26 May 2026
Stephen Dziedzic: Mark, thank you very much for speaking with us. Let's start with a bit of a long view. As we just heard from Gordon, you've been in the Navy for an awfully long period of time — it sounded more uncharitable than I meant it to. Can you give us a sense of the strategic picture? What did it look like when you started in the 80s, and what does it look like now? We heard a little bit about this earlier today. What are some of the tectonic shifts?
VADM Mark Hammond: Sure, it's a really good question, and it's a real privilege to be here.
I joined in 1986. I was an electronics technician, and my first ship was here in Western Australia, HMAS Stirling. I drove over that causeway in 1987 to join a 2,500‑ton destroyer escort. Back in those days, we had a crew of about 250. Everybody lived on board — some of the officers lived ashore, certainly all the junior sailors were on board unless they were married.
Most of our time was spent going up to Southeast Asia, operating with our allies and partners in the region, conducting a structured series of activities. The Navy hadn't really been in conflict or supported anything meaningfully operational since the Vietnam War, and not many of the senior sailors or our colleagues in the Army and Air Force had a lot of medals.
1987 — things changed in the South West Pacific with Fiji. Then there was Bougainville, and next thing you know, Solomon Islands. And then we were into the Gulf, and from 1991 that became the main effort: maintaining a surface combatant in the Middle East.
I joined my surface warfare colleagues. Who saw the submarines as training aids to train them for anti‑submarine warfare, and we had one or two submarines that were off doing high end missions throughout the region, alongside allies and partners, going through the South China Sea.
Back then, when the Seventh Fleet came over the horizon, there weren’t just three or four surface combatants — there were dozens. They pretty much owned the water space, and navigating through them at night was an interesting experience.
Things have changed markedly since then. When I first went to sea on operations in the South China Sea in a Collins‑class submarine, the area was much less contested, much less congested. Nowadays it is in a constant state of contestation, and it's extremely congested. And you're not looking at Cold War surface combatants and submarines — you're looking at high‑end submarines and surface combatants, many of which are amongst the most capable ever manufactured.
One of my classmates talked about sailing past the Spratly Islands. They were in command of a surface combatant back in the mid‑1990s. They didn't even get out of bed — there was nobody else there. You sailed two miles past the shore; you were just worried about safety of navigation. Now there are legal claims on that water space.
Stephen Dziedzic: Obviously undergirding all of this is what we've heard a lot about already — the extraordinary growth in the PLAN in particular. The most vivid demonstration of this is the two task groups that we saw coming quite close to Australia last year, one of them circumnavigating Australia.
I remember Andrew Shearer saying last year that the PLAN were doing two things: probing to see what our response would be, and trying to shape Australia's behaviour. What's your assessment?
VADM Mark Hammond: I'm not going to speculate about what their intent was — there are commentators better placed to do that.
What I would observe is that the circumnavigation of Australia had an impact. It occurred in the middle of a federal election in this country, and it occurred in the midst of a defence strategic review across the Tasman in New Zealand. I think the timing triggered a level of anxiety here in the populace, and — to quote a colleague from New Zealand — a level of anger across the ditch, which ultimately resulted in the doubling of their defence budget.
Here, the Albanese government was returned and has continued to double down on the Defence Strategic Review and National Defence Strategy to uplift the lethality and capability of the ADF at speed, recommitted to AUKUS, etc.
So it certainly had an impact, and it's reflective of what we've seen throughout the region: an increased level of anxiety about power dynamics, and how a power‑based system is replacing a rules‑based system — the rules‑based system we've all benefited from for 80 years. That's probably the biggest challenge we've seen in recent years.
Stephen Dziedzic: In both the South China Sea and the Yellow Sea, we've seen multiple encounters between the ADF and the PLA. Has the ADF — and the RAN specifically — now priced this in as an inevitable risk accompanying operations in those areas? How do you minimise the risk of a catastrophic accident or loss of life? And what can we do in the face of this pretty unprofessional behaviour to minimise risk?
VADM Mark Hammond: More than 95% of our interactions with PRC forces in the region are safe and professional. There have been handfuls of unsafe, unprofessional interactions.
At all times, we act in accordance with international law. We then engage diplomatically through diplomatic channels where there is an unsafe or unprofessional act, and we leave that to our diplomats to resolve.
We have a mandate to operate in international waters and international airspace — that's what we do, alongside our allies and partners. And where incidents occur, there are de‑escalation mechanisms, etc., and that's what we use.
Stephen Dziedzic: Do you think we're going to continue to see this behaviour? Have you seen anything that makes you think it might cease?
VADM Mark Hammond: We have a good understanding of where the areas of sensitivity are, even though we're operating in international waters. We keep that front of mind.
But we're not looking to see a change in the international rules‑based order or the interpretation of international law at sea. There is an appropriate forum for that — the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and associated agencies.
We just need to continue to train and perform to the highest possible standard in accordance with international law.
Stephen Dziedzic: Let's move to AUKUS. This is a huge, sprawling, complicated topic. About 18 months or two years ago, you exhorted Australians to have more confidence in AUKUS and the Navy's ability to deliver it. Why did you feel the need to say that, and what's your assessment of progress? Do we need a Plan B?
VADM Mark Hammond: Plan B — interesting concept.
Let me start with this: I lived through the transition from Oberon to Collins. We were at sea in a Collins‑class submarine during our first RIMPAC deployment, going up against Los Angeles‑class submarines, with US submarine force sea riders supporting one of their commanding officer courses.
Inside that pressure hull, the consensus was: this is the most capable conventional submarine they've seen. Up at COMSUBPAC headquarters, they said, “We've got to work more closely with the Australians — this thing's incredible.”
That was in 2000.
Headline back in Australia — capital letters Ian McFeder, and I'll call him out: Dud Subs.
So in the context of anxiety around the Collins program — the politicisation of that program — compared to what it does and consistently does at sea: chalk and cheese.
We should stop politicising ambitious, challenging programs. Be transparent about risks and challenges, yes — but stop politicising them.
Our first submarines, AE1 and AE2, were the longest‑range, most capable submarines on the planet at the time. What AE2 achieved — the first successful penetration of the Dardanelles in 832 years — is extraordinary.
That’s the DNA of the Australian submarine force.
Every submarine capability we've operated since then has been the longest‑range, most capable platform the Australian government could get its hands on.
So when I look at the next challenge — operating a submarine capability with a different propulsion system — I know our people are up to it.
Just last month, one of our young sailors topped a course at the US Naval Nuclear Power School with the highest GPA in the history of the course. That young girl from Western Australia is making history.
I have complete confidence in our sailors to deliver this program.
The big challenge is the massive infrastructure uplift, and the development of a system of people — in uniform and out — who can competently steward naval nuclear propulsion.
But this is a nation that does hard things.
We've integrated three new missile types into two classes of surface combatants. We've integrated uncrewed underwater and surface vessels at a speed and scale never done before.
We do things that have never been done before.
So I acknowledge the risks, the challenges, the political risk, the three‑nation complexity — but the evidence is that we are succeeding, and we will succeed.
By the end of this year, I'll be surprised if there's a fast‑attack US nuclear submarine in the Pacific that doesn't have Australians on board.
Stephen Dziedzic: There’s also a political conversation — anxiety about what we're seeing in the US, particularly the chaos coming out of the Trump White House. What do you say to people who think this is a terrible time to ally so closely with a country whose commitment to democratic fundamentals appears under assault?
VADM Mark Hammond: I'm going to stay in my lane.
The diplomatic relationship between the Australian government and foreign governments is a matter for the government.
We have a clear mandate from the Australian government to execute this program. The UK has a similar mandate. The US conducted its own national review and concluded: get on with it, full speed ahead.
I acknowledge there is political risk. After every electoral cycle, the Australian government will have to recommit to this program. It wouldn't surprise me if they conduct their own independent review each cycle.
But the evidence so far is that every time one of the three governments has conducted a review, they've concluded it remains in their best national interest, and they've doubled down.
Stephen Dziedzic: Where are the US shipyards up to? Are they anywhere near meeting the production rate needed to get us the Virginia‑class submarines?
VADM Mark Hammond: The latest Senate testimony by accountable officers in the US system is that they are seeing progress. The CNO believes they will achieve 2.0 production on the Virginia program by 2030 — but not 2.3 not 2.33, which is the ideal number.
Remember, the caveat around this program is net impact on US combat capability. Minus one US submarine — in Mark Hammond’s view — is outweighed by the strategic impact of a plus‑one SSN operating as a sovereign Australian asset from 2032.
It's not an even equation.
The US is also building its next strategic deterrent submarine — the Columbia class — while ramping up Virginia production. Their strategic deterrent must always be their highest priority.
But they are making progress. They are breaking it down into elephant‑sized pieces — workforce, infrastructure, sequencing — to deliver both programs concurrently.
The graphs they’ve shown me are compelling. You’re seeing a U‑shape — the bottom of the bell curve — and evidence they are turning the corner.
Stephen Dziedzic: We’ve only got a few minutes left. The extraordinary scenes in Ukraine and more recently Iran — what have these conflicts told you about modern warfare?
VADM Mark Hammond: There are many conclusions — land, maritime, cyber, space.
The biggest implication for me is that hybrid forces offer a return on investment greater than the sum of their parts.
A nuclear‑powered submarine can be anywhere — not everywhere, but anywhere — very quickly, and stay there a long time. It's very difficult and expensive to detect.
Uncrewed systems — like the Ghost Shark capability — are affordable at scale, highly capable, long‑range, and in the right numbers can be everywhere else that matters.
Hybrid forces working together allow us to use uncrewed systems for high‑risk missions — the dull, the dirty, and the dangerous — as well as defensive and offensive roles at scale, similar to what we've seen in Ukraine.
The Iran challenge is different. The key takeaway is that we must not lose sight of access to the sea. We've assumed it for decades because everyone played by the rules‑based system.
Now there are actors who decide it's in their national interest to use force or the threat of force.
Access to the sea is an existential issue for us. Our economic wellbeing — particularly in Western Australia — relies on sea lines of communication, import‑export systems, $650 billion a year, and the rest of the nearly $2 trillion economy.
We cannot assume that system will maintain its flow. We must play a role in preserving it.
Stephen Dziedzic: Last question — the WA government announced a weapons GUIO manufacturing hub this morning. Early thoughts?
VADM Mark Hammond: When I took over the role in 2022 at IODS, one of my first speaking engagements, I was asked what I wanted to see out of the Defence Strategic Review. I said: more people, more ships, more missiles.
What does Western Australia mean in that regard?
We're open for business. For any West Australian citizen who wants meaningful employment — we've got it in spades.
Shipbuilding — let's get on with it. We need more ships at sea. Sustainment — optimising our sustainment system to ensure ships are available, ready, lethal, survivable.
And when it comes to Guio, any state that wants to build munitions for the ADF is welcome news in my mind.
Stephen Dziedzic: We're out of time. Ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much for your time. And thank you, Mark. Can we please thank the Chief for being so candid with us?