03 Sep 2026

Thanks, James, and appreciate that. Great welcome to country. It's an important thing for us to reflect upon.

Every morning when I get up, the first thing I do, in fact, I do 2 things in parallel.

One of them is I have an espresso, usually within 5 minutes of waking up. If not, I get sadder by the second. But while I'm drinking that black gold, I reflect on the 20,000 permanent, part-time officers and sailors in our Navy and our APS and their well-being. And the last thing I do every night when I'm brushing my teeth, tonight I'll be reflecting on a Fremantle Dockers victory, hopefully.

But along with doing that, I also think then about, before I get my head down about those same 20,000 people.

I feel that weight every day and you should be very worried if I wasn't doing that.

But each and every one of us as part of that ecosystem, should think about that first and foremost. And if that frames everything you think about, then it sets the culture of how you do business.

We've got a pretty good roll up here today from what I would call the ‘Team’, the enterprise. And for those who know me, I'm absolutely an enterprise guy. I reach across the aisle kind of person. And I'm mindful that, we operate as an ecosystem. You know, Navy, we’re the capability operator, in the same way as my service colleagues are capability operators.

And particularly in our context, both myself and the Chief of Army have a lot of skin in the game in terms of operating maritime platforms – sea-going platforms. But that ecosystem extends to our delivery group partners, the broader Defence enterprise that supports us, it extends to our industry partners. It extends to the regulators, and everyone else in that ecosystem that spans out.

As a capability operator, there is no way that you can look after, and the well-being and safety of those 20,000 people without the assistance and engagement and full commitment of those partners.

So I want to extend my warmest welcome beyond the ADF side of the house to that broader enterprise and say that when I speak today, I am absolutely speaking to all of you.

The Defence Seaworthiness Authority role, which is an accountability and a responsibility that sits alongside my role as the Chief of Navy - is something that I reflect on. It gets to the point of the assurance required for those 20,000 people. And in this case, it actually extends to the 1000s of people that are operating watercraft that come under that Seaworthiness already outside of Navy.

It really gets to 4 pretty simple things. The safety, in the first instance, of all of the Defence maritime activities, the things that happen in and around, the ships themselves, the safety, clearly, of the people that operate them, and I always talk about, Navy being a service that integrates the person and the machine together, and really you can't have, if one isn't safe, the other isn't safe, you know, you can't pull those two things apart quite clearly, and that is as old as there have been Navies. The integrity of our platforms, clearly, to get to that point, and then the other important point is the protection of our environment, which is another critical role in accountability that sits there.

I don't look at these as administrative responsibilities.

They’re command and leadership, responsibilities and as the Defence Seaworthiness Authority, I wanted to begin with what I believe is the most critical point in that entire Defence Seaworthiness Program. And I have been on a bit of a journey as we've evolved into the Defence Seaworthiness Program. And I want to thank Head of Navy Engineering for walking me onto target.

But like all good submariners, I want to be convinced and I want to see lots of drawings and have 4 or 5 discussions and I'd drag people like Head of Navy Engineering, Sands and Col in there and, you know, they did they did a good job. They got me there.

But the bit that really swayed me, was that the Seaworthiness system doesn't belong to the regulators, the classification authorities, the headquarters. It must sit with that command. And within that program, it's the naval vessel operator that I see is the key.

So if you're a naval vessel operator in this room, I am talking to everyone here, but I am particularly talking to you. In the Navy context, we've decided to align that naval vessel operator with the force commander. I think that's a good decision. I've been a force commander, and we're making other changes to make sure that the force commanders also have some degree of accountability over their budget and some degree of accountability over how sustainment of their platforms is done.

Reporting through the Fleet Commander because they, must be able to have the wherewithal, but they must feel that weight.

When I was the Submarine Force Commander, Admiral Barrett was the, was the Chief of Navy, and one of the things he demanded was that the submarine force commander personally walked in through a submarine license for a submarine coming out of a very major maintenance availability. And out of a full cycle docking, that was 10 years, and I remember him talking to me. I spent many, many weeks with my engineers and the rest of my team, including my industry partners, line by lining it because I knew he would. Going through the fact that he said, now for the next 10 years, Matt, we are signing off that that submarine is safe to operate within that context and we need to be damn sure that we've done everything we can. And that stayed with me as a really important thing and I use that example, and I want to make sure that all of our naval vessel operators, they must feel that weight and they must feel that accountability, and that will drive the diligence required, and then will, in some ways, ensure that they seek out all of the expertise and the advice that they need to be able to discharge those accountabilities.

Everything else in the Program, from my point of view, exist to support that role. And that is the central idea that I want to leave with you today. Taking time to reflect on Seaworthiness is important, which is why I very much appreciate you all investing the time in today. It allows us to examine our systems, challenge our assumption and it's also an opportunity for us to learn from one another. So I expect there'll be a lot of learning today, which is exactly where we want to get to. But to strengthen the systems that keep our people safe, as I get back to my very first point and that is ultimately the purpose of Seaworthiness.

It remains fundamental to our ability to generate and sustain maritime capability.

It's a system that gives us assurance that our platforms are safe, our people are safe, and our activities are conducted responsibly. It gives confidence to commanders, to crews, government and the Australian public - that we are across our brief.

And I have always said in my career, if you cannot do it safely, you cannot do it.

And I've heard people say, well, you know, in wartime though, that's not true.

You even have a higher accountability for the well-being of your people.

And if you want to have a think about the how the sanctity of life from a Western perspective, you go back to the Second World War.

You read about the Battle of Savo Island where destroyers, the US destroyer pulled alongside the sinking HMAS Canberra, putting themselves at great risk to ensure that they save those people. Or they'd go back and recover and search for survivors in the water despite being attacked by enemy aircraft. I mean, it doesn't stop whether you're in the shipyard, you're on exercises, or you're in conflict. If you can't do it safely, you can't do it. If you lose a ship, you've lost that capability. To me, those 2 things are not separate. They are absolutely and incredibly latched together. And that is the way that people need to think about it. So if any of you hear someone saying that, you need to remind them that they've got it wrong because it's not how we roll. It's not what we do.

As we go on the journey to naval nuclear propulsion, and I'm delighted to see the Regulator and the Deputy Regulator here, that accountability goes beyond the safety and integrity of the ship itself. It's to a much greater part of the ecosystem. It's the city under which they birthed alongside. It's the environmental factors. So it's the same thing, but it's upscaled. And that accountability never stops from the minute that you start owning that forever. Because you've always got accountability for that material. So it's a good starting point and I need everyone in this room and online to help me in getting that message out there.

You know, and it's the reality is no military should diminish its own capability through a preventable error – a mission, or negligence. Or indeed praying to the mission god to use that term. Because if you pray to the mission god, you will take risks unnecessary risks. You need to understand first, is this a safe activity and then you go and do your mission. That applies equally across the system.

Safety is an interesting thing. I'll just tell you how I think about it. I do not think of it as an input. It's an outcome. Safety is an outcome. That activity was conducted safely or it was not conducted safely. So it's not like there's a safety guy and we're now going to do the safety input. Safety is an outcome. It's like winning. If you are safe, that's part of the win. If you are not safe, you've lost. It's that simple. So please help me in making sure that people think about safety as an outcome, an output, not an input. And it does reframe your way of thinking about things.

Some of you, most of you, perhaps, would have already seen my Commander's Intent. It has only been out for a couple of days. I sent it to with a company email to the whole Navy Leadership Group, but I've also shared it with some of the some of our government partners in the enterprise and I do intend on sharing it with some of our key industry partners. It's designed to be shared. I don’t mind if it ends up in the front of the Sydney Morning Herald. That's fine. Probably not exciting enough to get a Guernsey, but, it's not it's not something to be hid. It's very clear and it's aligned entirely with our National Defence Strategy.

But I do look at it through this lens. What we achieve, we achieve for our people, our platforms, our partners and with purpose. And the Defence Seaworthiness Program very naturally aligns with these elements. If we get these 4 things right the safety outcome will be achieved. The Seaworthiness element is a fundamental arrangement or framework that allows us to achieve that safety outcome.

I’m going to just quickly talk through those 4 things and I'll be going to talk to our Command Designate Course next door. So the people who are going to be commanding our ships and submarines and aviation squadrons and establishments at sea. And I think Fleet Commander, you're probably talking to them today as well and I will be talking about these same things to them in that context and they will feel that weight. You can rest assured when I'm done with them. So they'll be happy, but they'll be like feeling like sick in the stomach if I, if I do my job properly, which is okay. Not violently ill, just a little bit sick in the stomach.

We employ and develop suitably qualified and experienced people. If you do that, then the regulatory framework just examines the fact that you've achieved that. The process itself does not trump that. There's no substitute for mastery. If someone is suitably qualified and experienced to do that job, that is like the pass score. That is the threshold. If someone is not, they should not be doing that job. The end. So that's where you start with people. And if you then extend that to the fact that most people, the vast majority of people set out to do the right thing, if they are suitably qualified and experienced, they should know that you follow a due process to get a task done, or if you're tired, you get someone else to do it or get some assistance.

Then you start to build the foundations of a safe outcome. The strongest assurance system we possess is a professional workforce exercising that sound judgement every day, but first asking themselves, am I suitably qualified and experienced to be doing this job? That applies across our system. It applies to our sailors; our officers; the APS personnel; the people that have got the engineering delegations and authorities; the people doing the maintenance work – including our industry partners, it applies to our regulators and it applies to the whole system. Everyone needs to ask themselves: ‘Am I suitably qualified and experienced to do that job?’ And then you can frame it in that context.

This aligns directly with, in the Navy context, the Mastery Model, which is essentially now replicated in the Defence Mastery Model, gives our people the professional knowledge and expertise to safely operate, maintain and assure increasingly complex systems, and like all models, you advance along in terms of your levels of expertise. It talks about social mastery, which is all about developing, whether they're in the right state of mind. For me, I wouldn't do it unless I'd had that espresso in the morning, by way of example.

It's all about maintaining a culture, where people speak up and when something's not right. And I had a good chat to Defence Airworthiness Authority yesterday and told him that I was going to have this chat. And he is, you know, always talking about that generative safety culture being at the very heart of that of that system. And social mastery is the thing that allows our people within those teams to do that. And then, of course, there's domain mastery or defence mastery, which provides that broader understanding of our operating context that allows you to make decisions in context and understand the consequences beyond the immediate area of responsibility.

I'll use 2 examples equally valid for this audience. A shipyard is a particular environment. There are most people in this country have no idea what it's like in a shipyard. They kind of equate it to a normal building site. It ain't. It's a shipyard. It requires a degree of wherewithal, of understanding, of a multitude of hazards intersecting in the shipyard. In the same way as the seagoing environment. Both of those environments present a whole range of challenges. And if you're a ship's crew that spend the last 6 months deployed, you need to reorient yourself. Your domain context has shifted when you're in the shipyard and then if you take that ship out, the same at sea.

Same as when we sometimes have our industry folks or contractors come and do some in situ work on a ship at sea, that operating context and environment has changed. So expertise and an understanding of your domain is that third and critical ingredient.

Let's move now to platforms. Our platforms put simply have to be properly maintained. Where engineering changes is controlled and understood. Where configuration management is robust and where technical governance is discipline and effective. This is not a bureaucratic overhead. This is stewardship of that platform. We are the stewards of those platforms. And that word has a particular meaning, but all of those inputs that I talked about need to be there to ensure that we are appropriate stewards.

Good technical governance gives commanders confidence. It used to give me confidence when I was a submarine commander and then a submarine force commander. I had to have confidence in the material state of the vessels. That defects are understood and that risks are managed. And the engineering decisions are being properly made at the right level and that platforms remain fit for service. If we maintain the integrity of our platforms, we fundamentally improve our Seaworthiness and our safety outcomes. The relationship is straightforward. It's simple when you think about it. But you have to do all of those things in order to achieve the outcome.  

I talk a lot about partners. The third P.

Seaworthiness as I alluded to early, is absolutely delivered through an enterprise. Naval vessel operators cannot achieve it alone. No single organisation can achieve it alone. Our shipyards, our sustainment organisations, project officers, the broader industry partner, including our supply chain, regulators that our allies and partners all contribute in different ways. And this becomes increasingly important as the complexity of our systems evolves.

I've talked in my opening remarks as the Chief of Navy about the fact that we are recapitalising our whole Navy and that is true. At the same time, our Army is introducing a very substantial and important maritime capability. The first time that they have really done that in earnest since the Second World War.

We are sustaining at the same time as we are building the new railroad to use that term. We've got to keep the trains running, and some of those are ageing platforms, either at or approaching their life-of-type. And in some cases extended deliberately beyond their design intent.

While we're doing this, we've got increasing partnerships with allies in capability, development, acquisition and sustainment. The general purpose frigate is a good example. It's essentially a no-change acquisition or to use that great Air Force term, we're buying what they're selling.

But that approach requires a very close understanding and alignment between our assurance system and Japan. We have to get into that OODA loop. We need to understand the design intent. We need to understand the cultural application of that design intent. We need to understand how we flex our support system around that. In order that a fleet commander can be satisfied that we can take that ship forward and operate it. It will not be done the same way as we have done it before. But there will be some things that will be immutable. It must sit and reside within our Seaworthiness framework. So we ain't changing that, but we are going to have to change the way the inputs are put into that System – and we don't have long.

First crews are going to be going over to the shipyard in Japan earlier than probably what others might have thought. I want them there as soon as practicable. So I'm going to say it's been kind of 18 month’s time and they need to spend a lot of time, a lot of hard yards in that shipyard so that they've got the confidence to take that ship and bring it home; commission her and then get her into service. But this is all happening in the next couple of years. This is not like off in the in the never never.

I already alluded to our nuclear powered submarine program, which just massively uplifts the level of complexity, safety, certification, regulation and assurance and expands the ecosystem and enterprise in which we're operating. We're operating within a trilateral endeavour. I just met with Admiral Houston, Director Naval Reactors just the other day, the regulator - as our ASA colleagues have, you know, we are in it as part of that team. If one fails, we all fail. And the biggest fail you can have is a safety incident in that regard. Simple as that.

None of these are small changes. These are fundamental shifts within the way our Navy will operate, and that is why the integrity of this Seaworthiness system is important and it's why strong partnerships create stronger assurance. Ultimately, this will contribute to safer, more seaworthy platforms. I'm going to finish now in the 4 Ps on purpose. It's a key element of the Seaworthiness intent. And I do want to just tease out what people might see as a bit of a tension. I have said that we must deliver at the speed of relevance. The enemies of the free world have not been idle. We have to recapitalise our Navy as quickly as is safe to do so, and that is a clear priority. We need to set ourselves challenging but achievable targets.

But while all of this is happening, I remind myself of the words that the previous Director Naval Reactors had ringing in my reactors had ringing in my ears. Doing it right is doing it fast. If you don't do it right, you will have to do it again. And that will be slower. So take the time. Get the evidence base before you, examine the evidence. If there's questions, ask the questions then, and then you move forward. That is the approach we will be taking, and if there is one thing that I'm happy to see a bit of shine off the ball, to use that great Australian thing, it is on that.

We are not going to rush to failure on these things, but we are going to deliberately and purposely move forward because doing it right is doing it fast.

Let me now move to the Defence Seaworthiness Program itself. As I said before, I've watched the development of this closely over the last 18 months. I'd like to think that I have been engaged in it. Head of Navy Engineering will probably tell you whether or not that's been the case. But I am interested in these things. I was interested as Deputy, because I think the way that we, the way that we assure our systems, the way that we bring it all together, and make sure that we are safe. Is critical.

And I got to say, the progress has been remarkable, and I want to particularly acknowledge Admiral Durban, Commodore Skinner, and Mr Colin Dagg, and all of their teams and support for the tremendous amount of work that's gone into developing, implementing the new framework. And I'm very grateful to see, that the capability operator, ecosystem has equally leaned in to that space, particularly in the context of Navy and Army. The obvious question really was why we've changed, and I'm not going to eat Head of Navy Engineering’s lunch, she'll talk about it more.

So I'll just give you like the high level overview. But the reality is our organisation has matured. Our understanding of risk is mature now and our strategic environment has changed, as I've talked about. Good organisations have continually reassessed how fit for purpose their systems are and are they aligned to the outcomes?

And we should never continue a process simply because it's familiar. So we always have to periodically challenge ourselves. One of the reasons why I like peer reviews of our systems. You know, ‘are we are we doing best practice’? And in this case, it's exactly what we did. Through the development of the Defence Seaworthiness Program. We've looked at best contemporary best practice, including a bunch of lessons from the evolution of the Defence, Airworthiness Framework, and other similar systems across partner nations, and we examine what genuinely requires regulatory oversight and what properly belongs within Command, and what then adds unnecessary burden. Because if you're looking at everything, you're not looking at the things that matter.

We became more clear-eyed about what genuinely contributes to outcomes and what similarly accumulated over time. The result is a more focused system, centred on the safety of our people, the integrity of our platforms and the protection of the environment. Those outcomes are the reason that the system exists, not process, not paperwork, just outcomes. It then gives the rest of the operating environment – whether it be Navy or Army or other operator—opportunity to set their own governance and framework settings about the sort of outcomes that we need to achieve beyond the foundational Seaworthiness elements.

You know, as I've sort of been on this journey and I like using these tactical examples, but, I got over the line when I thought, well, you know, in a submarine, you spend a lot more time examining the evidence base around a whole valve change out, even a backup valve change out. Because if that valve fails, like things are going to be bad. You're probably gonna die. In the worst, worst case, along with everyone else in your crew.

So we have a very, very high level of oversight. The commanding officer has to sign out on all the re-entry control arrangements and all of those things on those vowels. Sign off on the evidence base. And you know, it takes a long time sitting there as a CO. It reminds you of what's important, but you don't do that for fresh water valves where you might end up with a bit of fresh water on the deck. Is that good? No, you might lose some capability, but it isn't going to kill someone. And I think as I use that example, I use it because the thing that you want people to invest that time in is looking at the whole valve.

Sure, someone will, there'll be a system, someone will look at the fresh water valve, it's not going to just be random. It'll have some objective quality evidence. But you don't need to place that same weight, that same oversight on it.

So I kind of try and think of things in simple terms, or maybe I've got that wrong, but anyway, that's how I convinced myself it was a good idea. That's probably fine. One of the benefits of the new framework is that does place that governance back where it belongs and it allows us to put things in the right, in the right frame of reference.

I'm going to just quickly now talk through a couple of the last things that the team said, and as I'm looking at them, important, but probably ones that others are going to talk more about. Look, I think the other things that might help folks and Head of Navy Engineering will realign me, if I've got this wrong between the Naval Flag Authority; the Australian Naval Classification Authority, and the Australian Naval Seaworthy Authority.

In simple terms, you know, the Naval Flag Authority provides that overarching assurance framework for all of the defence maritime activities. It's a really important and critical role. And that sits across the whole ecosystem. It gives you confidence that the system is fit for purpose and that we have the information needed to support decision making across the enterprise.

ANCA provides a classification framework that assures a design construction, maintenance, and integrity of our vessels. So Cole’s like the AFL. They make the rules, we might not like them. They sometimes change, but they're the rules. But you got someone's got to have the rules or the game's a mess. It doesn't work. So he’s the rules guy, that's how I think about it anyway. And you got to have rules and people need to understand what those rules are and they need to understand, unlike the AFL, what the basis are for those rules. So Cole's doing a much better job than they are.

ANSA, they're the cop on the beat. They're providing that regulatory oversight that is necessary to ensure that the vessels are being operated safely. The umpire blows the whistle. Now, the best umpires, as you all know, keep their put their whistle away most of the time. No one wants to be there to listen to the umpire or the referee play their whistle. So a good system means that the players kind of regulate themselves. We have systems in place to allow that.

And then just occasionally the umpire would be like, there's a 50 mate. So Cole is there, AFL, making the rules. ANSA is the head of the umpire are just as popular. The head of the umpire association.

But you're not going to have a game without the, the league or the umpire. So that's why they're important, but it does help to explain how people. Someone sets the rules and then someone makes sure that we're doing what we said we're going to do. In obeying those rules. But in terms of that regulation, the way I do think about it is this, it is the job of the people who are doing the business to present a case as to how they're doing it safely.

That is where there is a difference and where that analogy starts to fall over because there are many ways to achieve a seaworthy outcome. It just needs to be based on evidence. It needs to be based on people who are suitably qualified and experienced to provide advice or make decisions. And then that case needs to be transparent and available so that the umpire can look at it and go, you know what, they're doing exactly what they said. They've got a very robust way of making sure that they've got a safe outcome. I can go back to looking at whatever they're looking at in terms of the system or dealing with whatever else they're dealing with.

So a great system means that there's very little to know into the active intervention. The very best systems, though, mean that there is a working relationship with regulators and I do think that that is where people get it wrong.

If I if I look at a mature system, that if you didn't understand it would seem strange at first, but worse and this to me is like what really good looks like. If you're, if you're, you know, if you look at the US system, when they're doing a bunch of work, let's say, a task and they come across a particular challenge, in terms of a decision making, let's say they're taking a submarine through a bunch of test and trials, a nuclear propelled submarine.

That team that is examining that, the regulator is kind of sat alongside there. Not to intervene unless they have to. But are happy to say, have you thought about that? Have you thought about this? No, I'm not saying we'll get to exactly that point. But, you know, they do have a regulatory hat on, whether it's the Seaworthiness regulator or the nuclear powered submarine regulator, or whatever any other regulator, the best arrangements are:

Hey, here's our case, here's what we said we're going to proceed with. Particularly when you have time to do so. We think that we've got a strong case and an evidence base. What do you reckon?

And that can happen at the point of need if you do it well. And I go, yep, that seems fine. Proceed. What you don't want to do is when you get the eyebrow rays really, you might want to just go back and say right as fast. Did we think about all those factors? And that's, to me, what kind of good looks like at the end of the day. There's a little note here that the team gave me about the Defence Seaworthiness management system and the courage to evolve. I'm just going to say 2 things.

Firstly, the Defence Seaworthiness and Measurement system was a critical and important thing for our organisation, and particularly our Navy, when it was brought in. It really realigned us to some of the things that we needed to think about. We've now evolved our system to something that is more targeted, more direct, and frankly better. So all those who've been involved in it, thank you for being involved in it and getting on board with it.

It's now time to jump onto the next train. We're on the Defensive Seaworthiness Program.

So in conclusion, I began, uh, besides talking about my coffee and what I think about every morning and evening, the next thing I really talked about was naval vessel operators. So I'm going to finish there. It doesn't matter how sophisticated our frameworks become, Seaworthiness ultimately rests with Command. They are the people that are making the final decisions that will keep us safe. But with vast amounts of inputs. And that accountability does sit with naval vessel operators. They hold that account of visibility for the vessels they operate, and I will hold them to account. For that. I must, including, and it doesn't matter where you sit within the system, and it's exactly the same as the Airworthiness Authority holds the account of the Military Air Operators (MAO).

But you will be supported by suitably qualified and experienced people. If you feel that way, you should seek all of the advice and all of the evidence to make that decision. And that can only come with trusted partnerships across our maritime enterprise and a clear purpose focused on delivering at the speed of relevance, and getting those things right.

If we had the discipline to continually assess, adapt and improve the systems, we will remain fit for purpose for the challenges ahead. It's what the Defence Seaworthiness Program represents, and why we are all here today.

I do now just want to finish with thanking you all for the role that you play in supporting our naval vessel operators and ensuring that Defence’s maritime capability remains safe, seaworthy and ready for service, and you might think when you get up in the morning and before you go to bed about your role in keeping those 20,000 fantastic Australians safe every day.