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UNDERSTANDING MARITIME DOCTRINE



- Maritime doctrine contains the principles by which naval forces guide their actions in support of national objectives.
- Maritime doctrine is derived from hard won national and international experience gathered over many years.
- Comprehensive maritime doctrine is a key element of the Royal Australian Navy's capability.

THE PURPOSE OF MARITIME DOCTRINE

Military *doctrine* contains the fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of national *objectives*. It helps planners and commanders approach dangerous, chaotic and unfamiliar situations with clarity of thought. It is based on rigorous analysis and a comprehensive understanding of the history of human *conflict* and national military experience. In effect, military doctrine provides a basis for action founded upon knowledge.

Maritime doctrine is that component of military doctrine which sustains the employment of armed forces at and from the sea. This definition recognises the inherently *joint* nature of *maritime operations* and the fact that these *operations* are of use only so far as they can affect the course of a *campaign*, whether directly or indirectly. This book, *Australian Maritime Doctrine: RAN Doctrine 1*, explains the key concepts for the conduct of successful maritime operations. At a fundamental level it explains why Australia has a navy.

THE ORIGINS OF AUSTRALIAN MARITIME DOCTRINE

One of the principal themes of the Royal Australian Navy's (RAN) doctrinal experience is that for most of its history its practices have been largely international. As the Navy of a medium power, and one which had its roots in the Royal Navy (RN) and has since frequently operated as part of alliance forces, the RAN has had no need to develop its doctrine wholly from first principles. Rather more than air forces and considerably more than armies, almost all modern navies operate from a very large base of shared international doctrine, allowing a level of mutual understanding that also manifests itself at much higher levels of *command*. For example, all of Australia's allies at sea operate with *Allied Tactical Publication 1* as a standard reference when manoeuvring and communicating with each other. Most friendly navies have access to earlier but still valid versions of the same document, while those that do not are able to use an expurgated version which allows any *warship* to communicate and manoeuvre safely with another. *Replenishment at sea* is also a generally shared skill that is the

result of the extensive development, practice and dissemination of agreed allied procedures since the end of World War II. Today there are more than thirty navies with which Australian warships can safely conduct underway replenishment with little or no notice. Thus, Australian maritime doctrine is a synthesis - and not just in a joint sense - of national effort with that derived from the country's major allies and a wide range of other sources.



Replenishment at sea is a skill shared by many navies, often allowing the RAN to extend its reach and persistence beyond the limitations of our own national force structure.

A second theme of Australia's maritime doctrine is one of complexity. The fundamentals of maritime doctrine contain many different elements; components which include factors not clearly related to conflict. These range widely. One example is that there are *logistics* and maintenance procedures which combine to determine whether warships are capable of extended and wide ranging activities, or whether they must confine themselves to coastal operations. Another is that the RAN ascribes to and has developed for its own use the concepts of ship navigation and pilotage laid down within the RN's *Manual of Navigation*. These give it a capacity for operations in shallow water and within *littoral* regions that some other navies might hesitate to attempt. Thus, an activity related ostensibly to the safe passage of ships has direct implications for the Navy's *combat* potential.

Iraq War, 2003

In the lead up to combat operations against Iraq in March 2003, Australian warships consistently operated in the difficult shallow waters off the Iraqi coast while enforcing a long running economic sanctions campaign on behalf of the United Nations. By maintaining a sustained overt presence close inshore they were better able to intercept smugglers, while at the same time building up a detailed picture of local civil and military activities. This experience proved of immense value when combat operations began, allowing for better understanding of changes in Iraqi activity and movement patterns, and more effective support for coalition forces operating ashore.

THE LEVELS OF MARITIME DOCTRINE

Australian Defence Force (ADF) doctrine is a hierarchy of *capstone doctrine*, philosophical doctrine, application doctrine and procedural doctrine. Although these different levels of doctrine bear some relation to the levels of command – strategic, operational and tactical – the point at which one level is subsumed by another is rarely clear. That maritime warfare does not readily allow for clear distinctions between these levels of command further complicates the issue. Elements of procedural doctrine can have fundamental implications for every other level, just as changes in philosophical doctrine will have ramifications elsewhere.

Application and Procedural Doctrine

Application and procedural doctrine, which relate to the operational and tactical levels and the detailed mechanics of operations at sea, have a long professional history, starting with the RN's *Fighting Instructions* of 1672. The RAN employed the modern British versions of *Fighting Instructions* as a primary doctrinal source for the operational and tactical levels of warfare until well into the 1970s. Other important sources of guidance for operations and tactics were found in a range of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), United States (US) Navy and allied publications to which Australia had access. In the case of operations with the US and New Zealand under ANZUS and with Singapore, Malaysia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom under the Five Power Defence Arrangements, considerable effort has gone into the development of mutually agreed procedures and tactics. Evolution of these procedures continues, constantly validated by regular multinational exercises, and providing the basis for *coordinated multinational* and *combined operations* in the event of contingencies.

When Australia's strategic situation demanded a more self-reliant approach, the need for guidance tailored to Australian circumstances was met by the 1972 classified publication, *Australian Maritime Doctrine and Fighting Instructions*. Pared down to focus on the tactical level, this was renamed *Australian Fleet Tactical Instructions* (AFTI) in the late 1970s. Although AFTI remained under the editorial guidance of the RAN's Fleet Command, it transmuted in 1994 into *Australian Maritime Tactical Instructions*, thereby highlighting the joint nature of maritime operations and the extent to which it received Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) and Australian Army input. The more recent issue of the comprehensive 'Australian Defence Doctrine Publication' (ADDP) series, and in particular ADDP 3.0 *Operations*, has furthered inter-Service linkages at the operational level.

Higher Level Doctrine

Capstone and philosophical doctrine have not enjoyed so long a formal existence as application and procedural doctrine, particularly those discussing maritime and naval affairs. However, they are vitally important in many ways. Higher level doctrine has educational purposes in addition to its direct relevance to the employment of military force. It not only serves to educate and motivate personnel and improve their understanding of the roles and functions of their services, but can also be used to inform those within government and the wider community of the varied ways in which military forces can be used by the nation in exercising its national power.


Although the philosophers of land warfare might be said to date back several thousand years, the first comprehensive analyses of maritime strategic doctrine in the Western world date only to the late 19th century. Works such as *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783* by the American Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914) and *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy* by the British historian Sir Julian Corbett (1854-1922) had particular impact.

Later in the 20th century there were increasingly sophisticated contributions from France in the work of Admiral Raoul Castex (1878-1968) in the 1930s and from the former Soviet Union by Admiral Sergei Gorshkov (1910-88) in the 1970s. These joined continuing efforts by British and American analysts to define maritime strategic concepts and match them to contemporary requirements. The British *Naval War Manual* (the original BR 1806 – the RN's capstone doctrinal publication) which derived from 1921 and 1925 versions, was in successive iterations (1948, 1958 and 1969) the principal source of higher level doctrine for many of the Commonwealth navies, including the RAN, in the period after World War II.



Australian Maritime Doctrine *draws on a wide variety of sources.*

The end of the Cold War in the early 1990s served as the impetus for an explosion of formal doctrine as Western navies searched for new roles and justification in the absence of a great power competitor. This work fundamentally reinforced longstanding maritime concepts and tasks, some of which had received too little emphasis within the context of 20th century wars. The body of higher level maritime strategic work has been extended further by contemporary thinkers and writers such as Professors Ken Booth, Colin Gray, Eric Grove, John Hattendorf and Geoffrey Till. Within Australia, much pioneering work was done by Alan Robertson and Vernon Parker in the 1970s and this has since been carried forward by Sam Bateman, Jack McCaffrie, James Goldrick and others. The 'Further Reading' section provides a chronological selection of some of the more important works in *maritime strategy* and doctrine.



*Maritime doctrine is derived from the hard won
experience of those who have gone before.*

As the RAN's capstone doctrinal publication, *Australian Maritime Doctrine* draws on all these sources and many others. It stands at the summit of Australian naval doctrinal effort and fits alongside such publications as Land Warfare Doctrine (LWD) 1 - *The Fundamentals of Land Warfare* and Australian Air Publication (AAP) 1000-D - *The Air Power Manual*, as well as the major elements of the Australian Defence Doctrine Publication series, in particular ADDP-D - *Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine*. This book is designed to be read not only by those in the Navy and other elements of the ADF who have a direct professional concern, but by all those with an interest in and a concern for the issues of Australian security and maritime affairs.



Ship visits serve as a visible demonstration of Australia's interest in strengthening international security cooperation.