence Engagement Strategy*. And this, in turn, has helped to give life to the government’s overarching strategy paper *Building Stability Overseas Strategy*, which was produced a year after our 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review.

This engagement business, instinctive to we navies, is very much at the heart of UK political thinking. Indeed, our Foreign Secretary William Hague, just a month ago, reminded us that: ‘Britain must have a global internationalist outlook’ and that ‘it is in the interests of Britain to be engaged in world affairs’. And it does not stop there. Our Prime Minister is currently taking a direct, close and personal interest in the Royal Navy’s defence engagement activity.

So, what is our international defence engagement strategy? Well, in broad terms, it shapes our approach over the next 20 years. It is about using Defence assets more specifically and more strategically - to do better for UK influence, security and prosperity - all in an era of significant uncertainty and change - all in an era of contingency.
The Royal Navy’s Contribution to Defence Engagement

That is the strategic context. But for the Royal Navy, what does this mean in practice?

The first point I would make is this. There is no great whiff of revolution in the air, at least from a naval perspective. Defence engagement was already one of the three core roles performed by the Royal Navy to protect and promote the nation’s interests, along with maritime security and warfighting. In fact, defence engagement has been a longstanding and customary task for the Royal Navy. It is part of our story, our reputation, and our being. So the name may have changed, but the substance remains essentially the same.

Yet something is new. There is now an integrated approach, and importantly an integrated approach across the Ministry of Defence. And of course Defence is part of an integrated approach across government. Self-evidently it must be, and that is why the strategy was jointly published by both the Foreign and Defence secretaries. That is why its governance board has representatives from all the relevant government departments, and it is why our National Security Council feeds into it.

So what is new is that we now have a fully-fledged partnership in the delivery of defence engagement. And that partnership is a good thing, because it breeds understanding, because it generates focus, because it delivers coordination, and that makes political sense.

In simple terms, as the strategy itself says, defence engagement covers all of our activity short of combat operations; so it covers a wide spectrum. And today I wanted to give you a sense of that spectrum - by touching on four ways in which the Royal Navy goes about delivering defence engagement.

First, it is about high level international engagement. It is about us building the maritime component in international partnerships and alliances. These may be multilateral, take the 27 nation Combined Maritime Forces operating in the Indian Ocean undertaking counter-piracy operations, or Royal Navy involvement in the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), to name but two. And HMS Daring, here for the International Fleet Review, will be exercising with other FPDA navies during her current deployment in the Far East. These partnerships may also be bilateral. Take, for example, the Australia-United Kingdom Defence and Security Cooperation Treaty signed in Perth on 18 January 2013. And, in the last two years, we have also signed defence cooperation and defence-technical arrangements with other countries from this region, such as Japan, India, Indonesia and Vietnam. And you will all have your own multilateral relationships, such as ASEAN, and bilateral partnerships like those between India and Australia which was reaffirmed in June 2013.

Second, it is about the smartest possible use of our ships, for engagement effects at sea and ashore. For us, our maritime commitments strategic steering group guides this, on behalf of the Foreign Office and Defence, to deliver maximum effect from expensive assets. This means our ships multi-task and as an example, we program our South Atlantic patrol ship to also assist with maritime security operations around the Gulf of Guinea, which, in turn, helps underwrite the security within the prosperity agenda. Whether this is off West Africa, or as part of the multinational counter-piracy effort in the Indian Ocean, whether it is operating around the chokepoints in the Persian Gulf; it is about reassuring markets, helping the world to feed and fuel itself, preventing the arteries of global trade from hardening. And it means that we look at how deployed ships might contribute to the government’s growth and prosperity agendas, by exporting our defence technology around the world. And Daring is doing just that; she is here acting as a living, breathing example of British technological success - as a worthy platform for a defence sales and industry day, which is taking place as I speak.

The third way that defence engagement works for us is about training with our international partners. At Britannia Royal Naval College in Dartmouth, we train officers from across the globe alongside our own. And this has enduring benefits, as 20 current chiefs of navy around the world have been trained there, all soaked in a common ethos which now permeates relationships at the highest levels. And just down the road from Dartmouth, Flag Officer Sea Training welcomes navies from around the world into Plymouth. In 2012, 19 different navies trained there, reinforcing them as a global brand. And by training other nations, we help to train ourselves. I could give you many more examples, but my point is that this training together helps to build our cooperation, our interoperability, our ‘international brotherhood of the sea’. And I regard that as a key enabler when we come to operate together. When a crisis hits, we already have an understanding of partners and structures, so we do not waste valuable time.

Fourth, it is about routine and regular staff level engagement. We have a formal program of bilateral staff talks with the navies of 26 different nations, from every continent on the planet. Building shared understanding - building mutual trust - and building common agendas.

So, what is the effect of these four areas of activity? It is simple, really.

Beyond its enduring contribution to operations, the Royal Navy supports UK activity across the arc of security, prosperity and diplomatic business. That is what most navies do. But defence engagement, as is clear from the name, is an activity that applies to all three of our armed forces. And, as part of the integrated approach in our national strategy, we can join together to do it. The delivery of training in Libya is a good current example. And I am an advocate of this joint approach, because I see things through a defence lens, not a naval lens.

But our maritime forces, which may include Army and Air Force elements, do have certain unique selling points in delivering effective defence engagement. In the era of contingency, our maritime forces are an engaged force. That means they are forward deployed around the globe. This is a return to the old ways. Last year, for
example, there were ship visits to 90 different countries. And, in terms of defence engagement, real advantages flow from this. Why? Because properly led and used, it means that our maritime forces have good situational awareness. This comes through a more persistent presence, through information gathering, and through building a rapport and relationships with other navies.

So we are culturally aware too, with less of a shallow interpretation of matters, less of a fly-by-night navy. Going back - again and again - to the regions that we are interested in. And, with a range of 400nm a day, our maritime forces can deliver a large regional footprint of influence, but without having to commit to a footprint ashore.

Our maritime forces also provide value for money - and that is important in an age of fiscal tightness - because they are already ‘in area’ and can flex between roles. Take, for example, the COUGAR 2013 deployment of the Royal Navy Task Group. This year, it is operating East of Suez, but not a long way from the strategic interests of the United Kingdom. ‘In area’ it is taking the opportunity to engage with 20 different countries over the course of 13 different exercises and 24 planned port visits. But it is elastic: so it can flex to another core role - contingent warfighting - if required. Defence engagement one minute, warfighting the next. As it found itself doing in 2011 when it was called into action off Libya.

And our maritime forces also provide value for money because they come with a ‘light touch’, with the potential to operate independently, not depending on host nations, access or overflight. Please may we use your runway, or airspace, or harbour? Not necessarily needed with the maritime.

So our maritime force, an engaged force, provides the United Kingdom with what I would call ‘sea choice’ options, in the delivery of defence engagement or in other core roles, at low marginal cost. Many of you will recognise many of these unique selling points as applying to your own navies; many of them are universal truths for all navies.

So, in closing, what thoughts would I like to leave you with? It is these. Defence engagement is nothing new for us, or you. But what is different is the emphasis on an integrated approach, a joined up approach, a partnering approach. And that is why we value our relationships with so many of you in this room - whether they are relationships in this region of the world - or wherever else. That is why - as many of you know - we want to strengthen our partnerships with you. And that is why - as I said at the beginning - I am lucky and happy to be here.

Endnotes
This paper will consider first whether there is a common Southeast Asian perspective on naval engagement, or a diverse collection of differing viewpoints reflecting varying traditions and capacities at the national level. Then the more consequential question: are Southeast Asian approaches developing along convergent, parallel or divergent tracks? I will define regional engagement and power projection in more depth, highlighting some of the difficulty in easily separating the two concepts, in the process offering a distinction between force and power projection.

ASEAN has served as a collective banner for regional engagement on maritime security, with some success. Multilateral forums and opportunities for Southeast Asia's navies to engage each other and extra-regional players have never been so numerous. But how deep does naval diplomacy and regional cooperation go? The growth of power projection capabilities across Asia inevitably complicates the environment, as extra-regional maritime players interact with each other more regularly in Southeast Asia's congested maritime space. On a smaller scale, modernisation efforts within Southeast Asia have also seen the creation of modest projection and denial capabilities where none existed previously. Managing these multilayered strategic interactions could prove taxing on Southeast Asian unity as 'maritime' and 'continental' fault-lines have re-emerged in respect to ASEAN member respective orientations towards the great powers, complicating the challenges of regional conflict prevention and maritime crisis management.

With these introductory thoughts in mind, my analysis of Southeast Asian perspectives of regional engagement and power projection can be framed around three guiding questions:

- Is there a Southeast Asian perspective?
- What are Southeast Asian perceptions towards regional engagement?
- What are Southeast Asia’s perceptions towards power projection?

Is there a Southeast Asian Perspective?
There are multiple viewpoints in Southeast Asia rather than a collective regional voice. The fact that there are 11 states in the region, of markedly different sizes, national capacities and strategic traditions means, self-evidently, that there is no one-size fits all approach. How maritime and naval priorities are framed varies according to the vantage point - be it Banda Aceh, Changi Naval Base, Cam Ranh Bay, Dili, Sitwe or Zamboanga. This is only stating the obvious. But given such
Southeast Asian Perspectives of Regional Engagement and Power Projection

The states that make up Southeast Asia are all middle or small powers. That is another common baseline which shapes and constrains regional perspectives and behaviour. Indonesia alone has the potential to emerge as a great power, but for the foreseeable future its navy and civilian maritime agencies will be playing catch-up with the daunting prospect of having nearly 8 million km² of sovereign sea space and 17,000 islands to police with not much more than a 100 naval vessels in active service. That equates, crudely, to approximately 170 islands and 80,000km² per vessel. The Philippines, as the region’s other officially archipelagic state, confronts similar issues from a lower base, following decades of neglect that have seen its air force atrophy into obsolescence and its navy struggle to meet even constabulary duties. Capabilities aside, one major commonality of perspective is that all of Southeast Asia has now ratified or acceded to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (LOSC), with the solitary exception of Cambodia. That can only help to consolidate common approaches towards maritime engagement, notwithstanding some questionable practice on straight baseline application. Apart from Singapore, however, the prevailing perspective is that of the coastal state, with the onus on exerting control over the exclusive economic zone and territorial seas.

Given that Southeast Asian countries share certain maritime interests and concerns across borders, and have only limited, sometimes inadequate, capabilities for ensuring maritime security, it is possible to generalise some common fundamentals of regional approaches to power projection and engagement. Speaking at the RAN Sea Power Conference in 2006, my Singaporean colleague Kwa Chong Guan advanced a number of assertions about naval strategy in the region, including the following statements:

- Naval strategy for most Southeast Asian navies will be limited to observing and responding to the major maritime powers’ interpretation and practice of naval strategy.
- Maintaining a blue water navy to project into the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean may be an option for the major powers but it is not an option for any Southeast Asian nations, neither singly or as ASEAN.
- What are the Southeast Asian responses? In short the response is to regionalise maritime security. From this admittedly cherry-picked assortment of quotes, I think a clear perspective emerges nonetheless. First, Southeast Asia lacks the national or collective capacities to secure its own region, or to prevent more powerful navies from securing sea lines of communication for commerce and power projection. Second, Southeast Asia’s strategic standpoint is basically reactive: to ‘observe’ and ‘respond’ to the larger players as they manoeuvre within the region.

Southeast Asia is not a unitary actor. Some commentators and regional policymakers have lapsed into talking about engaging ASEAN as if it were the region. ASEAN now has separately accredited ambassadors, resident in Jakarta and acquired ‘legal personality’ with the adoption of the ASEAN Charter in 2007. ‘Centrality’ has become the aspirational watchword of ASEAN’s diplomacy - to project ASEAN’s image as the anvil around which Asia’s multilateral frameworks are forged. The widespread acceptance of this notion demonstrates the success of the ASEAN ‘brand’ as a banner for collective engagement - including maritime security cooperative activities and dialogues conducted through the ASEAN Regional Forum, the Extended ASEAN Maritime Forum and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM). ASEAN’s self-set community-building objectives are fast approaching in 2015. These partly serve an intra-mural, integrative agenda. But I think the core function of ASEAN remains principally outward facing: to present a Southeast Asian badge of solidarity to the outside world. There is therefore a promotional aspect, at times verging on the proprietary, about the central role of ASEAN in East Asia’s multilateral processes.

This success should not obscure the differences of interest and perspective, and trust deficits, which deflate the common denominator for cooperation on maritime security with Southeast Asia. Above a certain threshold, national security and sovereignty still trump the collective approach. This leads in turn to duplication and to resources being preferentially solicited from outside the region rather than pooled at the ASEAN level. Where interests diverge, as in the South China Sea, it exposes a disconnect between the diplomatic external engagement of ASEAN and what happens bilaterally and at sea. Furthermore, a porous continental/maritime sub-division within Southeast Asia is becoming more pronounced, as the South China Sea has exposed in recent years.

For all that, a cursory look at the map reveals Southeast Asia as a predominantly maritime region. Southeast Asia’s security environment is also genuinely marked apart in the Indo-Pacific for the large number of transnational issues that demand cooperation and collective action across borders and boundaries, most of which have a maritime or riparian dimension. Despite land borders with South Asia and China, Southeast Asia’s prevailing geography is archipelagic and peninsular in nature. Not only the Malay Peninsula and Kra Isthmus, but Indochina, we sometimes forget, is a peninsula too. Myanmar has its own archipelago in the Andaman Sea and a long Indian Ocean coastline; the only country in Southeast Asia that faces exclusively onto the ‘Indo’ half of the Indo-Pacific.
Southeast Asia can already be considered a provider of global maritime public goods, by ensuring access and safe navigation for the world’s merchant fleet via the Malacca Strait and other bottleneck straits linking the Indian Ocean to the western Pacific Ocean, and by guaranteeing rights of transit and innocent passage to foreign warships and aircraft. Yet the region is not yet a net ‘exporter’ of maritime security, apart from niche contributions to international coalitions - including Southeast Asian navies which have participated in international counter-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean.6

Reactivity does not mean passivity, necessarily. To make up for the deficit in capacity and trust among neighbours, some Southeast Asian states, including Singapore and The Philippines, have actively courted a naval presence from external powers, principally the United States, but also India, Australia and others. Indonesia has traditionally preferred to limit the involvement of outsiders to an indirect capacity building role, while Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam have fallen somewhere between these two stools. Meanwhile, steady gains in economic development have given some Southeast Asian countries options to move beyond the requirements of surveillance and a patrol presence within their jurisdictional waters, to acquire a modest denial capability for deterrence, be it benchmarking against residually distrusted near neighbours or hedging against a hegemon emerging over the horizon. We can see elements of these various strategies playing out in parallel.

What are Southeast Asian Perceptions towards Regional Engagement?

Regional maritime engagement has emerged as a common denominator and focus for Southeast Asian countries, because this is an arena where small and medium-sized countries in Southeast Asia can to some extent control the diplomatic initiative. If Southeast Asia cannot compete in the material power balance vis-à-vis the great powers, then maintaining a hand in the choreography of external power interactions is the fallback strategy. Engagement ideally aims for three basic objectives:

1. avoiding armed conflict between the great powers, or strategic competition spilling over into Southeast Asia
2. avoiding exclusive loyalty choices among the external powers
3. attracting external resources into the region to fill capacity gaps, in which some competition for influence between outside powers is considered optimal.

This is what is broadly meant by ‘regionalising’ maritime security. This engagement mindset is clearly evident in Singapore, through its hosting of the multinational Information Fusion Centre (IFC) at the Changi C2 Centre, as well as the Information Sharing Centre (ISC) of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against ships in Asia (ReCAAP). Singapore is in many ways exceptional within Southeast Asia, as a city state possessing high-end capabilities, with a systemic stake in securing the global maritime commons, yet completely lacking maritime ‘depth’ beyond the outer port limits. Hence Kwa Chong Guan’s judgement in 2006, that ‘the Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN) principal mission is not so much to protect Singapore’s territorial and contiguous maritime zones, but to ensure the security of the SLOC on which Singapore relies’ applies unchanged seven years on. It is also worth noting that while the defence of sea lines of communication has taken on an abstract quality for many navies, as a form of publicly digestible shorthand for a country’s stake in the global maritime commons, for Singapore geography still dictates that the security of the Malacca and Singapore straits and the South China Sea is elevated to existential importance, as a ‘survival’ issue, since these are the only routes for shipping in or out.

Goldrick and McCaffrie’s categorisation of certain Southeast Asian navies as being primarily concerned about shipping protection in adjacent waters sheds useful light on the force development and operational behaviour of the RSN, and to a lesser extent the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) and Royal Thai Navy, as navies that have invested in conventional ‘warfighting’ capabilities, but without the same emphasis on power projection.7

In general terms, the spectrum of naval cooperation engagement ranges from simple passage exercises and ship visits, through staff exchanges and information-sharing arrangements to coordinated patrols and higher-level exercises, to ‘asset-sharing’ and capability pooling, joint defence industrial development and extending ultimately to joint, multinational defence operations. To be effective, these activities demand a sliding scale of trust. Regional engagement can be broken down into, firstly, ‘intra-regional’ maritime engagement among the ten ASEAN states (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam) and Timor-Leste. Second, there is Southeast Asia’s engagement with countries outside the region to consider.

Intra-regional maritime engagement includes sub-regional arrangements like the quadrupartite Malacca Strait Patrols, but extending to all-inclusive meetings of the ASEAN naval chiefs.8 ASEAN has served Southeast Asia by acting as a collective banner for multilateral engagement on maritime security, with some success. The expansion of ASEAN-centred dialogues, working group activities and expert forums has created habit-forming opportunities for Southeast Asia’s defence officials, naval staffs and maritime security professionals to engage each other.

While few would dispute that gains have been made in confidence building and consultation within Southeast Asia, such quantitative success has arguably been achieved at the qualitative cost of de-coupling the ‘low-hanging fruit’ of maritime security from the more sensitive issues such as territorial disputes and crisis management of incidents at sea, which remain off the agenda of consensus-bound forums like the ASEAN Maritime Forum.9 Reducing the incidence of piracy and armed robbery at sea in Southeast Asia stands out as a qualified achievement for regional maritime cooperation, but is not only a naval responsibility.
Many observers concluded that ASEAN’s public disunity on the South China Sea in 2012 revealed the limits of political cohesion and its potential to serve as a springboard for collective action. Yet at the working level ASEAN has now regularised the meeting of its naval chiefs to an annualised gathering, an initiative launched during Vietnam’s 2010 chairmanship of ASEAN, the most recent conclave being held in September 2013, in Manila. The ASEAN meeting of navy chiefs provides a useful channel for communication, helpful not only for trust building, but for minimising unnecessary duplication of effort. In fact, the more meaningful momentum is being felt at the sub-regional and bilateral level. For example, Singapore’s recent agreements with Indonesia and Vietnam on submarine search and rescue, in 2012 and 2013 respectively, shows forward momentum towards a more integrated approach among the Southeast Asian navies, albeit in a peculiar capability niche in which Singapore enjoys a regional monopoly. Vietnam has been notably active in pushing forward direct communication and coordinated patrol initiatives with several ASEAN partners, including Thailand, Cambodia, Malaysia and Brunei as well as maintaining a longstanding arrangement with China in the Gulf of Tonkin, since 2005. This kind of organic cross-bracing engagement among Southeast Asian navies may be more sustainable than the ASEAN top-down approach, which is more about projecting a collective face to the external powers.

Turning to information sharing arrangements, Singapore’s IFC is another a good example of maritime engagement from within the region, grouping mostly naval liaison officers from around 20 states including fellow ASEAN members, and extending participation even as far as Latin America. Set up in 2009, the IFC represents a significant sunk investment in regional naval coordination. Its brief is deliberately described as information sharing, in order to minimise regional sensitivities over what constitutes ‘intelligence’, and hence to maximise buy-in from states that still harbour residual distrust towards close neighbours. The direct link back to national headquarters which resident liaison officers maintain is an important extension of the ‘fusion’ concept. And 24-hour manning, which is patchy elsewhere in the region, potentially empowers the IFC potential with crisis-response functions. However, it remains a work in progress in some respects, and participation from outside the immediate region is not universal. China has yet to send a permanent representative despite indications some time ago that it would.

At the international level ReCAAP is another major multilateral plank in Southeast Asia’s maritime engagement. Singapore also hosts the ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre, though it is not a Singapore government body, originating from a Japanese initiative at the turn of the century. Since 2007, ReCAAP membership has expanded considerably to include, for example, four north European signatories: the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark and the United Kingdom. Australia is the newest state to join. While ReCAAP is an inter-governmental body, a major limitation is that its mandate is confined to piracy and sea robbery.

In terms of external naval engagement in Southeast Asia, the US Navy still occupies by far the highest profile, through its alliances and defence partnerships, including a program of multilateral exercises such as Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training, Southeast Asia Cooperation and Training and PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP that brings in virtually all littoral states in the region. Bilaterally, the United States maintains regular exercises with its treaty allies in the region, including BALIKATAN (Philippines), COBRA GOLD (Thailand), as well its security partners. Although Thailand is classified as a major non-NATO ally and the United States has acquisition and cross-serving arrangements in place elsewhere, with Malaysia for example, Singapore and The Philippines stand out as the most important regional partners for US naval engagement. The US Navy accounts for one third of all foreign warship visits into Changi Naval Base, which includes berthing facilities purpose-buil to handle US aircraft carriers, and over two-thirds of all foreign warship calls into Sembawang, where COMLOGWESTPAC, a US logistics command servicing the Seventh Fleet, is located. The Philippines is likely to at least maintain the current average of 40-50 US Navy ship visits annually, and may expand further if agreement is reached between Washington and Manila on visiting forces.

The Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) provide a framework for Australia’s naval and air defence engagement with Singapore and Malaysia, alongside the United Kingdom and New Zealand. Australia has also been expanding defence interactions with Vietnam fairly rapidly in recent years, albeit from a low base. For Australia, the momentum in recent years has clearly been with its thickening defence and security engagement with Indonesia. This shift sensibly reflects the transformation of Australia’s strategic priorities from the era when the FPDA was inaugurated in 1971 and ‘Confrontation’ a recent memory. Still, as a contingent concern for Australia to bear in mind, there is the possibility that unease could begin to surface among its oldest defence partners in Southeast Asia if the perception grows that ‘more Jakarta’ spells less resource for FPDA.

Japan and India’s maritime engagement with Southeast Asia have both been growing steadily - Japan’s regional capacity building now includes a modest but symbolically important formal defence component, while civilian capacity building on a much larger scale includes the provision of around ten patrol craft, each, to marine policing agencies in The Philippines and Vietnam. In November 2013, Japan mobilised its largest-ever Maritime Self-Defense Force contingent to lead its contribution to the humanitarian assistance and disaster relief effort in the typhoon-affected regions of The Philippines. India’s naval links with Singapore and Vietnam remain Delhi’s most established bilateral partnerships in Southeast Asia. India has extended submarine training and recently confirmed a US$100 million defence credit line to Vietnam, to include the purchase of offshore patrol vessels. Indonesia has recently expressed interest in improving maritime security links with India, which has its tri-Service command in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, to the immediate north of Sumatra.
What are Southeast Asia’s Perceptions towards ‘Power Projection’?

Before moving on in more detail to perceptions of power and force projection, it is worth asking how separable this really is from regional naval engagement. In the fuzzy world of perceptions, a low-level exercise can still be interpreted through the lens of balancing behaviour. Even if the signal is a false one, the temptation towards over-interpretation is an occupational hazard in the scholarly and analytical community: one sailor’s friendly port call or passage exercise are another analyst’s pearls on a string. Naval interactions build up confidence and benchmark the potential for interoperability among the participants. Yet, for as long as balance of power remains intuitively persuasive as a paradigm in the Indo-Pacific, strategic motivations and signalling can and surely will be read into the diplomatic spectrum of naval presence, as well as the capacity building programs undertaken in Southeast Asia by the major maritime powers. This gets to a basic limitation of naval diplomacy as a tool for confidence building. Warships may act as ‘floating embassies’ in a way that other military assets do not. This flexibility empowers them to function as ambassadors for cooperation and reassurance, as well as delivering deterrent or coercive messages. But they are still warships at the end of the day.

‘White’ shipping is not immune to this problem either. Capacity building earmarked for civilian maritime law enforcement or to boost maritime domain awareness can also be perceived as a kind of soft or proxy power projection, especially when regional the recipient countries, for example Vietnam and The Philippines, happen

to be the two main frontline Southeast Asian claimants in the Spratly Islands, involved in a dispute with China and Taiwan that at sea-level has taken on an ‘asymmetrical’ paramilitary dimension, in which the activities of law enforcement vessels in disputed waters can take on a proxy quality. Encounters involving white shipping are less likely to escalate into military conflict, but the corresponding risk is that they may also be subject to less strict rules of engagement than apply to warships. Hence good seamanship training needs to be regarded as an integral component of capacity building programs in the region.

Before turning to regional attitudes towards power projection, a distinction may firstly be drawn from force projection. The latter might include missions where naval assets are deployed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction and territorial defence interest, for other-than-war missions and hence without the same requirement for force protection and replenishment. While no navy in Southeast Asia possesses fully fledged expeditionary power projection capabilities of its own, several have participated in limited force projection within wider coalitions, including counter-piracy missions in the Indian Ocean (such as Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia). These interactions have increased the scope for out-of-area engagement and confidence building. The Gulf of Aden counter-piracy mission has also brought Northeast Asian navies into more regular contact with Southeast Asia, as contingents from Japan, China and Republic of Korea transit from the western Pacific to the Indian Ocean, usually via the Malacca Strait. This kind of projection is not perceived negatively across Southeast Asia, with the important caveat that Malaysia and Singapore continue to see counter-piracy patrols within the Malacca Strait as the exclusive purview of the littoral straits. One other form of external force projection mostly welcomed into Southeast Asia is humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) delivered from naval platforms. The recent experience of super-typhoon Haiyan in The Philippines in November 2013, demonstrated not only the effectiveness of a concerted international response but equally the limits to ASEAN’s own collective HADR efforts.

Maritime surveillance and intelligence gathering could be defined as a less welcome form of force projection that brings foreign navies potentially up to the limits of the territorial sea. This of course is one of the major controversies within LOSC, and regardless of the legal merits of the case for military surveys or data-gathering being lawfully undertaken in the exclusive economic zone, it is not an activity welcomed by most coastal states in Southeast Asia, a number of whom ask foreign warships for prior notification or authorisation to enter their exclusive economic zones.

Power projection on the other hand, I would define as involving the threat or use of force. It characteristically requires a much higher level of capability, in terms of force protection, sustainability, maritime strike and amphibious assets. Expeditionary deployments are difficult and costly to mount, hence mainly within the purview of only the most well-equipped navies and marine units. Special forces operations and

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<th>2010-11</th>
<th>2011-12</th>
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<tr>
<td>United States Navy</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>110</td>
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<tr>
<td>Royal Australia Navy</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>43</td>
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<td>Royal NZ Navy</td>
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<td>Royal Thai Navy</td>
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<td>US Coast Guard</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>138</td>
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Table 1: Navy/Coast Guard vessel calls into Sembawang wharves, Singapore, 2010-13
other limited uses of force also require ‘projection’ which may be within reach for smaller armed forces, willing to make the necessary investments in joint doctrine, training and capabilities. Yet no Southeast Asian country, with the exception of Singapore, currently possesses the capability to project power much beyond its own maritime borders. Several in fact lack the means to do so fully within their borders. Some, like Malaysia and Thailand, possess ocean going capabilities that can operate out of area, as part of a broader coalition, although sea-lift notably lags behind their other surface capabilities.\(^{19}\)

What about the ability of extra-regional states to project naval power into Southeast Asia? In this category, there are two key protagonists: the US Navy (throughout the region) and China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (in some areas of the South China Sea). But we also need to consider other navies possessing long-range platforms and the capacity to support at least a limited projection of maritime power. This brings in a number of extra-regional navies, including India, Australia, Japan and perhaps Russia and Republic of Korea. However, the capacity for any of these navies to project power independently and sustainably into Southeast Asia, against opposition, is questionable.

What about within Southeast Asia itself? Back in 2006, Kwa Chong Guan’s sweeping assessment was that Southeast Asian navies lacked any power projection capability of their own. However, he did also note that

Southeast Asian responses to unacceptable levels of military activity in their waters will be to try to develop their capacity for more effective surveillance, interdiction where possible and hopefully, enforcement of their rights over their waters.

Furthermore,

the intent of Southeast Asian navies, led by Singapore and Malaysia, is to upgrade and modernise their inventories. This means that at some point in time they may be able to respond to the projection of naval power into their waters, by major Asia Pacific powers, through a strategy of sea denial.\(^{20}\)

According to Collin Koh, the step change in the RSN approach came earlier, in the 1990s, with a doctrinal shift from local sea denial operations to limited sea control, generating

a need for force-projection assets to sustain its coverage of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore and the South China Sea at least, and with surplus capacity to allow for international security operations in distant, extra-regional waters, such as the Gulf of Aden.\(^{21}\)

New capabilities and operators have entered the region over the last seven years, including more submarines and anti-ship missiles. Navies from outside Southeast Asia are deploying submarines into the region, but Southeast Asia has also become a region of small-scale submarine proliferation in its own right.\(^{22}\) As sea denial platforms, submarines are ‘different’. As Goldrick and McCaffrie have argued in the Indonesian context, even where there are doubts about the serviceability of submarines

the mere existence of such vessels and the knowledge that such vessels can operate in the archipelago creates an ‘uncertainty’ factor which no diversion of equivalent resources to other naval systems can match in deterrent effect.\(^{21}\)

In this limited sense, several Southeast Asian navies are investing in submarines as a form of power projection for sea denial purposes. Vietnam’s acquisition of six Russian Kilo submarines appears to be the clearest demonstration of this dynamic. Elsewhere, the reasons for acquiring new submarines (Indonesia, Malaysia, possibly Thailand in the future) owe to more diverse factors than deterrence alone, but will bring an aggregate step-change to regional capabilities regardless.

The focus on submarines should not obscure the importance of steady improvements to regional amphibious capabilities, which generally receive less attention but are more likely to be used. In Northeast Asia, amphibious development is moving apace in Japan and Republic of Korea, which have both made impressive investments in amphibious platforms and belatedly in Japan’s case, doctrine. This has no direct impact on Southeast Asia, but the ongoing development of China’s amphibious forces, and their concentration in southern military regions, clearly does have the potential to change the dynamic in the South China Sea, with direct defence impacts for the Southeast Asian claimant countries.\(^{24}\) In Southeast Asia, Indonesia, The Philippines, Vietnam and Singapore all have marine or ‘marine-like’ capabilities. AMI International, in their forecast of amphibious development in the wider region, ranked Indonesia fifth among the top predicted spenders on amphibious platforms over the next 20 years, while Indonesia also aims to build up its marines to 24,000 personnel. Malaysia has also shown more interest in amphibious development of late, while ranking third in forward projection for auxiliary and support platform acquisitions; the only Southeast Asian country in the top five.\(^{25}\) In October 2013, Malaysia announced the creation of an amphibious unit to be based at Bintulu in East Malaysia, adjacent to a prime area for offshore energy exploration and production, as well as several features occupied by Malaysia in the southern Spratly Islands.\(^{26}\) However, the current sea-lift capacities of the RMN are significantly lacking, since no long-term replacement has yet been acquired for Malaysia’s only amphibious ship KD Sri Inderapura (LPD), which was damaged by fire in 2010 and subsequently decommissioned.\(^{27}\) Hence Malaysia still lacks the capability to ‘project power’ amphibiously in any meaningful way. While Thailand has recently acquired an amphibious ship (LPD) from Singapore, with a second likely to follow, the complement of four Endurance class LPD gives Singapore an expeditionary capability unmatched anywhere else in the Southeast Asian region.
It should be recognised that the spectrum of threats and contingencies likely to be faced by Southeast Asian navies is wider and less conventional than in Northeast Asia, including lingering internal and trans-border security challenges exemplified by recent events in Sabah and Mindanao. Hence multi-spectrum capabilities being acquired by Southeast Asian armed forces, including small numbers of high-end maritime platforms and weapons systems should be assessed in the context of a long-term modernising trend, in which external (not necessarily inter-state) defence functions are likely to assume greater importance over time. Most Southeast Asian navies will continue to have their focus primarily on the defence and protection of waters under their jurisdiction, from disputed claimants, illegal fishing, piracy, smuggling and other forms of maritime crime.

Conclusion
In conclusion, there are common denominators across Southeast Asia on maritime security perceptions. These are framed by the region’s predominant peninsular and archipelagic geography, as well as capacity limitations that constrain options at the national level. The LOSC is another linking theme which conditions a similar coastal state outlook, despite generating overlapping continental shelf and exclusive economic zone boundaries that have the potential to fan distrust and existing maritime territorial disputes. While Cambodia remains the sole Southeast Asian country outside of LOSC, the region’s more obvious outlier is Singapore - in the sense that the city state has more of a maritime state outlook given its overwhelming dependence on seaborne trade and near-absence of coastal resources. Singapore is also in a class of its own in terms of military capability, as well as its high-quality supporting maritime civil infrastructure. To help bridge these gaps, Singapore is also deploying its maritime ‘soft power’ to play a regional facilitation and coordination role, as seen through its hosting of the Information Fusion Centre and the ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre.

Southeast Asia’s limited maritime capacity, even in aggregate, has led to a fallback engagement strategy that seeks to maintain the external great and middle maritime powers - to borrow a term from Indonesia’s diplomatic lexicon - in a ‘dynamic equilibrium’. Ideally balanced, such equilibrium would prevent the spread of proxy conflicts to the region, while channelling maritime capacity building resources in a benign competition for influence. There is ample evidence that this strategy has worked well for Southeast Asia at the lower end of the maritime security spectrum, helping to contain piracy and other forms of maritime crime which threaten trade. However, where inter-state concerns predominate, above all in the South China Sea, the limitations of intra-ASEAN unity have been unable to prevent the emergence of a growing maritime/continental schism within Southeast Asia. The US-China strategic relationship is perhaps the single biggest contingent factor bearing on this. Nonetheless, a web of bilateral and ‘mini-lateral’ links within the region is growing, between Southeast Asian states and the other capable Asia maritime powers: India, Australia, Japan and Republic of Korea. This cross-bracing trend is currently enjoying some momentum - and is perhaps the most promising dimension of naval and maritime engagement.

Endnotes
1 Regional ‘Track I’, ‘Track I.5’ and ‘Track II’ fora that actively discuss maritime security issues include the following: At the leader and ministerial level, the East Asia Summit, the ASEAN Regional Forum and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) Plus have all deliberated maritime security issues during recent summits. In addition, the Shangri-la Dialogue has featured maritime issues prominently on its agenda in recent years, while the ADMM Plus includes a dedicated Maritime Security Working Group to promote cooperation at the working-level. Other regular official, uniform and expert-level exchanges take place through the ASEAN Expanded Maritime Forum, the Western Pacific Naval Symposium, the ASEAN Navy Chiefs Meeting, and the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific study group on maritime security.
2 Southeast Asian leaders have agreed to establish three ASEAN communities: economic, socio-cultural and politico-security, with the target date of 2015.
4 Baselines, from which the 12nm territorial is measured under LOSC, are usually drawn from the low-tide mark. However, LOSC provides for the drawing of straight baselines under certain limited geographical conditions, such as a heavily indented coastline or the presence of fringing islands. Within Southeast Asia, Indonesia and The Philippines are entitled to draw straight baselines from their outermost islands, as archipelagic states. However, Malaysia, Vietnam and Myanmar have also applied straight baselines, without obvious legal grounds for doing so, with the practical effect of substantially projecting their claimed territorial seas and exclusive economic zones.
6 The Republic of Singapore Navy has held the rotational command of the Combined Task Force 151 three times, and Thailand once. Malaysia has been another active contributor, among Asian countries despatching vessels independently to the Gulf of Aden and off Somalia.
8 Started in 2005, the Malacca Strait Patrols was initially a three-way initiative to coordinate counter-piracy surface patrols between the littoral states Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia, whose territorial waters overlap across large sections of the Malacca and Singapore straits. Law enforcement vessels participate as well as warships, since Malaysia has largely handed over constabulary responsibilities to the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency. Thailand joined as the fourth participant in 2008, but participates only in the aerial ‘Eyes in the Sky’ patrol component.
11 Singapore has the only submarine rescue capability within Southeast Asia. Launched in 2008, Singapore’s submarine support and rescue vessel, MV Swift Rescue, is designed to carry out a submarine rescue in up to sea state 5.
The rising profile of the Indian Navy in the Indo-Pacific and Delhi’s adoption of military diplomacy as an integral part of its external engagement have helped reinforce the recent proposition that India is a net security provider in the Indian Ocean region and beyond. After a rather tentative engagement with its Southeast Asian neighbours in the early 1990s, the Indian Navy today conducts regular exchanges with many countries of the Indo-Pacific littoral stretching all the way from southern Africa to the South Pacific and from the eastern Mediterranean to the East China Sea. The Indian Navy’s regular forays into the western Pacific Ocean since the beginning of the last decade, has been welcomed by many regional countries. While the primary interest of India is in the Indian Ocean littoral, it has declared the South China Sea and other littorals abutting the Indian Ocean as secondary areas of interest. Meanwhile Delhi is a much sought after naval partner for the major powers - the United States, France, Russia and Britain - that have long operated in the Indian Ocean. The Indian Navy has also become an object of interest to a rising China, whose interests in the littoral are growing by the day. As the maritime footprints of India and China overlap, the Indian Navy has become a new element in the changing power dynamic between the two Asian giants.

On the multilateral front, India is now a full part of the security dialogue mechanisms led by ASEAN: the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the East Asia Summit (EAS), the extended maritime forum and the biennial meetings of the ASEAN Defence Ministers in an expanded format (the ADMM Plus). Delhi is also trying to inject some security content into the moribund forum called the Indian Ocean Rim Association. Delhi has also taken the initiative to convene the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium that brings the chiefs of navies every two years to discuss maritime issues from a professional perspective. India also participates in the activities of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS). By any measure, India’s naval activism has seen impressive expansion over the last two decades. This paper is an attempt to explain the sources of this extraordinary naval activism that many find some what out of character for India, long seen as rigidly non-aligned. The paper will also assess the outstanding issues that complicate and limit the effectiveness of India’s naval engagement in the Indian Ocean and beyond.
Economic Change and the Maritime Imperative

The fundamental source of growing Indian expanded maritime engagement in the Indo-Pacific littoral is the structural change in its economic orientation at the turn of the 1990s. From being a closed economy focused for decades on self-reliance, India turned to economic liberalisation and globalisation in the 1990s. The accelerated growth has ended India’s prolonged isolation and begun to enhance its relative economic weight in the international system. Even with the current slower growth rates, India is likely to emerge as one of the world’s five largest economies within a couple of decades. The steady accretion of economic power has made allowed India to build up its military muscle by devoting a small portion of its gross domestic product (GDP) for defence spending. India is today the seventh largest spender on military in real terms while spending barely 2 per cent of its GDP on defence. Equally interesting is the fact that a relatively small share of total defence spending on the navy (less than 20 per cent) already helped grow India’s navy into one of the largest in the world.

Delhi’s new interest in sea power is driving the growing importance of trade, especially seaborne trade, in India’s economy. India’s two way trade which stood at less than $50 billion in the mid 1980s now stands at nearly $750 billion. This in turn amounts to 40 per cent of India’s GDP - which stood in early 2013 at $ 1.8 trillion. This intense international exposure of the Indian economy is changing the nature of India’s national interests. As the world’s leading importer of natural resources India is also focused on promoting exports to different corners of the world. India’s economic interests today are dispersed all across the Indian Ocean and beyond and are no longer limited to its immediate neighbourhood in the subcontinent. Like many of great trading nations of the world in the past, India is seeking to build a strong navy. With 90 per cent of its trade travelling by sea - India’s overland trading routes remain underdeveloped - the maritime domain has acquired an unprecedented importance in India. The more integrated India becomes with the world economy, the greater is its stake at sea. If oceans are the lifelines for the economic well-being of its large population, Delhi has begun to invest in building up its naval capabilities and stepping up its maritime diplomacy. The navy as the most versatile and flexible of the military instruments has begun to loom large on India’s strategic calculus. India is not only interested in building a strong navy, but is also determined to acquire blue water capabilities. For India, a blue water navy is an inevitable adjunct to its globalised economy.

India’s new interest in acquiring maritime power marks a historic break from its strategic tradition. Naval nationalists in India do speak of the ancient maritime tradition. But there is no denying that India’s interest in the seas through its history has been episodic. India’s principal security threats tended to remain on its north-western frontiers. Even when it was ruled by the world’s foremost naval power, Great Britain, India’s military energies were devoted to the defence of India’s expansive land borders. The power of the Royal Navy, paradoxically, limited the incentive for building a strong Indian navy during the British Raj. The Indian nationalists did imagine a strong maritime future and a special role for itself in the Indian Ocean. But its economic strategy and the challenges of defending its old and land frontiers necessarily limited India’s maritime possibilities. It is only in the last decade that India’s economic logic has come in alignment with its maritime aspirations. For contemporary India, maritime strategy has become integral to the management of its economic interdependence and securing the prosperity of its large population. While India’s new regional maritime engagement is impressive, it is also constrained by a number of tensions within Delhi’s strategic thinking. The conflict between the old political ideas and the new maritime imperatives express themselves in at least five broad areas that are discussed below.

Between Autonomy and Responsibility

Most analysts of Indian foreign and security policy, whether at home or abroad, would argue that the organising principle of India’s contemporary international relations is the notion of ‘strategic autonomy’. The use of this phrase is relatively new and has replaced the emphasis on ‘non-alignment’ that dominated India’s world view in the past. Students of India’s foreign policy have seen the new emphasis on ‘strategic autonomy’ as a ‘realist mutation’ of the traditional emphasis on non-alignment. While strategic autonomy, rooted in realism, is an improvement over the ideology of non-alignment, it may not be adequate to cope with the changing nature of India’s national interests. Just as the mantra of ‘self-reliance’ is no longer the lodestar guiding India’s foreign and security policy. Autonomy is a great prize for weak middle powers who are trying to insulate themselves from the regimen defined for them by the great powers. For many decades, India has seen itself as a weak developing state that must protect its territory, interests and freedom of choice from the dictates of the great powers. As India becomes a major power in its own right, Delhi’s strategic objective is transforming into something different. India now needs to contribute to the management of the external environment and not seek autonomy from it. The new strategy must be about expanding its choices amidst its growing interdependence with the rest of the world.

Externally, the international pressure on India to take a larger role in the region and the world is becoming relentless. Delhi is already beginning to feel some of it as other powers begin to see Delhi as critical for shaping the strategic balance in the Indo-Pacific. The increase in the economic and military mass of India has generated a strong perception of the emerging power as a ‘swing state’ that will influence the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. Washington has begun to argue that Delhi is a ‘lynchpin’ in the American pivot to Asia amidst the rapidly expanding defence relationship with India. As India’s defence cooperation with the United States grows, sections of the strategic community in China have expressed fears of India joining US plans to contain China. The idea of a ‘strategic triangle’ involving these
three powers has begun to gain some traction in recent years. While other major powers like Russia and Japan and medium powers like Republic of Korea, Indonesia, Australia and Iran are bound to have considerable bearing on the maritime structures of the Indo-Pacific, the triangular dynamic between Washington, Beijing and Delhi is likely to become more consequential in the coming years.

There are many ways in which the triangular relationship could unfold. Some Americans see the importance of accommodating the rise of China through the construction of a condominium; some others see India as a natural balancer against China’s rise. Yet other Americans argue that Washington must balance against both Beijing and Delhi. Some in Beijing worry that India’s naval power, acting in collaboration with the United States and Japan, could hit at the vital maritime interests of China. Delhi is itself quite coy about identifying the hierarchy of its threats. At some point, India will have to make strategic choices amidst the growing tensions between China and the United States as well as between Beijing and its Pacific neighbours. Non-alignment and strategic autonomy, I believe, do not provide an adequate foundation for dealing with the changing power equations in the Indo-Pacific.

Between Territorial Defence and Power Projection

Since independence, India’s traditional impulse was to protect its own territory and the waters around it. The partition of the subcontinent and the creation of new borders made internal conflict in the subcontinent a perennial one; the emergence of China as a new land neighbour after its entry into Tibet added to India’s security burdens. If India’s land forces were weighed down by the defence of its borders, India’s naval strategy too was guided by the logic of sea denial and a maritime diplomacy that sought to limit the role of the external powers in the Indian Ocean. This diplomacy was pursued through such initiatives as making the Indian Ocean a ‘zone of peace’ and opposing foreign military bases in the littoral. As the logic of economic globalisation unfolded over the last two decades, the Indian naval leadership began to invent a new maritime strategy that is in tune with its new circumstances and with it Indian naval diplomacy too has evolved.

Since the late 1990s, India’s two long serving prime ministers - Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh - have repeatedly underlined the expanded geographic scope of India’s maritime interests. The phrases from ‘Aden to Malacca’ or ‘the Suez to the South China Sea’ were re-injected into the national security discourse. That this is not an empty talk is reflected in the operations of the Indian Navy that has frequently shown the flag all across the Indo-Pacific. More importantly, counter-piracy activity in the Gulf of Aden (since 2008) and relief operations in Lebanon (2006), the eastern Indian Ocean tsunami (2004-05), and Libya (2011) have underlined the growing capacity of the Indian Navy and the new political will in Delhi to act far from its shores. These distant operations, to be sure, have not reduced the salience of territorial defence. The Navy was fully mobilised in the Arabian Sea during the

two military crises with Pakistan - the Kargil war of 1999 and the confrontation during 2001-02. The terror attacks on Mumbai during November 2008 reinforced the importance to India of protecting its waters from terrorist threat.

Successful power projection also depends on reorienting the armed forces towards expeditionary capabilities. Despite expansive expeditionary operations under the Raj and impressive international peacekeeping operations since independence, the word ‘expeditionary’ remains a taboo in Delhi’s discourse. The notion of ‘power projection’ continues to sit uneasily with our political classes who feel more comfortable with the old verities of ‘Third Worldism’. Power projection also needs a more vigorous military diplomacy that can reinforce the Navy’s capability to operate far from its shores. This would mean creation of arrangements for friendly ports and turn-around facilities in other nations that will increase the range, flexibility and sustainability of Indian naval operations.

No great power has built a blue water navy capable of projecting force without physical access and political arrangements for ‘forward presence’. Having long rejected ‘foreign bases’ in the Indian Ocean, it is somewhat disconcerting for India’s political and strategic communities to even contemplate the new imperatives. The proposition that China is building a ‘string of pearls’ along vital sea lines of communication in the Indian Ocean has had the merit of forcing open a whole new debate. Some analysts outside India are beginning to talk, somewhat prematurely, of a ‘necklace of diamonds’ emerging in India’s own plans for power projection. The idea of such a necklace is not new. Sardar KM Panikkar, who remains an inspiration for Indian naval thinking, emphasised the need for a ring of bases in the Indian Ocean to ensure India’s maritime security.

From National Security to Regional Security

Although the imagination of an expeditionary role for the Indian Navy remains controversial, the idea that India must look beyond its own security and provide it to others is beginning to re-emerge in Delhi. From the late 18th to the mid 20th centuries, it was British power radiating, first out of Calcutta and then Delhi that kept peace in the Indian Ocean. It was common place then to call the Indian Ocean a British Lake. Although Britain was the sole superpower then, it could not have exercised hegemony without the extraordinary resources of an undivided subcontinent and its geographical location at the heart of the Indian Ocean. In the decades after independence, India abandoned this tradition and adopted military isolationism as it turned inward economically and coped with the pressures for territorial defence. Despite the division of the subcontinent, India did retain a measure of the past legacy in terms of its ability to contribute troops to international peacekeeping under the auspices of the United Nations. While India’s territorial conflicts with its neighbours have not disappeared, the nuclearisation of the subcontinent has muted them into very different tensions, especially at the sub-conventional level.
As India’s economic power and military prowess grow, it is but natural that other powers have begun to see Delhi as a ‘net security provider in the Indian Ocean’.

But is the Indian political and bureaucratic leadership capable of internalising the notion of India becoming a security provider? The Integrated Headquarters of the Ministry of Defence (Navy) has begun to emphasise the importance of assisting the weaker states of the Indian Ocean littoral in building their own capacities. As a result we have seen the Navy provide training, advisers, and equipment to some of the smaller countries in the Indian Ocean. Whether it was helping Mauritius operate a coastguard; strengthening Sri Lanka's ability to control its waters; or improving the ability of Mozambique, Madagascar and Maldives to monitor their maritime domain, India has taken a number of steps. This somewhat ad hoc policy has included the recent transfer of ships to Seychelles, Maldives and Mauritius. To realise its true potential as a security provider in the Indian Ocean, Delhi needs to develop a comprehensive program for security assistance. This involves the development of a range of policy instruments including transfer of arms, financial support for military exports, and a strong domestic defence industrial base to match the growing demand for military cooperation with India. Delhi also needs to devise frameworks for intelligence sharing as well as stationing of Indian military personnel and equipment in other countries. This, in turn, calls for the national security apex to bring synergy and coordination to the activities of the Navy, and the ministries of Defence and External Affairs.

From Territorial Seas to Maritime Commons

Since independence India had a complex attitude towards the notions of collective security. While its idealist rhetoric always emphasised the notion of collective security, its practice often shunned any idea of deploying the Indian armed forces for collective security activity outside the United Nations. But in the last two decades, India has increased its participation in collective security efforts. Equally important India has begun to adopt the rhetoric of contributing to the management of maritime commons and was more open to collaboration with other major naval powers. The ‘global commons’ refers to various realms - like oceans, air, outer space and cyberspace - that are not under the control of any one state but are critical for the functioning of contemporary international life. The commons are a consequence of technological evolution and form the connective tissues of our globalised world. The dominant powers of each age had undertaken the responsibility to keep the maritime commons open for use by all and contribute to the maintenance of good order at sea. The new emphasis on the protection of the commons underlines two important evolutions in India’s maritime thinking. One is that as a rising naval power, India is taking a much broader view of its responsibility than the mere pursuit of its narrowly defined national interests. Contributing to the public good - such as keeping the sea lines of communication open - has become one of the stated objectives of the Indian Navy.

The other is the shift away from the territorial approach to the maritime commons that India had taken in the past. When the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea was being drafted in the 1970s, India sided with those seeking to extend the territorial jurisdiction of the coastal states. India, like many other developing states sought to restrict the rights of great powers to conduct naval operations near their waters. Today as a maritime power in the making, India needs open seas rather than waters that are enclosed in the name of national sovereignty. There has also been an emphasis on the ‘freedom of navigation’ and protection of sea lines of communication. The 2007 maritime military strategy of the Indian Navy is titled Freedom to Use the Seas. This in fact preceded the eruption of territorial disputes in the South China Sea. India’s new non-territorial conception of the seas stands in contrast to the maritime philosophy of China.

Between the ‘Regional’ and the ‘Extra-Regional’

One important feature of Indian maritime thinking has been the opposition to the presence of extra-regional powers in the Indian Ocean. In the Indian debate that followed the announcement of the East of Suez policy by Great Britain in 1967, the Indian strategic community rallied around Sri Lanka’s proposal for making the Indian Ocean a ‘zone of peace’. Arguing that the great power naval presence in the Indian Ocean will exacerbate regional insecurity, Delhi opposed the entry of the United States and Russia into the Indian Ocean after the British withdrawal. India’s chattering classes believed in the moral superiority of their position in favour of a collective security mechanism in the Indian Ocean. Yet, India's campaign for a zone of peace was seen by some as part of the Soviet propaganda against the West and an attempt to limit the naval options of the United States. Meanwhile within the littoral states, many of whom were dependent on either the United States or the Soviet Union had little commitment to the notion of collective security. India’s own neighbours including Pakistan projected India’s support for it and demand for the withdrawal of ‘extra-regional navies’ as a thinly disguised plot to make the Indian Ocean ‘India’s Ocean’.

India’s lack of realism was unsustainable after the end of the Cold War two decades ago. Along with its economic reforms, India began to engage all great powers, including the United States, which had a presence in the Indian Ocean. Yet when India took the initiative for convening the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium in 2008, it insisted that the membership must be limited to ‘regional’ states of the littoral. India’s support for the zone of peace in the 1970s was probably rooted in the fear about the United States (recall 1971 and the USS Enterprise incident!) and opposition to Washington’s alliances with China and Pakistan. India’s rejection of ‘extra-regional’ powers in the current phase appears to be a reflection of Delhi’s concerns about the new Chinese profile in the Indian Ocean. As a rising maritime power, India must now begin to move away from the unproductive divide it has set up between the ‘regional’ and the ‘extra-regional’.

Looking East and West: The Indian Navy’s Regional Engagement
For one, India itself has often become a target of these artificial divisions. For example in the Malacca Strait, the theme of ‘regional versus extra-regional’ is playing itself out often to the disadvantage of India. Nor would India want to be treated as an extra-regional power in the western Pacific Ocean where it has significant interests. While the very definition of a region means drawing the line somewhere, it is reasonable to suggest that no regional mechanism will work if it is seen as keeping out an interested great power. From a practical perspective, then, India cannot either wish away the extra-regional presence of the United States or prevent the significant rise in Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean. Instead of proclaiming a Monroe Doctrine that it cannot enforce, India has begun to find ways to deal with the reality of American and the growing Chinese interests and presence in the Indian Ocean.

Conclusion: From Lone Ranger to Coalition Builder

In conclusion, the Indian Navy stares at an important paradox. Even as its capabilities and reach have grown, the Indian Navy must come to terms with the logic of collaborating with other countries, big and small, to secure its maritime interests in the region. The Indian Navy has broken out of the ‘lone ranger’ syndrome and has outlined a doctrine that is in tune with Delhi’s emergence as a trading state with widely dispersed interests. It is deeply conscious of the virtues of being part of ad hoc coalitions. The Ministry of External Affairs has begun to recognise the virtues of naval diplomacy. Maritime security and enhanced naval cooperation with other countries has become a standard part of India’s diplomatic tool kit. The Ministry of External Affairs has shed much of the old baggage of non-alignment and has actively supported the various multilateral maritime initiatives. But the civilian bureaucracy in the Ministry of Defence and the political leadership continue to struggle with the logic of military cooperation and security diplomacy. The domestic political protests from left wing parties and the reaction of China to India’s aggressive naval diplomacy have re-injected ambiguity into India’s policy of engaging the United States and regional partners. India’s multilateral naval exercises in the Bay of Bengal during September 2007 with the United States, Japan, Australia and Singapore drew accusations at home of abandoning non-alignment and criticism from China that India was becoming part of an ‘Asian NATO’. Beyond the new political constraints, the implementation of a variety of naval cooperation agreements has been constrained by insufficient institutional capabilities within the central government. The lack of sufficient defence production capability at home has also prevented India from the growing demands for transfer of naval equipment to smaller countries. Yet within these limitations, India’s naval engagement has significantly expanded. Once India brings its policy in line with the new maritime imperatives, India’s maritime cooperation will see rapid expansion in the coming years.

I am sorry I could not be with you today in person; duties in the United States will not permit me.¹ This is not said lightly. These conferences play a critical role in Australia’s defence debate. They are an important part of the formulation of Australian defence policy. They reach into the Australian political community. That is a community where the debate on the application of Australia’s scant resources sees many contending worthy advocates compete with the interests of Australia’s national security. Defence has one important asset. That is the fact that if we cannot survive, if our interests are not protected, all else falls. Australia’s founders recognised this when they acknowledged that the need for a national defence was one of the most important causes for the creation of our federation.

Between 1983 and 1996 the mission of the RAN as a tool of statecraft, both in terms of national policy and maritime power projection, was defined in terms of a national strategy of defence self-reliance and a military strategy of defence in depth. The focus was on the capacity to dominate Australia’s sea and air approaches and ensure a favourable environment in Australia’s area of strategic interest. The one covered an area that constituted 10 per cent of the earth’s surface, the other 25 per cent. The governments’ 1987 and 1994 Defence White Papers acknowledged Australia had broader global interests, particularly as they reflected the sea lines of communication which, as a trading nation, were vital to us.² The capacity to act with allies and our interests through that in global and regional stability belied any notion that we could simply rely on a fortified nation and ignore developments abroad, to protect significant national interests. Nothing was more bogus than the criticism that planning for our navy’s role was a product then of a fortress Australia mentality. The 1987 Defence White Paper made clear that the Radford-Collins Agreement of the early 1950s gave Australia major responsibilities for the protection of shipping lanes in the eastern Indian Ocean, the Southeast Asian archipelago and western Pacific Ocean.³

On allies the 1987 Defence White Paper stated:

the type of Australian force structure required to protect our interests in our area of military interest entails substantial capabilities for operations further afield. For example, our guided missile frigates (FFGs) equipped with Seahawk helicopters are capable of effective participation in a US carrier battle group well distant from Australian shores.⁴
This was an attribute well tested in the Persian Gulf during the 1990-91 Gulf War. In terms of regional diplomacy these distant attributes of the RAN were likewise tested in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific in the same period. That they were part of a force structure defined in terms of dominance of our maritime approaches, and the creation of favourable circumstances in our area of direct military interest, was neither here nor there.

The notion of self-reliance, because it was heavily part of the 1987 Defence White Paper, was strongly associated with the Australian Labor Party. Partly this was a product of what had been perceived as an internal political fix for a party which had intensely debated one expeditionary activity in Vietnam. Certainly these issues had been important in Labor’s internal debate. More important was the statement by US President Nixon at Guam in 1969, reiterated by US Defense Secretary Cap Weinberger in 1984 that in areas of lesser importance in the Cold War struggle, the United States expected friends and allies to look to their own defence in the first instance. Inhabiting one of those areas, this was a challenge to Australia in the prevailing US concept of allied burden sharing. It did not mean that the United States would offer no help to such allies in extremity. It just meant that they should not use the United States as an excuse to assume a permanent peace dividend.

Nor was it an excuse to ignore an obligation to help a stretched US, economically, militarily and politically elsewhere when occasion demanded. Building alliances and relationships in the Western interest was a core element of the alliance we were and are part of. The RAN was an important part of building that process. It was a part of an independent Australian contribution which served a broader Western strategic interest. It envisaged also a collaborative role further afield.

Further, as the 1987 Defence White Paper acknowledged, responding to these considerations was first outlined in the 1976 Defence White Paper of Malcolm Fraser’s Liberal government. Not acknowledged in the 1976 Defence White Paper but nevertheless dimly perceived by the 1980s, the notion of the need for self-reliance had entered Australia’s strategic planning well before Nixon’s Guam doctrine. When the preceding Dibb Review looked closely at Australia’s air, naval and army requirements we were surprised at how much of the then force fitted in. But on reflection, a series of decisions taken by the Menzies government were critical. Between 1963 and 1966 the Menzies government stared with horror at Australia’s air, naval and army requirements we were surprised at how much of the then force fitted in. But on reflection, a series of decisions taken by the Menzies government were critical. Between 1963 and 1966 the Menzies government stared with horror at the inadequacies of its forward defence policy as it became clear expectations of it, as the British ran down its eastern commitments and the Americans were equivocal about handling difficulties with Indonesia, might prove confidence in it was misplaced. The Menzies government responded accordingly, acquiring Charles F Adams class destroyers (DDG), Oberon class submarines, F-111 strategic bombers, M-113 armoured vehicles and introducing conscription. The latter it is usually assumed, was based on the exigencies of the Vietnam War. It was not; it was based on the challenges we assumed might be forthcoming from a Soekarnoist Indonesia, heavily influenced by the local communist party and rapidly acquiring a potent array of naval and air equipment from the Soviet Union. These assumed challenges disappeared as a very friendly Indonesia emerged from the failed communist coup attempt and the direct American interest in Southeast Asia evolved in Vietnam. Keeping Indonesia friendly is a major Australian interest, and interactions between all sections of the Australian military with their Indonesian counterparts has been an important diplomatic part of it ever since. The force structure left in place made systematic planning for our defence much easier.

For the remainder of this talk I am going to concentrate on the Navy. Being able to defend our approaches and influence events in our region of direct military interest in the period 1983 to 1996 is a combined Service affair. That was made very clear in our parallel changes in command arrangements at the time. Our commander was made Chief of Defence Force and three joint headquarters were created. To fit the topic I am obliged to set to one side the critical role of our air force capabilities for surveillance, strike and interdiction and the army’s capacity to handle onshore and offshore problems, which involve intense collaboration with naval assets. Having been stated, I will ignore them.

The 1987 Defence White Paper entailed deep consideration of what was described as low level and escalated low level conflict. These were perceived as producing the most likely threats to our hold on this continent and which required a force-in-being to meet them. This was because, in the similarly elaborate consideration of warning time, these could arise at any point of time and be very challenging. Nation crushing threats would take much longer to develop and warning time should permit a capacity to respond by enhancing other capabilities that would be kept as part of an expansion base.

Closely examining the two types of low level threats revealed the possibility of challenges in a substantial array of threats to coastal shipping and wider sea lanes, offshore and onshore critical northern assets and population centres. On our approaches five chokepoints were identified in the Southeast Asian, South Pacific archipelagos which we needed to be able to defend. But defence was not enough, deterrence was needed, and that required strike capabilities so costs could be imposed on an enemy beyond simply the loss of attacking forces.

When this was examined there was not enough Navy. Then the Navy consisted of 12 major ships and six submarines, as well as patrol boats and other lesser capabilities. These could not protect the points and our approaches, and we needed an increased effort. It is forgotten now, but we expected the three destroyers to last to the late 1990s, the six Adelaide class frigates (FFG) until 2011, with eight new Anzac class frigates lifting the numbers. Likewise for inshore work, mine countermeasure vessels were to be acquired. A substantial elevation of anti-submarine warfare capability was perceived for the ships as a crucial element of surveillance and interdiction. Privately we knew this was not enough. Though the 1987 Defence White
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Paper discussed six Collins class submarines our contract entailed the possibility of another two. The force multiplier effect of seven and eight was much greater than five and six. We hoped that New Zealand might provide another four frigates for the chokepoints by picking up four Anzac frigates believing a solid defence of Australia’s approaches was in New Zealand’s interest. I am not critical here. New Zealand bought two and has a force structure that is superbly suited to the South Pacific, where their expertise and the role they play is very helpful to Australia. Likewise we do not have 17 major surface combatants and eight submarines! It is easy to see however the confidence the government had that these forces would be more than adequate to deal with the need to have a naval component of a more forward diplomacy and, with the stress placed on interoperability with US forces and use of US technologies, contributions could be made to allied naval activities.

In 1987 however, the forward activities that were envisaged were to be pursued independently. Moving to a ‘two ocean’ basing arrangement with submarines concentrated on the west coast was a significant force multiplier for the new ships and submarines to be acquired. For submarines in particular, west coast basing improved time on station, compared with deploying from Fleet Base East in Sydney on the east coast, in critical Southeast Asian chokepoints by one third. Roles enhancing surveillance and interdiction efforts in the South Pacific were perceived as an independent Australian effort using Australian surface assets and support for an extensive Pacific Patrol Boat Program. We signed an agreement in 1988 with Papua New Guinea that elevated our defence relationship with them to an equivalent status of the Five Power Defence Arrangements. Manus Island was revived as a patrol boat base and the wharf reconstructed to be able to berth a FFG. We were conscious that the battle fleet for Leyte Gulf assembled at Manus. More to the contemporary point it was adjacent to one of the identified chokepoints. With the Five Power Defence Arrangements, we were conscious of the fact that the need to withdraw the squadron of Mirage fighters would create a degree of alarm with our allies. A continuing operation, if not basing of F/A-18 hornet fighters, F-111 bombers and P3-C Orion maritime patrol aircraft substituted. To indicate our enhanced presence was being diminished by troubles with their Philippines bases. Though critical of some aspects of the 1987 Defence White Paper these factors caused the American leadership to endorse it.

These appeared to be good plans but then came a series of surprises which subtly shifted the basis of the planning. They should not have done so. The focus on the centrality in force structure of the defence of Australia’s approaches had resonance in a variety of conceivable geopolitical circumstances, including the changes which occurred. The changes which did occur did not alter the military realities entailed in the examination of Australia’s defence needs but they dramatically altered the psychological environment and the saliency of defence matters in national politics. The three changes which occurred were: the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the sudden significance of non-Cold War scenarios to our main ally, and the emergence of thinking about a regional stabilisation role for our armed forces.

The collapse of the Cold War did not of itself impinge on our naval operations. They were largely independent of it and geographically outside its main focal points. What it did do was change defence perspectives and government tolerance of expenditures. Before the fall of the Berlin Wall our percentage of gross domestic product spent on defence was never below two per cent and usually mid-way between two and three per cent. Within a decade of the fall our expenditure was rarely above two per cent. The US reduction was just as dramatic. Their 600 ship navy was halved in size in ten years. More subtly the sense that menace was more distant took the discipline out of planning. No subsequent white paper delved so deep into scenarios in determining force structure. The chokepoints drifted away and so did a lot of the anti-submarine warfare focus. This was odd because at the same time rapid development in regional naval capabilities might have suggested quantity and our technological edge were important.

The second change occurred before the end of the Cold War, though it had little to do with it. Though the 1980s structure of the Navy was anticipated to render it capable of supporting allied operations, no one really expected it would have to do so. Within six months of the publication of the 1987 Defence White Paper we were engaged with our ally in the Persian Gulf. The so-called ‘Tanker War’ subset of the Iran-Iraq War induced it. The sea mining of American merchant ships and mine and missile attacks on international shipping in the Gulf, saw the United States reach out to friends and allies for escort and ultimately punitive purposes. After considering a frigate, we offered a clearance diving team in response to an identified weakness in US capabilities.
More significant than the offer was the argument. The outcome provided guidance for future decisions. Fifteen years of post-Vietnam reluctance to commit in distant areas was set aside. Officials initially opposed the commitment as one too distant from Australia’s direct area of military interest, both geographically and by definition in terms of our national interest. The Americans said it was a test of our claims that our force structure permitted attachment to allied operations further afield. The politicians detected a direct Australian interest in freedom of the seas. Five Australian civilian ships plied the Gulf and the Royal Navy protected them. The Gulf sea lanes were important, and given allied concerns, and its maritime character, this was a legitimate task in the national interest to be performed by the RAN, albeit in least expected times and locations.

It has been ever since. With limited interruption, from the 1990-91 Gulf War until today, the RAN has operated in the Persian Gulf/Red Sea area. It is a political flag, a gesture of allied support. It is also effective. Mine clearance divers were critical cleaning up Kuwait and later after the 2003 Iraq War. The shallow draft of the Anzac frigates has made them excellent counter-smuggling, shore bombardment platforms. Our value has been recognised in command arrangements from time to time. Our navy has as much familiarity with Middle Eastern waters as our own.

Finally there was a commitment to regional stabilisation arrangements. The story here belongs to the next paper. These were not anticipated in the 1987 Defence White Paper but their possibility was evident in the response to the first Fijian coup. There was no intervention, but a presence was established in case of need for rescue in which the Navy played a prominent role. Cautious approaches were likewise made in relation to problems in Vanuatu and Papua New Guinea. It was not until the post-1996 era that regional stabilisation arrangements were added formally, as a force structure determinant, but the 1994 Defence White Paper foreshadowed it. Largely unexplained, the government declared the need for two additional amphibious ships.

The missions given the Navy between 1983 and 1996, whether they related to regional surveillance, coastal surveillance, fisheries protection, diplomatic deployments, Persian Gulf operations, fighting or counter-smuggling, counter-piracy patrols, neighbourly capacity building, and demonstration of resolve; all were done effectively. The Navy paid its way. The question arises however, did the predominance of these roles, few of which were taxing on ship numbers and none crippingly expensive, conceal something critical of which we lost sight during those 13 years. Did the good performance and our allies’ gratitude, smooth the sharp edges of responsibility in the political leadership and defence command? I still remember many briefings I had as Paul Dibb prepared his report on defence capability and then the 1987 Defence White Paper. The escalated low level conflict which seemed the most likely of the threatening scenarios; the perception of growing regional military capability offsetting Australia’s edge; informed a very hard-headed look at Australia’s approaches. The judgement that the force-in-being had to be able to handle it was firm in all our minds. Our understanding of our geography in realistic threat scenarios was strong. The Navy that was planned we understood to be barely able to handle it (hence the importance of New Zealand). It did not, however, emerge. This probably impacted in terms of ship numbers. Further, the anti-submarine warfare component of the mission drifted away. The talk of self-reliance remained. The understanding that we had a sea/air gap in which we needed to predominate was there. The requirement for a strike capability for deterrence was understood. Did our structure in the end, in that period and after, mirror the task?

Endnotes

1 Currently serving as the Australian Ambassador to the United States of America.
4 Department of Defence, The Defence of Australia, p. 3
Thank you for the invitation to contribute to today’s discussions. It is a pleasure to follow on from my old friend Kim Beazley, and I know he would have loved to be here. I have been asked to cover the period of the Howard government, so I am talking about the period 1996 to 2007, which includes my period as Minister for Defence. Over that period we had five Ministers for Defence, which is probably a bit more than is desirable in just 11 years: Ian McLachlan (1996-98); John Moore (1998-2001); Peter Reith (2001); Robert Hill (2001-06); and Brendan Nelson (2006-07). And during that period the Chiefs of Naval Staff/Navy were vice admirals Rod Taylor (1994-97); Don Chalmers (1997-99); David Shackleton (1999-2002); Chris Ritchie (2002-05); and Russ Shalders (2005-08).

Kim talked a lot about ‘strategic guidance’ and the reasons for which the governments of the day, through their white papers, determined that guidance. During my time as Minister for Defence, we did not write another white paper and this was despite some within Defence arguing that we should do so. I guess if you have a section in Defence whose job it is to write white papers, they like to be tasked to write them, but I was of the view that white papers are not something that you do often. In fact, you only legitimately do it with a change of government, but otherwise you only do it if you believe that the strategic guidance under which you have been operating is out of date. I operated under the policy laid down in the 2000 Defence White Paper, remembering that we had a few years after we got into government to think about what we wanted to say, and we undertook an extensive and complex public consultation process as part of its development.

One of the things that I found interesting from Kim’s presentation was that although his white papers were heavily premised on the concept of ‘defence of Australia’ and ‘self-reliance’, he found that when the threats that he had to address, the tasks that he had to meet, were not those that were anticipated, he nevertheless had the capability within the ADF to meet those challenges.

It is interesting to reflect on the differences in emphasis concerning the concept of ‘defence of Australia’ between our respective governments. The policy of the previous government could be summed up as the policy of concentric circles, where you have a more intense capability the closer you got to the Australian mainland and you have these circles that move out. We tended to see the globe a little differently and suspected that the tasks that we might be engaged in could well be further afield, which in fact turned out to be the case. We believed there was a greater likelihood of being requested to be part of expeditionary forces and we were more
inclined to be ready to join them. But as Kim noted, he was faced with the issue of the 1990-91 Gulf War and the Hawke government decided to contribute naval capabilities on Australia’s behalf.

When I look at the strategy in the 2000 Defence White Paper, I have to concede that of the four or five different levels of potential threat/tasking, I think the expeditionary potential was listed last. But the point I wish to make is that Kim found that although things did not work out exactly as he anticipated, he found there was sufficient flexibility in Australia’s naval capabilities to meet the unexpected as well as the expected. I guess that is one of the principal lessons that came from my experience as Minister for Defence, and when we talk about capability requirements, where Australia is never going to have a large navy, we are more likely than not to face a whole range of different contingencies and we need to build as much flexibility as possible into our force structure, because the unexpected is just as likely to be before us as the expected.

I inherited the capabilities and associated issues arising from many of Kim’s decisions and this is the second point that I want to make, and that is that while ministers and defence chiefs will change, capabilities continue. So I, like all Ministers for Defence, inherit continuity or rolling program of capabilities; in my case they included:

- the two ocean basing decision, placing half of the Fleet at HMAS Stirling in Western Australia
- the six Collins class submarines replacing the Oberon class
- the upgrade program for six Adelaide class frigates I got from a colleague, but I think the decision to decommission two of them ahead of the upgrade was mine
- the eight Anzac class frigates were in the process of being delivered
- from a colleague I inherited the six Huon class coastal minehunters
- I made the decision on the new Hobart class destroyers
- I made the decision on the Armidale class patrol boats
- the new Canberra class amphibious ships were within the 2000 Defence White Paper, and while I worked on it, a successor made the source selection decision
- I was responsible for the purchase of the fleet oiler HMAS Sirius
- in relation to the Fleet Air Arm, I inherited the decision to purchase and refurbish the Super Seasprite helicopters and one of my successors cancelled the project.

The major challenges I had as Minister for Defence related to the refurbishment of equipment and I think it pays to be realistic up front about timings and costs. One of the good things about the ADF, but also one of the things that needs to be watched carefully, is when you say to the military ‘can this be done’, the answer is always ‘yes, sir’. But sometimes it is probably not the best answer to receive and I hope that we have learnt some lessons from that. Concerning the issues associated with the Collins submarines, I was deeply involved in issues of refurbishment, almost before they were operational, and when we sent those boats on operational tasks they did a superb job. Kim would like to hear me say this - I think that they have in many ways received a bad press. I guess it is relevant to the future as well that submarines are very complex and the challenge of building, maintaining, building, operating and upgrading submarines is a huge and complex task and will not come without a few tears.

I now want to talk about operations because although governments make the decisions to deploy, we have very little to do with how successful or otherwise these operations are; that is due to the calibre of the men and women in the Navy. In my period as Minister for Defence, and really for the whole of the Howard government, it was a time in which the Navy was very busy on many different tasks and did an excellent job. I will do this in a chronological manner which might become somewhat convoluted - my purpose is to demonstrate both the complexity and wide variety of tasks to which we committed the Navy.¹

1990-2001: Operation DAMASK - ADF contribution to United Nations economic and military sanctions against Iraq (including the 1990-91 Gulf War) in which the Navy conducted boardings, and more significantly, interdicted the illegal smuggling trade that was coming out of Iraq.

1996: Operation BUSKIN - the provision of maritime security during a visit to Australia by the US President.

1997: Operation BARITONE - several Navy units were placed on alert and pre-positioned for potential evacuation operations following political disturbances in Papua New Guinea resulting from the ‘Sandline Affair’.

1997-2006: Operation CRANBERRY - Australian fisheries patrols in northern Australian waters; these were politically very sensitive, as we managed our relationship with Indonesia.

1997: Operation COULTER - a task group was diverted and placed on standby to evacuate Australian citizens in response to smoke haze over eastern Malaysia.

1997: Operation DIRK - deployment of Navy units deep into the Southern Ocean to conduct patrols off Heard and Macquarie Islands to counter illegal fishing; two foreign fishing vessels were apprehended.

1997: Operation SIERRA - Navy units were involved in drought and humanitarian relief activities in support of Papua New Guinea.
1997-98: **Operation BEL ISI** - assistance provided to the Australian and New Zealand Truce Monitoring Group at Bougainville, with the Navy conducting inter- and intra-theatre logistic support operations, as well as the provision of an afloat headquarters.

1997: **Operation BANNER** - preparations made for the evacuation of Australian citizens following a coup in Cambodia.


1998: **Operation BRANCARD** - preparation for an ADF assisted evacuation of Australian citizens from Indonesia during civil disturbances; the operation stood down following the resignation of President Soeharto.

1998-2001: **Operation BEL ISI II** - an extra Navy unit deployed to Bougainville following a breakdown of the ceasefire. Other Navy units continued to provide logistical and operational support as per the 1997-98 operational commitment. This was a nasty environment and the back-up provided by the Navy was critically important and the government was most appreciative of them being there and providing that support.

1998: **Operation AUSINDO JAYA** - an ADF operation to deliver food and medical supplies to drought-affected areas of central Irian Jaya.

1998: **Operation OP AVIAN LINNET** - a combined drug enforcement operation between the Australian Federal Police, Coastwatch, Australian Customs Service and the ADF off the NSW central coast.

1999: **Operation SPITFIRE** - a services assisted evacuation of Australian and approved foreign nationals from Dili and Baucau following a surge in violence in East Timor after the independence referendum.

1999: **Operation WARDEN/STABILISE** - ADF contribution to United Nations sanctioned peace enforcement operations in East Timor. I was not the Minister for Defence when Cabinet made the decision to intervene in East Timor, but it was one of the toughest days that we had as a government and we were lucky to have the forces available to support us in that difficult political decision.

1999-2000: **Operations WARDEN/STABILISE** - ADF contribution to United Nations sanctioned peace enforcement operations in East Timor. I was not the Minister for Defence when Cabinet made the decision to intervene in East Timor, but it was one of the toughest days that we had as a government and we were lucky to have the forces available to support us in that difficult political decision.

2000-01: **Operation TANGIER** - successor to WARDEN where UNTAET assumed control from INTERFET in East Timor. The Navy involvement continued through the use of amphibious vessels for all-weather movement and logistic support.

2000: **Operation PLUMBOB** - following civil unrest in the wake of the abduction of Prime Minister Ulufa’ alu of Solomon Islands, almost 500 Australian citizens were evacuated from Honiara.

2000: **Operation DORSAL** - support to the Solomon Islands peace negotiation process.

2000: **Operation GOLD** - security operations with the NSW Police and broader support to the ADF presence at the Sydney Olympic and Paralympic Games.

2000-01: **Operation TREK** - Navy units deployed to promote stability in Solomon Islands and to support the peace monitoring team.

2001: **Operation TEEBONE** - Southern Ocean fisheries patrol where the Navy, in conjunction with the Australian Fisheries Management Authority (AFMA) and the South African Navy, successfully apprehended FFV *South Tomi* after a 2200nm pursuit across the Indian Ocean.

2001-on: **Operation SLIPPER** - ADF contribution to the US-led international coalition against terrorism in the Middle East. In some senses, this is a continuation of the DAMASK deployments and as of August 2013, the 31st rotation continues.

2001: **Operation RELEX** - air and surface patrols across Australia’s northern approaches to detect, deter and deny access to unauthorised boat arrivals.

2002-06: **Operation RELEX II** - a transition from RELEX, with similar objectives. We all went through some very difficult times in relation to it, but those on the frontline that had to make some very tough decisions, did a wonderful job in those circumstances and we were hugely appreciative.

2003: **Operation BASTILLE** - ADF contribution in support of the US led build-up to remove the threat of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, leading to...

2003: **Operation FALCONER** was the ADF support to US-led coalition operations to eliminate Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, using HMA Ships *Kanimbla*, *Anzac*, and *Darwin*, as well as Clearance Diving Team 3.

2003: **Operation CATALYST** - ADF contribution to efforts to assist with the stabilisation and rehabilitation of Iraq. I recall that in 2004, HMAS *Stuart* was involved in responding to attacks on Iraqi offshore oil terminals as well as an attack on a boat from USS Firebolt.

2003: **Operations TARTAN/SORBET** - support to Coastwatch to track, intercept, board and apprehend MV *Pong Su* (which was suspected of drug smuggling), after a four day pursuit along the Australian east coast.

2003: **Operation GEMSBOK** - Southern Ocean fishery patrol resulting in the apprehension of FFV *Viarsa I*. 

2003: **Operation RELEX III** - air and surface patrols across Australia’s northern approaches to detect, deter and deny access to unauthorised boat arrivals.
2003-04: Operation ANODE - ADF contribution to the Regional Assistance Mission in the Solomon Islands (RAMSI), where the Navy provided a highly visible presence and logistic support.

2004: Operation CELESTA - Southern Ocean fishery patrol resulting in the apprehension of FFV Maya V.

2004-05: Operation SUMATRA ASSIST - ADF response to the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami in the Indian Ocean/Southeast Asia, and continued following another severe earthquake and tsunami on 28 March 2005. On a sad note I recall the tragic loss of 9 ADF personnel on Nias Island when a Sea King helicopter from Kanimbla crashed while providing much needed assistance to the local people.

2006: Operation ACOLYTE - ADF security operation in support of the Melbourne Commonwealth Games.

2006: Operation BREAKWATER - established following a rise in the arrival of suspected illegal entry vessels in northern Australian waters.

2006: Operation LARRY ASSIST - ADF response to Cyclone Larry, aimed at supporting the inhabitants of far north Queensland; where heavy landing craft provided a transport network in flooded areas.

2006-07: Operation ASTUTE - ADF contribution following the flaring of violence in East Timor in the lead up to elections. The RAN response included the first operational use of the Amphibious Ready Group.

2006: Operation QUICKSTEP - ADF deployment for the evacuation of Australian citizens from Fiji in the lead up to and following a successful military coup. An Army black hawk helicopter crashed when trying to land on Kanimbla, resulting in the loss of two ADF personnel.

2006-ongoing: Operation RESOLUTE - the amalgamation of all concurrent border protection operations in Australian waters.

2007: Operation DELUGE - ADF contribution to security during the 2007 Asia-Pacific Economic Caucus.

While the foregoing are some of the ‘named’ operations with which the Navy was involved, it of course undertook a range of routine tasks, which I think are just as challenging as formal operations: some very difficult search and rescue operations, work on the national surveillance program, hydrographic support in support of commercial shipping, and the major bilateral and multilateral exercises.

Reflections

As a former Minister for the Environment and Heritage (1998-2002) before becoming the Minister for Defence, I had a great appreciation for the Navy’s operations in the Southern Ocean under the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 1980 and what they achieved really changed the game down there. That said, the various Southern Ocean fisheries patrols were a concern to the government. They sound like a fairly straightforward task, but were undertaken in ships that were not designed to operate in that part of the world, and the Navy found it hugely challenging to operate in those inhospitable waters. I cannot recall which operation it was, but there was an instance where a boarding craft sent to apprehend an illegal vessel had overturned, with two men in the water. A second boat was sent and it too overturned, so now there were four men in the water. A ship-borne helicopter was despatched to rescue them and did so. This incident illustrated to me the terrible conditions facing the Navy in the deep Southern Ocean (you will not last long if you are actually in the water), and gives you the sudden feeling ‘was it the right decision to send forces into that environment? The fish poachers soon realised there was a naval force that would chase them from one side of the ocean to the other until they were caught. Before that, they basically were free to do as they pleased. After that, the whole game changed and that area is largely free of what I refer to as ‘the pirates’ now and it would not be so without the efforts of the Navy.

I know the officers and men were not all that keen to go down there but I do remember coming upon one of those ships later in the Persian Gulf and notwithstanding their initial reluctance, they were so proud when they showed me the photos of the apprehension of the vessel after such a challenging mission. They were really chuffed with what they had achieved and so they should be.

Thinking about fishery patrols in Australia’s northern waters, I must say we never envisaged that the Armidale class would have to work as hard as they have and I commend those who have had to serve on them in circumstances beyond that which we anticipated.

I also had some interesting experiences in the Persian Gulf. As some of you will know that the operational command of that force, the coalition force, rotated and that Australians on occasions took command. I was coincidentally on an Australian warship when an incident occurred. The force was being commanded by an Australian officer on an American ship and it was one of those small Iranian boats that got too close and nobody was quite sure what the game was going to be and it called for a response. To hear over the radio the Australian officer calling in the American warship to intervene was something that I will not forget; I thought to myself ‘I wonder what they would say about that in the US Congress’ but that nevertheless I think it illustrates the confidence that existed within the alliance and within the forces that made up those coalitions.
Responding to the 2004 tsunami was something I will never forget. It occurred immediately after Christmas, and General Peter Cosgrove as the Chief of Defence Force and I talked about the capability we could send to help Indonesia. We wanted to send materials by air and the issue was where the aircraft could land. The thought of Australian military aircraft landing in Aceh was a little beyond comprehension at the time, but I rang the Indonesian Defence Minister and Cosgrove rang the Chief of the Indonesian Defence Force and we both said the most useful place for us to land these resources would be in Aceh and both, without hesitation, said ‘go to it’; in some ways, Australia’s relationship with Indonesia changed from that day.

I can remember farewelling Kanimbla out of Darwin and thinking ‘thank goodness we had that capacity at that time’. I can remember being told on the wharves in Darwin that there was further equipment that they would have liked to take but the ship was not big enough and I thought ‘well, the next ships we get will be bigger’. Even though some people do not argue for bigger ships, I think they give you more flexibility.

So, this was a hugely busy period of time on a great range of different types of operations and I can say that government was so appreciative of the professionalism and the judgment that Navy played in them all.

Endnotes
1 I thank the Navy History Section within the Sea Power Centre - Australia for providing me with an aide memoire to jog my memory.
While the newly elected Abbott government has promised a new defence white paper within 18 months, it has confirmed that its defence policy objectives are basically the same as those in the 2000 Defence White Paper prepared under Prime Minister John Howard:

1. ensuring the defence of Australia and its direct approaches
2. fostering security and stability in our immediate neighbourhood
3. supporting strategic stability in the wider Asia-Pacific region
4. supporting global security.

These are basically no different from the strategic priorities in the 2013 Defence White Paper.

The 2013 Defence White Paper’s description of Australia’s military strategy emphasises the importance of the maritime domain to controlling the sea and air approaches to the continent, and it seeks to optimise the significant advantages to be gained from the strategic depth provided by the geography of our continent. When we compare ourselves with many other nations in our region we should be grateful for the security that comes from our strategic geography.

Although the 2000 Defence White Paper also talked about Australia needing a fundamentally maritime strategy, it failed to provide much detail and was overtaken by events in Iraq and Afghanistan for the next decade. And therein lies a problem: because of our preoccupation with expeditionary forces in distant theatres we have run down some of the most crucial capabilities we now need to support a maritime strategy. These include: anti-submarine warfare, mine hunting and sweeping, electronic warfare, and maritime surveillance and detection. Moreover, our bases and facilities in the north and north-west of the continent cannot sustain high-tempo military operations; a problem that left unaddressed will be compounded by new military assets of the ADF, including those of the two 27,000 tonne Canberra class amphibious ships (LHD). These will present significant operational gain but also be easy for the opposition to conceal.

We need to refocus on the highly demanding nature of military operations in an archipelagic environment. This means re-familiarising the Australian Defence Force (ADF) with what is involved in operating in the seas of Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. For the Navy, operating on and under the sea in the relatively confined waterways to Australia’s north in particular will mean that avoiding detection and acquiring targeting data will be demanding. The technical specifications of sonars and radars will require optimisation for potential military operations in the archipelago, as will the capacity to detect and track targets in a theatre of operations where it will be easier for the opposition to conceal itself.

All this points to the need to reinstitute those capabilities that have been allowed to be run down in a period when the ADF has been preoccupied with operations in Afghanistan and the Middle East. Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, and targeting and network analysis must now be prioritised for our own unique operating environment.

There are three geographical areas that require the attention of the ADF. First, it needs to reacquaint itself with the north and north-west of our own continent and our maritime approaches. The ADF Posture Review, conducted by two former Secretaries for Defence, found that some of our northern bases have inadequate logistics support and infrastructure and lack protection. The Abbott government has said it will consider the need for a greater presence of our military forces in northern Australia, especially in resource-rich areas with little or no current military presence.

If we are to protect our extensive maritime territory and strategically significant offshore territories and economic resources, more attention will need to be given to the adequacy of air, naval and land bases, as well as access to commercial infrastructure. In addition, we now need to pay more attention to the Indian Ocean - and particularly the eastern part of it - which will increasingly feature in Australia’s defence planning and maritime strategy.

The second area of strategic focus is our immediate neighbourhood where we have important interests and responsibilities. The security and stability of our immediate neighbourhood, which we share with Papua New Guinea, Timor-Leste and the small island states of the South Pacific, are interests where Australia has a central strategic role. It is a part of the world where we must be able to intervene, if requested.

The drawing down of our troop presence in Timor-Leste and Solomon Islands after more than 10 years does not spell an end to the requirements in the South Pacific for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, capacity building and governance, potential peacekeeping operations, and military intervention. It is not too difficult to contemplate some demanding contingencies for the ADF in this part of the world.

There is an important role here for Australia’s new amphibious capabilities based on the two 27,000 tonne Canberra class amphibious ships (LHD). These will present a serious challenge to both the Army and Navy. They will be the largest ships ever operated by the ADF and will represent what the white paper terms ‘a step change’ in the way Australia deploys its land forces and their supporting systems in amphibious operations. The initial focus will be on security, stabilisation, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief tasks. Of course, the LHD will be able to operate much further afield, but if they are to undertake high-intensity operations it will take a great deal of the key military assets of the ADF, including those of the RAAF, to protect them. The demands of such operations would risk the ADF becoming a one-shot defence force - something we must avoid, especially if the potential operational gain is not worth the strategic risk.
The third area of strategic focus is Southeast Asia, which includes its seas and straits including the South China Sea. I consider the security of Southeast Asia to be an enduring Australian strategic interest because of its proximity to our northern approaches and crucial shipping lanes. Southeast Asia is the fulcrum point between the Indian and Pacific oceans in what some observers are inclined to see as a single strategic entity called the Indo-Pacific. I disagree with that all-embracing geopolitical definition in terms of what is a feasible defence focus for Australia. It is the eastern Indian Ocean and the seas of Southeast Asia that should be our priority concern for force structure planning.

The priority we give to Southeast Asia should include being able to help Southeast Asian partners to meet external challenges, particularly given the uncertainty surrounding the strategic transformation of our wider region. This means Australia should be prepared to make substantial military contributions if necessary. In this context, we need to give much more thought to the sort of ADF joint force that might be appropriate for credible Southeast Asian contingencies, as well as to how the ADF might operate in closer partnership with Southeast Asian countries as they become more capable over time.

We will also have a modest capability to contribute to high-intensity conventional conflict in Northeast Asia. That is not, however, a part of the world where we can make a real military difference. Even so, meeting our alliance commitments to the United States might involve niche contributions by some of the high-technology assets that we acquire for our own force structure purposes and that would also be relevant to Northeast Asian contingencies. A useful contribution in the event of high-intensity conventional war in Northeast Asia would be for us to be able to contribute to what the Americans call a ‘distant blockade’, which for us would be a closer military operation to our north.

The 2013 Defence White Paper observes that our national prosperity is underpinned by our ability to trade through Indo-Pacific maritime routes and that the ADF needs to be prepared to play a role in keeping these sea lanes secure. That should not be interpreted, in my view, to mean that Navy will be required to defend sea lanes all the way to the north Pacific or the western Indian Ocean. Rather, we should concentrate our efforts on operations and focal areas closer to home, including the protection of trade vital to our economy.

All of this means that we need to focus on what is affordable and credible militarily with a defence force the size of ours. In the event of high-intensity conventional combat operations in our region we would always need to hold sufficient forces to defend ourselves. Our military resources are limited and the first call upon them must be in respect of our own national security tasks. It should be a fundamental tenet of Australian strategic policy that the scale of our contributions will be determined by our national interests and the limits of our capacity. And I now want to turn to the latter.

**Affordability and the Limits to Australia’s Defence Capacity**

The outlook for the world economy is in many ways the biggest strategic uncertainty facing us. Until recently, Australia has not been affected significantly by the economic damage done to the United States and much of Europe where many nations are facing at least a decade of poor economic growth. And although the world’s economic weight is shifting from West to East, China too faces challenging internal economic and social problems. China is not yet a superpower in the real sense of that word, but its build-up of naval capabilities is raising concerns in the region.

America will continue to be the world’s strongest military power and the most influential power in our region for the foreseeable future. However, it is unlikely to conduct large-scale and prolonged stability operations, such as we have seen in the last two decades in Iraq and Afghanistan. Most Western nations are now likely to be much more selective about participating in large-scale ground conflicts in the Middle East. We should not rule out making modest military contributions in future, but Australia is unlikely to be involved in major military operations in the Middle East.

For Australia, our economic outlook has changed: the resources boom is slowing, government revenues have taken a big structural hit, economic growth is well below trend, and the Abbott government budget faces long-run deficits. Something serious has to be done about cutting government expenditure. And yet we continue to load the budget with future debt.

This means that Defence should not expect a return to the good times any time soon. There is, in my view, a good case to spend more on defence as soon as practicable. However, there is nothing magic about a particular percentage of gross domestic product (GDP). What matters is the relationship between our strategic outlook, realistic assessments of risk, and prudent hedging against the need to use military force. The fact is that our region has been at peace now for almost 40 years and, in my view, there is a low likelihood of war between the major powers. The reasons for this are twofold: the fear of the use of nuclear weapons will remain a huge deterrent and the world is now so interconnected economically that there would be no winners in a major war.

Even so, miscalculation and misjudgement short of major war are a risk, as they have been throughout history. And in our part of the world there are plenty of territorial and ideological tensions and jockeying for influence by the rising powers. It is, therefore, prudent for Australia to develop a capable, high-technology force with which to defend itself and its vital interests.

However, the cost of projecting and sustaining military power is increasing and the range of our interest is expanding just as defence budgets are effectively declining. The ADF will have to deal simultaneously with increased sustainment costs for ageing equipment and a highly ambitious new acquisition program. This means we
need to set priorities among competing military requirements much more rigorously that we have in the past. We cannot aspire to do everything.

In my view, we are in for a significant period of fiscal constraint until the government turns around the budget deficit. Under these circumstances, it will not be easy for any government to find large increases for defence spending. I note the new government’s commitment to return the defence budget to 2 per cent of GDP within a decade. According to Mark Thomson this will involve 5.3 per cent annual growth sustained over the next 10 years.11 No Australian government has been able to sustain those sorts of growth rates in defence funding for more than a few years, other than in wartime.

Instead, we will need to take a harsh look at the entire structure and functions of the Department of Defence and how it spends money. Too often, defence decisions have been dominated by the domestic politics of defence policy, parochial bureaucratic interests - both military and civilian - and sheer inertia in the cumbersome machinery we have created in Russell Offices. The government has foreshadowed a first principles review of Defence’s structure and major processes with a focus on minimising bureaucracy and maximising front-line resources.12 It also says it will reform the Defence Materiel Organisation to make its procurements more cost-effective. That is something that clearly needs attention.

So, what to do? First, escalating manpower costs are threatening to undermine the delivery of sharp-end, warfighting capabilities. Traditionally, our Defence budget has been allocated one-third each to personnel costs, operations and investment. Today, however, the personnel share of the Defence budget has risen to 42 per cent and the investment share has fallen dramatically to 22 per cent. Given the capital acquisition program ahead of us, the investment share must be restored to 33 per cent - and even that might not be enough for the modernisation program currently envisaged. That means finding an additional $2.9 billion a year, which should be one of the first priorities of the new Abbott government for the Defence portfolio. If these additional funds cannot be found from the federal budget then there should be a review of ways in which defence personnel costs and the costs of operating the huge defence enterprise can be reduced.

The fact is that there has been a tremendous blow-out in defence personnel numbers and ranks. According to ASPI, the civilian workforce has grown by 30 per cent and the military workforce by 16 per cent over the past 13 years. Over the same period, the number of civilian senior executives has increased by 63 per cent and military star rank officers by 58 per cent.13 And the numbers of civilian and military officers of Colonel and Lieutenant-Colonel rank or equivalent have grown by 104 per cent in the public service and 44 per cent in the ADF. Moreover, the percentage of officers in the ADF has grown from 17 per cent in 1989 to 24 per cent in 2010: this means that there are now around only three other ranks for every officer compared with five in 1989.14

What to do about all this? Consideration should be given by the new government to radically cutting the Defence civilian bureaucracy of 21,000 people. Even if that number were cut in half, however, it would only result in savings of about $1.1 billion a year and still leave a shortfall of $1.8 billion in the historic share of capital investment. This would imply that cuts to the ADF, whose per capita costs are 30 per cent more than those of civilians, might also need to be considered. Public service costs account for less than 20 per cent of the overall Defence personnel budget. So, if a shift is to be made to allow for force modernisation, then ADF personnel costs and efficiencies might also need to make a contribution.

If governments are not willing to contemplate either cutting defence personnel or providing additional funds for the Defence budget, it will be necessary to zero-base the Defence Capability Plan and see what is practically affordable. For example, it may be that we have to contemplate acquiring less than 100 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters for $16 billion and fewer than 12 submarines for up to $30 billion, and invite Army to reconsider its $19 billion bid for Project Land 400 to defeat a peer competitor on the battlefield (whatever that means). These three projects alone account for more than one-quarter of the $275 billion defence acquisition plan out to 2030.

My view is that the huge cost of these programs needs to be reconsidered against our economic circumstances. And some of them simply do not have any plausible strategic justification. These are projects that have gone well beyond the scale and risks in any previous big defence projects, and will crowd out what is required to acquire other important elements of a technologically complex force through their sheer demands on future budgets. So, as the government considers big capability proposals like these, it will be important for it to understand the scale of investment involved and what other defence capabilities might need to be forgone.

Keeping the Peace and the Role of Naval Diplomacy

Australia has been free from the threat of military attack for almost 70 years now. The use of military force is not a course adopted lightly by one country against another.15 Our strategic assessments identify many uncertainties, but the prospects for keeping the peace are, in my view, relatively favourable. Of course, any prudent defence force has to hedge against an unpredictable future. That is why Australia must focus on developing a high-technology, capable ADF that has a clear margin of technological advantage in our region.

The drawdown of the ADF from major operations overseas presents an opportunity to rebalance Australia’s force posture to refocus efforts in support of regional security.16 This operational drawdown should be used to increase the capacity of the ADF for regional engagement and so help shape a cooperative security environment.17
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As a not insubstantial local power, Australia is able to influence regional developments that support the present basically peaceful strategic environment to our advantage. We should not allow pessimism to become a self-fulfilling wish. However, we need to be alert to lesser situations developing in a manner adverse to the interests of a medium power like Australia. Therefore, we maintain credible high-end military capabilities to act decisively when required, deter potential adversaries and strengthen our regional influence. 8

Defence makes a substantial contribution to Australia’s regional engagement in support of a favourable security environment. Our force posture and preparedness decisions play an important role in positioning the ADF to enhance engagement and contribute to security and stability in the Indo-Pacific, with priority given to Southeast Asia as befits Australia’s strategic environment. 9 We have patiently built over many decades an enduring network of defence contacts and relationships throughout Southeast Asia. Our defence cooperation programs, military exercises, consultations and defence force visits are a crucial part of our defence diplomacy. Service-to-Service relationships are already strong with a number of regional countries and provide a firm basis to deepen particular security partnerships.

Our membership of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting-Plus, the East Asia Summit and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation organisation underlines our commitment to confidence building and strengthening rules-based institutions. While it is true that the Asian region lacks the sort of arms control agreements that existed in Europe in the Cold War, the fact is that we do not face the same dangerous ideological confrontation of that era. In view of the great diversity of the region, and the different security concerns of the countries in it, we simply cannot copy the experience of other regions in building confidence, trust and transparency.

On behalf of our Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, I have represented Australia since 2006 at all seven meetings of the ARF Expert and Eminent Persons group, which is tasked by ARF Ministers to advance practical preventive diplomacy measures with the 27 countries of the ARF. It is playing a significant role in building up mutual understanding and mutual trust in our region. This is the way to manage differences and avoid tension.

In this context, I consider that naval diplomacy is one of the key non-threatening areas of military cooperation that we need to develop further. Naval diplomacy does not have the same territorial sensitivities as boots on the ground or aircraft over flights. It can embrace the entire gamut of our international interests ranging from fostering goodwill, demonstrating our way of life, supporting our trade interests, showcasing our military capabilities, and supporting our regional military engagement.

Maritime security is of crucial interest to us all due to the importance of shipping and seaborne trade throughout the entire Indo-Pacific region. Maritime security related issues represent some of the most pressing and potentially useful areas for cooperation in the region. They range from conventional maritime security issues including state sovereignty concerns, to non-traditional maritime security issues such as piracy, terrorism, natural disasters, drug smuggling, and search and rescue.

However, as the ASEAN Regional Forum 2011 Work Plan on Maritime Security observes ‘cooperation in some areas still falls short of that which is necessary’. 20 I note in this regard that of late there has been a significant increase in the potential for military confrontation over disputed maritime territories in Northeast Asia and the South China Sea. It is important that antagonistic naval confrontations do not occur and slide into the use of military force, either by accident or design. The declaration from the August 2013 ADMM-Plus Ministerial meeting pointedly observes the need to ‘establish practical measures that reduce vulnerability to miscalculations, and avoid misunderstanding and undesirable incidents at sea’. 21

I have been pressing for some time now, in the ARF group with which I am involved, for a multilateral avoidance of naval incidents at sea agreement. What we are talking about here is agreeing to operate in accordance with international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, the commonly accepted rules of the nautical road, agreed communications procedures when ships encounter each other, and adopting procedures which reduce the risk of miscalculation and undesirable incidents at sea.

The aim would be to avoid unintended collisions or conflict through the exercise of self-restraint, which would be guided by an agreed multilateral regional maritime security regime. 22 If we cannot move towards such an understanding in the near future, then I fear a crisis or conflict on the high seas may well be inevitable.

Endnotes

7 The Coalition’s Policy for Stronger Defence, p. 6.
8 Department of Defence, Defence White Paper 2013, p. 10.
9 Department of Defence, Defence White Paper 2013, pp. 25.
In recent years, land-based conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as ongoing concerns about ‘sea blindness’ have obscured the importance of maritime strategy to those outside maritime circles. Where maritime issues are understood to be important, it is often in the context of Australia’s extensive reliance on maritime trade and the importance of securing sea lanes and consequently economic prosperity.

However, I argue that thinking about maritime issues is of essential importance for Australia for different reasons. Australia is, like most Western states, not seriously threatened by direct military attack. Therefore, much of maritime strategy is directed towards lower-order threats that stop short of war. I argue that many of these threats are criminal problems with security implications, and are connected together through the illegal use of the maritime space. These hybrid criminal-security threats create a situation of pervasive low-level insecurity rather than a high-level existential challenge. Accordingly, responding to many of these threats, from counter-piracy to preventing refugee arrivals by boat, have at least a policing component even when they are not entirely constabulary in nature. This paper has two goals: explaining the nature of these criminal-security threats and their maritime connections, and considering how ‘strategy’ does and does not apply to them.

I explore four hybrid criminal-security threats that take place in the maritime sphere: piracy; people smuggling (both illegal migration and human trafficking); illegal, unreported and unauthorised (IUU) fishing; and narcotics smuggling. I highlight how these are criminal threats with security implications, and consider how they are interconnected, using the case of narcotics smuggling to draw together the other three threats. I focus on narcotics smuggling because this is the longest interaction between maritime forces and a hybrid criminal security threat, and so can reveal how other types of control may evolve. I then turn to a discussion of whether or not ‘strategy’ in its traditional sense can be applied to these maritime threats.

Hybrid Criminal-Security Threats and the Maritime Space

While the necessity of maintaining open trade routes for Australia is a clear feature and priority area for Australia’s foreign policy, and so an obvious goal for maritime strategy, its importance may overshadow the range of maritime goals Australia wishes to pursue. In fact, the three most active current operations undertaken by the RAN (RESOLUTE, SLIPPER and ANODE) are all focused on the type of hybrid criminal security threat that this paper intends to explore.

The mission of RESOLUTE is particularly relevant here, as it seeks to protect Australia itself
from maritime terrorism; piracy, robbery and violence at sea; prohibited imports and exports; and illegal fishing. ANODE is also closely involved in protection from non-traditional threats as it has a focus on counter-piracy and counter-terrorism. Operation SOVEREIGN BORDERS is a military-led border protection operation seeking to prevent irregular migration into Australia. If two of the three most active RAN operations, as well as SOVEREIGN BORDERS, are involved in countering hybrid criminal-security threats, then it is essential that these threats are understood. This section will examine four hybrid threats that have several features in common. All four threats are activity which is in part or in whole illegal; if they were activities that occurred within Australia the primary mechanism to deal with them would be the police and justice system; and they could not function without using maritime space.

**Piracy and counter-piracy**

Countering piracy is an explicit aim of two Australian naval operations: RESOLUTE and ANODE. In practice the latter has been more active, conducting specific counter-piracy activities as part of CTF 151 in the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden. Currently, the focus on piracy on Somalia, but in the past piracy has been a problem in the Malacca Strait, and also is becoming an increasing problem in the Gulf of Guinea.

Piracy is a classic hybrid crime-security problem, and is essentially, robbery that occurs at sea. However, its ability to disrupt trade routes means that it is has broader international security implications. Historically, navies have been the chosen tool to deal with piracy, as it was in stamping out the pirates of the Barbary Coast in the 19th century, or more recently, in the trilateral efforts of Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia to deal with pirates in the Malacca Strait. If piracy has been a criminal problem, why are navies the chosen tool to counter it?

Part of the answer is that states have sought to protect their interests (ships, goods or trade) and in many cases these interests are located far from home and at sea, making the navy both the obvious, and in most cases the only, instrument states can use. A further explanation stems from the fact that piracy has historically been understood as a collective problem requiring considerable action. In international law, pirates are referred to as *hostis humani generis*, or enemies of all mankind, and states have a customary law obligation to counter pirate activity. Because the international legal definition of piracy (as opposed to sea robbery) requires the act to occur on the high seas, navies are really the only logical way to counter the problem.

Finally, in the modern context, piracy has tended to emanate from weak states with fairly limited policing capacity. Accordingly, the international community has had to step in to provide this capacity, either broadly as in the case of Somalia, or regionally, as in the case of the Malacca Strait.

**Illegal, unreported and unauthorised fishing**

One of the tasks of RESOLUTE is to control IUU fishing, which is, at least at first glance, one of the most obviously criminal threats that this paper discusses. After all, IUU fishing is about the stealing of fish stocks, many endangered. IUU fishing, perhaps surprisingly, is a form of highly organised criminal activity, particularly in high value fish such as Patagonian toothfish, shark fin, seahorse, and abalone.

How does IUU fishing then pose a security threat? One answer is because illegal fishing is associated with all the other threats identified in this paper. In a way, it is the engine that allows international criminal activity to flourish. De Coning points out that fishing vessels have been used for narcotics and people smuggling, and both adults and children are trafficked onto fishing vessels and forced to work as slave labour; they have also been implicated in weapons smuggling and acts of terrorism. The profits associated with illegal fishing have attracted organised crime activity, and, for example, illegal abalone fishing has been linked with drug gangs in South Africa and motor cycle gangs in Australia.

**Human trafficking and people smuggling**

Organised crime groups, as discussed in more depth below, have also diversified their existing operations into human smuggling, whether or not to traffic in people against their will or to transport migrants. IUU fishing vessels often provide the mode of transport, and the same routes that are used to smuggle illicit goods are used to smuggle people.

The distance over which people are smuggled, and the number of illegal activities often required to facilitate their transit (false papers, bribes paid to customs and border officials) highlight the degree of criminal organisation required to mount a large-scale trafficking operation. While Taibly notes that smaller, more independent attempts to reach states like Australia illegally do occur, she also points out that the distances and difficulty involved in smuggling people into Australia indicates the presence of a sophisticated criminal group. While there is debate about the degree of organisation involved in people smuggling and human trafficking (in other words whether or not it is mafia-style organised crime) there is little doubt that numerous crimes are committed in order either to move people against their will or to move people illegally into other countries.

Moving people illegally, whether or not that movement is voluntary, relies on using transport networks and remaining undetected. Maritime transport, subject to fewer checks than transport by road or rail, is ideal for such purposes. It is also ideal to move narcotics and accordingly there is considerable overlap between drug and people smugglers.
Illegally moving people, either against their will or at their behest, can form a security threat in several ways. First, the individuals smuggled can be a direct security threat; had they moved through regular channels they may not have received permission to come to Australia. Second, the personal security of people trafficked against their will is obviously challenged.

Narcotics trafficking

While the international community has not had extensive recent experience attempting to control pirates, international cooperation to control narcotics trafficking began in the 1950s, beginning with American initiatives that were gradually extended to international operations. The trade in narcotics merely utilises the maritime for business, rather than occurring directly at sea, as is the case with piracy and IUU fishing. As states have been continuously dealing with narcotics trafficking at sea for at least 50 years, it is a far more mature threat than some of the others examined here, and consequently is an important case study for what happens when states attempt to deal with a criminal threat over a long period. Efforts to control the trade in drugs have resulted in four key features essential to considering the formation of a maritime strategy to counter this as well as other similar threats. These features provide an important concluding counterpoint to the analysis of the other threats.

First, the narcotics business has gotten increasingly sophisticated in direct response to efforts to control it. Traffickers have adapted to policing in the Caribbean region by adopting increasingly elaborate mechanisms to evade detection. On land this includes building tunnels for smuggling, some with rail transport. At sea, traffickers have used submarines, which again have become more and more sophisticated to avoid detection. Drugs are also moved in ‘go-fast’ boats, which move at speeds so high they are difficult to spot on radar. Consequently, states have had to adopt the use of faster boats and better detection techniques, which will likely in turn result in drug traffickers adapting again. The tendency of enforcement mechanisms to spur criminals onto more inventive modes of committing crimes is a feature across many areas of criminal behaviour, including the other threats examined in this paper.

Second, the narcotics trade, particularly in Mexico and the Latin American states most associated with the export of drugs, has become increasingly violent. In Mexico, the government estimated in 2012 that approximately 47,500 people had been killed in violence associated with drug crime; this estimate has been attacked for being imprecise. The situation in Colombia is more complicated because of the relationship of drug trafficking with the insurgent group Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and a broader civil war; however, the Colombian president estimated that these drug-associated wars had killed 250,000 people over 50 years.

The problem with criminalising an activity and deploying extensive resources (including military resources) to stop it is that violence can increase. Even in cases where the activity, such as piracy, has long been deemed to be illegal, enforcing the law may require the use of violence. It has been suggested that the prohibition of drugs, and the control efforts that accompany that prohibition, increase violence. While some of the threats examined here do not yet have the broad social penetration of illegal drug use, and so the control efforts may not be as sweeping, it is worth considering whether or not a long term effort to control them will result in a similar increase in violence. This is particularly important because while some of these activities are damaging, they may not all be violent. Andreas notes that the smuggling of people is notably non-violent, compared with drug smuggling, and especially considering how many people are smuggled annually. He points out the people smugglers prefer to evade detection rather than confront authorities. Another facet of this problem is determining how to maintain these low levels of violence.

Third, international cooperation on drugs trafficking is, unsurprisingly, more mature and sophisticated than it is in other areas. In high trafficking areas, like the Caribbean, there are permanent commands that deal with narcotics. Joint Interagency Task Force South, based in Key West, is part of the US Southern Command, led by the US Coast Guard, which coordinates between 9 different US agencies as well as liaison officers from 12 states. Therefore, it is a hybrid military-policing operation with a significant international element. It is worth considering whether or not cooperation dealing with the other hybrid threats mentioned here will take on a similar form, and if it is desirable that they should do so. For example, the structures devised to deal with counter-piracy are noticeably different. While there are multinational missions using conventional command structures, such as CTF 151 or the NATO and EUNAVFOR led operations, there are also other navies involved in counter-piracy. Shared Awareness and Deconfliction meetings, which are deliberately informal and does not create a permanent command has been the preferred mechanism, largely because states would not agree on anything more elaborate.

Fourth, the proceeds from drugs crime have been used to fund insurgency and terrorism. The relationship between poppy farming and the insurgency in Afghanistan and FARC and cocaine smuggling are often cited examples. Likewise, terrorist groups such as various IRA splinter factions have used the drug trade to finance their activities as well as in other contexts around the world. In fact, observers have noted that terrorist groups and criminal organisations are extremely similar in their organisation and methods.

Fifth, even the most elaborate and militarised mechanisms do not stop organised crime. While it is highly unlikely that the states involved in controlling the narcotics trade in the Caribbean and in South America will stop, it is important for analysts of other criminal threats that are being countered by the military to consider, particularly in the early stages, whether or not they may be unintentionally creating
superior criminals in response to control efforts, and whether or not they escalate the violence being used. Piracy, for example, has appeared to get more violent when more violent control mechanisms are used.\textsuperscript{29}

**Consequences of hybrid criminal-security threats**

One of the consequences of hybrid criminal-security threats is that while they may be relatively minor when taken singly, all these threats have the capacity to facilitate more serious threats. For example, in the early days of Somali piracy, despite sensationalist stories about a maritime Islamist terrorism, al-Shabaab and the pirates were obdurately opposed to each other. However, an unintended consequence of control efforts has been that the pirates and the terrorists are now working closer together.\textsuperscript{30} Illicit behaviour of one kind can fuel or promote more dangerous illicit behaviour of another kind.

The first link is simply the maritime space itself. All commerce, whether legal or illegal, requires movement, and as Murphy notes, the sea one of the easiest ways to move anything.\textsuperscript{31} The vast nature of the high seas, as well as the inability of many states to police their territorial waters effectively, means that not only are the world’s oceans an easy place to conduct illicit trade, they are a largely unsupervised place. It is both essential and desirable to use sea transport for illegal commerce.

Each of the threats I have outlined also share explicit links. Drug smuggling has been linked with human trafficking, in at least two ways: trafficked individuals are forced to smuggle drugs and drug gangs have diversified into human trafficking because the same basic *modus operandi* is used in both.\textsuperscript{32} Illegal fishing vessels are used to smuggle drugs and people, and are often manned by trafficked individuals.\textsuperscript{33} It has been postulated that when pirates seize vessels and sell them as ‘phantom’ ships, these ships are useful for drug and other types of smuggling.\textsuperscript{34}

As argued above, the maritime space fuels criminal activity, and all of the four threats I have examined could or already do fuel terrorist or insurgent activity. In fact, while it is often assumed that weak states facilitate criminal activity, the preferred situation for criminals is a state with relatively strong but corruptible structures.\textsuperscript{35} It may be that these maritime criminal operations have less of a need to work in symbiosis with authorities because the ‘sphere’ in which they operate is so vast that it is hard to police and does not create many direct confrontations with authorities. The closer these activities get to land, the closer they come to policing, and therefore the more likely symbiotic activities will occur.

All the hybrid threats rely on corruption in order to function. Whether or not it is the paying of bribes to encourage authorities to turn a blind eye to pirate activity in Puntland, or the payment of border officials to facilitate the transit of an illegal shipment (whether drugs or people), corruption is essential for criminal activity. In fact, while it is often assumed that weak states facilitate criminal activity, the preferred situation for criminals is a state with relatively strong but corruptible structures.\textsuperscript{40} Even here, however, the policy lesson is not straightforward as saying that diminishing corruption is important for reducing crime. Corruption may be such an essential component of criminal behaviour that limiting it can fuel violence, as criminals who wish to keep conducting business must begin to fight through areas that they had previously used bribes to navigate. Andreas points out that this sort of equation may have been responsible for the marked increase in violence in the Mexican drug trade in 2006.\textsuperscript{41}

It follows that discovering effective control methods in one of these areas could be extended to the others. Unfortunately, seeing these four threats as interrelated also reveals the difficulty of solving them. Criminal threats, particularly organised criminal threats, are resistant to change as criminals will alter their business models to avoid policing. In Somalia, pirates extended their sphere of operations significantly further into the Indian Ocean in order to avoid the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor, the modified convoy system adopted to help shipping transit the region safely. Somali pirates, in light of enforcement initiatives, are now expanding their business beyond hijack and ransom and towards smuggling and other illegal activity.\textsuperscript{38}

Organised crime at sea may differ from organised crime on land. The criminologist Peter Hill became intrigued by the Japanese *yakuza*, who could apparently operate an enormous criminal business in one of the world’s most crime-free societies. He argues that the *yakuza*, like other organised criminals, learn to live in symbiosis with authorities. In practice this means that governments accept they do not have a monopoly on power and come to terms with sharing it with criminal groups; in exchange, the criminal groups follow a basic set of rules that prevent confrontation with law enforcement. In other words, they carve out spheres of influence and generally abide by them.\textsuperscript{39}
Implications for Strategy

None of the threats I outline pose an existential threat to any state. Moreover, with the possible exception of piracy, none of the threats even form a conventional security threat that we would ordinarily see countered by the military. It is not obvious to see how people smuggling to facilitate irregular migration or narcotics smuggling are inherent security threats, even though they may be criminal threats. However, it is obvious that both narcotics smuggling and irregular migration by boat have been ‘securitised’, or turned into a security issue by governments and other authoritative actors. Securitising an issue has the benefit of allowing policymakers to extend emergency measures, which include distorting aspects of regular practice (such as altering the status of Australian territory to prevent migrants from claiming asylum) and using the military to deal with these threats. Even piracy, which is more obviously a security threat, has been securitised, in that it is not obvious that the best solution to Somali piracy is an extremely expensive multinational naval mission.

I argue that these issues, because of their hybrid character but also crucially because of their use of maritime space, are easily securitised. Securitisation is easy for any criminal threat, because of the simplicity with which we equate criminal behaviour with danger.

Threats in the maritime space are also easily securitised because the military is the only actor that can operate on the high seas, and for many states, in territorial waters. In other words, the only tool most states have to deal with some of these threats is military, or, in the case of movement onto shore, border protection (which in many states is notably militarised). Whether or not militaries should play a policing role is another question. Andreas notes that the military are not the most appropriate actors to take on a policing role. However, Murphy makes an important point that provides a caveat worth watching: the criminal actors behind many of these threats do not distinguish between the high seas, territorial waters, and any other maritime distinction commonly understood by navies. Rather, they treat the whole space as one. While it may be unwise to have navies conduct policing, it may be equally unwise to separate these functions in a smaller navy experiencing budgetary pressures. One solution might be to reposition the navy so that it can do both.

Australia, and many other nations, face neither existential threats nor the prospect of direct attack responded to by the navy. As Murphy puts it, the situation facing navies today has more in common with the nineteenth than the twentieth century. It is made up of overlapping small wars, each of indeterminate duration against enemies that are illusive…and that find shelter in weak states and operate in the anonymous alleyways of third-world cities and the urban sprawl of Western slums.

The main threats outlined in this paper straddle the lines between crime and security threat, between land and sea, and between each other. It is a situation of pervasive low-level insecurity rather than existential threat. So what does a maritime strategy in this situation look like, and accordingly, what should a navy look like?

If strategy is about the sensible application of military means to political ends, how can it be applied here? There are political goals associated with each of these threats: reducing piracy, reducing irregular migration, and reducing the flow of illegal drugs are all clear objectives. However, one question is whether or not military means are the best means of achieving these goals; a more stark query is whether or not these goals are achievable at all. Navies can contribute to the reduction of these threats by patrolling the seas and controlling the criminals. But criminals will evolve in response to control measures. And in our most mature example, that of narcotics, the idea of a military or paramilitary response to a criminal threat does not bode well for the success of similar responses to other criminal problems. More than 30 years of a ‘war on drugs’ has not resulted in a noticeable reduction in illegal drug importation, and has been associated with extensive, and in many cases, increasing violence. Ongoing operations in response to piracy and illegal migration are extremely costly. They may work as long as they continue, but this means that individual states and the international community must continue to finance them. If the operations go away, then the problems will likely return. Navies must guard against unintentionally creating better adversaries. Thinking of navies as ‘cops on the beat’ is a different way of thinking about navies. It might require different technological capabilities and different training. It might require new types of cooperation with law enforcement.

Murphy points out that this view of navies is not novel and existed before the twentieth century. The goals of the RAN, as pursued in Operations RESOLUTE, SLIPPER and ANODE, are in many ways goals associated with the ‘defence of trade’. Murphy points out that when we talk about countering threats to the freedom of the seas, we are talking about defence of trade, but calling it maritime security. Murphy, he suggests, is returning to a world that predates fleet warfare and battleship groups. But providing maritime security in this way can have the unintended consequences discussed above, such as creating criminal evolution. It can be costly, violent, and permanent rather than a mission with a defined end. In a world where military resources are dwindling and further defence budget cuts looming, open-ended expensive missions may be a difficult political sell. But if these really are the threats that face Australia, then the navy must sell them.

If the role of navies is returning to a pre-20th century world, then what of the role of strategy? I will now make the mandatory reference in a paper on strategy: does Clausewitz’s argument that war is the continuation of politics by other means still apply to modern naval activities? It does, in the sense argued above, because there are political goals at work. But it also does not, because in this case, unlike
in Clausewitz’ world, the adversaries are not political. Clausewitz saw war as the clash between political objectives pursued by militaries. The world of maritime security today is a world where political objectives clash with the objectives of illegal commerce, and these are apolitical. Clausewitz says that ‘the plan for war results directly from the political conditions of the two belligerent states, as well as from their relations to other powers.’ The adversary is no longer another state; the actors are not belligerents, because there is no war; and while one side is political, the other side is not.

I would like to conclude by offering three main points about maritime strategy in a world of pervasive low-level insecurity. First, as with any strategy, the achievability of the political goals discussed above, must be seriously analysed. Second, criminal adversaries may well differ from political adversaries. Political adversaries are subject to negotiation. Concessions can be made to them. Criminal adversaries, who after all have no political goals that can be achieved or altered, are not. States must decide how best to deal with criminal threats and whether or not existing with them symbiotically is possible or desirable. Finally, a strategy dealing with one of these hybrid threats must take the others into consideration, both in terms of what has worked in one arena, but also because serious reduction in one of these areas may also require serious reduction in the others.

Endnotes

3 ANODE provides support to Solomon Islands for policing its own waters; SLIPPER provides support for the Combined Maritime Forces and for Middle East operations. See Royal Australian Navy, ‘ANODE’, www.navy.gov.au/operations-and-exercises/anode and ‘SLIPPER’, www.navy.gov.au/operations-and-exercises/slipper respectively. SLIPPER is a peace support operation that expands the idea of how navies provide ‘security’ in different and interesting directions but will not be examined in depth here.
10 Anderson & McCusker, ‘Crime in the Australian Fishing Industry: Key Issues’, p. 16.
11 Rebecca Tauby, Organised Crime and People Smuggling/Trafficking to Australia, Australian Institute of Criminology, Canberra, 2001, p. 4.
13 Schloenhardt, Migrant Smuggling: Illegal Migration and Organised Crime in Australia and the Asia Pacific Region, p. 118.
18 The US Coast Guard is developing a faster boat to deal with this problem, US Coast Guard, ‘Cutter Boats’, www.uscg.mil/acquisition/boats/default.asp.
42 On securitisation, see Ole Wæver, Securitization and Desecuritization, Working Paper, Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, 1993.