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MONOGRAPH 12.—The Action of Dogger Bank, January 24th, 1915.

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NAVAL STAFF MONOGRAPHS (HISTORICAL).

FLEET ISSUE.

ERRATA.

Page v.—Plan 5; for "4th" read "5th."

vi.—Plan 5; for "1200" read "1206."

161.—3rd Flotilla 2nd Division; for "Lt.-Cdr. Basil W. Lloyd Owen" read "Lt.-Cdr. Bruce Lloyd Owen."

MONOGRAPH 11.—The Battle of Heligoland Bight, August 28th, 1914.

MONOGRAPH 8.—Naval Operations connected with the Raid on the North-East Coast, December 16th, 1914.

MONOGRAPH 12.—The Action of Dogger Bank, January 24th, 1915.

NAVAL STAFF,

TRAINING AND STAFF DUTIES DIVISION,

July 1921.
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NAVAL STAFF,
Training and Staff Duties Division,
July 1921.

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THE PASSAGE OF THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, AUGUST, 1914.

INTRODUCTION.

This monograph covers the period August 4th to August 27th and deals more particularly with the Naval movements associated with the transport of the preliminary British Expeditionary Force, which covered the period August 9th to 23rd.

The subject has been treated from a Naval point of view and the paper, therefore, deals chiefly with the disposition of ships in Home Waters with the orders for the same and subsequent changes up to August 28th.

The paper must not be regarded as dealing with the subject from a transport point of view, and details of wharfage and harbour accommodation have not been included.

NOTE ON SOURCES.

1. Operations Division papers. These give Commodore (T) and Commodore (S) orders to patrols, and other miscellaneous information bearing upon dispositions in Home Waters. Some of these are in Appendix C.

2. Positions and movements of Ships, Daily Returns in H.S. C 12, Volume I., August 17th to 31st, 1914. States the movements of British ships if in harbour or at sea; but does not give detailed positions. Is not entirely reliable.

3. I.D. Daily Return of German, Austrian, and Italian ships.

4. Telegrams to and from Admiralty; bound in volumes in H.S. C.I.D.;—
   - H.S. 51 — August 1st to 4th.
   - H.S. 52 — August 5th to 7th.
   - H.S. 53 — August 8th to 11th.
   &c.
   - H.S. 59 — September 1st to 4th.

All Home Waters telegrams are together, arranged chronologically; the page in the H.S. volume has been given in the Appendix A. to facilitate reference (see p. 24).

5. Inter-Departmental Conference Report, July 1914, drawn up by an Admiralty and War Office Committee. This was a pre-war report giving the plans and orders upon which the transport of B.E.F. was carried out. Extracts are in Appendix F.

6. Admiralty letter T. 9138/14 of October 2nd, 1914, with enclosures—a return sent to War Cabinet showing the progress of the transport of the Expeditionary Force. In Appendix G. (see p. 66).

7. Grand Fleet Narrative of Proceedings. The daily report of C-in-C, giving movements and daily operations of Grand Fleet, but not of forces in the Southern North Sea or in Channel. Extracts are in Appendix D.

N.B.—V.A., Channel Fleet, did not send in any narrative of proceedings.

1 Late C.B. 1537: Naval Movements in August, 1914, associated with the Transport of the British Expeditionary Force to France.
CHAPTER I.

STRATEGY IN HOME WATERS ON OUTBREAK OF WAR.

1. Preliminary Strategy.—The outbreak of war with Germany found us not unprepared. The labours of a Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence, an organisation set on foot in 1911 to co-ordinate the work of the Departments of State, had produced a war book in which was detailed the action to be taken by each Department when war appeared threatening. The telegrams which put into action the various steps of the process from peace to war were decided upon and coded1; and in each Department the staffs arranged the methods of carrying these steps into force. As regards the Navy, the general idea was to ensure the destruction of the enemy’s naval forces and obtain command of the North Sea and Channel, with the object of preventing the enemy from making any serious attack upon British territory or trade or interfering with the transport of British troops to France should the situation necessitate their despatch.

The Home Fleets were organised in two battle fleets; one, the Grand Fleet, containing all “Dreadnoughts,” “King Edward VII.”s, and modern ships, was to be stationed in northern waters resting upon the Scottish coast and islands, and the other, the Channel Fleet, consisting of battleships earlier than the “King Edward VII.” class was to be stationed in the Channel. The Channel Fleet was to be based on Portland; the Grand Fleet was to take up a position between 1° east and 3° east and south of 58° N., approximately 200 miles east of Aberdeen. The main base and headquarters of the Grand Fleet was to be at Rosyth, with Cromarty and Scapa Flow as alternative fuelling bases, to which the Fleet should be taken from time to time, but during the period of strained relations Scapa Flow was to be used as a preliminary base.2

On the outbreak of war the Grand Fleet was to carry out frequent sweeps in the North Sea as far south as the 54th parallel with the idea of making the enemy realise that he could not venture far out of port without risk of encountering a superior force.3

Under the aegis of the Grand Fleet a cruiser force was to patrol east and north from the Shetlands, to deny the northern passage to enemy merchant vessels, whilst another force of cruisers was to patrol at the western end of the English Channel and deny that passage to the enemy.

2. The Disposition of Channel Fleet, & c.—The older battleships of the 2nd and 3rd Fleet, named the Channel Fleet, were to be stationed in the English Channel for the protection of the lines of military transport in that area, with the alternative duty of moving into the North Sea to cooperate with the Grand Fleet in attacking enemy transports if an invasion of the East Coast of England should be attempted.

At the southern end of the North Sea a force of modern destroyers was based on Harwich to patrol the waters between 52° N. and 54° N., to assist in the sweeps of the Grand Fleet or to join the Channel Fleet if the latter moved north. As a coastal defence force there were also patrol flotillas at the several dockyard ports, principal east coast ports, and across the Straits of Dover. The submarine flotillas were to work in conjunction with those patrol forces, except the latest boats, D’s and E’s, which were earmarked for offensive operations in the Heligoland Bight.

The Channel Fleet and forces west of Dover were to be under direct Admiralty control upon the outbreak of war, but to the C-in-C., Grand Fleet, were left wide powers of discretion as to his particular strategy, together with control of the general disposition in the case of sweeps, subject to the proviso that he should always keep the Admiralty fully informed of his intentions and progress.

1 For details, see Corbett: Naval Operations, Vol. I.
2 Corbett: Naval Operations I., p. 29.
3 Jellicoe: The Grand Fleet, p. 16.
3. Change of Disposition.—In the event of troops being sent to France, the Grand Fleet was to take up a position at sea to the southward of 50° N. (the latitude of the Firth) on the second day after the outbreak of war so as to be in a position to follow up and strike at the main battle squadron of the enemy should it attempt to interfere with any movement of British troops across the Channel.

The Fleet never actually, however, took up this position, for by the time war was declared at midnight on 4th-5th August its proposed dispositions had been changed. On July 28th the Grand Fleet was ordered by the Admiralty to leave Portland and proceed westward to its preliminary station, Scapa Flow. Admiral Callaghan, who was then C-in-C. repaired to the Admiralty, and presumably it was then decided to make Scapa Flow the principal war base instead of Rosyth, for, without further orders, this step was taken when war was declared, and the Fleet never took up its preliminary cruising position south of 38° N. Neither Scapa nor Rosyth possessed any anti-submarine defences, but the strong tides and difficult navigation of Orkney waters offered a certain amount of protection against submarine attacks, and this in conjunction with its greater distance from the enemy and its ample anchorage probably made it more attractive to the Admiralty as Second Sea Lord, went north on July 30th, and subsequently took over the command of the Grand Fleet from Admiral Callaghan, hoisting his flag on August 4th. The Grand Fleet passed into this day, and cruised in a position roughly between the Orkneys and Norway, and except for occasional sweeps to the south it remained between the latitude of 58° and 61° N. during the whole of August 1914.

4. The Grand Fleet and High Seas Fleet.—The Grand Fleet in 1914 consisted of all our modern battleships and nearly all our modern cruisers and battle cruisers with the exception of three battle cruisers (“Indefatigable,” “Inflexible,” and “Indomitable”), the First C.S. and four light cruisers in the Mediterranean, H.M.A.S. “Australia” in Australian waters and the China squadron cruisers in the Far East. The whole available force of the German Navy was similarly concentrated in their home waters. The strategy on which the British dispositions was based can be most conveniently summarised by considering it with regard to these assumed objectives.

The greater portion of the German Fleet was in the Jade River, the Battle Fleet having moved through the Kiel Canal on August 2nd, leaving in the Baltic the only effective battle cruisers and the destroyers of the First C.S. were on the English coast in action. At least 48 hours were needed to recall coal and concentrate squadrons from the Baltic, (1) The six newest battleships, forming the 3rd squadron, had to be lightened by discharging a great part of their coal before they could pass through the Canal.

The Grand Fleet and High Seas Fleet. —The Grand Fleet, consisting of the three dreadnoughts, the battle cruisers, the four battle cruisers, the Mediterranean, H.M.A.S. “Australia” in Australian waters and the China squadron cruisers in the Far East, was the only force that could move south to follow up the main battle squadron of the enemy. This was also the strategy contemplated in the event of a powerful force moving south to attack the Channel communications.

Further west a light force was based on the Ems River, consisting of two, sometimes three, light cruisers; and Heligoland and Sylt were bases for smaller patrol flotillas. With the exception of the Baltic ships, all German naval forces were concentrated in August 1914 in the triangle Ems River, Sylt and River Jade.

5. Enemy Objectives: Comparison with our Dispositions.—It was considered that there were three probable objectives on the part of the enemy in the North Sea:

(1) To break out of the North Sea in order to attack our trade.
(2) To raid our East Coast, either on a small scale as a raid, or on a large scale as an invasion.
(3) To attack in the Channel the transports moving to France.

The Grand Fleet, and High Seas Fleet, and took over the command of ships changed slightly from time to time during August, vide Chapter III.

Further west a light force was based on the Ems River, consisting of two, sometimes three, light cruisers; and Heligoland and Sylt were bases for smaller patrol craft.

The strategy on which the British dispositions was based can be most conveniently summarised by considering it with regard to these assumed objectives.

If the Germans attempted their first assumed objective, namely, to break out of the North Sea to attack trade, the whole Grand Fleet lay across their path and the cruiser forces on patrol completed what was practically a distant blockade of the Heligoland Bight.

If the Germans attempted to break through the Straits of Dover to attack Channel communications or the trade in the Channel, the Harwich flotillas constituted an outpost to give warning of their approach and enable the cross-Channel transport to be stopped in time and behind them were lines of submarines and the Dover Patrol in a position to report and attack the enemy. Cruiser Force C, supported the Harwich flotilla and the Channel Fleet protected the transport in the Channel from cruiser attack. If the attack was from the west instead of the east—and it was considered that minelayers and armed merchant ships might be used for this purpose—a cruiser force at the western entrance to the Channel and some French submarines were disposed so as to cooperate with the Channel Battle Fleet in defending the passage.

Finally if a raid or invasion of the English coast was attempted, the local defence forces would form one line of observation and defence; the Channel Fleet, preceded by the Harwich flotilla, would be in a position to move up to intercept the raiding force if the raid was not too far to the northward; and the Grand Fleet could move south to follow up the main battle squadron of the enemy. This was the strategy contemplated in the event of a powerful force moving south to attack the Channel communications.

6. British Expeditionary Force authorised.—On August 5th, 1914, a War Council decided that five army divisions (four infantry and one cavalry division) were to be sent to France; the commencement of the transportation was fixed first of all for August 7th, but was changed later to August 9th, as the military arrangements could not be completed before that date. By this time, the Fleets in home waters had already taken up their war stations, and the initial critical period which had been regarded as presenting a possible opportunity for a great offensive stroke by the German Fleet had passed without any special signs of activity. Apparently the Germans were so confident of achieving military success on the continent that they were not inclined to accept the risks of a naval offensive in the face of our superior forces, and the Expeditionary Force commenced to move across the Channel in safety and unharassed by enemy attack; but the threat was none the less present and had to be anticipated.
3. Change of Disposition.—In the event of troops being sent to France, the Grand Fleet was to take up a position at sea to the southward of 56° N. (the latitude of the Firth) on the second day after the outbreak of war so as to be in a position to follow up and strike at the main battle squadron of the enemy should it attempt to interfere with any movement of British troops across the Channel.

The fleet never actually, however, took up this position, for by the time war was declared at midnight on 4th-5th August its proposed dispositions had been changed. On July 28th the Grand Fleet was ordered by the Admiralty to leave Portland and proceed thence to its preliminary station, Scapa Flow. Admiral Callaghan, who was then C-in-C., repaired to the Admiralty, and presumably it was then decided to make Scapa Flow the principal war base instead of Rosyth, for, without further orders, this step was taken when war was declared, and the fleet never took up its preliminary cruising position south of 58° N.

Neither Scapa nor Rosyth possessed any anti-submarine defences, but the strong tides and difficult navigation of Orkney waters offered a certain amount of protection against submarine attacks, and this in conjunction with its greater distance from the enemy and its ample anchorage probably led to the selection of the former port. Admiral Jellicoe, then the Second Sea Lord, went north on July 30th, and subsequently took over the command of the Grand Fleet from Admiral Callaghan, hoisting his flag on August 4th. The Grand Fleet put to sea that day, and cruised in a position roughly between the Orkneys and Norway, and except for occasional sweeps to the south it remained between the latitude of 58° and 61° N. during the whole of August 1914.

4. The Grand Fleet and High Sea Fleet.—The Grand Fleet in 1914 consisted of all our modern battleships and nearly all our modern cruisers and battle cruisers with the exception of one German battle cruiser and one light cruiser in the Baltic, all our modern battleships and nearly all our modern cruisers and battle cruisers with the exception of one German battle cruiser and one light cruiser in the Mediterranean, H.M. A.S. " Australia " in Australian waters and the China squadron cruisers in the Far East. The whole available force of the German Navy was similarly concentrated in their home waters with the exception of one German battle cruiser and one light cruiser in the Mediterranean, two cruisers and two light cruisers in China, and four other light cruisers in the Pacific, Atlantic or East African waters. The relative strength of the two forces facing each other across the North Sea on August 4th, 1914, was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Great Britain</th>
<th>Germany</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dreadnoughts</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Dreadnoughts</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battle cruisers</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruisers</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light cruisers</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airships</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The greater portion of the German Fleet was in the Jade River, the Battle Fleet having moved through the Kiel Canal on August 2nd, leaving in the Baltic only the older pre-Dreadnought battleships and the cruisers of the same period, though these could be moved through the Canal into the North Sea at short notice, the passage for an average ship taking about 14 hours.

Further west a light force was based on the Ems River, consisting of two, sometimes three, light cruisers; and Heligoland and Sylt were bases for smaller patrol craft.

With the exception of the Baltic ships, all German naval forces were concentrated in August 1914 in the triangle Ems River, Sylt and River Jade.

The strategy on which the British dispositions was based can be most conveniently summarised by considering it with regard to these assumed objectives.

5. Enemy Objectives:—Comparison with our Dispositions.—It was considered that there were three probable objectives on the part of the enemy in the North Sea:

(1) To break out of the North Sea in order to attack our trade.
(2) To raid our East Coast, either on a small scale as a raid, or on a large scale as an invasion.
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The strategy on which the British dispositions was based can be most conveniently summarised by considering it with regard to these assumed objectives.

If the Germans attempted their first assumed objective, namely, to break out of the North Sea to attack our trade, the whole Grand Fleet lay across their path and the cruiser forces on patrol completed what was practically a distant blockade of the Heligoland Bight.

If the Germans attempted to break through the Straits of Dover to attack Channel communications or the trade in the Channel, the Harwich flotillas constituted an outpost to give warning of their approach and enable the cross-Channel transport to be stopped in time and behind them were lines of submarines and the Dover Patrol in a position to report and attack the enemy. Cruiser Force C. supported the Harwich flotillas and the Channel Fleet protected the transport in the Channel from cruiser attack. If the attack was from the west instead of the east—and it was considered that minelayers and armed merchant ships might be used for this purpose—a cruiser force at the western entrance to the Channel and some French submarines were disposed so as to co-operate with the Channel Battle Fleet in defending the passage.

Finally if a raid or invasion of the English coast was attempted, the local defence measures would form one line of observation and defence; the Channel Fleet, preceded by the Harwich flotillas, would be in a position to move in the North Sea to attack the raiding force if the raid was not too far to the northward; and the Grand Fleet could move south to follow up the main battle squadron of the enemy. This was also the strategy contemplated in the event of a powerful force moving south to attack the Channel communications.

6. British Expeditionary Force authorised.—On August 5th, 1914, a War Council decided that five army divisions (four infantry and one cavalry division) were to be sent to France; the commencement of the transportation was fixed first of all for August 7th, but was changed later to August 8th, as the military arrangements could not be completed before that date. By this time it was apparent that the waters had already taken up their war stations, and the German Fleet had been regarded as presenting no threat.
 CHAPTER II.

ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE TRANSPORT OF THE ORIGINAL EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

7. Pre-War Organisation.—Before the war broke out a clear understanding existed between England and France that in the event of both Governments declaring war upon Germany an Expeditionary Force should be sent from England to assist the French army, and that the two navies should co-operate in covering its passage.1

For some three years before the war the Admiralty had been in conference with the War Office concerning the transport of this force, and it was a fortunate circumstance that the report of an Inter-Departmental Conference,2 appointed in February 1914 to consider the subject, was issued on July 30th, 1914, just in time for its proposals to be carried into execution five days later when the need for it arose.

This Conference had considered the transport of the British Expeditionary Force from all points of view, and had prepared a detailed organisation for all stages of the operation, the line of demarcation between naval and military responsibility being laid down as the high-water mark at the ports of embarkation and disembarkation.3

The organisation was drawn up under four main divisions:

1. Assembly of transports,
2. Embarkation of troops,
3. Sailing and passage of transports,
4. Disembarkation of troops,

of which (1) and (3) were mainly naval and (2) and (4) mainly military.4

To co-ordinate these four divisions of work, the Conference drew up a detailed programme of sailings, to which the naval and military authorities were strictly to adhere.

The actual passage of the Expeditionary Force during August 1914 did, in the main, adhere to this programme, but differed in certain important details on account of the retention in England for some days of two infantry divisions included in the original plan.

8. Strength of the British Expeditionary Force.—It was the pre-war intention to send to France in the event of aggressive action the part of Germany, six infantry divisions, and one cavalry division, or, roughly, 120,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry,5

and it was for this force that the programme of sailings and transport organisation was arranged.

Of the infantry divisions, the 5th and 6th were stationed in Ireland, and the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th in England, and it was proposed to transport them from their stations direct to France. These five divisions included almost all the active service troops in the British Isles, and when war was declared in August 1914, the War Cabinet were averse to sending them all abroad in view of the possibility of invasion in the interval that would elapse before reserve troops were mobilised.

Accordingly, instead of sending to France six divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, the Cabinet only authorised the immediate despatch of four divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, or in effect 80,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry, instead of 120,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry. The 6th Infantry Division, instead of going to France, was ordered to be transported from Ireland to England, and the 4th Infantry Division was also retained at home.

It was on August 4th, 1914, that the War Council6 came to the momentous decision to send troops to France, and on August 5th they authorised the despatch of this reduced Expeditionary Force, which was to disembark on August 7th, 1914. This date, however, gave insufficient time for the concentration of troops by rail, and it was altered to the 10th.

9. Transport Routes of the British Expeditionary Force.—It had been arranged by the pre-war Committee that the main ports of embarkation should be Southampton for troops and Newhaven for stores, the troops to disembark at Havre and stores to be landed at Boulogne. These two lines, Southampton to Havre and Newhaven to Boulogne, were the lines along which respectively 80 per cent. of the troops and 87 per cent. of the stores were actually transported,7 and as the movement of troops from Ireland to France was not carried out, it was along these two cross-Channel passages that almost all the Expeditionary Force was moved.

In speaking of Havre, however, Rouen, 50 miles beyond Havre up the River Seine, and in speaking of Boulogne, Calais and Dunkerque respectively, 20 and 40 miles to the eastward, should be included as the ports of disembarkation of a small percentage of stores and of a few men.

There were also a few transports moving along other lines carrying the 13 per cent. of stores and 20 per cent. of the troops that were not embarked at Newhaven or Southampton.

These lines were—

- From Liverpool
  - Avonmouth
  - Mechanical transport and frozen meat.
  - Glasgow
  - Troops and horses.
  - London
  - Stevedores.
  - Devonport
  - Single Brigade.
  - Dover
  - Naval Brigade.

All disembarked at Boulogne, Havre, or Rouen, whilst from the Irish ports of Dublin, Belfast and Queenstown certain detached units of infantry and cavalry were also transported to Havre. The Royal Flying Corps, one squadron strong, were intended to embark at Glasgow for transport to France, but they were retained in England for a few days and then flew direct across the Channel on Friday, August 13th.

9. The Collection of Transports Organisation.—To carry out the programme, it was plainly necessary to have the transports at the different ports by the time that the military had concentrated their troops and stores ready for embarkation.

The direction of this branch of the work was in the hands of the Transport Department of the Admiralty, under the Director of Transports, who, in August 1914, was Rear-Admiral (Retired) H. W. Savory, M.V.O.

On the outbreak of war Vice-Admiral Sir Edmund Slade represented, and was responsible to, the First Sea Lord for the transport of the British Expeditionary


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1 There was no written agreement between France and England before the war by which either country was bound to definite action; but there was a clear understanding that if France and England should both declare war upon Germany (for the defence of France), an Expeditionary Force should be sent by England to France to co-operate with the French Army; and the French and British Navies in the Channel should co-operate in covering its passage.

2 Inter-Departmental Conference Report, July 30th, 1914, 22 pages printed, signed by Vice-Admiral E. J. Slade, Rear-Admiral (Retired) H. W. Savory, Director of Transports, O. A. R. Murray, Colonel H. M. Harper, Lieut.-Colonel E. Sturt Wootley, Commander C. H. Sinclair, V. H. T. Weeks, Secretary. These and other officers had been at work on the organisation of transport of the British Expeditionary Force for some years before this date. See Appendix F1.

3 Appendix G1.

4 The military organisation for executing this programme as regards the railway concentration of the troops and their disembarkation and dispersal after disembarkation, etc., was entirely arranged by the War Office and is not touched upon in this monograph.

5 Appendix G3.

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| Strength of an infantry brigade | 1,750 | 4,655 | 4,455 |
| Strength of a cavalry brigade | 1,200 | 18,073 | 19,293 |
| Total | 1,718 | 1,777 | 1,750 |
| Number of troops | 864 | 9,269 | 10,134 |
were appointed, in accordance with pre-war organisation, early in August 1914. The Transport Department had prepared lists before the war of all British vessels suitable for the work, including in the list full details of each vessel, obtained from owners before the war. These vessels were classified for particular purposes—freight ship (men), freight ship (stores), frozen meat ships, horse transports, &c., &c.—according to their construction and suitability.

Of these vessels a certain number at any moment were abroad, a certain number in home waters, some with a full cargo, some empty, some half empty, &c.; a list had therefore been kept up to date daily of the vessels immediately available, the information being largely obtained through the Customs House officials.

10. On August 5th and 6th, telegrams were sent to the ships immediately available, requisitioning them for transport service, and directing them to particular ports. In the majority of cases the ships were to sail direct for the embarkation ports, freight ships (men) to Southampton, freight ships (stores) to Newhaven, &c., but a few vessels had first to go to "fitting ports." These were Liverpool, Southampton, Liverpool, and Glasgow, where before war there had been collected and stored such "fittings" as were required to convert a vessel for transport duties. Horse transports required most alteration in order to provide horse stalls; the ordinary troop and store ships required little alteration having their necessary fittings added to them whilst they were at the port of embarkation, reballasting, loading, or raising steam. The fittings for a troop ship consisted of boilers for hot water, a few washing basins, &c., and some upper deck latrines, which were placed on board in about 48 hours; the necessary fittings took nearer four to six days; and on the horse carriers—big passenger liners converted temporarily into hospital ships for service during the three to four weeks that it took to prepare proper hospital ships—required 24 to 36 hours to fit out.

The vessels which were required for the first six days of embarkation when infantry were being transported (see later) had only to proceed from the ports of embarkation on 5th August direct to Southampton or Newhaven. As many vessels as were necessary were obtained in this way, but there was practically no reserve beyond two or three spare vessels arising from the margin used in estimating the cargo that each ship could carry.

The total sailings programmed for August 9th to August 22nd inclusive, or up to the end of the 14th day of embarkation was 359, and 358 sailings were actually completed by the end of the 15th day of embarkation, August 23rd. During this period, August 9th to 23rd, the average number of sailings per day was 24, or a total gross tonnage of 1,340,575 tons, representing a daily average of nearly 90,000 tons.

The dates August 9th and August 23rd may be considered the first and final days of the Transport of the original Expeditionary Force, and this was also the period during which the naval forces were continuously disposed to cover the passage, and the period when the tonnage crossing the Channel for this stage of the war, reached its highest average.

11. Organisation at Ports of Embarkation and Disembarkation.—At the several ports of embarkation both in the United Kingdom and in France, transport officers were appointed, in accordance with pre-war organisation, early in August 1914. These officers had various publications issued to them to guide them in the execution of their duties, which dealt fully with the various stages of a transport operation, and it remained for the Transport Officers to see the orders executed, and to give individual transports directions where and when to move.

12. Time Table of Movements and General Plan of Transport carried out.—Having collected the transports at the ports of embarkation the next step was to move them by sea in accordance with the programme. A programme was issued arranging the sailings in accordance with the War Cabinet's decision. Most of the force was to sail from Southampton, but the 5th Division who were stationed in Ireland sailed from Dublin on August 13th and 15th direct to Havre, whilst a few other transports sailed from Queenstown and Belfast between August 13th and 21st carrying miscellaneous troop detachments, horses, and stores, which at the time were in Ireland. In order to retain two Divisions in England for Home Defence the 4th Infantry Division was taken out of the Expeditionary Force programme, but as it was necessary to transport this Division on August 12th it was ordered to Ireland to England instead of to France. It moved from Queenstown, Dublin and Belfast to Fishguard, Holyhead and Liverpool, on August 14th to 16th, principally in the steamers of the railway companies, though a few transports were lent in addition for this purpose. Generally, its transport did not come under the direction of the Admiralty Transport Department, and it was not included in the programme.

The Transport Department possessed a reserve over pre-war estimates owing to the 4th and 6th Infantry Division having been omitted from the programme, but on August 5th the former was ordered to France and entered the programme on the 14th day of embarkation, though no arrangements for it had been made in the programme of August 8th.

The pre-war programme of movements had been as follows:

On the first, second and third days of embarkation the staffs and units necessary for duty on the lines of communication, &c., were to be transported; on fourth, fifth, and sixth days the infantry, less the 4th Division, were to embark; on the seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, and eleventh days the cavalry and other units not in infantry divisions were to embark; on the twelfth and thirteenth days the 4th Infantry Division was to embark, and finally on the fourteenth and fifteenth days of embarkation base detachments were to be moved. The stores were to be moved concurrently.

The movements actually carried out did not differ very greatly from the pre-war programme, the only important variation being that the 4th Division when replacing the 2nd Division moved from Queenstown to England instead of to France. It moved from Queenstown, Dublin and Belfast to Fishguard, Holyhead and Liverpool, on August 14th to 16th, principally in the steamers of the railway companies, though a few transports were lent in addition for this purpose. Generally, its transport did not come under the direction of the Admiralty Transport Department, and it was not included in the programme.

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In terms of dates, then, the moves actually carried out were:

August 6th, 7th, 8th:
Before programme.

August 9th, 10th, and 11th:
First, second, and third days of embarkation. Staffs, units for lines of communication, &c.

August 12th and 13th:
Fourth, fifth, and sixth days.

August 15th, 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th:
Seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, and eleventh days.
1st Cavalry Division, 5th Cavalry Brigade. Various units.

August 20th, 21st:
Twelfth and thirteenth days. Base detachments.

2. Instructions to Chief of Transport Department, 6 pages.
3. Instructions to Transport Officers, 10 pages.
4. Instructions to Masters of Freight Ships, 8 pages.
5. Instructions to Masters of Transit Vessels, 5 pages.
6. Instructions to Officers of Transport Service, 5 pages.
August 22nd, 23rd:

Fourteenth and fifteenth days. 4th Infantry Division.

After August 23rd:

Reinforcements, &c.

By the eighth or ninth day of embarkation, that is August 16th or 17th, a certain margin of time had been gained as troops had been embarking and transports sailing a few hours ahead of schedule. As soon as transports were ready, whether by day or night, they had sailed, subject of course to considerations of weather, tide and time, and so the movements after the first few days were actually slightly ahead of the programme, and when referring to the above table for the date of a movement this should be remembered. For example, a proportion of the cavalry commenced to move on August 14th while the transportation of the infantry divisions was being completed although the “official” first day of embarkation for the cavalry was August 15th, but as some units of the cavalry division were still moving on August 16th, its dates of movement may be taken as the 15th to 16th August.

A number of transports engaged in carrying the British Expeditionary Force and its stores had 210 vessels. Of these, the majority made more than one passage, some making as many as nine between August 9th and 31st. No transports were lost during the passage either by accident or by enemy action, and the Transport Department’s working programme, which was drawn up on August 5th, required no modification on this account.

The organisation at the ports was controlled by the local transport officers as regards ordering particular transports to enter or to sail, providing them with pilots, &c., and in France the P.N.T.O., at Havre, exercised a general control over the N.T.O.’s at other ports. The decision as to whether troop transports should stop at Havre or proceed up the river to Rouen was in the hands of the N.T.O., Havre, who consulted with the military authorities in order to adjust disembarkation to the convenience of the military programme. This should be remembered. For example, a proportion of the cavalry commenced to move on August 14th while the transportation of the infantry divisions was being completed although the “official” first day of embarkation for the cavalry was August 15th, but as some units of the cavalry division were still moving on August 16th, its dates of movement may be taken as the 15th to 16th August.

The principle upon which the transports sailed and made their cross-channel passage is summarised in the Admiralty telegram to C.-in-C., Portsmouth, of 9th August:

“The transports will sail singly and not in groups, and make their best way from point to point. Patrol should not try to accompany each individual ship, but should be on the line in touch with each other, so as to be ready to be called up, if required.”

The Patrol referred to was the Portsmouth life-saving patrol (see para. 30) which worked along the Southampton to Havre route. The transports, therefore, at all the ports of embarkation in England, Ireland, and Scotland, loaded up according to the military programme, sailed as soon as ready by the direction of the Transport Officer of the port, and their way was as ordered and tide permitted. In most cases Havre or Boulogne, and there, after receiving orders from the Transport Officer to enter the port, unloaded their shipment of troops or stores, and returned to an embarkation port in the United Kingdom. To assist troop transports the port of Southampton was closed to commercial shipping from August 5th to 23rd and again on August 26th (Tels. 47, 215, 217).

Since no interference was attempted by the enemy, there is little to be said about the actual passage of the transports other than the plain fact that they were navigated from the United Kingdom to France without any incident of importance. On August 21st the transport of the four Infantry Divisions and the 1st Cavalry Division, as authorised on August 5th by the War Council, was completed, and by August 23rd the 4th Infantry Division also had been transported to France. By August 23rd, therefore, the essential British Expeditionary Force was landed in France and until September 8th, when the 6th Division was sent across, only reinforcements and minor detachments were being transported.

During this period there had been 358 sailings or a daily average of 24, by which 100,000 men and 12,000 horses had passed, and over 120,000 tons of stores, requiring altogether a daily average of 30,000 tons of transport, or a total gross tonnage of 1,340,576 tons.

**Notes:**
1. See Table in Appendix G3.
2. Tel. 75.
3. The Press Bureau on August 18th announced that the B.E.F. had landed in France on August 16th, but for the reasons stated in this chapter, August 9th to 23rd are considered to be the more correct dates of the transport.
4. This figure has been roughly calculated from the working programme.
5. Appendix G1.
Vice-Admiral Sir C. Burney was in command of the 2nd and 3rd Fleets and, on the outbreak of war, Vice-Admiral Bethell was appointed from the War College to hoist his flag in the 3rd Fleet under the general command of Vice-Admiral Burney in accordance with War Orders.

The 2nd Fleet was composed of the 5th and 6th Battle Squadrons, and the 3rd Fleet of the 7th and 8th, but on the 8th August they were re-organised, the 6th Battle Squadron ceasing to exist, and the 7th Battle Squadron being merged into the 8th.1

For operational purposes this left Vice-Admiral Burney in command of the 5th Battle Squadron of 10 Second Fleet ships:

- "Lord Nelson" (Flag),
- "Prince of Wales" (Squadron Flag),
- "Agamemnon",
- "Queen" (Squadron 2nd Flag),
- "Formidable",

with two attached cruisers, "Topaze" and "Diamond."

Vice-Admiral Bethell was left with the 8th Battle Squadron of eight 3rd Fleet ships:

- "Prince George" (Flag),
- "Vengeance" (Flag after August 15th),
- "Cesar",
- "Jupiter",
- "Canopus",
- "Albion",

with "Prosperine" attached.

Several other battleships which were originally in these two commands were detached for other duties before the passage of the British Expeditionary Force began, viz., the "Illustrious" reduced to "care and maintenance party" to provide crew for the "Erin"; the "Hannibal" and "Magnificent," sent to Scapa as harbour defence ships; and the "Victorious" and "Mars" to Grimsby for the same purpose.

On August 8th orders were sent from the Admiralty to Vice-Admiral Burney charging him with the duty of covering the movement of the British Expeditionary Force, and suggesting that he should place his ships near the western end of the Varne coast, as this would be a very favourable position to meet a raiding force, enabling him to deploy his fleet ready to receive them on a narrow front.4 Vice-Admiral Bethell was given separate orders to support the transports on the western side of the Dover Passage—Newhaven to Boulogne for stores and Southampton to Havre for troops.

The reason of these dispositions was plain. There were two main lines of passage—Newhaven to Boulogne for stores and Southampton to Havre for troops.

The 5th, the stronger Battle Squadron, Vice-Admiral Burney's, was placed on the Newhaven-Boulogne line, which was the nearest to the expected source of danger—a raid from the North Sea—and thereby covered both lines, whilst the 8th Squadron, under Vice-Admiral Bethell, was placed near the Southampton-Havre line, where the troop transports were continuously moving. One ship at a time from both battle squadrons was sent in to coal, the 5th Battle Squadron using Portsmouth or occasionally Dover, whilst the 8th Battle Squadron used Portland as their base.2

17. On August 10th the Admiralty approved a suggestion from Vice-Admiral Bethell that his patrol line should be withdrawn to between St. Albans and Cape de la Hague, about 60 miles west of the Southampton-Havre line, and hence the 5th Battle Squadron patrolled for two days.2 On August 16th the Admiralty withdrew this patrol altogether and Admiral Bethell took his squadron to Portland and until August 25th proceeded to sea only for firing exercises.

Until August 23rd the 5th Battle Squadron remained on their patrol, but on this date the Admiralty signalled that the main body of the Expeditionary Force would be across that afternoon and that the Channel Fleet could now be withdrawn and the 5th Battle Squadron proceeded to Portsmouth accordingly.2 Here half the squadron at a time were to rest with fires drawn at 48 hours' notice; but on August 25th the Ostende operations were initiated, and both the 5th Battle Squadron and the 8th Battle Squadron were sent to their home ports to embark marine detachments with which, on August 26th and 27th, they sailed for Ostende.6 But meanwhile the 8th Battle Squadron had been depleted of three battleships—the "Ocean," "Albion," and "Canopus"—which were required for the defence of trade in the Atlantic,7 and on August 29th these had been detached from Vice-Admiral Bethell's command to take up their new duties.

The movements of the Channel Fleet during the passage of the British Expeditionary Force were uneventful. The speed on patrol was seldom more than 7 knots, the lines of patrol were mostly regular "up and down" lines, and though the ships passed daily up and down the same area, no attack, either by submarine, destroyer, or by other craft, was attempted by the enemy.

18. Cruiser Force C—Cruiser Force C consisted of the "Euryalus," "Bacchantes," "Aboukir," and "Cressy," under the command of Rear-Admiral H. H. Campbell, to which the "Hogue" was added on August 11th.8 They were 2nd Fleet ships and were ready as they were most suited to patrol in a narrow front.4 Their orders of August 8th, 1914, Appendix A. 63.

The force was completed to full complement by Admiralty orders of July 27th,9 and by August 5th, 6th, and 7th patrolled the Broad Fourteens from the North Linder Light Vessel to Terschelling.10

On August 8th they were sent from the North Sea through the Straits of Dover to take up a patrol off Dungeness whilst the British Expeditionary Force was crossing. This patrol was from Dungeness to Vergeyon Shoals, about 20 miles west of the Hague, about 60 miles south-west of the Dutch coast, and was about 20 miles wide, running parallel to and about 20 miles from the Dutch coast, and about 20 miles wide, running parallel to and about 20 miles from the Dutch coast, and was about 20 miles wide, running parallel to and about 20 miles from the Dutch coast.

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1. Tels. 115.
2. Tels. 86, 87.
3. Tels. 86, 87.
4. Tels. 73.
5. Tels. 151.
6. Tels. 183.
7. Tels. 96.
8. Tels. 106.
9. Tels. 102.
10. Tels. 171.
11. Tels. 115.
12. Tels. 106. Appendix B.
13. Tels. 96.
14. "Broad Fourteens are an area of water off the Dutch coast of an average depth of 14 fathoms, running roughly in longitude 4° E. between lat. 53° N. (latitude of Texel) and lat. 52° N. (latitude of the Hague). It has no defined limits, but the Haaks Light Vessel, 30 miles west of the Texel, and the Maas Light Vessel, 10 miles west of the Hague, may be considered its rough northern and southern limits. It is about 60 miles long by 20 to 30 miles wide, running parallel to and about 20 miles from the Dutch coast, and is about 20 miles wide, running parallel to and about 20 miles from the Dutch coast. It constitutes the eastern side of the North Sea Narrows. Chart 2182 A."
Battle Squadron, and they acted both as a cruiser screen and as a link between him and the Dover Patrol and light forces further east. At night, from 8:00 p.m. until midnight, they "conformed to the Battle Squadron's movements," and steamed to the south-westward, turning at midnight on to the opposite course until 4:00 a.m., when they resumed their daylight patrol at 6 to 8 knots off Dungeness. One ship at a time was sent to Spitehead or to the Nore to coal, until on August 15th the force left the Channel and proceeded into the North Sea to support the Harwich flotillas off the Texel during the Grand Fleet sweep of August 16th. On this day, Admiral Christian was placed in command of the forces in the southern North Sea. After August 16th Cruiser Force C did not return to the Channel, but from August 17th to 22nd were on patrol at the southern end of the North Sea, supporting the Harwich flotilla. On this patrol the Admiralty could consider them as still employed in covering the transport of the B.E.F., for they remained a link between the Harwich flotilla and the Channel Fleet, although more advanced than in the Dungeness position, and to the east instead of the west of the Dover Patrol and submarine lines.

13. On August 22nd two cruisers of this force were detached to Ostende with two divisions of the Harwich flotillas to make a demonstration from seaward against German troops who had reached the coast, but the force was withdrawn on the same evening.

On the next day, August 23rd, the passage of the originally-planned British Expeditionary Force was complete, and the Admiralty gave orders that the watching patrol on the Broad Fourteens could be withdrawn and Cruiser Force C returned to the Nore by midday on the 24th. The following day, however, the Admiralty issued orders for a landing to be carried out at Ostende, and Cruiser Force C was directed to embark a marine detachment from Chatham, with which they sailed for Ostende at noon on the 29th, arriving at 8:00 p.m. that evening. The marines were landed, and at 4:00 p.m. the next day, August 30th, the cruisers left Ostende to take part in the Heligoland Bight operations, and proceeded to Terschelling Light Vessel, where they were on patrol throughout the 28th as a support to the Harwich flotilla, and covered the retirement of the forces; they did not actually come into action, but were of assistance in towing and escorting the damaged ships back to Sheerness; they returned to the Broad Fourteens on the morning of August 30th, and remained in support of the Harwich destroyer patrols until the disastrous September 22nd, when the "Hogue," "Cressy," and "Aboukir" were sunk in quick succession by "U. 9." on this patrol.

20. The Dover Patrol. From the beginning of the war the Dover Patrol fulfilled an important function. Dover was the pre-war base of the 6th Destroyer Flotilla, consisting of "tribal" class and 30-knot destroyers, the 3rd and 4th submarine flotillas, four scouts, and two gunboats. This force took over the duty of patrolling the Straits of Dover from the night of August 1st to 2nd. Emphasis in its orders was laid on the importance of this force denying passage to the Straits of Dover to an enemy, or, if the enemy was in strength, of reporting his presence to the V.A., Channel Fleet, and, further, instructions had been issued that coastal flotillas were not to be diverted from their patrol duties without direct orders from the Admiralty. Commodore Ballard, as Admiral of Patrols, was in command, but as he was also in charge of the East Coast patrols and frequently away from Dover, Captain Lowther Crofton acted as S.N.O. during his absence. Captain C. D. Johnson was Commander (D) of the 6th Flotilla.

The disposition of the Dover Patrol, as arranged before war, were as shown in Map, p. 70, and were largely governed by the configuration of the coast. The approach to the Straits of Dover from the east consists of three channels and two coastal routes, the latter hugging the Kent coast and the Flanders coast respectively.

There are four principal patches of shoal water forming these channels: (a) The Goodwins, shoaling several feet; (b) The South Falls (least depth, 4 fathoms); (c) The Sandettie Bank (least depth, 3½ fathoms); (d) The Outer Ruytingen (least depth, 7 fathoms).

At Dover, the rise and fall in springs is 18 feet and in neaps 14 feet, and a destroyer, therefore, would be able to cross the South Falls and Sandettie with safety at high water, but at low water a battleship or large cruiser drawing from 24 to 32 feet of water would not be likely to risk crossing them. The distances between the shoals at the southern, which is the narrowest, end, are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Miles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Goodwins and South Falls</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Falls and Sandettie</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sandettie and Ruytingen</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Between the Goodwins and the coast of Kent lies the route through the Downs, which for nearly 10 miles is, on an average, little more than 1 mile broad; and in this route, frequented by traffic, there would be little chance of an enemy squadron passing through undetected.

Off the opposite coast, from Calais to Ostend, for about 45 miles, are numerous shoal banks, amongst which a navigable passage can be found inshore; but in thick weather or by night, for an enemy who could not be certain of what navigational marks had been marked, this would be a passage difficult and daring in a destroyer and foolhardy in a large ship.

The navigational difficulties, then, of the passage from the North Sea into the English Channel were considerable for the destroyers, and restrict a squadron in itself, to the necessity of passing through one of three narrow passages which converge on a front of only 14 miles broad.

Along this front, from the South Goodwins to Ruytingen, the Dover patrol was disposed, whilst the French local destroyers, torpedo boats and submarines forming the defense, therefore, would be able to cross the South Falls and Sandettie with safety at high water, but at low water a battleship or large cruiser drawing from 24 to 32 feet of water would not be likely to risk crossing them. The distances between the shoals at the southern, which is the narrowest, end, are:
Commodore (S) had not been in favour of sending submarines into the Bight which he regarded as a hazardous experiment and preferred to use them as a watching patrol in southern waters.

The patrol first proposed consisted of two pairs, one patrolling on a line 11 miles south-east of the Outer Gallard, the other on a line 11 miles north-west of the West Hinder.

On August 8th, being strongly of opinion that the German High Sea Fleet would attack our Channel communications, Commodore (S) decided to increase his patrol to 10 boats, to shift it some 15 miles to the southward to patrol on two lines, one 15 miles south-east of the Galloper, the other 15 miles north-west of the West Hinder, evidently as constituting a better position in narrower waters for the interception of the German Fleet, while he himself in the "Larcher" with Captain Waistell in the "Firebrace," Commodore Somerville in the "Lemno," and Commander Palmer in the "Legion," would remain between the Galloper and West Hinder (a stretch of about 50 miles) till the transportation of the British Expeditionary Force was completed.

On August 9th, "E. 6" and "E. 8" returned from Heligoland Bight and Commodore (S) in reporting this arrival stated that they did not recommend further work of the kind in view of the number of trawlers there fitted with wireless.

After one day on the Galloper—West Hinder lines, Commodore (S) proposed to shift his patrol still further to the southward on to the line North Goodwin—Sandettie—Ruytingen, presumably in order to reduce still further the area covered and make more certain of sighting the enemy. This was not at first approved in view probably of the close proximity of the proposed line to the 4th Submarine Flotilla on the South Goodwin to Calais line, but on his again pointing out, at daylight on August 10th, that his disposition with only two scouting vessels did not ensure full use being made of his submarines, his proposal was approved and the patrol was finally brought down to the line North Goodwin—Sandettie—Ruytingen, that is practically to the month of Dover Straits and only 7 miles north of the Dover Patrol.

On the evening of August 10th the Admiralty informed Commodore (S) that the submarine patrol might need to be maintained for a fortnight, and that he was to arrange relief accordingly, but on August 12th they ordered him to withdraw half his D and E boats to Harwich, to fuel and to send two to Yarmouth in case of an attack on the Norfolk coast, and the next day, August 13th, Commodore (S) was told to withdraw the patrol altogether, evidently in order that they might take part in the Grand Fleet sweep on August 15th. From this time the 5th Submarine Flotilla was more regularly employed in offensive operations, co-operating with the Grand Fleet in their sweeps on August 10th and in the operations of August 28th, 1914.

24. The Harwich Force.—Watching Patrol on the Broad Fourteens.

To the northward of the submarine lines, forming the advanced force nearest to the enemy, were the 1st and 3rd Flotillas from Harwich, consisting of 35 L Class and Ariel Class Destroyers and two Flotilla Cruisers, under the command of Commodore (T) R. Y. Tyrwhitt. The general duty of the flotillas was that of sweeping the area to the southward of 54° N. and to the east of 2° E. with the object of keeping the eastern approaches to the English Channel clear of enemy torpedo craft and mine-layers, and also to reconnoitre and give early information of the movements of any enemy vessels sighted.

On August 5th the Harwich force left harbour to patrol this area and at about 11 a.m. met and sank the "Konigen Luise" laying mines east of the Shipwash Light Vessel. The next day H.M.S. "Amphion" struck a mine on this minefield on her way back to Harwich and sank. This minefield, described later as the Southwold area from 51° 33' N. to 52° 30' N. west of 3° E, had the effect of restricting the passage of an enemy moving from Heligoland Bight towards Dover to the Dutch coast side of the southern North Sea, i.e., to the Broad Fourteens, for the Germans were uncertain of its exact location.

On August 9th, the first day of embarkation of the Expeditionary Force, the Harwich Force took up a slightly different patrol line from the one which they had assumed on August 5th. The orders for this patrol stated that its main object was to keep the German High Sea Fleet at bay as long as possible, and to oppose the landing of the Expeditionary Force on the continent. This patrol, called the watching patrol in later Admiralty telegrams, was maintained by one-half of the Harwich Force at a time, i.e., one destroyer flotilla of 12 to 18 vessels with the "Amphion" or the "Fearless," and patrolled N.N.E. and S.S.W. from the Maas light vessel to the Haaks Light vessel, on roughly a 30 mile front, with subdivisions 3 miles apart.

From August 15th, Rear-Admiral Christian was nominally in command of Cruiser Force C., Commodore (T) and Commodore (S), and Cruiser Force C., acting directly in support of the flotillas. On August 21st further support was given by the creation of Cruiser Force K., consisting of the two battle cruisers "Invincible" and "Amethyst" or the "Fearless," and patrolled N.N.E. and S.S.W. from the Maas light vessel to the Haaks Light vessel, on roughly a 30 mile front, with subdivisions 3 miles apart.

1 "Fearless," Captain (D 1) and "Amethyst," Commodore (T). "Amphion," Captain (D 3) was sunk on August 5th, and was not replaced until "Faulknor" came in on August 15th.
2 Commodore Tyrwhitt and Captain Blom (D 3) were kept manned at full complement.

24. The Harwich Force.—Watching Patrol on the Broad Fourteens.

To the northward of the submarine lines, forming the advanced force nearest to the enemy, were the 1st and 3rd Flotillas from Harwich, consisting of 35 L Class and Ariel Class Destroyers and two Flotilla Cruisers, under the command of Commodore (T) R. Y. Tyrwhitt. The general duty of the flotillas was that of sweeping the area to the southward of 54° N. and to the east of 2° E. with the object of keeping the eastern approaches to the English Channel clear of enemy torpedo craft and mine-layers, and also to reconnoitre and give early information of the movements of any enemy vessels sighted.

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cruiser force for the support of the combined forces under Rear-Admiral

Cruiser Force K, however, did not go to sea until August 27th, when it took
part in the Heligoland Bight operations, after which it went north to Rosyth and was
re-absorbed in the Grand Fleet, leaving Cruiser Force C as the only immediate
support of the Harwich flotillas.

During the Grand Fleet’s sweep from the north towards the Heligoland Bight on
August 15th-17th, the Harwich Flotilla were at sea towards Terschelling co-operating
with the Grand Fleet and supported by Cruiser Force C, but no enemy ships were
sighted. The “watching patrol” was then resumed, and the next day, August 18th,
the “Fearless,” with the 1st Flotilla, sighted the “Rostock” when about 20° west of
Haaks Light Vessel. No action, however, developed, as the enemy was thought to be
the “York,” and the “Fearless” did not attempt to close her until the mistake was
discovered too late. In view of the position of the watching patrol being now known
to the enemy, the area patrolled that night was further to the southward.

25. Except for the above operations the watching patrol on the Broad Fourteens
was continuously maintained during the rest of the period of the British Expeditionary
Force, from August 9th to August 23rd. On this latter date, August 23rd, the Admiral ordered the patrol to be withdrawn and the destroyers and armoured cruisers returned respectively to Harwich and the North Sea.

On August 22 part of the Harwich force had been sent to demonstrate off
Ostende as described in the account of Cruiser Force C’s movements, but they returned to Harwich the same evening. For the next three days the main body of the flotillas were in harbour resting, and then at daylight on August 27th the whole force sailed to carry out the operations which resulted in the action in the Heligoland Bight of August 28th.

Returning from this on the night of 28th to 29th August the ships which had
suffered most damage were sent in to be repaired and others short of ammunition and
fuel were ordered to return to Scapa for action were then taken.

On August 29th all boats were sent in to oil as it was thought unlikely that the enemy
would be active immediately after the action of August 28th, and when complete with
fuel the patrol on the Broad Fourteens was resumed and maintained during the ensuing weeks.

26. The Grand Fleet.—The Grand Fleet had come from Portland to Scapa on
July 29th to 31st, and on August 4th Admiral Jellicoe hoisted his flag in the

Early that morning he had received orders to proceed to the eastward within
100 miles of the Norwegian Coast, when the cruisers were to make a wide semi-circular
sweep, searching for the North Sea, and early in the afternoon the Grand Fleet
was sent to their new fuelling base, Loch Ewe, to coal, and the Cruiser and Armoured
Cruiser Force C was sent to Scapa to bring the Fleet further south for the purpose of covering the Channel, and in fact it was on the very evening of the first day of embarkation, August 9th, that the Fleet was brought back to the North Sea.

On August 11th and 12th the Fleet was west of the Orkneys and on the 13th went to Scapa to refuel, the cruisers meanwhile continuing their sweeps across to
Norway north of 58° N., examining merchantmen, sinking some German trawlers,
but meeting no enemy ships nor finding the submarine or aeroplane bases, of which
rumours were still current.

27. Sweep of the North Sea.—On August 12th, the Admiralty, in view of the
silence and inertia of the German Fleet considered it possible that an attempt at
landing on a large scale might be pending and suggested that the Fleet should be
brought back to the North Sea.

The C-in-C, in reply was of opinion that if he returned to the North Sea the
object should be definite, and proposed a sweep for August 16th to the line Horn Reef to Flamborough Head, with the co-operation of the 1st and 3rd Flotillas from Harwich and Cruiser Force C.

This was approved and on August 14th movements began for the first sweep
towards the southward.

The Battle Fleet moved from the west to the east of the Orkneys, was joined
by the Northern Patrol, and the Cruisers and Flotillas including the 10th but excluding the 6th on the Northern Patrol, swept to the south-east towards the Heligoland Bight with the object of “examining the North Sea generally and getting in touch with the enemy if possible.”

In the south it was arranged for Rear-Admiral Christian to be on a line N. 30° W. from Terschelling with 4 “Bacchantes,” 36 destroyers, and 3 light cruisers, with 2 submarines off the Ems and 2 off the Jade. At 9.30 a.m. on August 16th the cruisers reached their southerly limit, a line joining Flamborough Head to Horn Reef Light Vessel, without sighting any enemy ships, and the Fleet then turned 16 points and withdrew to the northward. The Dreadnought Battle Fleet was sent to their new fuelling base, Loch Ewe, to coal, and the Cruiser and Armoured Cruiser Squadron swept up the Norwegian Coast.

On arrival at Loch Ewe on August 18th, Admiral Jellicoe at once proposed
further operations of the same nature for August 23rd, but these were not approved by the Admiralty, so that the second sweep was made on August 23rd, the object of which was apparently to
endeavour to intercept enemy ships which might be at sea and to counter any
28. Grand Fleet Bases.—Throughout Admiral Jellicoe's reports of early August the problem of fuel and a safe harbour for the Fleet appears to have been uppermost in his mind together with the possibility of the Germans having advance bases in Norwegian waters and employing torpedo craft to attack the Grand Fleet. The coal supply, which was too limited on August 4th to allow all ships to complete to full stowage, had been improved by August 10th, and the C-in-C. had it distributed between Scapa Flow, Rosyth, Cromarty, and Loch Ewe, the latter place being made the alternative coaling base for the Battle Fleet.

The Fleet went to Loch Ewe, after the sweep south, from midday on 18th to 7 p.m. on August 20th, when they returned to their previous cruising area east of the Orkneys, though from August 21st to 24th they were as far north as 60° instead of 58° to 59°. From the 26th until the end of August the Grand Fleet remained east of the Orkneys refuelling at Scapa and cruising between 58° north and 59° north, and usually between 1° west and 1° east, while the cruiser squadrons continued to sweep from Aberdeen to Norway, and the northern patrol guarded the northern exit from incoming or outgoing enemy vessels.

Three or four submarines were sighted during these patrols, but no successful attacks were made, and the Grand Fleet was able to maintain the positions selected by the Commander-in-Chief without further event.

29. 11th Cruiser Squadron (Cruiser Force E).—A brief account of this squadron may be included, as its ships covered both the passage of troops from Ireland to England, and the passage of transports moving from Glasgow, Liverpool, the Irish ports and Avonmouth to France. The squadron consisted of the “Doris,” “Venus,” “Isis,” “Minerva,” and “Juno,” 3rd Fleet ships, which were commissioned and paid under the command of Rear-Admiral Phillips-Hornby when war broke out and reached their station on August 5th and 6th.

Their function was to guard the Irish Channel, and principally the passage of transports across, from attacks of the enemy, which were expected to take the form of minelaying; they had also the duty of examining and searching merchant vessels homeward bound before they were allowed to establish their identity, and as in the case of the 11th C.S. the Admiralty directed the Rear-Admiral to hinder trade as little as possible in carrying out this duty.

The “Juno” was stationed at the northern entrance to the Irish Channel, the other four ships in the south. Until August 12th the latter cruised some distance to the westward beyond Ireland, but on August 13th they were placed on a line from Queenstown to the Scillies. It was on this day, August 12th, that the 6th Division in Ireland received orders to move to England, and on 13th-16th they were on their way across. Meanwhile a certain number of transports were moving from Avonmouth to France, and the 11th C.S. formed their sweep, which was continued to sweep from Aberdeen to Norway, and the northern patrol guarded the northern exit from incoming or outgoing enemy vessels.

After August 18th a reduced patrol was continued in the same waters carrying out the same duties, of which the protection and examination of trade soon became the most important as the number of transports moving from Irish ports was very small.

1 August 15th and 16th were the two heaviest days of transport (August 15th, 42 ships, August 16th, 41 ships), and it might be inferred that the sweep was definitely designed on this account. It appears, however, only conclusively connected with the British Expeditionary Force, for its origin is to be found in the telegram of August 12th, 1914 (Tel. 117), which is more concerned with the possibility of a raid than with communications in the Channel.

2 Grand Fleet Narrative, August 3rd, 1914, p. 75.

3 Tel. 98.

4 Tel. 121.

5 Telegrams referring to 11th C.S., 114, 121, 124, 145, 159.

6 Tel. 152.
A raid on the transports, therefore, really depended for its success upon the Germans evading our patrols in the North Sea, which required either thick weather or darkness, but these conditions introduced certain difficulties for the enemy, for the raiding forces would then run the risk of working in narrow unlighted waters close to shoal water, and in the narrower waters of Dover Straits would be unlikely to evade the Harwich Force and Dover Patrol. The alternative was to overwhelm the patrols which were supported by the 2nd and 3rd Fleet battleships, an operation certainly not wholly impracticable, as may be surmised from the work of the Flanders flotilla later in the war. Points would also have had their value, for a reconnaissance in force need not have entailed any serious loss, and the report of enemy ships would have dislocated the transport organisation and delayed the passage of troops, as occurred on a small scale on August 17th when the "Fearless" sighted the "Rostock." There can be no doubt that the free and continuous passage of our troops was a great military asset to the Allies in France during this critical phase of the war, and the enemy's lack of initiative at sea reacted heavily on their military campaign.

Further south the Harwich flotillas carried out patrols off the Dutch coast and were supported from August 16th by Cruiser Force C of "Cressy's." On August 5th they met and sunk the German minelayer "Königen Luise," and on August 17th the cruiser "Rostock" was sighted for a few minutes by the "Fearless." The submarines of the 4th and 8th Submarine Flotillas were on patrol between the Dover Patrol and the Harwich Flotilla, the disposition of the 8th Flotilla having been gradually shifted further to the south, but their employment in offensive operations in Heligoland Bight was restricted by the presence of hostile trawlers in that area.

The Dover Patrol, co-operating with the French, maintained their station in the Straits without enemy interference.

In the Channel the battleships of the 2nd and 3rd Fleet patrolled without interference or any noteworthy event from August 8th to 23rd, and were throughout assisted by French light forces.

After August 23rd the Admiralty considered that the transport of the original British Expeditionary Force had been completed, and the patrols were withdrawn for a time though the passage of troops continued and gradually increased in number until the end of the war, but the general disposition of our squadrons was regarded as, and proved to be, a sufficient protection.

The C.-in-C. had meanwhile on August 18th proposed a plan for another fleet sweep on August 24th, but this had been postponed. Commodore (S) had also on August 23rd proposed a sweep based on the reconnaissance work of his submarines in the Bight, and orders for an operation of this nature were drawn up by the Admiralty on August 25th involving the use of two flotillas of destroyers (31 boats), Cruiser Force K and Cruiser Force C, and three groups of submarines. C.-in-C., on being informed, proposed to co-operate, but the Admiralty approved of only the Battle Cruiser Force taking part. The signal of the V.A., B.C.S., informing the Admiralty of his disposition, was not sent till August 27th, and the Admiralty signal repeating it to R.A., Cruiser Force C, Commodore (T) and Commodore (S), was not received by the two latter, as they had left Harwich when the signal arrived.

The action in Heligoland Bight was the outcome of the sweep; in it the Harwich flotillas and submarines were engaged, supported by the B.C.S. and 1st L.C.S. with Cruiser Force C in reserve off Terschelling.

Submarines and mines were actively employed by the enemy during August, but in the North Sea only, and until late in September no submarine was seen in the Channel west of Dover; nor were any mines laid there.

Three important minefields were laid by the Germans in the North Sea—one on August 5th, by "Königin Luise," about 30 miles east of Aldeburgh; the second, on 26th August, off Newcastle; and a third off the Humber about the same time.

1 Tels. 167, 172.
2 Commodore (S) to C.O.S., August 23rd, 1914.
3 M.0073/14.
The German submarines operated chiefly east of the Orkneys in the cruising area of the Grand Fleet.

The movements of our ships early became of a routine nature, for they encountered no activity of the enemy, and the majority of the forces covering the British Expeditionary Force continued a regular uneventful patrol from August 9th until 23rd, without change of disposition.

33. On the evening of August 23rd, the transport of the first five infantry and one cavalry division had been completed, and from that date the passage of troops consisted only of reinforcements until September 8th, when the 6th Infantry Division crossed.

From August 24th onwards, although the German Naval forces made no active threat, military events on the continent induced an alteration in Naval dispositions, and created a great strain on our resources. The German advance to Antwerp seriously threatened the Channel ports of transport, including Boulogne, the main port of disembarkation of stores, and at 7.45 p.m. on August 24th the Admiralty felt compelled to issue orders to close and evacuate the harbour. The new harbour chosen was St. Nazaire, at the mouth of the Loire, in the Bay of Biscay. This meant a redistribution of the covering forces, but just at this time a large portion of the Channel forces was dispatched to assist in the landing at Ostend, which had been authorised on August 25th, and the 12th Cruiser squadron and the French 2nd Light Squadron were left to cover the line to St. Nazaire without the immediate support of the Channel Battle Squadron.

34. Demonstration off Ostende.—Four days before, on August 21st, when German cavalry were approaching the town, a naval demonstration had been arranged at Ostend by the Admiralty, and two Bacchantes of cruiser force C., a light cruiser and two divisions of Harwich destroyers had been ordered to be off the port at daybreak on August 22nd and open fire at any German troops approaching the coast, but the force was withdrawn the same day as it was thought that the inhabitants of Ostende would lose more by German retaliation than they would gain by any attempt at protection from the sea. On August 25th Burney's squadron, Bethell's squadron and cruiser force C. were ordered to Portsmouth, Devonport, and Chatham respectively to embark a field force of marines. The ships sailed that night from Spithead and Portland, where they had gone to refuel, embarked the troops on the 26th and sailed for Ostenda the same day. At daylight on August 27th cruiser force C. disembarked their detachment; the battle squadrons arrived later in the day, and all three marine detachments were landed on the 27th under General Aston, with a strength of 2,000 men. Cruiser force C. then hurried away to take part in the Heligoland Bight operations of August 28th in which they were required as a supporting force off Terschelling, whilst Vice-Admiral Bethell remained in charge of the Ostende operations.

On August 29th, it was officially decided to make St. Nazaire the base for all transport, and the Channel Fleet battle squadrons being required to cover the new and longer line of communication, on August 30th it was decided to withdraw from Ostende.

35. Channel Fleet Disposition after 24th August.—The shifting of the ports of disembarkation on August 24th and 29th, the demonstration and landing at Ostende and the continued inactivity of the enemy's Fleet which was contrary to early expectation, all tended to create a fresh situation after August 24th, and the dispositions for covering the line of passage underwent considerable modification.

On August 23rd when the Admiralty ordered the Channel Fleet to Portsmouth the Broad Fourteens patrol had been withdrawn, and C.-in-C. Portsmouth, was instructed to suspend the life-saving patrols. The Dover Patrol was maintained, but the 8th Submarine Flotilla line and the French and Channel submarine line were withdrawn. The new line of transport to St. Nazaire was covered by the 12th Cruiser Squadron (Cruiser Force G), and the French 2nd Light Squadron reinforced by two French armed merchant cruisers which extended their line of patrol though they still continued to examine all ships bound up Channel. The latter squadron had been told on August 24th to hold itself in readiness at Cherbourg for military operations, to the eastward, i.e., Ostende, but this was cancelled and they resumed their patrol.

The Battle Squadrons of the Channel Fleet returned from Ostende with the re-embarked marine detachments on September 1st, but did not continue their patrol in the Channel. Burney's 6th Battle Squadron lay at Portsmouth until September 4th, when they moved to Portland and remained there during September, only going to sea for exercises. The 8th Battle Squadron, mustering now only four ships, for the "Glory," "Albion," "Canopus," and "Ocean" had been detached on August 29th to reinforce the cruiser forces abroad, were also at Portland until September 12th, when they took over the western patrol duties of Cruiser Force G, which had been informed on September 10th that they would be sent across the Atlantic to escort the first Canadian troop convoy.

St. Nazaire remained the Army base until October 11th, when orders were given for it to be closed, and Havre once more became the main base with Boulogne as a secondary base, and the passage of troops continued without interruption.
APPENDIX A.

TELEGRAMS.¹

Home Waters.

26th July to 31st August 1914.

NOTE.—Notes in Italic are not in the original.

CALENDAR.

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Code Letters for Ports.

A. was Calais.
B. ,, Boulogne.
C. ,, Havre.
D. was Dunkerque.
R. ,, Rouen.

TELEGRAMS.

All Telegrams are in the Year 1914.

1. From C-in-C., H.F. To Admiralty.
332. Your 250. First fleet squadrons all disperse Monday 27th in accordance with your approved programme.—(H.S. 50, p. 20.)

2. From Admiralty. To C-in-C., H.F. 26/7/14.
No ships of First Fleet or flotillas are to leave Portland until further orders. Acknowledge—(H.S. 50, p. 28.)

3. From C-in-C., H.F. To Admiralty. 26/7/14.
338. Following ships of First Fleet are not present at Portland and Weymouth:

   — "Bellerophon"
   — "Boxburgh"
   — "Shannon" and "Natal"
   — "Washington"
   — "Lowestoft"
   — "Amethyst"
   — at Devonport giving leave.
   — at Chatham giving leave.
   — at Harwich.
   — at Home Ports giving leave.

259. Complete First Fleet with coal. Gunery practices arranged to be carried out from Portland can be continued.

5. From Admiralty. To A.O.P. 26/7/14.
Before giving leave to the 6th and 8th Flotillas further Admiralty approval is to be obtained.

By W/T.

101. Return to Portland with moderate despatch. (Copy to C-in-C., H.F.) (H.S. 50, p. 37.)

7. From Admiralty. To General and to Press. 27/7/14.
The Secretary of the Admiralty beg to state that it has been decided not to re-open the schools after the manoeuvre for the present; consequently the balance crew of the Second Fleet ships and vessels will remain in their ships.—(H.S. 50, p. 40.)

8. From Admiralty. To C-in-C., Home Ports, C-in-C., H.F., etc. 27/7/14.
251. The schools are to remain closed for present but boys and youths training establishments remain open. No men on four days' manoeuvre leave, belonging to 1st or 2nd Fleet, to be recalled, but second detachment are not to proceed on leave. Complete all 2nd Fleet ships to full numbers so far as resources allow until men on leave are back.

9. From Admiralty. To C-in-C., H.F.; S.N.O., Coast of Scotland; Ad. of Patrols. 27/7/14.
262. Admiral of Patrols is to keep all his vessels and to be responsible for Scottish coast, including Firth of Forth and Shetlands. Orkneys and Cromarty are to be defended by C-in-C., Home Fleets, with the 8-river class t.b.d.'s from Patrol flotillas, which eight are to remain under orders of C-in-C., H.F. They are to be despatched to Cromarty when ready. Some of destroyers now in 8th flotilla to change with some ex-coastals for patrol of Forth.—(H.S. 50, p. 44.)

283. Any further long leave for officers is suspended. Officers already on long leave need not be recalled.

265. 8th S.M. Flotilla has been ordered to proceed to the Humber early to-morrow, 28th July.*—(H.S. 50, p. 43.)

12. From Admiralty. To C-in-C., Nore, etc. 27/7/14.
"Magnificent," "Victorious," "Hannibal," "Mars," to be brought up to active crews and report when they are ready to proceed to Humber. "Majestic" and "Jupiter" to proceed with re-tubing as arranged.

"Abukir" and "Bacchante" will not go to Humber for the present.—(H.S. 50, p. 64.)

14. From Admiralty. To various S.N.O.'s abroad. 27/7/14.
Secret. European political situation makes war between Triple Alliance and Triple Entente by no means impossible.

* This was cancelled.

APPENDIX A.
26. Your 372, 63,250 tons of coal has actually sailed from Cardiff for Scapa since July 28th.


303. After the Cabinet this morning, I gave Monsieur Cambon the following aide-memoire:

(F) "I am authorised to give an assurance that, if the German Fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British Fleet will give all the protection in its power.

This assurance is, of course, subject to the policy of His Majesty’s Government; receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding His Majesty’s Government to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German Fleet takes place.

I pointed out that we had very large questions and most difficult issues to consider, and that the Government felt that they could not bind themselves to declare war upon Germany necessarily if war broke out between France and Germany to-morrow; but it was essential to the French Government, whose Fleet had long been concentrated in the Mediterranean, to know how to make their dispositions with their north coast entirely undefended. We were untried, it was impossible safely to send our military force out of the country.

Monsieur Cambon asked whether this meant that we should never do it, saying that I should say about the violation of Belgian neutrality. I told him the doctrine on that point laid down by Lord Derby and Lord Clarendon in 1867. He asked me what he should say about the violation of the neutrality of Belgium. I said that was a much more important matter; we were considering what statement we should make in Parliament to-morrow, in effect whether we should declare violation of Belgian neutrality to be a casus belli. I told him what had been said to the German Ambassador on this point. I also explained how, at the beginning of a great catastrophe such as this European War, of which no one could foresee the consequences where we had such enormous responsibilities in our Empire, as in India, or as regards countries in our occupation such as Egypt, when even the conditions of naval warfare and the possibility of protecting our coasts under these conditions were uncertain, it was impossible safely to send our military force out of the country.

Monsieur Cambon asked whether this meant that we should never do it. I replied that it dealt only with the present moment. He dealt upon the moral aspect of our sending only two divisions. But I said that to send so small a force as two or even four divisions abroad at the beginning of a war would entail the maximum of risk to them and produce the minimum of effect. (H.S., Vol. 51.)

From Admiralty. 2/8/14.
To C.-in-C., H.F., &c. At 1355.

At 2.20 to-day, 2nd August, the following Note was handed to the French and German Ambassadors:

The British Government would not allow the passage of German ships through the English Channel or the North Sea in order to attack the coasts or shipping of France. Be prepared to meet surprise attacks. (H.S. 51, p. 331.)

From Admiralty. 2/8/14.
To C.-in-C., H.F., &c. At 2105.

It is understood that French destroyers and submarines are being used to patrol the Straits of Dover by night and day. All ships and vessels are to be informed. Any ships known to be in this area to communicate to the British forces stationed in the North Sea to be informed by wire. (H.S. 51, p. 338.)

From Admiralty. 2/8/14.
To C.-in-C., H.F., &c. At 1115.

All colliers are being ordered to Scapa for the present. Any coal required for the Firth of Forth is to be sent on from Scapa. (H.S. 51, p. 279.)

From Admiralty. 3/8/14.
To C.-in-C., H.F., &c. At 2130.

French Fleet, consisting of one six-funnel cruiser, 10 light cruisers, seven battleships, steaming slow from South to South-West off Dover, 4.59 p.m. About 12 to 15 miles distant, apparently not trolling. (H.S. 51, p. 370.)

Note.—These were actually the cruisers and light cruisers of Admiral Roget's Squadron. There were no battleships.—T.S.D.D.

From Admiralty. 3/8/14.
To C.-in-C., H.F., &c. Received 2105.

The First Fleet is to leave Portland to-morrow, Wednesday, for Scapa Flow. 4,000 tons should have arrived by to-day; 3,001 tons should arrive to-morrow; 37,000 tons'...

To Capt. (D. 6), A.O.P.

The Dover Patrol is to take up war stations at 8 a.m., Tuesday. The Cross Channel Patrol is to act in conjunction with the French. No German vessels are to be attacked unless they first attack our vessels. The French vessels will attack in any case.—(H.S. 51, p. 610.)

34. From Admiralty, 4/8/14.

To Vice-Admiral, H.M.S. "Centurion," Kirkwall.

3. Open secret personal envelope taken with you from London and act forthwith upon the instructions therein contained. These orders are imperative.


To C.-in-C., H.F.

36. Their Lords have determined upon, and H.M. the King has approved, the appointment of Sir John Jellicoe as Commander-in-Chief. You are to strike your flag forthwith, embark in the "Sappho," or other cruiser, and come ashore at Queenstown, reporting yourself at the Admiralty therefor at your earliest convenience. These orders are imperative.—(H.S. 51, p. 662.)


To Vice-A., 1st B.S.

From patrol in the Channel is being carried out from 8.00 a.m. this morning. Cruiser Force G* will be in place from to-morrow morning.


To S.N.O.

At 1405. The British ultimatum to Germany will expire at midnight G.M.T., 4th August. No act of war should be committed before that hour, at which time the telegram to commence hostilities against Germany will be despatched from the Admiralty.

39. From C.-in-C., H.F.

To Admiral, 4/8/14.

4. Presume movements should commence Friday.—(H.S. 51, p. 810.)


To C.-in-C., H.F.

374. Your 4. Expeditionary Force not going. This movement need not take place.—(H.S. 51, p. 810.)

41. From Admiralty, 4/8/14.

To C.-in-C., H.F.

372. Use your discretion about withdrawing the 2nd Cruiser Squadron from the Shetlands. You have complete freedom of action as to Fleet movements now. FIRing has been heard off the Forth; patrolled, no details known. Report position and movements occasionally.—(H.S. 51, p. 867.)

42. From C.-in-C., H.F.

To Admiral, 4/8/14.

5. Please inform ships South of Rosyth His Majesty's gracious message. Will ships of "Duncan" class be ordered join Grand Fleet. I should much like them. The ships of Northern Patrol on way north.—(H.S. 52, p. 41.)

Norm.—They sailed at 1120 on 5/8/14 from Portland. H.S. 52, p. 132 (T.S.D.D.)

43. From Admiralty, 5/8/14.

To C.-in-C., H.F.

5. For the present you should keep north of 57° 30' N. unless there is some tactical reason. The domination of the northern entrance to the North Sea is most desirable.—(H.S. 52, p. 147.)

* i.e., 12th C.S. under Rear-Admiral Vivian in Channel West.

1

44. From Capt. (D.), To Admiral, 5/8/14.

"Amphion," report 3rd Destroyer Flotilla have sunk German minelayer "Konig Luise" at noon—day. 1415.

Norm.—Position reported later was 52° 34' N., 2° 34' E., approximate. Rough plan of minelayer by "Konig Luise" is on page 910 of Hist. Soc. C.D., volume 53, T.S.D.D.

45. From Capt. (D.), To 3rd Flotilla, 5/8/14.

At 1405. If you have any trouble with prisoners, shoot them.—(Lance's Sig. Log.)


At 2140. With regard to sunk German minelayer, following remarks of German petty officers, prisoners of war here, forwarded for consideration of Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty:

"If all the ships-of-war fire like them to-day, God help us."—(H.S. 52, p. 225.)

47. From Admiralty, 5/8/14.

To N.T.O., Southampton.

Immediate. Dockers manager should be informed that Southampton is to be closed to commercial shipping at once.—(H.S. 52, p. 349.)


To British D.N.T.O., St. Nazaire.

State how many transports can be dealt with in one day at St. Nazaire and Nantes respectively.

Norm.—No reply to this signal has been traced.—T.S.D.D.


To A.O.P.

At 1345. Coast must be patrolled day and night to prevent enemy minelaying.—(H.S. 52, p. 479.)


To " Bacchantes," " Anamethys," &c.

At 2328. Warning. Mikes have been laid between British coast and 3rd Meridian E. and between 52 degrees and 52 degrees 30 minutes North. Armoured cruisers addressed are to return to the Downs, keeping to the eastward of this area and are to indicate present position. "Cressey" has been ordered not to sail. First Flotilla, when returning to Harwich, is to keep to eastward and southward of mined area, 2328.


To C.-in-C., H.F.

At 1210. 3rd Expeditionary Force begin to move across the Channel on Sunday morning that the Grand Fleet should remain at sea while transports are leaving, but should not go south of latitude 57° N.—(H.S. 52, p. 743.)

52. From Admiralty, 5/8/14.

To V.A., 2nd and 3rd Fleets, Portland.

At 0115. Secret. The military force will begin crossing the Channel Sunday morning next. You should keep under way with "Lord Nelson," "Agamemnon" and the 5th Battle Squadron, and cruise between the longitude of Dungeness and the Owers. The transportation will last ten days; not more than two ships should be away coaling at a time.—(H.S. 53, p. 15.)

53. From Commodore (S)., 5/8/14.

To Admiralty (Chief of War Staff).

At 1118. Immediate. My telegram was correctly cyphered, but apparently wrongly transmitted, as second group you quote is erroneous. Telegram should read as follows: Propose postponing overseas operations from Yarmouth and concentrating all submarines in area arranged until after the transit of the Expeditionary Force. How many days will the passage occupy. As my whole force will be sea, I am unable to say that either Captain of the "Maidstone" or I will be at Harwich.—(H.S. 53, p. 73.)


To V.A., 2nd and 3rd Fleet, Portland.

At 1150. Secret. "Lord Nelson" and "Prince George," 6th B.S. cease to exist. "Lord Nelson" and "Agamemnon" and "Diamond" join 5th B.S. "Vengeance" joins 8th B.S. Four "Majesties" on East Coast will be known as 9th B.S.—(H.S. 53, p. 79.)


56. From Commodore (S)., 5/8/14.

To Admiralty.


A44.
63. Orders to V.A., "Lord Nelson." (V.A., 2nd and 3rd Fleets.)

58. [Continued]


58. [Continued]

56. [Continued]

50. [Continued]

49. [Continued]

48. [Continued]

46. [Continued]

40. [Continued]

38. [Continued]

30. [Continued]

28. [Continued]

26. [Continued]

22. [Continued]

20. [Continued]

19. [Continued]

17. [Continued]

15. [Continued]

14. [Continued]

13. [Continued]

12. [Continued]

11. [Continued]

10. [Continued]

9. [Continued]

8. [Continued]

7. [Continued]

6. [Continued]

5. [Continued]

4. [Continued]

3. [Continued]

2. [Continued]

1. [Continued]
81. From 2nd and 3rd Fleets.
To Admiralty.
Cruiser Force C and "Topaze" will patrol between Dunbegness and Vergoyer Shoal from 4.0 a.m. to 8.0 p.m. At 8.0 p.m. cruisers will close to the north and will stand to the S.W. until next morning return to the southward of patrol by 4.0 a.m. Battle Fleet will arrive in the vicinity of R.V. "A." in Lat. 50° 45' Long. 1° E. at 5.0 a.m. and 7.0 p.m. each day, shape course as requisite during the day and stand towards S.W. during the first half the night. Request English and French patrol be informed accordingly. Direct to give me immediate warning of enemy's approach. Some of Cruiser Force C will require coal shortly. Where should they go? It would be convenient if battleships could coal at Spithead. — (H.S. 53, p. 379.)

74. From Admiralty.
To Admiral, Devonport.
14. "Illustrious" to be reduced to C. and M. complement at once so as to provide crew for "Etna." All officers to remain on books of "Illusions," until further orders. Inform Vice-Admiral, 3rd Fleet Battleships. — (H.S. 53, p. 377.)

73. From V.A.C., 2nd and 3rd Fleets.
To Admiralty.
67a. Urgent. Requested that I may be informed whether English or French torpedo craft or submarines may be expected to meet with at night in area 6 miles either side of a line south of 50° West 50 miles from a position 50° 45' N. and 1° E. — (H.S. 53, p. 443.)

76. From Admiralty.
To C-in-C, Portsmouth.
At 1915. Table showing the number of transports sailing from Southampton each day was sent to you last night. The principal line to be provided for is the Southampton-Havre one, and if you have any vessels to spare after that Beachy Head to Boulogne. The transports will sail singly and not in groups, and make the best of their way from point to point. Patrol should not try to accompany each individual ship, but should be on the line in touch with each other so as to be ready to be called up, if required. — (H.S. 53, p. 441.)

77. From Admiralty.
To G.S.-in-C, G.F. At 2140 Gmt 1830.
269, 423. Take heavy ships to northward then west at once, and remain north-westward of the Orkney Islands. — (H.S. 53, p. 428.)

They remained to northward till 1 August 146—T.B.D.D.

78. From Admiralty.
To V.A.C., 2nd and 3rd Fleets.
9/8/14.
71. Your tel. 67a. Reply is in the negative. The orders for submarines and destroyers are as laid down in the plan of Anglo-French channel patrol. War Stations No. 2. — (H.S. 53, p. 443.)

79. From Seair, Sheerness.
To Aircraft, London.
9/8/14.
Grain patrol stopped. Wind south-westerly, force 35 miles per hour. Bad sea in Channel. Will not resume unless Admiralty wish risk taken. If machines come down at sea, total destruction almost inevitable. — (H.S. 53, p. 444.)

80. From Aircraft, Westend.
9/8/14.
To Seair, Sheerness.
At 1920.
Grain seaplane patrol till weather moderates. — (H.S. 53, p. 445.)

81. From Admiralty.
To C-in-C, Portsmouth.
9/8/14.
At 0120.
Your proposal to hire yachts is approved. — (H.S. 53, p. 513.)

82. From Comm (S) to Felixstowe W.T.
To Admiralty.
10/8/14.
At 0644.
•••• begins. Commodore (S), "Lurcher." Have resumed Gallipool Light Hinder line, but it is evident to me that even in such weather as yesterday this disposition, particularly with only two escort vessels, will not ensure full use being made of submarines. Opinion unchanged respecting this and it is intended to keep a reserve at Sandestice, if you have any vessels to spare after that Beachy Head to Boulogne. The transports will sail singly and not in groups, and make the best of their way from point to point. Patrol should not try to accompany each individual ship, but should be on the line in touch with each other so as to be ready to be called up, if required. — (H.S. 53, p. 441.)

83. From "Fearless" from Comm. (T.).
To Admiralty.
10/8/14.
Replied 0635.
Following message received from Commodore (S) begins: "Our large submarines are on the line north of Goodwind Lightship, Sandetice Lightship, Roytynsen Lightship. Any submarines to the northward of that line are enemies." Ends.

84. From A.C., 2nd and 3rd Fleets.
To A.C., 7th Squadron.
10/8/14.
Intercepted 0820.
Following received from "Marsillaise" begins: "French submarines are obliged to leave Cherbourg during the night in order to be sufficiently far to the eastward of Cherbourg by daylight as arranged by the two Admiral's. A recent occurrence has made me fear that British ships cruising off (1) do not know this (0630)."
Note on original telegram: "V.A., 2nd and 3rd Fleets dealing with this." — (H.S. 53, p. 546.)

85. From Comm (S.).
To Admiralty.
9/8/14.
Have resumed Gallipool Hinder line. — (H.S. 53, p. 528.)

86. From A.C., 3rd Battle Fleet.
To Admiralty.
9/8/14.
Received 1015.
0909. Propose to retire my patrol line to between St. Albans Head and Cape de la Hague. Where I shall be better placed for intercepting minelayers. Request approval. — (H.S. 53, p. 589.)

87. Reply.
Admiral, Devonport. At 1444.
9/8/14.
Approved between St. Albans and Cherbourg. French submarine patrol is between Portland and Cape de la Hague. Western patrol are stopping and examining all vessels. — (H.S. 53, p. 570.)

88. From C.-in-C., G.F.
To Admiralty.
9/8/14.
At 1 a.m.

89. From Commodore (S), Lurcher.
To Admiralty.
10/8/14.
Received 1200.
It is important that I should know how long the patrol is likely to be required, in order that I may arrange for relief. 1100. — (H.S. 53, p. 584.)

90. From Admiralty.
To C.-in-C., G.F. At 1235.
9/8/14.
Add following to paragraph 9 ordering orders for Expeditionary Force Transports: "No other lights are to be shown at night than Navigation lights. Search lights are to be kept closed at night and searchlights are to be down. Also add new paragraph 15: Three airships will probably be used to assist in patrolling the waters between S.E. England and the French and Belgian coasts during the transport of the Expeditionary Force."

91. From C.-in-C., C.F. Home Fleet.
To Admiralty.
10/8/14.
Received 1235.
69. Your 427 proposing to commence search Norwegian fjords to-morrow morning, with a view to immediate offensive measures against any submarine boats found using them as base, or more than 24 hours at anchorage. Please telegraph if approved as soon as possible. — (H.S. 53, p. 589.)

92. From Admiralty.
To A.O.P., 8c.
9/8/14.
Aircraft "Parseval," "Delta," "Astra Torres" and seaplanes are patrolling Straits of Dover and in vicinity of Straits. — (H.S. 53, p. 606.)

93. From Admiralty, Transport Office.
To Principal Transports, Havre.
10/8/14.
Arrivals transports to be reported to me at once by wire. Stop. Instruct Divisional Naval Transport Officers. Stop. Have "Laura Sarnia Vera arrived."
94. From Admiralalty.
To C.-in-C., G.F.
10/8/14.
At 1534.

95. Secret. Scans having been discovered by enemy as our war anchorage is necessarily
provide for another one on North-west, coast of Scotland, Loch Ewe and Loch Broom are
both suitable. Where do you propose fuel to be sent? One hundred modified sloops are
being made for defensive use by trawlers or destroyers. How many do you want?

96. From Admiralalty.
To C.-in-C., Portsmouth.
10/8/14.
At 1014.

97. From Admiralalty.
To Admiralalty Transports, Southampton.
10/8/14.
At 2205.

98. From Admiralalty.
To Admiralalty Transports, Nore.
10/8/14.
At 0915.

99. From C.-in-C., G.F.
To Admiralalty.
10/8/14.
At 0914.

100. From Admiralalty.
To Admiralalty.
10/8/14.
At 0945.

101. From Admiralalty.
To C.-in-C., G.F.
10/8/14.
At 1145.

102. From Admiralalty.
To C.-in-C., Home Fleets.
10/8/14.
At 1114.

103. From Admiralalty.
To C.-in-C., Portsmouth.
10/8/14.
At 0914.

104. From Admiralalty.
To Admiral.
10/8/14.
At 1014.

105. From Admiralalty.
To Admiralalty Transports, Havre.
10/8/14.
At 1225.

106. From Admiralalty.
To Admiralalty.
10/8/14.
At 1018.

107. From Admiralalty.
To Admiralalty Transports, Southampton.
10/8/14.
At 0915.

108. From Admiralalty.
To A.O.P., Comm. (S), Comm. (T).
10/8/14.

109. From Admiralalty.
To C.-in-C., G.F.
10/8/14.
At 1014.

110. From Admiralalty.
To C.-in-C., G.F.
10/8/14.
At 1114.

111. From Admiralalty.
To C.-in-C., G.F.
10/8/14.
At 0914.

112. Omitted.

113. From "Canopus."
To "Prince George."
12/8/14.
 Intercepted 1205.

114. From Admiralalty.
To 11th Cruiser Squadron.
12/8/14.
Sent 1450.

111. Admiral Purefoy appointed Senior Naval Officer, Loch Ewe. He will endeavour to leave
their north or north-west coast of Scotland. Loch Ewe and Loch Broom are
both suitable. Where do you propose fuel to be sent? One hundred modified sloops are
being made for defensive use by trawlers or destroyers. How many do you want?

112. Omitted.

113. From "Canopus."
To "Prince George."
12/8/14.
 Intercepted 1205.

114. From Admiralalty.
To 11th Cruiser Squadron.
12/8/14.
Sent 1450.

9. Transports with Expeditionary Force will be crossing from Queenstown, Dublin and Belfast
to France, commencing to-morrow. You must arrange to prevent any enemy's cruisers
from interfering with their passage as far as the latitude of the Scillies.—(H.S. 64, p. 94.)

1 Re precautionary arrangements for life-saving.
From Admiralty.

To V.A., 7th and 8th B.S. and
V.A., 2nd and 3rd Fleets.
9. To return to Portland complete with coal and be ready for further service. Draw lines in boilers not required for 11 knots. (H.S. 54, p. 132.)

From Admiralty.

To Commodore (S).
12/8/14.
Sent 1053.

22. Reference my 33. Half B and E submarines to be withdrawn from Patrol and sent Harwich to fuel. Two E boats then proceed Yarmouth in case of mid Norfolk coast, remaining awaiting orders at Harwich. Acknowledgement. (H.S. 54, p. 153.)

From Admiralty.

To G.F.
12/8/14.

120. IIS.

In addition to the possibility explained in Admiralty appreciation situation sent you on the 33rd, we cannot wholly exclude the chance of an attempt during this week on a large scale, supported by High Sea Fleet. Extraordinary silence and inertia of enemy may be to generate serious enterprises. Our view remains as expressed in policy appreciation, and even if larger landing force were employed the general principle action will remain unaltered except the urgency of intercepting the landing will of course be greater. You ought, however, to be nearer the theatre of decisive action as we originally contemplated, and now that you have shaken off the submarine menace, or as soon as you can do so, it would appear necessary to bring Fleet to the eastward of the Orkneys, passing either north or south of the Shetland Islands, keeping well out of sight of land. Stop traffic if necessary. Cruiser sweeps to the south and south-east should be made as convenient. (Signed) A. P. Addison. (H.S. 54, p. 225.)

121. From C.-in-C., G.F.

To Admiral.
12/8/14.

18. 3 Tel.

N o record of this; it is not mentioned in G.F. Narrative.

122. From H.M.S. "Larisher."

To Admiralty.
12/8/14.

Received 2000.

6. Referring to your 412, 11th Cruiser Squadron and "Caronia" will proceed to take up position on line Dunst. Rock, Bishop Light, at intervals of 25 miles, commencing 10 miles from Dunst. Rock. Suggest transports should be informed of the position of these cruisers, so that if attacked they can run for support. "Juno" proceeds to guard North Channel. (H.S. 54, p. 171.)

123. From Commodore.

To Captain, G.F.
12/8/14.

From 3rd B.S. using Cromarty as a base. Request to be furnished with any information gained and "Gibraltar" left to-day to support her and watch line Faroe Islands-Iceland. 2nd and 3rd Flotillas, supported by Cruiser Force C., may be on line westward; also that our submarines may be warned of movements, and not to be within thirty miles of line Horn Reef-Flamborough Head. On completion of sweep, I propose returning with Grand Fleet to west of Orkneys, and coal Loch Ewe and Scapa.—(H.S. 54, p. 296.)

124. From Admiral.

To V.A., 2nd and 3rd Fleets (79).
12/8/14.

18. At 1200.

On completion of sweep, I propose returning with Grand Fleet to west of Orkneys, and coal Loch Ewe and Scapa — (H.S. 54, p. 239.)

125. From Commodore.

To Admiral.
12/8/14.

Received 2103.

105. Your 432. I am of opinion that when Grand Fleet goes into the North Sea the object should be definite, and as soon as the object is accomplished Fleet should withdraw. Indefinite movements entail risk from mines and submarines with no compensating advantages. With this object in view, I propose to take the measures named below:


From Rear-Admiral.
12/8/14.

At 2000.

From Commodore.
12/8/14.

(Received 2103.)

At 0900.

13/8/14.

To Commodore (S).

From Commodore (S), 12/8/14.

(H.S. 54, p. 225.)

126. From C.-in-C., G.F.

To Admiral.
12/8/14.

From C.-in-C., G.F.

Tel. 116.

119. 125.

No record of this; it is not mentioned in G.F. Narrative.
128. From Admiralty. 15/8/14.
To C-in-C., G.F.
472. "Oceanic" and "Alsatian" will be sent in a day or two to join Cruiser Force B under your orders. There seems to be a possibility, if the High Sea Fleet comes out and your attention is diverted to meeting it, a cloud of commissariat destroyers may be let loose. Two more will be sent as soon as ready.—(H.S. 54, p. 498.)

129. From Admiralty, Portsmouth. 15/8/14.
To Admiralty. Received 1040.
32. Your 23. Delay caused by insufficiency of Southampton pilots, who are kept at Southampton for outgoing transports. Local efforts being made to obtain more, also dispense with them in some cases; also for one pilot to take back three or four empty at a time.—(H.S. 54, p. 491.)

130. From Admiralty. 14/8/14.
To "Larcher." Sent 1634.
36. Withdraw Patrol and proceed to Harwich with all submarines. Await further orders.—(H.S. 54, p. 490.)

131. From C-in-C., G.F. 14/8/14.
To R.A.C., 10th C.S.
What is your position? What movements yesterday and projected movements for to-day?—(G.F. Narrative of Events.)

132. From R.A.C., 10th C.S. 14/8/14.
To C-in-C., G.F. At 1220.
Your 1009. My position 10 a.m.: Latitude, 60° 30' N.; Longitude, 0° 14' W. Movements of 10th C.S.: "Crescent" and "Phoenix" on south part of patrol; "Royal Arthur" and "Hawk" on north part of patrol; "Grafion" and "Edgar" to coal at Rusta Voe; "Endymion" and "Gibraltar" at Force Islands with "Drake." To-day, "Hawk" on north sweep position at 10 a.m., Latitude 62° 20' N., Longitude 1° 34' E.; "Crescent" to Lerwick this afternoon and coal and repair leaky joint; "Endymion" and "Gibraltar" still with "Drake" (1200). —(G.F. Narrative of Events.)

133. From C-in-C., G.F. 14/8/14.
To R.A., 10th C.S. At 1555.
If you have enough coal for three days steaming at 12 knots, and have no important project in hand, could you, by 8 a.m. to-morrow, Saturday, 15th August at rendezvous Latitude 59° 0' N., Longitude 30° E.—(G.F. Narrative of Events.)

To C-in-C., G.F.
I shall be at rendezvous 59° 0' N., Longitude 30° E., at 8 a.m., to-morrow, Saturday.—(G.F. Narrative of Events.)

135. From Admiralty. 15/8/14.
To R.A.C., Cruiser Force C. Sent 0900.
Commodore (T). Commodore (S).
R.A., Christian, whose flag is now flying in "Euryalus" at Sheerness, will transfer his flag to "Sapphire" at Dover at 4 p.m., 15th August, and from that time Cruiser Force C and Commodore (T) and Commodore (S) will come under his command temporarily pending further orders.—(H.S. 54, p. 778.)

136. From C-in-C., G.F. 15/8/14.
To General (to ships in company).
For information. The Grand Fleet to-day will sweep to eastward, the direction of the sweep being altered to southward this evening. Cruisers will be spread well abroad. If nothing occurs in the interval, the Fleet will return North on Sunday. The object of the movement is to examine the North Sea generally, and get in touch with the enemy if out. Our forces to southward are co-operating.—(G.F. Narrative of Events.)

137. From Divisional Transports, Boulogne. 15/8/14.
To Admiralty. Received 0815.
Tugs available numerically sufficient and capable of carrying out work in calm weather, but lack power for very large vessels now arriving; should weather change for the worse submit that three powerful tugs may be sent.—(H.S. 54, p. 619.)

138. From Admiralty. 15/8/14.
To Admiral, Portsmouth.
Your 22. Your 22. Ships urgently required to embark troops are still delayed by examination service in Sandown Bay. Immediate arrangements must be made to bring them up, otherwise military programme will be disorganised.—(H.S. 54, p. 651.)

139. From V.A.C., 2nd and 3rd Fleets. 15/8/14.
To Admiralty.
851. Following received from "Mar法律顾问": Begins: With reference to signal "Prince George" stating she is leaving patrol line, please confirm that there will not be any British ships patrolling between Chequers and English coast. In that case, I propose extending French patrol further northwards. Ends. I have concurred in French Admiral's proposal. 1140.—(H.S. 54, p. 656.)

140. From C-in-C., Portsmouth. 15/8/14.
To Admiralty. Received 1209.
34. There is some congestion of empty transports Sandown owing to rain and fog. Master of transports declines responsibility of proceeding without pilot. Have telegraphed for 12. I hope to clear away congestion without much more delay.—(H.S. 54, p. 664.)

141. From Admiralty, Portsmouth. 15/8/14.
To Admiralty. Received 1336.
19. Referring to your telegram No. 12, delay not to be attributed to Examination Service at all, but to causes already explained in preceding telegrams 20 and 23 of 14th August and 14 of 15th August. Already this forenoon 10 transports have been sent and only two remain. Every possible effort to facilitate and expedite transport service is being made, importance being fully realised.—(H.S. 54, p. 690.)

142. From Admiralty. 15/8/14.
To C-in-C., G.F. At 1409.
450. "Bacchantes," thirty-six destroyers and three light cruisers will be on a line N. 30° W., from Terschelling Light, forty miles in length by 9 a.m., to-morrow, Sunday; two submarines off the Jade and two off the Ems by 6 a.m. Sunday. Regular submarine blockade established. No submarines will operate north of Latitude 56° N. The Force under Rear-Admiral Christian. It is believed no mines recently laid. Routes Blyth to Hull and Bergen to Newcastle are considered clear; merchant ships are running.—(H.S. 54, p. 762.)

143. From Havre Docks. 15/8/14.
To Admiralty. Received 1648.
Request Irish and West Coast transports to be instructed to report through War Signal Stations probable time of arrival at overseas port if practicable as early as possible. Estimated time of arrival now telegraphed has proved to be not sufficiently accurate, which makes overseas railway transport difficult. Priority forms over land lines would be advisable for these reports. The ports concerned are Avonmouth, Belfast, Queenstown, Liverpool, Southampton. Have instructed transports that, in reporting to War Signal Stations (para. 46 of their instructions), they should communicate probable time of arrival overseas port. Will you please instruct the War Signal Stations to pass the messages on to the overseas ports, using priority forms. The telegraphic addresses are: "Divisional Transports, Havre." Rouen. " " Boulogne. D.D.O. GRANT THOMSON, for D. of T., 15/8/14.

144. From P.N.T.O., Havre. 15/8/14.
To Admiralty. Received 1703.
Weather and other conditions permitting, much time would be saved if horse kowls were not left rigged during voyage. Present system is extremely serviceable, but has the disadvantage of saving time. When may the "Laistane" be expected?—(H.S. 55, p. 16.)

To Admiralty. Received 0256.
11th Cr. Squadron all employed covering transports and guarding cables. When may the "Laisance" be expected?—(H.S. 55, p. 78.)

146. From C-in-C., Home Fleet. 16/8/14.
To Admiralty. Received 1040.
39. Sent 10 miles beyond line Horn Reef-Flamborough Head, sighted nothing. Now steering N. by W., sweeping front 150 miles broad. (0950.)—(H.S. 55, p. 47.)

147. From P.N.T.O., Havre Docks. 16/8/14.
To Admiralty. Sent 1051.
Transports "Eaton Hall," "Hazelwood," are being diverted to Rouen at request of military authorities. —(H.S. 55, p. 109.)

To Admiralty. Sent 1120.
Have you anything to report?—(H.S. 55, p. 109.)
From D. of T. To D.O.D. 16/8/14. At 1700. Transport “Matheson,” No. 8120, left Havre, 12.30 a.m., to-day for Queenstown or Liverpool, requires to be diverted to Dublin to arrive there to-morrow for embarkation 18th. Can you get into touch with her and convey the above orders? (Signed) CHARLIE THOMSON, for D. of T.  

(H.S. 55, p. 126.)

From “Sapphire.” To Admiralty. 16/8/14. Arrived off Western Sea noon to-day: nothing seen of enemy. Sighted one Dutch cruiser off the Texel 6.30 o’clock this morning; two Dutch torpedo boats off Stote Meik, 10.2 a.m.; small Dutch destroyer off Terschelling Island at 11 a.m. Repeating operations to-morrow 6.45.—(H.S. 55, p. 153.)

Note on original “Suggest preliminary arrangements stand. It only means a more advanced position for destroyers giving early information for Expeditionary Forces.”

From C-in-C, Home Fleets. To Admiralty. 16/8/14. To-day there were 23,000 tons of coal Scapa Flow, 3,400 Cromarty, 3,4000 (corrupt group—probably Loch Fyne), just over replenishing Grand Fleet. Number of colliers quite insufficient for rapid coaling, and amount arriving hardly keeps pace with expenditure. Consider situation very serious.—(H.S. 55, p. 176.)


From Admiralty. To R.A., “Sapphire.” At 2300. Signal received. An advance beyond the Terschelling line is not to be made to-morrow, Monday. Arrange about reliefs of destroyers who, after noon, Monday, can fall back on original patrol line; C Cruiser Force to return to the Downs at noon. Retains “Sapphire” as convenient to transfer your flag to “Euryalus,” now ready for sea. “Aethedus,” when ready, will be attached to “Euryalus.”—(H.S. 55, p. 186.)

From C-in-C, Home Fleet. To Admiralty. 17/8/14. Received, 0635. 132. Your 491 urgent. Unless considerably more colliers can be sent for use of Grand Fleet, operations will be most seriously hampered. Supplies are getting less instead of greater. Only just sufficient for rarest (sic) fill, and that slowly.—(H.S. 55, p. 236.)


(H.S. 55, p. 237.)
In view of the position of our destroyer patrol being known the destroyers must be more 
concentrated and a position further south taken up with the cruisers acting as a support not 
more than 20 miles to the southward. Suggest patrolling on the parallel of South's knoll 
across the expected course of enemy from 3° E. to the Dutch coast until to meet 
Commodore (S) and support submarines. Acknowledge.—(H.S. 56, p. 666.)

To Admiralty. 
Request information whether it is considered safe for transports and mine sweeping 
trawlers bound north to proceed to their destination. Several were turned back yesterday 
by Thomas patrol and are now here.—(H.S. 55, p. 777.)

Received 1429. 
Destroyer patrol to-night is to go to South of 52° 20' North and should be on their limit at 
10 p.m. Cruisers should come South inshore to East of you. Report when destroyers have 
been informed.—(H.S. 55, p. 769.)

Sent 1615; Received 1633. 
With reference to your telegram of to-day referring to 4th and 6th Division I have conferred 
with military authorities and arrangements have been made accordingly.—(H.S. 55, p. 800.)

At 1635. 
Three battleships of your squadron are required for the defence of trade at their focal points. 
"Canopus" at St. Vincent, Cape Verde. 
"Albion" with Rear-Admiral at Gibraltar.

Sent 1800. 
It appears that when news of reported presence of German vessels was received on morning 
of 15th, all transports, mine sweeping trawlers and merchant traffic were held up for a considerable 
period and considerable dislocation of traffic ensued and unnecessary alarm caused. This 
action should be used as sparingly as possible and steps should be taken to restore normal 
conditions as soon as possible. When local authorities stop traffic owing to immediate presence 
of enemy Admiralty should be at once informed.—(H.S. 55, p. 883.)

Sent 1737. Received 1815. 
Arrange for life-saving patrol to recommence at daylight to-morrow, Saturday.—(H.S. 56, p. 382.)

179. From Admiralty. 20/8/14. To Admiral, Portsmouth. 
Sent 1740. 
In your telegram 19th August, I have visited Bouen and am of opinion that 
tugs are only required in river and estuary to be ready to assist immediately if a transport 
should be grounded or be in difficulties with possibility of blocking river. Five tugs will be 
sufficient for this and seven are required at Havre at the present time.—(H.S. 56, p. 387.)

At 2015. 
A German cavalry force may be expected at Ostend to-morrow morning, Saturday. Arrange 
for a light cruiser and two divisions of destroyers to make a demonstration before Ostend 
and along the coast supported by two “Bacchantes” outside the shoals.—(H.S. 56, p. 457.)

181. From Transports. 21/8/14. To Admiralty, Transports, Southampton, Newhaven. 
At 2039. 
Masters Transports to be instructed to illuminate their special number when entering Havre 
during hours of darkness.—(H.S. 56, p. 429.)

At 1740. 
12. Your 1135, August 22nd. Withdraw the whole force, giving necessary orders.—(H.S. 56, p. 910.)

At 1456. 
The main body of the Expeditionary Force will have crossed this afternoon. You can 
return with the Channel Fleet to Spithead after 4 p.m. to-day. 
Inform C-in-C., Portsmouth, probable time of arrival. 1456.—(H.S. 56, p. 779.)

At 1720. 
16. The watching patrol on the Broad Fourteens is to be withdrawn. Destroyers are to return 
to Harwich. You should give the necessary orders. All ships of Cruiser Force "V" are to 
carry out target practice to-morrow, unless any of the ships are short of coal. After target 
practice, unless conditions change, ships are to return to the Nore to coal ready for further 
service.

Sent 2210. 
The life-saving patrol may be suspended, but may be required again in a few days.—
(H.S. 56, p. 865.)

1. Telegraph at 2145 altered this to 23rd August, and Telegraph at 1630 on 20th August altered it again to 22nd August.—
T.S.D.D.

2. Related to life-saving patrol.
3. Not traced. The withdrawal referred to the demonstration off Ostend, Telegraph 1810.
To Admiral, Chatham.
At 2248.
In view of congestion at Southampton it is desirable to allow some of Union Castle steamers to lie at Southend. This is to be arranged, if possible. Telegraph reply.—(H.S. 57, p. 868.)

197. Directions to Director of Transports. 24/8/14.
1. Stop all sailings of ships with men and stores under orders to proceed to Havre and Boulogne, pending further instructions.
2. Report amount of stores actually accumulated or now under way at Boulogne or Havre, if any.
3. Report arrangement capable of being at once made to transfer stores, &c., to Cherbourg.
4. War Office must be immediately consulted about what stores should not be removed because wanted immediately for the Army.—(H.S. 57, p. 79.)

Note on original “No action other than report on (2) and (3) until (4) is clear.”

198. From Admiralty (T). To Transports, Newhaven, Sussex.
At 1110.
No transport is to sail to Boulogne or Havre until further orders. Acknowledge.

To Principal Transports, Havre.
Report number of tons stores now at B and C and the number of transports required to convey them to Cherbourg.—(H.S. 57, p. 82.)

200. From C-in-C., Portsmouth. 24/8/14.
To Admiralty, Sub-Committee.
Received 1211.
7. Vice-Admiral Burney, Channel Fleet, has arrived Spithead and states that although Fleet is now efficient, desirable when circumstances permit to draw fires for 48 hours to clean sweeping tubes, &c., as steam has been continuously up for 24 days. If you approve, suggest ships come into harbour at 1 p.m. to-day—please telegraph if approved as soon as possible.—(H.S. 57, p. 87.)

201. From Admiralty. 24/8/14.
To C-in-C., Portsmouth.
At 1310.
One half of ships at a time may draw fires for 48 hours, but this may be interrupted any moment. Several battle squadrons to be kept ready for sea during this time. Inform Admiral Bethell.—(H.S. 57, p. 85.)

To Marine, Paris.
At 1140.
The Admiralty think it essential in the Naval interest to defend Dunkerque, Calais and Boulogne as long as possible. The Admiralty authorises the Squadron of Admiral Rouyer to co-operate in the defence by land of these three places, (En clair) to be continued.—(H.S. 57, p. 90.)

To Admiralty Transports, Avonmouth.
At 1140.
No transports to sail for B or C until further orders. Acknowledge.—(H.S. 57, p. 89.)

204. From Admiralty. 24/8/14.
To C-in-C., Home Fleet.
At 1140.
July 64. The 60,000 tons at this place are tons measurement. Boulogne has been ordered to report direct to Admiralty.—(H.S. 57, p. 243.)

205. From Principal Naval Transports Officer, Havre. 24/8/14.
To Admiralty (T). 2309.
B. 64. The 60,000 tons at this place are tons measurement. Boulogne has been ordered to report direct to Admiralty.—(H.S. 57, p. 243.)

206. From Principal Naval Transports Officer, Havre. 24/8/14.
To Principal Transports, Havre.
At 2323.
You are to unload and return to embarkation ports Achlibster and Nuceria will be sent to Boulogne to assist remove stores to Cherbourg (stop). “Saturnia” should not remain at Boulogne (stop).’ (H.S. 57, p. 249.)

207. From Admiralty, to (1) Divisional Transports, Calais; (2) Principal Transports, Havre.
(1) Leave for Havre at once and report yourself to Principal Transport Officer.
(2) D.N.T.O., Calais, has been ordered to report himself to you at Havre.—(H.S. 57, p. 247.)

208. From First Lord. 25/8/14.
To C-in-C. (At 0120.)
The British Government is examining the desirability of transporting from Boulogne to Cherbourg all military stores of British Expeditionary Force. It desires to know the views of the French Government on the necessity for this transportation when the results of the present battle become more apparent. The War Office has informed the Admiralty that it is consulting you on the question of the permanent defence of the Isthmus of the Cotentin in case the course of the war should necessitate its being made a place of arms and a sea base for British reinforcements.—(H.S. 57, p. 146.)

209. From Admiralty (T). To Divisional Transports, Boulogne.
24/8/14.
“Woodfield” sailed Avonmouth for Boulogne this morning. Wheeled vehicles may be unloaded but no stores.—(H.S. 57, p. 160.)

To Marine, Paris.
At 1800.
Years to-day. Presume you are obtaining number tons measurement stores now at B. and C. (stop) Information urgently required.—(H.S. 57, p. 260.)

211. From Admiralty (T). To Admiralty Transports, Avonmouth.
Sent 1945.
Transports can be dispatched to C. or R., not to B. (1) Report to Admiralty Transports, Newhaven; Admiralty Transports, Southampton. (H.S. 57, p. 221.)

To Principal Transports, Havre.
At 2153.
Boulogne to be closed down, supplies now there to be used up where possible (stop) Balance and ordnance stores and transport stuff to be transferred to Port G. by ships now a Boulogne. Report progress. (H.S. 57, p. 222.)

To Admiralty (French N.A.). (At 2220.)
In agreement with British Admiralty I give orders to Rear-Admiral Rouyer to leave to Admiral Wemys, for barring the West of the Channel, light cruisers and auxiliaries (French), and to go to Cherbourg to replenish his armoured cruisers ready to contribute to defence of Northern ports—he will send back to Cherbourg torpedo boats and submarines from Cherbourg.—(H.S. 57, p. 239.)

214. From Principal Naval Transports Officer, Havre. 24/8/14.
To Admiralty (T). 2309.
B. 64. The 60,000 tons at this place are tons measurement. Boulogne has been ordered to report direct to Admiralty.—(H.S. 57, p. 243.)

508. British retirement on French frontier successfully and skilfully effected Army now in strong position well supported. Our casualties reported not severe considering continual engagement with two German Corps and two Cavalry Divisions. (.) Main battle has still to be fought General impression better than this morning Hope all is well with you.

509. British retreat on French frontier successfully and skilfully effected. Army now in strong position well supported. Our casualties reported not severe considering continual engagement with two German Corps and two Cavalry Divisions. (.) Main battle has still to be fought. General impression better than this morning. Hope all is well with you.
217. From Admiralty. 29/8/14.
   To 1st B.C.S. 28/8/14.
   All ships.
   From Commodore (T) eii “Euryalus.”
   To Admiralty.
   5.70 this morning destroyers in action with destroyers 0900.—(H.S. 57, p. 902.)

   To Admiralty.
   584. Your 203. Restrictions named in my 360 are removed. Your coaling policy approved.

   To Admiralty.
   585. Your 203. Restrictions named in my 360 are removed. Your coaling policy approved.

221. From Admiralty. 27/8/14.
   To C.-in-C., Home Fleet, Scapa.
   Your 360. Restrictions named in my 360 are removed. Your coaling policy approved.

222. From Admiralty. 27/8/14.
   To C.-in-C., Home Fleet. 26/8/14.
   Your 360. Restrictions named in my 360 are removed. Your coaling policy approved.

   To C.-in-C., Home Fleet. 25/8/14.
   Your 360. Restrictions named in my 360 are removed. Your coaling policy approved.

   To C.-in-C., Home Fleet. 25/8/14.
   Your 360. Restrictions named in my 360 are removed. Your coaling policy approved.
234. From Admiralty. 20/8/14.
To H.A., “Euryalus.”
41. Send destroyers into Harwich to oil. Approved for “Euryalus” to carry out firing, giving necessary warning. There will be little chance of a German destroyer attack for a day or two. To guard ships at Ostend watch Southern end of Broad Fourteens. Some destroyers will be sent out as soon as oiled. Acknowledge.—(H.S. 58, p. 367.)

235. From Admiralty. 20/8/14.
To P.N.T.O., Havre. At 0220.
Yours 29th August. Southampton has been instructed to send three ships to Havre and three to Rouen for conveyance of stores to St. Nazaire. 6,000 reinforcements proceed to-morrow night; some of the ships conveying these can also be used if necessary.—(H.S. 58, p. 953.)

236. From Admiralty. 20/8/14.
To C-in-C., Portsmouth. At 1207.
Arrange for life-saving patrol from 6.30 this evening.

237. From Admiralty. 31/8/14.
To P.N.T.O., Havre. At 1207.
Your telegram to-night ships for 15,000 troops and 1,500 horses are being despatched from Southampton at once.—(H.S. 58, p. 1051.)

238. From Admiralty. 31/8/14.
To P.N.T.O., Havre. At 1207.
Your telegram to-night. All Naval Staff from C. and R. should proceed to St. Nazaire and await further instructions.

To Admiralty.
66. The War Ministry wishes to transport urgently to ports on the Atlantic and Mediterranean shores of oil refineries existing at Rouen and Havre. The stores comprise 60,000 tons of oil and petrol. 40,000 at Rouen and 20,000 at Havre. Out of this total there are 30,000 tons petrol which it is necessary to carry first. No ship is available for this purpose, can you find at once in England tank steamers available . . .—(H.S. 58, p. 104.)

240. From P.N.T.O., Havre. 31/8/14.
To Admiralty (?).
B. 124. Transports still required 14,000 troops, 1,500 horses also two store ships moderate size one of them suitable for carrying petrol.—(H.S. 58, p. 1061.)

241. From Admiralty. 31/8/14.
To Naval Attaché, Marine, Paris.
Sent 1690.

242. As base of British Expeditionary Force has been changed to St. Nazaire, the Admiralty would be obliged if one division of armoured cruisers of the second light cruiser squadron were sent at once to patrol and cover the route from Ushant to Finisterre. This would allow it is possible that a raid may be made on the transports. The other divisions of armoured cruisers should be kept at Cherbourg ready to relieve the first or go to the East as may be required.

243. From Admiralty. 1/9/14.
To P.N.T.O., Havre.
(Made after explanations that 15,000 troops were from the depots at Havre.) Yours to-night ships for 15,000 troops and 1,500 horses are being despatched from Southampton at once.—(H.S. 58, p. 1051.)

244. From Admiralty. 11/10/14.
To P.N.T.O., Nantes.
It has been decided to close Saint Nazaire as a base and no more ships will be despatched there. It is now proposed to make Havre the main base and Boulogne a secondary base.

APPENDIX B.

ALLIED AND ENEMY FORCES.

1. Summary of Strength of Allied Fleets.
2. Composition of British Squadrons in Home Waters.
3. Composition of French Squadrons in the Channel.
4. Pre-war organisation and war disposal of 2nd and 3rd Fleet battleships.
5. German ships in Home Waters on 5/8/14.

APPENDIX B1.

ALLIED FORCES.

SUMMARY OF STRENGTH OF FLEETS IN HOME WATERS.
August, 1914.

(The class names is approximate; e.g., town class, light cruiser includes a “Southampton” or a “Liverpool.”)

GRAND FLEET.

20 Dreadnought class.
8 “ King Edward VII.” class.
3 “ Albemarle” class (from 7/8/14).
4 “ Shannon ” class cruisers.
4 “ Argyll ” class cruisers.
2 “ Drake ” class cruiser, Northern Patrol.
8 “ Crescent ” class cruiser, Northern Patrol.
6 town class light cruisers.
40 T.B.D.’s of “ Acasta ” and “ Aesculapius ” class.
Mississauga gunboats and auxiliaries.

HARWICH FLOTILLA.

2 Light Cruisers.
37 T.B.D.’s of “ Ariel ” and “ L ” class.

CRUISER FORCE C.

5 “ Cressy ” class cruisers.

FRENCH SUBMARINES.

At Calais 6 (Varne patrol).
At Cherbourg 16 (mid-Channel patrol).

SUBMARINES IN SOUTHERN NORTH SEA.

8th S/M flotilla—16 boats D. and E class.

BRITISH FLEET IN HOME WATERS.1

2nd Battle Squadron—cont.

“ Oak ” (T.B.D.)
1st Battle Squadron—cont.

“ Colossus ”—
“ Hercules ”—
“ Neptune ”—
“ Vanguard ”—
“ Collingwood ”—
“ Superb ”—
“ Bellona ” (Light cruiser).
2nd Battle Squadron—cont.


1 Position and movements, H.M. Ships, War Vessels and Aircraft, British and Foreign, Parts I. and II., August 1914.
3rd Cruiser Squadron—continued.

"Commonwealth."
"Durham."
"Hindustan."
"Zealandia."
"Blanche" (light cruiser).

4th Battle Squadron—

"Tennant."
"Bellerophon."
"Agincourt."
"Blonde" (light cruiser).

6th Battle Squadron—

[Joined G.F. at Scapa 7/8/14, worked with 3rd B.S.]

"Russell."
"Aldemarke."
"Ermouthis."

1st Battle Cruiser Squadron—

"Lion."
"Queen Mary."
"Princess Royal."
"Invincible."
"Indefatigable."

2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron—


3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron—

"Birmingham."
"Lion."
"Southampton."

4th Cruiser Squadron—

"Achilles."
"Argyll."
"Natal."

5th Cruiser Squadron—

"Vale of York."
"Hesperus."
"Nightingale."

6th Cruiser Squadron—

"Swift."
"Active."

1st Destroyer Flotilla—

"Aberconwy" (T) C. Y. Tyrwhitt (sen. 20/9/12).

2nd Destroyer Flotilla—


3rd Destroyer Flotilla—

"Brocklesby." — Capt. H. E. T. Auckland (sen. 30/5/05).

4th Destroyer Flotilla—


5th Destroyer Flotilla—

"Bretagne." — Capt. F. W. Blunt (sen. 20/12/12).

HARWICH FLOTILLAS.—

"Amethyst." — Commodore (T) R. Y. Tyrwhitt (sen. 20/9/12).

1st Destroyer Flotilla—

"Fearless."

2nd Destroyer Flotilla—

"Achilles."

3rd Destroyer Flotilla—


CHANNEL FLEET.—

1st Battle Squadron—


2nd Battle Squadron—


3rd Battle Squadron—


4th Battle Squadron—

"Irresistible."

5th Battle Squadron—


6th Battle Squadron—


7th Battle Squadron—

"Canopus." — Capt. C. H. Fox (sen. 31/12/11).

8th Battle Squadron—


9th Battle Squadron—


10th Battle Squadron—

"Topaz." — Capt. C. J. Wintour (sen. 31/12/11).

ARMED MERCHANT CRUISERS.—

Between 21/8/14 and 30/8/14 the following were in commission:

With Cruiser Force B (Northern Patrol) —

"Cromarty."

With C.-in-C., H.F. . . . . —

\[\text{Total - 21}\]

TRAWLERS.—

The following numbers were commissioned and stationed by 30/8/14. (Before that date the disposition of hired trawlers is not shown in L.D. returns.)

At Devonport —

At Portland —

At Portsmouth —

At Falmouth —

At Lowestoft —

At Humber —

At Sheerness —

At Scapa —

At Cromarty —

At Firth of Forth —

At Peterhead —

At North Shields —

At North Shields —

\[\text{Total - 208}\]
APPENDIX B3.

FRENCH FORCES.

2ND LIGHT SQUADRON.
R.A. Rouyer.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Tonnage</th>
<th>Speed</th>
<th>Armament</th>
<th>1 B.S.</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>10 Cruisers.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Marceillan</td>
<td>1904</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>21/19</td>
<td>8 B.D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Submarine Flotilla; Headquarters, Cherbourg—</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Guinon</td>
<td>1906</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>12/9</td>
<td>4 B.D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dubreton</td>
<td>1906</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>12/9</td>
<td>4 B.D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desay</td>
<td>1905</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>12/9</td>
<td>4 B.D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D'Estrees</td>
<td>1899</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>12/9</td>
<td>4 B.D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guichen</td>
<td>1899</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>12/9</td>
<td>4 B.D.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4 Light Cruisers.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Lavoisier</td>
<td>1898</td>
<td>2,300</td>
<td>6-5-5</td>
<td>4 B.S.</td>
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<tr>
<td>D'Estrees</td>
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<td>2,000</td>
<td>6-5-5</td>
<td>4 B.S.</td>
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<td>Scurt</td>
<td>1860</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>10/12</td>
<td>10 B.S.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Friant</td>
<td>1865</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>10/12</td>
<td>10 B.S.</td>
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APPENDIX B4.

PRE-WAR ORGANISATION AND WAR DISPOSAL OF SECOND AND THIRD FLEET BATTLESHIPS.

5th B.S.—
5th B.S.—

6th B.S.—
N.B.—"Agamemnon" of 4th B.S. remained at Loch Ewe 30/8/14 as local defence ship.

7th B.S.—
" Caesar," "Illustrious," Reduced to care and maintenance party, 7/8/14; to Loch Ewe 30/8/14 as local defence ship.

APPENDIX B5.

DISPOSITION OF GERMAN SHIPS.

(See Monograph No. 11, Appendix E.)

APPENDIX C.

GENERAL ORDERS.

1. Commodore (S) to C-in-C., H.F., 31/7/14.
2. Commodore (S) to C-in-C., H.F., 1/8/14.
3. Commodore (S) Orders to 8th Submarine Flotilla, 8/8/14.
4. Commodore (S) to Chief of War Staff, Admiralty, 5/8/14.
5. Commodore (S) to Chief of War Staff, Admiralty, 14/8/14.
6. Commodore (T) War Orders No. 1 to 1st and 3rd Flotillas, 8/8/14.
7. Commodore (T) War Orders No. 2 to 1st and 3rd Flotillas, 9/8/14.
8. War Order to Rear-Admiral "Invincible" (Cruiser Force), 21/8/14.

APPENDIX C1.

From Commodore (S).
To Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet.
31st July 1914.

Submitted: I arrived at Harwich this morning with "Maidstone," "Adamant," and 10 submarines of the 5th Flotilla, and while I have been informed that the four "Bacchante" will take the place of the four "Drake" and that the former cannot take up their station until about four days after the outbreak of war. Under the circumstances, and with a view to the possibility of the German Fleet proceeding to the southward to attack the Expeditionary Force in transit, I propose to station four submarines to the southward of the destroyer sweep. These will be relieved from time to time by four which will be held in reserve at Harwich.

If the two selected submarines which go to the Heligoland Bight return and report favourably, I will send two more, but I look upon this operation as a hazardous experiment, and in the early stages of the war I submit that the remainder will be better employed as I have arranged, particularly in view of the small number available, and the fact that their engines are still somewhat unreliable for long surface cruises. The First Sea Lord and Chief of the War Staff concur in these proposals, and I trust you will approve.

ROGER KEYES, Commodore (S).

APPENDIX C2.

From Commodore (S).
To Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleets.
1st August 1914.

1. I propose to send two pairs of submarines to patrol between the Outer Gabbard Light Vessel and the North Hinder Light Vessel.
2. One pair will remain on a line 14 miles South-east from the Outer Gabbard, and the other on a line 14 miles North-west from the North Hinder.
3. They will take up these stations when war is declared, and will be relieved by two more pairs as necessary.
4. On the arrival of the four "Bacchante" class cruisers, I will confer with the Rear-Admiral Commanding as to future movements in this area.
5. In the event of the 1st and 3rd Flotillas being withdrawn to join the Channel Fleet, the Commodore (T) has arranged to detail a destroyer to scout for each pair of submarines.
6. One submarine of each pair will be fitted with W/T.
7. Copies of this communication have been furnished to Admiral of Patrole, Commodore (T), Captain (D), 6th Flotilla, and to the Chief of the War Staff.

ROGER KEYES, Commodore (S).
APPENDIX C3.

COMMODORE (S) ORDERS TO 8th SUBMARINE FLOTILLA.

(Copy.)

H.M.S. "Maidstone" at Harwich,
8th August 1914.

Memorandum.

Submarines will take up the following positions, commencing daylight, Sunday, 5th August —

Position —

"A" — Position "E 4." —

"B" — "E 9." —

"C" — "G." —

"D" — "H." —

"E" — "I." —

"F" — "J." —

"G" — "E 5." —

"H" — "J." —

"I" — "E 3." —

"J" — "E 7." —

2. Daylight Positions.

"A" and "B." — Between Galloper Light Vessel and position 7½ S.E. of Galloper Light Vessel.

"C" and "D." — Between positions 15 miles N.W. of West Hinder Light Vessel.

"E." — Between West Hinder Light and Fairy Bank.

"F." — Between Fairy Bank and position 7½ N.W. of West Hinder Light Vessel.

"G" and "H." — Between positions 7½ and 15 miles N.W. of West Hinder Light Vessel.

"I" and "J." — At position 7½ S.E. of Long Sand Light.

"J." — At position 4½ S.W. of West Hinder Light Vessel.

These positions are not to be left until dark.


"A" and "B." — Close as possible to Long Sand Light Vessel.

"C" and "D." — Close as possible to Galloper Light Vessel.

"E." — Close as possible to Kentish Knock Light Vessel.

"F." and "J." — Close as possible to West Hinder Light Vessel.

"G" and "H." — Close as possible to Ruytingen Light Vessel.

These positions are to be left in time to be on patrol at daylight.

On patrol submarines of a pair should keep about one mile and a half apart, and are on no account to get to the N.E. of their line.

Until buoys are laid "B" and "C," and "F" and "G," are to sight each other every hour at positions 7½ miles S.E. and N.W. from their respective Light Vessels, in order to correct the position of the other boats. "F" is to aim at "E" at the half-hour to correct its position.

4. There will probably be destroyers stationed in the following positions: 5 miles N.E. of "A" and "B" patrol; 5 miles N.E. of "C" and "D" patrol; and 5 miles N.E. of "F" patrol. If altering their positions and approaching the patrols of other submarines, destroyers will fly an ensign at the masthead. If the enemy is sighted, these destroyers will signal by Black Flag Code, and will endeavour to keep directly ahead and so indicate the direction in which the submarines should proceed.

5. Buoys will probably be laid shortly in the following positions:—

(1) 7½ miles N.E. of Galloper Light Vessel.

(2) 15 miles S.E. of Galloper Light Vessel.

(3) 7½ miles N.W. of West Hinder Light Vessel.

(4) 15 miles N.W. of West Hinder Light Vessel.

(5) Lat. 52° N., Long. 3° E.

6. If they can be supplied in time, the following signals will be used by all destroyers:

By Day.

Rocket which on explosion displays a red flag suspended from a parachute.

Ditto, with blue flag.

Red rockets (which have been ordered).

White Service rockets.

(Signed) ROGER KEYES, Commodore (S).

The Officers Commanding, 8th Submarine Flotilla, and H.M. Ships "Lurcher," "Firedrake," "Lennox," and "Legion.


(Note.) — Commodore (S) will be in "Lurcher," and will remain in the vicinity of the submarine patrol as long as it is maintained.

1 This disposition of this Flotilla. were apparently only adhered to on 5th August. On 18th August the 8th B.M. Flotilla was re-disposed on the line N. Goodwin-Sandettie-Hoytingen.—(T. & S.D. D.)

APPENDIX C4.

From Commodore (S).

To Chief of the War Staff, Admiralty.

No. 07. 8th August 1914.

After much consideration, I submit the following:

1. If the German Navy is as gallant and efficient as we have reason to believe, I feel sure that it will come out to dispute the passage of our expeditionary force.

2. The reverse of the German Army in Belgium, I think, makes this all the more probable, and I propose to act on the supposition that, mainly as the result of this reverse, orders will be given to the High Sea Fleet to prevent reinforcements being sent to France, at all costs.

3. How could the German High Sea Fleet justify its existence the proud boasts of the Emperor, or face the Army and its women folk, if it rests in harbour when the army has been checked and reinforcements are being poured into France.

4. If it elects to act by demonstrating on our coast, I presume it will be dealt with by the Grand Fleet, and in any case, I submit it could achieve nothing of vital importance.

5. I therefore propose to embark in "Lurcher" this evening, and to remain between the Galloper and West Hinder until the transportation of our Expeditionary Force is complete. The name of the vessel to which I will transfer, when the "Lurcher" returns to fuel, will be communicated later.

6. I consider it most desirable that officers possessing good submarine experience should be in destroyers in touch with the submarines, and I propose to send Captain Wainstall, of "Maidstone," to embark in "Firedrake," Commander Sommerville of "Adaman," to embark in "Legion," and Commander Palmer, of "Thames," to embark in "Legion" if the Commander-in-Chief of the Nore approves of a submission I have made to him.

7. I have made satisfactory arrangements for the care of the submarine depot ships during the absence of these officers.

8. Two lines of submarine will be stationed by day as follows (11 "D" and 11 "E" class submarines now available—13 when "E5" and "E8" return) ;—

15 miles S.E. from Galloper Light Vessel.

15 miles N.W. from West Hinder Light Vessel.

At night they will be in the vicinity of these Light Vessels.

9. Commodore Tyrwhitt is submitting his dispositions.

10. I will communicate with the Rear-Admiral Commanding Cruiser Force C, with a view to obtaining co-operation.

11. If my hopes are not realised, no harm will have been done. The Expeditionary Force will have been afforded good protection, and the destroyers and submarines will be ready to operate elsewhere within two hours of the completion of the transportation.

(Signed) ROGER KEYES, Commodore (S).

APPENDIX C5.

From The Commodore (S).

To Chief of the War Staff, Admiralty.

No. 06. 9th August 1914.

Submitted. With reference to my No. 09 dated 13th instant, and to a letter from Captain A. P. Addison, written by your direction : As it would appear that the enemy’s capital ships have no intention of coming into the Channel, I presume that the Sandettie Patrol will be withdrawn when the Expeditionary Force has been landed.

2. The present position is :"Adaman" was sent to Dover on receipt of information that the patrol might be required for about a fortnight.

3. It is understood that half the 8th Submarine Flotilla is to maintain the Sandettie Patrol, the remainder being held in readiness for offensive operations. With regard to the former, I propose that four submarines should remain on patrol and two should rest at Dover.

4. "D9," "D10," "D11," and "D12" will return to the patrol on Saturday, 15th, releasing "D6" and "E9" (defective clutches) to proceed to Dover to rest as relief for Sandettie Patrol, and "E3," "E8," "E9," "E10," and "E11" to proceed to Harwich to rest preparatory for overseas operations.

5. "E5" and "E8" are at Yarmouth awaiting orders.

6. "Firedrake" is preceding to Harwich for rest, and will return to the patrol on Saturday morning, 13th. If you concur, I propose to then proceed in the "Lurcher" to Harwich, visiting Admiralty on arrival to submit proposals for offensive operations.

(Signed) ROGER KEYES, Commodore (S).
DISPOSITION OF 8TH S.M. FLOTTILLA.
(10 a.m., 10th August 1914.)


"Lurcher" and "Firedrake" scouting. Commodore Keyes is in "Lurcher."

DISPOSITION OF 4TH S.M. FLOTTILLA.
(10 a.m., 10th August 1914.)

Holding line, S. Goodwin to Calais. Bae.—H.M.S. "Arranog" at Dover.

Rough plan showing relative position of the two flotillas:

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APPENDIX C6.

COMMODORE (T)'s WAR ORDERS No. 1.
(To 1st and 3rd Flotillas.)

Secret and Personal.
No 001.—Memorandum.


WAR ORDERS FOR THE 1ST AND 3RD DESTROYED FLOTTILAS.
The 1st and 3rd Flotillas will work under the orders of the Commodore (T). Base.—Harwich.
The object of the sweeps described later is to keep the eastern approaches to the English Channel clear of enemy's torpedo craft, and minelayers, and also to reconnoitre and give early information as to the movements of enemy vessels which may be sighted.

Our chief duty, therefore, is to prevent the enemy's vessels passing unobserved and unattacked through the area south of Lat. 54° N. and east of Long. 2° E. In the event of meeting German transports, which will probably be accompanied by war vessels, the transports are to be attacked and sunk in preference to the accompanying war vessels.

2. Position of Friendly Forces.—Friendly forces in the vicinity will be:
(a) Cruiser Force C, consisting of "Ecochotte" (Flag of Rear-Admiral H. H. Campbell, C.V.O.) "Aboukir," "Euryalus," and "Cressy."

Cruiser Force C acts in support of the 1st and 3rd Flotillas, its itinerary being:

Noum — Leave "Z," steer N.E. by N (Mag.) 8 knots. 8.0 p.m.—Arrive "Y," turn 16 points, steer N.E. by N. 8.0 a.m.—Arrive "X," turn 16 points, steer N.E. by N. 9.0 a.m.—Arrive "Z," turn 16 points, steer N.E. by N. 10.0 a.m.—Arrive "Y," turn 16 points, steer S.W. by N.; and so on.

War orders will not be rigidly adhered to, but will be varied anything up to 15 miles to the N.W. by W., or S.E. by E. Positions of "X," "Y," and "Z" —

"X," Lat. 52° 34' N., Long. 3° 56' E.
"Y," Lat. 53° 31' W., Long. 3° 56' E.
"Z," Lat. 52° 31' W., Long. 3° 18' E.

(b) Two submarines ("E3" and "E4") operating on the enemy's coast. They will be towed to their stations by "Amethyst," and "Ariel" (see paragraph 12).
(c) Four submarines ("E4," "E9," "D3," and "D5"). The following orders have been issued to them by the Commodore (T.) —

WAR ORDERS FOR SUBMARINES ("E4," "E9," "D3," and "D5"). Submarines ("E4," "E9," "D3," and "D5") are to patrol during daylight hours on a line 14 miles North-west from North Hindle Light Vessel, and "D3" and "D5" on a line 14 miles South-east from Outer Gabbard Light Vessel.

(2) When on patrol during the day, the submarines of a pair are to remain in sight of each other, and are never to be more than 5 miles apart.

(3) During dark hours the submarines are to patrol near the following positions —
"D3" —6 miles South-East Outer Gabbard Light Vessel.
"D5" —17 miles S.E. by E. Outer Gabbard Light Vessel.
"E4" —6 miles S.E. Galloper Light Vessel.
"E9" —6 miles N.W. North Hindle Light Vessel.

(4) They are to return to Harwich on being relieved, which will probably be during the forenoon of the third day of patrol, and may proceed by the shortest route. Torpedo craft belonging to the Nore Defence Flotilla may be near the Long Sand Vessel.

3. Destroyers are not to go north of Lat. 54° N. nor East of Long. 6° E.

In case of necessity, destroyers are to fall back on Cruiser Force "C," which is there for that purpose.

The general attitude is to be offensive to anything that can be attacked with a reasonable chance of success, and if not to fall back on Cruiser Force "C." (Paragraphs 4 to 21.)—Give detailed orders for the patrol, movements in and out of Harwich, reliefs, fighting lights to be used, &c., together with a plan of patrol. The patrol was to commence at the Outer Gabbard Light Vessel, be spread to the Maas Light Vessel, and extend up to the Haaks Light Vessel, then turn East on a 23 mile front by Therschelling Light Vessel to the longitude of 6° E. Units were not to be more than 5 miles apart, and the Senior Officer present was to decide which portion of the patrol would be searched. The 1st and 3rd Flotillas together were to sweep the area the first time, after which only one flotilla at a time would be on patrol.

APPENDIX C7.

COMMODORE (T)'s WAR ORDERS No. 2 TO 1ST AND 3RD FLOTTILAS.


The "No. 1 Destroyer Sweep" contained in Commodore (T)'s War Orders, No. 001, dated 4th August is suspended.

The orders contained in Commodore (T)'s War Orders, No. 0015, dated 8th August 1914 (issued to part of 3rd Flotilla only), are cancelled and are to be burnt upon receipt of this Memorandum.

The following orders have been approved by the Admiralty and are to be followed by the 1st and 3rd Flotillas.

1. The main object of the sweep described herein (Destroyer Sweep No. 2) is to give information of the approach of a force which it is expected will be sent to oppose the landing of the British Expeditionary Force on the Continent.

2. The attached plan, which is to be plotted on Chart 2182 (a), North Sea, Southern portio, shows the lines of patrolled, each of which is to be occupied by a sub-division by day and night, except in thick weather when the even-numbered sub-divisions are to form astern of the divisional leaders without orders.

The Captain (D.) is to order the divisions to close at his discretion.

5. The general idea is to keep the eastern approaches to the English Channel clear of enemy's torpedo craft and minelayers, and also to reconnoitre and give early information as to the movements of enemy vessels which may be sighted.

Our chief duty, therefore, is to prevent the enemy's vessels passing unobserved and unattacked through the area south of Lat. 54° N. and East of Long. 2° E. In the event of meeting German transports, which will probably be accompanied by war vessels, the transports are to be attacked and sunk in preference to the accompanying war vessels.

2. Position of Friendly Forces.—Friendly forces in the vicinity will be:
(a) Cruiser Force C, consisting of "Ecochotte" (Flag of Rear-Admiral H. H. Campbell, C.V.O.) "Aboukir," "Euryalus," and "Cressy."

Cruiser Force C acts in support of the 1st and 3rd Flotillas, its itinerary being:

Noum — Leave "Z," steer N.E. by N (Mag.) 8 knots. 8.0 p.m.—Arrive "Y," turn 16 points, steer N.E. by N. 8.0 a.m.—Arrive "X," turn 16 points, steer N.E. by N. 9.0 a.m.—Arrive "Z," turn 16 points, steer N.E. by N. 10.0 a.m.—Arrive "Y," turn 16 points, steer S.W. by N.; and so on.

2. The dispositions given in the following orders were assumed by the Harwich Force on 5th August 1914, with certain modifications due to the minefields laid by "Königen Luise," that morning, and to a decision not to go as far east as 6° East. Fresh dispositions, vire Comm. (T)'s War Orders No. 7, were assumed on 9th August to cover the movement of the Expeditionary Force to France. The portion of War Order No. 4 given here will be sufficient to show the general purpose of the dispositions first assumed when war was declared.
Should no Flotilla Cruiser be present, a T.B.D. is to be detached to proceed at utmost speed to the Southward until her W/T call has been answered, and in the event of her not being able to get the message through, she must proceed towards Harwich and report to the Senior Naval Officer there through Felixstowe W/T station.

It is of vital importance that the Admiralty, Fleets, and the ships of the Expeditionary Force should be aware of the approach of the enemy.

8. The enemy is to be attacked by the Duty Flotilla at night, not in the daytime. On the approach of the enemy during day, the flotilla should close on their Flotilla Cruiser and endeavour to entice the advanced enemy ships towards the other flotilla, which is to be ready to leave Harwich at a moment's notice.

The flotilla at Harwich must be ready to proceed with all dispatch to the Galloper Light Vessel and assist the retreating flotilla, or take action as may be desirable.

9. "Ametheus" will act as Flotilla Cruiser of the 3rd Flotilla, until Captain Fox arrives in "you." It is of vital importance that you inform the Commodore (T.) of its arrival at Harwich, and that you order the 1st Flotilla and copies are attached for the 3rd Flotilla.

10. There will be a strong force of British submarines to the Southward. Their positions are shown in the orders of the Commodore (T.); copies of these orders have already been issued to the 1st Flotilla and copies are attached for the 3rd Flotilla.

The 1st and 3rd Flotillas must keep clear of the submarines.

11. The following programme is to be followed:

First Flotilla:
- Leave Harwich at 1 p.m. and arrive B.C. at 8 p.m.
- Arrive on B.C. at 4 a.m., Monday, 10th August.
- Arrive on B.C. at 4 a.m., Tuesday, 11th August.
- Return to Harwich.

Third Flotilla:
- Leave Harwich at 4 a.m.
- Patrol in the immediate vicinity to the northward of B.C. until 8 p.m.
- Leave B.C. at 8 p.m.
- Arrive D.E. at 4 a.m., Tuesday, 11th August.
- Arrive B.C. at noon.
- Leave B.C. at 8 p.m.
- Arrive D.E. at 4 a.m., Wednesday, 12th August.
- Arrive B.C. at 10 a.m.
- Return to Harwich.

First Flotilla:
- Leave Harwich at 4 a.m.
- Arrive B.C. at 10 a.m.
- Return to Harwich.

Wednesday, 12th August
- Leave Harwich at 4 a.m. and carry out same programme as 3rd Flotilla.

12. The orders contained in Commodore (T.)'s War Orders, Memorandum 001 of 4th August, from paragraph 15 to the end, still remain in force.

APPENDIX C8.

ADMIRALTIES ORDERS TO REAR-ADMIRAL, "INVINCIBLE."

M.0072 of 21/8/14.

"New Zealand" is being detached from 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and will be placed under your orders.

The "Invincible" and "New Zealand" will act under the general orders of the Admiralty and will use the Hamber as its main base, and will be named R.C. Force. K.

Gerth and the Donzelas can be used as alternative bases near the Admiralty's discretion, according to circumstances.

Their Lordships' intention is that the two battle cruisers will be a powerful advanced cruiser force for the support of the combined forces under Rear-Admiral Christian, consisting of present 3 of the "Herculanum" class, 1st and 3rd Destroyer Flotillas, oversea submarines, and seaplane carrying ship.

For the present, while Expeditionary Force is crossing, "Euryalus" force is watching the approaches to the Straits of Dover in the Broad Fourteens. Later, more active operations will be undertaken by this force when Cruiser Force K will be required to support Euryalus force.

Rear Admiral, "Invincible," is to keep in communication with Rear-Admiral, "Euryalus," in order to know how and when the support will be required.

Cruiser Force K will be directed to combine in any advanced operations of the Grand Fleet.

By command of Their Lordships.

W. F. NICHOLSON,
For Secretary.

ADMIRALTY ORDER TO REAR-ADMIRAL, "INVINCIBLE."
21st August 1914.

Secret and personal.

M.0072.

Sir,

In confirmation of telegraphic orders, I am commanded by My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint you that orders have been given that Rear-Admiral A. G. H. W. Moore in "Invincible," with "New Zealand," (this force being known as Cruiser Force K) is to operate as a powerful advanced cruiser force for the support of the combined force under the Rear-Admiral, "Euryalus."

2. Cruiser Force K will use the Humber as its main base, and you are to keep Rear-Admiral, "Invincible," informed of all dispositions within your sphere, including those of the sweeping tuckers. You should inform him when these latter are ready for work.

3. The Rear-Admiral, "Invincible," has been instructed that you continue your existing duties notwithstanding his presence.

The receipt of this letter is to be acknowledged by cypher telegram in the form: "Admiralty letter of the 21st August, M.0072, received."

I am, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

The Senior Naval Officer, Harwich.

W. F. NICHOLSON,
For Secretary.

APPENDIX D.

EXTRACTS FROM GRAND FLEET DAILY NARRATIVE OF EVENTS.

3rd-31st August 1914 (0800-0800).


The G.F. Narrative was a daily report sent by the C-in-C, Grand Fleet, to the Admiralty, summarising the work and movements of the Grand Fleet for the 24 hours commencing 8 a.m. the previous day to 8 a.m. the day of the report. When Fleet was at sea near Scapa, H.M.S. "Oak" was usually employed to carry these and other despatches to the admiral.

In these extracts the more important parts are quoted in full.


4:th-5th August 1914 (0800-0800).

" invincible," informed of all dispositions within your sphere, including those of the sweeping tuckers. You should inform him when these latter are ready for work.

The receipt of this letter is to be acknowledged by cypher telegram in the form: "Admiralty letter of the 21st August, M.0072, received."

I am, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

The Senior Naval Officer, Harwich.

W. F. NICHOLSON,
For Secretary.
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5th–6th August 1914 (0800-0900).

3rd. B.S., 3rd C.O.S., at Scapa fuelling. Left 8 p.m.

2nd Flotilla at Rosyth.

"Dreadnought" battle fleet cruising north of 59° 30' N. all day. Admiralty orders received to remain north of 57° 30' N. At 8 p.m., Battle Fleet were in Lat. 59° 29' N., 1° W., steaming to N.E. to search for submarines. 1st Cruiser Squadron and "Dreadnought" ordered to sweep to eastward from 1° W., at 15 knots between 59° 10' N. and 60° N.; 1st L.C.S. carrying out similar sweep to southward of 2nd C.S. At 5 a.m. (daylight) Battle Fleet turned to S.W. for R.V. at 5° N. E. to meet 3rd B.S. and 3rd C.S.

2 a.m., 6th. Reported Germans have established a base in Norway. Lat. 62° N., exact position unknown.

Thursday, 8th August.

"Dreadnought" battle fleet cruising between Lat. 59° and 60° North, Long. 1° E. and 1° W. . . . 2nd C.S. and L.C.S. swept eastward 55 and 60 parallels, then north along Norwegian coast as far as 61° 30', then south, west to Shetlands, and to Scapa via East and West coasts. . . . No further news as to German base in Lat. 62° N.

7th–8th August 1914 (0800–0800).

"Dreadnought" Battle Fleet arrived Scapa at 6 a.m. Now coaling, will return to sea this evening. . . . (Search of Norwegian coast being carried out by 3rd C.S. and 2nd Flotilla between Lat. 61° N. and 62° 30').

General Notes . . . Lack of defences at Scapa is causing anxiety—the defences which it has been possible to extemporise being inadequate to protect the Grand Fleet and secure it from attack by torpedo craft.

6.30 p.m. Battle Fleet proceeded to sea to westward. . . . 6th B.S. proceeding to Scapa were met outside. . . . During the night the Battle Fleet cruised by squadrons round the Orkneys; at 8 a.m., 8th, in 59° 20' N., 2° 4' W. . . . Received news from Admiralty that Expeditionary Force was to be sent, and that it would commence moving on Sunday.1 . . . Admiralty telegraph "Honnablé," "Magnificent" ordered north for defence of Scapa Flow.

8th–9th August 1914 (0800–0800).

8 a.m. "Iron Duke," 1st B.S. (less "Vanguard") 2nd and 4th B.S. and "Blonde" in company rounding Orkneys.

11.45. Reports of submarines received from "Orion," "Monarch" and "Ajax" to southward of Fair Island, and "Monarch" reported she was sighted at 59° 21' N., 1° W. . . . Battle Fleet increased speed and altered course to south-westward and then back to N.E. . . .

6.45 p.m. O.O.W. in "Iron Duke" reported periscope about 11 cables on starboard bow; ship immediately altered towards it and increased speed—nothing more seen of it. . . . (Flotilla remained on course S. 71° E., 8 knots during the night until 3.30 and then altered to N. 71° W. position at 4 a.m., 58° 31' N., 1° 9' E.)

4 a.m. "Birmingham" reported she had rammed and sunk German submarine, U. 13.2 . . . O.D. (on reporting) ordered submarines from "Orion" or other to be "alert," and half of 2nd Flotilla to search area until dark and to ascertain that Fair Island was still in British possession.

Notes—Admiralty telegraphed to Commodore (T) and Commodore (S) that Fleet was in Scapa Flow and that no news had all afternoon.

9th–10th August 1914 (0800–0900).

. . . Battle Fleet and 1st B.C.S. noon position 58° 41' N., 0° 15' W. During both forenoon and afternoon the ship being in an area suspected to be frequented by submarines were made frequent blue signals. . . . (Position at midnight, 57° 61' N., 1° 2° E.)

5 a.m. (10th) "Iron Duke" parted company and proceeded to Scapa; Battle Fleet and 1st B.S. proceeded under V.A., 2nd B.S. to northward of Shetlands, keeping out of sight of land. Battle cruisers ordered to make a wide sweep to northward and eastward when rounding Shetlands.

(2nd C.S. and 1st L.C.S. swept from 3° 15' E. to 0° 30' W. at visibility distance south of 58° N.; then swept east between 56° 50' N. and 57° 50' N. 3rd C.S., 2nd and 4th Flotillas sweeping around Orkneys and Shetlands and near Battle Fleet.)

Notes—From 1 p.m. to 3 p.m. the Battle Fleet was passing through the suspected submarine area and "St. Vincent" reported sighting a periscope at 2.30 p.m. 10 p.m. Admiralty telegram received ordering the C.-in-C. to take all heavy ships to northward and then to westward to a position north-west of the Orkneys at once.

10th–11th August 1914 (0800–0900).

"Iron Duke" at Scapa . . . Remainder of Battle Fleet at sea . . . under V.A., 2nd B.S., proceeding north about to a position to westward of Shetlands . . . (3rd C.S., 1st L.C.S. swept east along 58° N. across North Sea; then to search for submarine base suspected near Stavanger (Norway).

Notes—No reports of German submarines received during the day. Airplanes reported as flying over the area (but not over Orkneys) both on evening of 10th and 11th, base thought to be either in Shetlands or parent ship. . . . A number of telegrams passed between C.-in-C. and the Admiralty on the subject of Norwegian neutrality. . . . About 50,000 tons coal now at Scapa; 10,000 tons of this ordered to both Rosyth and Cromarty, and an alternative coaling base now to be formed at Loch Ewe, provided quantity at Scapa is maintained at not less than 25,000 tons.

Note:

1 30 miles west of Orkneys.
2 N.E. corner Aberdeenshire.
3 Summary made from the copy enclosed with Grand Fleet Narrative.
21st-26th August 1914 (0800-0800).


5.30 p.m. Submarine reported seen from the bridge in 58° 42' N., 1° 10' W. Spread fleet clear of danger position, nothing further seen of it.

Fleet arrived Scapa, 7.30 a.m. 25th.

(1st B.S. left Scapa 8.30 a.m., 25th, to join 3rd B.S., supporting cruisers in areas 1 and 2. 6th C.S. position 10° to Norwegian coast on 99th parallel. "Agincourt" joined the fleet.

NOTES.—No definite news of enemy ships; another submarine report from Linga Sound in the evening.

26th-27th August 1914 (0800-0800).

"Iron Duke," 2nd and 4th B.S. at Scapa coaling, &c. 1st B.S. left at 8.30 to join 3rd B.S.

(1st B.C.S. and L.C.S. left at 6 a.m. 27th to take part in operations to the southward on 28th. Cruisers in areas 1 and 2.)

No definite news received of enemy ships.

27th-28th August 1914 (0800-0800).

"Iron Duke," 2nd and 4th B.S. and "Blonde" at Scapa till 3.45 p.m., then to R.Y. with 1st and 3rd B.S. at 7.30, 58° 16' N., 0° 10' E. Course E.S.E. 8 knots.

(1st B.C.S., 1st L.C.S., and southern forces operating to southward; cruisers patrolling.)

NOTES.—No news of enemy's heavy ships. German submarine reported off St. Abbs Head on night 26th-27th; Admiral, Roysth, asked to send a submarine after her. Admiralty telegraphed position of three mined areas known to exist: (i) off Harwich, (ii) off Flamborough Head, (iii) off Yarmouth.

28th-29th August 1914 (0800-0800).

"Dreadnought" Battle Fleet. Noon position, 58° 10' N., 0° 21' E. Midnight position: 59° 31' N., 0° 40' E.

(Heligoland Bight operations reported: "Main," "Augustburg," and two destroyers sunk by our forces, and other cruiser and other destroyers severely damaged. After retiring from Heligoland Bight, B.C.S. and L.C.S. swept north-eastward at Long. 4° E. Position, 5.00 a.m., 57° 18' N., 4° 19' E. 2nd C.S. working area 7 to 5 Norwegian coasts. Reports received during 24 hours of mines laid off Woodbank and St. Abbs Head: reports of enemy mines being laid on coast was very frequent. Admiralty also telegraphed that Germans were fitting out trawlers as mine layers.

29th-30th August 1914 (0800-0800).

"Dreadnought" Battle Fleet. Noon position, 58° 10' N., 0° 21' E. Midnigh position: 59° 31' N., 0° 40' E.

(1st B.C.S. and L.C.S. working area No. 6. Three mine layers patrolling south portion, area 3.)

NOTES.—No reports of enemy's heavy ships during the day except that an N.I.D. report states that one of the two battleships at Kiel (probably of "Blasse" class) have been moved to North Sea.

C-in-C. drew attention of Admiralty to the need of having more destroyers and torpedo boats for patrolling off Cromarty and Scapa; stating also that he considered patrolled trawlers should work further off the coast at night in view of the fact that enemy have been laying mines indiscriminately without distinction by the patrolled trawlers.

Asked that 20 drift net fishing vessels may be taken up for service at Scapa to act as look-outs in areas.

NOTES.—No recent indications point to the enemy doing his utmost to reduce our fleet by mining, the salient points of our coasts and the approaches to our harbours, but so far only one mine-layer has been seen and caught by our ships. The necessity for a more complete watch by small craft is apparent.

30th-31st August 1914 (0800-0800).

"Dreadnought" Battle Fleet and attached cruisers cruising between 58° and 50° N., 1° E. and 1° W. during the day, and to eastward on 29th parallel during night.

Noon, 58° 22' N., 0° 7' E.; midnight, 50° 5' N., 1° 24' E.

"Inflexible" arrived at Scapa.

(1st B.C.S. and L.C.S. working area No. 6. Three mine layers patrolling south portion, area 3.)

NOTES.—No reports of enemy's heavy ships during the day except that an N.I.D. report states that both of the two battleships at Kiel (probably of "Blasse" class) have been moved to North Sea.

C-in-C. drew attention of Admiralty to the need of having more destroyers and torpedo boats for patrolling off Cromarty and Scapa; stating also that he considered patrolled trawlers should work further off the coast at night in view of the fact that enemy have been laying mines indiscriminately without distinction by the patrolled trawlers.

Noted that 20 drift net fishing vessels may be taken up for service at Scapa to act as look-outs in areas.

NOTES.—No recent indications point to the enemy doing his utmost to reduce our fleet by mining, the salient points of our coasts and the approaches to our harbours, but so far only one mine-layer has been seen and caught by our ships. The necessity for a more complete watch by small craft is apparent.

31st August-1st September 1914 (0800-0800).

"Dreadnought" Battle Fleet and attached cruisers cruising between parallels of 58° 30' N. and 50° 30' N. between Orkneys and Norway. Noon position : 60° 10' N., 2° 9' E.; midnight: 58° 22' N., 1° 36' W., arrived at Scapa 7 a.m. 31st. 3rd B.S. left Scapa daylight 31st for a position north of 59° N. and east of 0°.

"Inflexible" arrived Scapa, 7 p.m., 30th, and joined 1st B.C.S.

(6th and 10th C.S. working area No. 6. Armed merchant cruisers patrolling 60th parallel east of Shetlands.)

NOTES.—No news of enemy's fleet. Admiralty informed C-in-C, that they were arming trawlers for patrol duties on coast as quickly as possible. Admiralty telegraphed that arrangements are being made for Scapa defences, which include laying of mines; mechanical mines are not, however, considered safe for use in or near fleet bases, and C-in-C is informing the Admiralty to this effect.

1 From 30 to 110 and 120 to 200 miles respectively from Rattray Head, N.E., Aberdeenshire, G.F. Order IX.XX.IV.

2 10 miles north of Berwick, 20 miles from Rosyth.

3 From 30 to 110 and 120 to 200 miles respectively from Rattray Head, N.E., Aberdeenshire, G.F. Order IX.XX.IV.

4 To miles north of Berwick, 20 miles from Rosyth.
APPENDIX F1.

EXTRACTS FROM INTERDEPARTMENTAL CONFERENCE REPORT.

ADMIRALTY, 30/7/14.

Para. 1.—In the course of their investigations the Conference have been impressed with the fact that, in order to ensure the concentration of the Expeditionary Force at the required place within the limit of time allowed by the plan of operations, it is necessary that transports should assemble, troops embark, transports sail, and troops disembark as nearly as possible according to the prearranged programme. Elasticity has been introduced into the organisation as far as practicable, but should a delay occur beyond that for which it has been found possible to make provision, the railway plans on both sides of the Channel may be upset and far-reaching effects on collateral arrangements will result.

2. In order to provide for contingencies, every effort should be made to ensure the arrival of each transport at the port of embarkation at least 24 hours before the time at which she is to commence to embark her troops or stores.

3. We have been informed that the Admiralty covering dispositions are such that the safety of the lines of passage and communication will be assured. We have, therefore, assumed that nothing will interfere with the sailing of the transports either by day or by night as required.

(Para. 8.) Mobilisation and Embarkation. Executive Orders.—The following procedure is proposed:

(1) On issue by the Admiralty of the warning telegram the Director of Transports will make preliminary preparations which do not involve publicity or the engagements of transports and crews.

(2) On receipt of instructions from the Cabinet the War Office will issue the order “Embark.”

(3) On issue by the War Office of the order “Embark” the Director of Transports will take up the necessary shipping, as detailed in paragraph 2.

(Para. 11.) Method of Taking up Tonnage.—It is understood that Their Lordships intend to utilise their existing powers to requisition vessels needed for the transport of the Expeditionary Force. A complete list of all British vessels suitable for the work (some 2,000 in number) is being compiled by the Admiralty Transport Department, and will contain particulars as to accommodation and other details. This will be printed and circulated to the officers concerned, and corrections will be issued quarterly. Under the Transport Department Intelligence Scheme the lists of vessels to be actually taken up (some 200) will be kept complete and corrected daily, and all the papers necessary for engaging the transports will be put into force.

(4) In the absence of special instructions, full executive action by the Admiralty in connection with the provision of sea transport for the Expeditionary Force should not be taken before the issue by the War Office of the order “Embark.”

(5) On the issue by the War Office of the order “Embark” the Director of Transports will take up the necessary shipping, as detailed in paragraph 2.

(Para. 17.) Order of Movement.—The order in which the movement is to be carried out is, generally, as follows:

(c) The staffs and units necessary for the first organisation of the lines of communication and the advanced portions of various headquarters embark on the first, second, and third days of military mobilisation.

(b) Supplies and stores are sent on the first and following days.

(c) The infantry (less 4th Division) embark on the fourth, fifth, and sixth days.

(d) The cavalry and the remainder of the fighting troops (less 4th Division) embark between the seventh and eleventh days, both inclusive.

(e) The 4th Division embarks on the twelfth and thirteenth days.

(f) The base detachments embark on the thirteenth and fourteenth days.

(Para. 47.) Disembarkation.—(a) The disembarkation will take place at Ports C, R, and B. Arrangements have been made for using Port A, if the naval situation allows as an alternative to Port B, when necessary owing to bad weather or other causes.

(b) Port C is the principal base and Port R is a subsidiary base. It is intended to use Port B mainly during the period of concentration, but it may be necessary to make use of it also for dispatching supplies during the period of operations.

(Para. 48.) Capacity of the Ports.—The daily capacity of each port for the purposes of this scheme has been estimated at the following:

Port C, 20 ships.
Port B, 14 ships.
Port A, 9 ships (other than “C” class).

The list of ships due to arrive at each port has been kept at about these limits.

(Para. 62.) Reserve of Transports to meet Contingencies.—From the tests carried out, little or no reserve of ships can be guaranteed on mobilisation, but the list of suitable ships (with the important exception of cattle ships) (paragraph 20) is steadily increasing, and the position improving correspondingly.

Certain ships allocated for one voyage only, will be available for further service if required, on their return to the United Kingdom; vessels arriving after the ships first required have been taken up will also form a reserve. There is a certain amount of spare accommodation in the ships already allotted.

APPENDIX F2.

Ports of Embarkation.—The ports of embarkation of the Expeditionary Force are as follows:

(1) Southampton.—For practically all units of the Expeditionary Force other than M.T. from England and Scotland; three aeroplane squadrons, three ambulance ships, and a small amount of M.T.

(2) Newhaven.—For practically all stores.

(3) Avonmouth.—For M.T. and petrol.

(4) Liverpool.—For M.T. and frozen meat.

(5) Belfast.—For troops from North Ireland.

(6) Dublin.—For troops from Central Ireland and some M.T.

(7) Queenstown and Cork.—For troops from Southern Ireland.

(8) Glasgow.—For two remount depôts and one aeroplane squadron.

APPENDIX F2.

SHIPS LEAVING PORTS ON U.K. EACH DAY.


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<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sun. 9th</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mon. 10th</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tues. 11th</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wed. 12th</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above was circulated as the programme on 8/8/14. It allows for 4 infantry and 1 cavalry division, which were actually transported by August 21st. Another infantry division, the 4th, crossed on August 22nd.

APPENDIX GI.

CONTENTS.

Review of the pre-war scheme.

1. The general scheme for the transport and maintenance of the Expeditionary Force (consisting of six divisions and a cavalry division) had been worked out by the Transport Department of the Admiralty and the War Office, over a period of some three years, culminating in the appointment of a joint Naval and Military Conference in February last (1914), which fully discussed the arrangements made by the War Office in concert with the railway companies.

The division of responsibility between the Navy and Army is laid down as follows:

(a) The general scheme for the transport and maintenance of the Expeditionary Force was in entire control of the Navy.

(b) The Navy will be responsible for the berthing of all ships, lighters, tugs and boats; and any labour required in connection with the same. All other labour required will be found by the Army, except in cases where the circumstances render it desirable that the Navy should provide some or all the labour.

(c) The provision of 20,000 sets of portable horse stall fittings (to ensure the safe conveyance of horses), and of other material, horse and passenger brows, slings, &c., for use both here and oversea.

(d) The Navy will be responsible for the embarkation of the Expeditionary Force, and will render the other all the assistance which lies in its power.

Roughly, for the shipment of the Expeditionary Force, the military were in entire control of the movement of troops, &c., until they reached the wharves of embarkation. The Navy was responsible for all arrangements on the wharves, and work connected with berthing and loading of transports, the supply of boats, lighters, &c., the embarkation, sailing and disembarkation. The Navy responsibility ceased when the troops, &c., were landed on the quays overseas. From this point military resumed full responsibility.

The scheme included:

(a) The provision of naval and military staffs at the Home and Oversea ports to be used, arrangements for mobilisation, preparation of full instructions for their guidance, provision of accommodation, &c.

(b) Arrangements for the impressment of ships of different kinds under Royal Proclamation, for the disposal of cargo on board, for their fitting by contractors under specifications drawn up for the service, coaling, manning and the like.

(c) The provision of 20,000 sets of portable home stall fittings (to ensure the safe conveyance of horses), and of other material, horse and passenger brows, slings, &c., for use both here and oversea.

(d) Arrangements for tugs, launches, lighters, &c.

(e) The provision of labour at different ports.

(f) The training of the necessary personnel for the embarkation and disembarkation of troops, &c., at overseas ports.

(g) The military arrangements with the French for conveying troops by rail to concentration point.

(h) The division of responsibility between the Navy and Army is laid down as follows:

(i) The entire operations of landing and shipping troops, animals, guns, regimental stores and baggage, and stores (cargo), whether alongside wharves or piers, either Government or mercantile, or to and from a beach, will be controlled by the Navy, who will provide the boats, lighters and tugs, and any labour required in connection with the same. All other labour required will be found by the Army, except in cases where the circumstances render it desirable that the Navy should provide some or all the labour.

(j) The ultimate decision on this point will rest with the Naval authorities.

(k) The provision of labour at different ports.

(l) The division of responsibility between the Navy and Army is laid down as follows:

(m) The entire operations of landing and shipping troops, animals, guns, regimental stores and baggage, and stores (cargo), whether alongside wharves or piers, either Government or mercantile, or to and from a beach, will be controlled by the Navy, who will provide the boats, lighters and tugs, and any labour required in connection with the same. All other labour required will be found by the Army, except in cases where the circumstances render it desirable that the Navy should provide some or all the labour.

(n) The ultimate decision on this point will rest with the Naval authorities.

(o) The military arrangements with the French for conveying troops by rail to concentration point.
A copy of the time-table is attached, from which it will be seen that the move was to be completed in 14 days, with slight exceptions.

1.—(b) Orders were received 5th August to put the scheme into execution, the first day of embarkation to be the 7th August. Ultimately the first day of embarkation was fixed for Sunday, the 9th August. The transports were ready, as a rule, on the day before (that) required to embark troops. Where fitting for men and horses was necessary, the work occupied from two to six days. Except on one occasion, owing to fog, there was no want of transports on any day.

1.—(d) The original scheme was modified as follows:

It was originally intended to embark six divisions. The 4th and 6th Divisions were taken out of the scheme, when the order to embark was received.

The 4th Division was put back into the scheme, and embarked on the 22nd August—the 14th day of embarkation, the moves originally fixed for the 13th day of embarkation took place on the 12th day, and those for the 14th day on the 13th day of embarkation. The 6th Division was conveyed from Ireland to England, and ultimately embarked for France on 8th and 9th September. Otherwise the programme followed exactly the course laid down.

2.—(a), (b), (c), (d), figures attached. As regards (a) the figures per day are not available at the War Office, who have supplied this information.

(c) Transports were despatched singly as ready, by day and night.

3. The numbers to be carried were actually worked out from the ships or from plans, allowing 8 superficial feet of 'tween deck space per man (or berths where cabins exist), and a stall of 7 to 8 feet long by 2 ft. 6 ins. wide, with necessary gangways per horse. The holds were also measured for guns, vehicles, &c., and in most instances the ships were able to take the full numbers which were required to accompany the unit.


5. Statements attached.

**APPENDIX Gl.**

*(Enclosure 1.)*

**EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.**

*Return showing the Total Number and Gross Tonnage of Transports used each Day, for the Conveyance of Troops (and Stores) from the United Kingdom to France, from the Commencement of the Move until Midnighit 20th September.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date, 1914</th>
<th>Total Number of Transports used</th>
<th>Total Gross Tonnage</th>
<th>Remarks added by T. and S.D. Division</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9th August</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5,361</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9,417</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>22,067</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>81,743</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>100,872</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>164,361</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>113,050</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>171,188</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>129,104</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>150,103</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19th</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>84,404</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>81,931</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>51,735</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22nd</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>130,761</td>
<td>August 9th-21st. Four infantry and one cavalry crossing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23rd</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>44,470</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24th</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3,755</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17,528</td>
<td>4th Infantry Division crossing, <em>i.e.</em>, five infantry and one cavalry divisions completed by 23rd. Boulogne being evacuated from 24th August and Havre used.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26th</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>22,930</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27th</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>27,522</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28th</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18,150</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29th</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12,187</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30th</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>52,965</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31st</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>45,038</td>
<td>From 31st August Havre and Boulogne being evacuated; St. Nazaire became main base.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX G2.
(Enclosure 2.)

DURATION OF VOYAGE.

Return showing Ports of Departure and Arrival of Expeditionary Force Transports, Average Duration of Voyage, and Service on which Employed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Port of Departure and Service</th>
<th>Boulogne</th>
<th>Havre</th>
<th>Rouen</th>
<th>St. Nazaire</th>
<th>Nantes</th>
<th>Marseilles</th>
<th>Dunkirk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NEWHAVEN</td>
<td>7½ hours</td>
<td>10 hours</td>
<td>18 or 30 hours</td>
<td>2 days 4 hours</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Stores.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(according to tide).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTHAMPTON</td>
<td>14 hours</td>
<td>13 hours</td>
<td>18 or 30 hours</td>
<td>1 day 20 hours</td>
<td>2 days 16 hours</td>
<td>11 days</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Troops and horses and hospital ships.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(according to tide).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIVERPOOL</td>
<td>2 days 22 hours</td>
<td>2 days 16 hours</td>
<td>3 or 3½ days</td>
<td>2 days 18 hours</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Mechanical transport and frozen meat.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(according to tide).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVONMOUTH</td>
<td>2 days 7 hours</td>
<td>2 days</td>
<td>2 days 8 hours or 2 days 20 hours</td>
<td>2 days 4 hours</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Mechanical transport and petrol.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(according to tide).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUBLIN</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1 day 21½ hours</td>
<td></td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>3 days 3 hours</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Troops and horses.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
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<tr>
<td>GLASGOW</td>
<td>3 days.</td>
<td>2 days 15½ hours</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2 days 20 hours</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Troops and horses.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QUEENSTOWN</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1 day 12½ hours</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Troops and horses.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BELFAST</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2 days.</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Troops and horses.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LONDON</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1 day.</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Stevedores.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JERSEY</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>11 hours</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Troops and horses.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEVONPORT</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>6 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Siege Brigade.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOVER</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1 day 12½ hours</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Naval Brigade.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 9th to 23rd August — Troops, Stores, etc. were conveyed to Boulogne, Havre and Rouen.
23rd to 31st August — " " " Havre and Rouen.
31st August to 16th September — " " " St. Nazaire and Nantes.
16th September — Service to Havre and Rouen was partially resumed.
# APPENDIX G3.

## Statement of Total Embarkations and Shipments.

9th August—Midnight, 6th September 1914.

(Summarised from Enclosures to A.L. T. 9186 of 2/10/14.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Port</th>
<th>Troops and Civilians</th>
<th>Horses</th>
<th>Food and Forage</th>
<th>Petrol</th>
<th>Ammunition</th>
<th>Vehicles</th>
<th>Stores</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Southampton</td>
<td>132,210</td>
<td>41,784</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>6,019</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Also 1,696 bicycles. Also 1,733 stretchers; 1,990 buckets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newhaven</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>42,724</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>4,131</td>
<td>511 and 1,443 tons.</td>
<td>14,761</td>
<td>And 1,733 stretchers; 1,990 buckets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avonmouth</td>
<td>4,499</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>4,068 tons</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1,619</td>
<td>1,371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liverpool</td>
<td>1,757</td>
<td>10,184</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2,985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish Ports combined.</td>
<td>26,747</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>165,609 men.</td>
<td>51,968</td>
<td>71,423 tons.</td>
<td>8,552</td>
<td>1,619</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Includes guns and limbers 2- and 4-wheeled vehicles, cars, heavy motor vans, ambulances, forage and water carts, &c.
DISPOSITION OF DOVER PATROL DURING PASSAGE OF EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, AUGUST 1914

REFERENCE
Light Cruisers (Day) shown thus. (Night)
Destroyers (Day) (Night)
Submarines (Day)
THE PATROL FLOTILLAS AT THE COMMENCEMENT
OF THE WAR.

NOTES ON SOURCES.

1. The telegrams reproduced in Appendix A have been obtained from the set
of Admiralty telegrams arranged by the Historical Section of the Committee of
Imperial Defence. Those relating to Home Waters for the period under review
are bound in 28 volumes numbered H.S. 50 to 77, the arrangement being strictly
chronological.

2. The more important documents consulted are detailed below and may be
arranged under three headings:
(a) Collection of papers in the Admiralty Record Office with Record Office
number.
(b) Documents which have passed through the Military Branch Confidential
Registry but not through the Record Office.
(c) Miscellaneous Papers without an M number or Record Office number, chiefly
originating from the Naval staff, deposited with H.S./C.I.D.

3. The following Admiralty Record Office collections have been referred to:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C. 1059</td>
<td>East Coast War Channel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X. 2990</td>
<td>Movements of A.O.P. in 1914.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X. 3766</td>
<td>Proposed 10th Destroyer Flotilla.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X. 3906</td>
<td>Report of T.B. 21 re sighting enemy destroyers on October 7th.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. The following documents are here listed in the order of their Branch Registry
numbers. They all belong to the 1914 series:

| M. 0081* | Disposition of Patrol Flotillas, November 7th. |
| M. 01728 | Proposals re Auxiliary Patrol, August 1914. |
| M. 02354 | Proposed modification to Dover Patrol, September 30th. |
| M. 02587 | Report of Sweep carried out by Tyne Flotilla, October 6th–7th. |
| M. 02603 | Appointment of R.A. Hood to Dover and letter to A.O.P., dated October 12th. |
| M. 02722 | Submarine Service Relations with A.O.P., October 15th. |
| M. 03269 | Engagement of “Halecyon” with enemy ships, November 3rd. |
| M. 03461 | Reports from “Lively” and “Leopard” re action of November 3rd. |
| M. 03481* | Letter from A.O.P., November 8th, enclosing revised Orders to Patrol Flotillas. |
| M. 03569 | Dover Patrol. Proposed new Scheme, November 10th. |
| M. 04012 | Investigation re conduct of Officers at Yarmouth. |

* Documents marked with an asterisk are reproduced in whole or in part in Appendix B.
THE PATROL FLOTILLAS AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE WAR:

CHAPTER I.

THE ADMIRAL OF PATROLS.

Origin and Functions.

1. The Original Appointment, 1912.—At the beginning of 1912 the torpedo craft in Home Waters were all attached to the Home Fleet, the 1st and 2nd Flotillas under the Commodore (T.) being fully manned and working with the fully-manned vessels of the 1st and 2nd Divisions, Home Fleet.

There remained a large number of the older classes of destroyers and torpedo-boats organised in flotillas and placed under the orders of the Vice-Admiral Commanding 3rd (nucleus crew) and 4th (reduced nucleus crew) Divisions of the Home Fleet. These torpedo craft were manned by nucleus crews and ranged from the River Class destroyers, only lately released from the “running flotillas,” to the obsolescent twenty-seven knotters—the earliest destroyers built. The River Class destroyers and the ex-coastal destroyers (oil T.B.’s) were based on Harwich, the remainder being organised in two flotillas at Portsmouth and Plymouth respectively. The submarines were divided into sections under the same command. Though the Vice-Admiral Commanding the 3rd and 4th Divisions, Home Fleet, was in command of these scattered flotillas, there was no central authority analogous to Commodore (T.), to co-ordinate their training and exercises, while their task in war—the patrol of the East Coast—was entirely distinct from the duties allotted to the older battleships and cruisers which composed the 3rd and 4th Divisions.

In view of these considerations a Conference was held at the Admiralty on February 14th, 1912, and it was decided to recommend that a Rear-Admiral should be appointed “to arrange for the efficient war training of flotillas not directly affiliated to sea-going fleets” and to be in charge of the coast patrols in time of war.

With regard to the Submarine Service, the Inspecting Captain of Submarines (later Commodore S.) remained responsible for all technical details of his service, and was authorised to communicate direct with the Controller of the Navy on such subjects. He was also to remain in charge of the elementary training of the submarine personnel, but all exercises which required submarines to work in conjunction with other craft were to be arranged by the Admiral of Patrols who was also generally responsible for the administration of the submarine service.

Admiral de Robeck was also specially enjoined to work in close co-operation with the military authorities and concert with them measures for the defence of the East Coast Ports. He had, moreover, no concern with the defences of the Home Ports or

1. Except the flotillas for the local defence of the Home Ports.
2. The “sections” were later known as “flotillas.”
3. For early history of A.O.P., see Admiralty Record Office collection of papers entitled “Council Office, 24.6.12.”
4. It was later moved to Central Buildings, Westminster.
the local defence flotillas attached to them. His actual War Orders were issued separately, and those in force on the outbreak of war will be considered later.

3. Admiral de Robeck's Command of the Patrol Flotilla.—Rear-Admiral de Robeck held the position of Admiral of Patrols till May 1st, 1914, his tenure of the command being exactly two years, and during this period the organisation and composition of the patrol flotillas remained essentially the same though there were many changes in detail which it is not necessary to follow. Much experience was gained by various exercises carried out in the North Sea either under the Admiral of Patrols himself or the Captains (D) of the various flotillas who were accommodated in light cruisers of the Scout class.

Before relinquishing his command Admiral de Robeck sent to the Director of the Operations Division (Captain A. C. Leveson) in April 1914, some suggestions on the working of the patrol flotillas, and also various proposals put forward by Captain E. G. Lowther-Crofton, who after serving as Captain D. 9, had become Assistant to the Admiral of Patrols in January 1914.1 These proposals were in substantial agreement with Admiral de Robeck's views, and were to the effect that the flotillas in war time should be kept concentrated at fortified ports in order to be ready, as far as possible, to repel hostile raids of which no warning could be expected. Detached destroyers scattered along the coast were described as quite useless for this purpose. It was urged that a motor-boat reserve should be formed at once to carry out the duties of observation and patrol.

Admiral de Robeck in his remarks also emphasised that the flotillas, if used for the purpose of repelling raids, ought to act as a whole, being supported by the flotilla cruisers. He also agreed with a proposal which had been put forward that he should be responsible for the East Coast of England only from Dover to St. Abbs,2 the Admiral Commanding the Coast of Scotland (Admiral R. S. Lowery) taking charge of the Forth Local Defence and the Scotch coast.

The views expressed in these memoranda are of considerable importance, as they indicate that which pre-war training had been carried out. Capt. E. G. Lowther-Crofton later (August 21st, 1914) drew attention to the fact that they had not been reduced to writing as a whole.3

On May 1st, 1914, Captain G. A. Ballard, lately Director of the Operations Division, was appointed Admiral of Patrols, being granted the rank of Commodore, 1st Class.

The patrol flotillas were to be employed in the sweeps carried out by the Grand Fleet except under extraordinary circumstances.

On receipt of the "warning telegram"4 all the patrol flotillas were to complete to full crews and proceed to their war stations, the Admiral of Patrols with the ships under his command (except the Dover Patrol) then coming under the orders of the Admiral of the Channel Fleet. As regards his own movements, he was to endeavour to exercise individual action of the officers commanding further than was necessary.

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On May 1st, 1914, Captain G. A. Ballard, lately Director of the Operations Division, was appointed Admiral of Patrols, being granted the rank of Commodore, 1st Class.

4. Duties of Defence and Patrol Flotillas.—It was now decided that the patrol flotillas on the East Coast and the local defence flotillas under the S.N.O's. of dockyard ports should have as their war duty that of dealing with raids by detached forces of the enemy and of supporting the shore defences of bases.

The Coast Patrol Flotillas were not to be employed in the sweeps carried out by the Grand Fleet except under extraordinary circumstances.

On receipt of the "warning telegram"4 all the patrol flotillas were to complete to full crews and proceed to their war stations, the Admiral of Patrols with the ships under his command (except the Dover Patrol) then coming under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet, who was to issue whatever orders were necessary to make the disposition of the Patrol Flotillas supplement and conform to his main operations. This arrangement, however, never came into force, and the Admiral of Patrols remained directly under the Admiralty.

On taking up war stations the 6th Flotilla was to proceed to Dover and establish a patrol across the Channel being assisted by the 5th and 6th Submarine Flotillas.

The 6th Flotilla was specially allocated for this service, and detailed instructions were issued as to the disposition of the ships. These will be considered in Chapter IV., but it may be noted here that besides the cruisers, destroyers, and submarines responsible for watching the Straits, the Admiral of Patrols was also in charge of the Downs Examination Service and the flotilla of small craft attached to it.

6. The disposition of the ships in the Straits of Dover was definitely laid down by the Admiralty, but with regard to the remainder of the flotillas the Admiral of Patrols was allowed considerable discretion.

A force of four destroyers and three submarines was to be attached to each of the three fortified ports of Harwich,1 the Humber, and the Tyne, to co-operate with the shore defences in the local defence of the coast. Two of the four destroyers were to be disposed as the Admiral of Patrols thought best in order to comply with his instructions, bearing in mind the varying nature of the coast, and old armoured vessels were to be stationed in the Tyne and Humber to support the local flotillas.

The Admiral of Patrols was also directed to keep in constant communication with the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet and the Vice-Admiral Commanding the Channel Fleet. As regards his own movements, he was to endeavour to exercise a general supervision over the operations of his flotillas without restricting the individual action of the officers commanding further than was necessary.

He himself was to move from station to station, first satisfying himself that the 6th Flotilla and the Downs Boarding Flotilla were carrying out their duties.

7. Summary of A.O.P.'s Orders.—From the foregoing it will be seen that the command of the Admiral of Patrols in time of war comprised two separate and distinct theatres of operations. The functions and composition of the force stationed at Dover were regulated by the Admiralty, and it played an essential part in the closure of the North Sea, which was the basis of Admiralty war policy. Thus from the outbreak of war the Dover Patrol was a unit distinct from the remaining flotillas, and for this reason it is considered in a separate chapter (Chapter IV.), and matters connected with it are only touched on incidentally elsewhere.

The remaining flotillas were to be disposed at the discretion of the Admiral of Patrols to protect the coast from the Forth to Harwich, being supported on the north by the Forth Local Defence and on the south by the Nore Defence Flotilla under the local Commanders-in-Chief. The part to be played by them was not very clearly defined. Their duty was to prevent minor raiding enterprises on the part of the enemy and to patrol the coast not only with the object of preventing raids, but also in order to ensure that any hostile vessels were reported and attacked if they approached near the coast.

There are evidently two conceptions discernible here, which cannot be entirely reconciled with each other. The repelling of a raid is a tactically offensive operation
which, as Admiral de Robeck had previously pointed out, implied concentration of force. On the other hand, the reporting of hostile craft seems to contemplate a service of information requiring dispersion over a considerable area. It is important to emphasise this point, for the two conceptions are both discernible in the dispositions of the patrol flotillas throughout the period under consideration.

It must be remembered that at the outbreak of hostilities, besides being in charge of Dover and the East Coast of England, the Admiral of Patrols was also generally responsible for the administration of the submarine service and the organisation of the hired minesweeping trawlers. But the stress of actual war soon demonstrated the impracticability of one and the same officer travelling about the country controlling such diverse activities, and before three months had passed the responsibility of the Admiral of Patrols was confined to the East Coast, and he was permanently stationed in the Humber.

8. Composition of Patrol Flotillas.—The Patrol Flotillas in July 1914 consisted of the 6th, 7th, 8th and 9th Destroyer Flotillas with the 3rd, 5th, 6th and 7th Submarine Flotillas.

The vessels which formed the Destroyer Flotillas may be considered as comprising four classes:

(i) The “F” class or Tribals; 12 boats of approximately 1,000 tons displacement and 35 knots speed. They were from four to six years old and mounted either 2—4-inch or 5—12-pdr. 12 cwt. guns, with two torpedo tubes, and burnt oil fuel.

(ii) The “E” or “River” class were of about 550 tons displacement with a designed speed of 25 knots, but as they were from 9 to 10 years old few could attain this speed. They were armed with 1—12-pdr. 12 cwt. and 3—12-pdr. 8 cwt. guns with two torpedo tubes and burnt coal.

(iii) The “B,” “C” and “D” class or “thirty-knotters” displaced about 400 tons with a designed speed of 30 knots. Their age varied from 14 to 17 years and their speed had fallen off proportionately. The armament consisted of 1—12-pdr. 12 cwt., 4—6-pdr., and two torpedo tubes.

(iv) Torpedo boats 1—36 or ex-coastals. These displaced from 250 to 300 tons, were five to seven years old and designed for 26 knots. Their armament consisted of 2—12-pdr. 12 cwt. guns and three torpedo tubes and they burnt oil fuel.

The light cruisers attached to the flotillas all belonged to the so-called “Scout” class built ten years previously and armed with 9—4-inch and two above water torpedo tubes. The submarines in the Patrol Flotillas consisted of the small “B” and “C” class boats of about 300 tons displacement.

The composition of the various flotillas after mobilisation was as follows, but it must be realised that all these vessels were not immediately available as some were undergoing extensive refits when the war broke out.

Sixth Flotilla.

Light cruiser.—“Attentive” (Captain D.).

12—42-knotters; 12 torpedo boats.

No depot ship.

Seventh Flotilla.

Light cruiser.—“Skirmisher” (Captain D.).

20—30-knotters; 12 torpedo boats.

Depot ship, “Leander.”

8. Composition of Patrol Flotillas.—The Patrol Flotillas in July 1914 consisted of the 6th, 7th, 8th and 9th Destroyer Flotillas with the 3rd, 5th, 6th and 7th Submarine Flotillas.

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The composition of the various flotillas after mobilisation was as follows, but it must be realised that all these vessels were not immediately available as some were undergoing extensive refits when the war broke out.

Sixth Flotilla.

Light cruiser.—“Pathfinder” (Captain D.).

12—30-knotters; 12 torpedo boats.

Depot ships, “Tyne”; “Aquarius.”

Ninth Flotilla.

Light cruiser.—“Patrol” (Captain D.).

16 “E” class.

Depot ship, “St. George.”

There were also eight “E” class destroyers, nominally detached from the 9th Flotilla, attached to the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet. These were kept nearly fully manned and were detailed for the local defence of the Orkney Islands and Moray Firth in time of war.

The 3rd, 4th, 6th and 7th submarine Flotillas consisted of from six to twelve boats each (see paragraph 12), under the orders of the Admiral of Patrols;
raids on any part of the section of coast for which they were responsible. This was in accordance with the general conception of their function as described in Chapter I.1

The 7th Flotilla was ordered to proceed from Grimsby to Rosyth and there place itself under the orders of the Admiral of Patrols, Coast of Scotland, for the defence of the Firth of Forth from St. Abb's Head to Greggness.2 It had originally been intended that the Admiral of Patrols should be responsible for the whole coast of Scotland with the exception of the Orkneys and Cromarty,3 a revision to previous arrangements which had been made necessary by the recent increase in the probability of hostilities, and on the 25th Admiral Lowry was informed by telegram of the new orders to the 8th Flotilla.4

The Orkneys and Cromarty were to be protected by the 8 River Class destroyers attached to the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, but he was not responsible for the Shetlands which were provided for by orders to the 8th Flotilla to detach a division of four destroyers to Lerwick after arrival in the Firth. At first it was intended that the "Pathfinder" with Captain D. S. should accompany them, but later the "Forward,"5 which had been employed on the Irish Coast, was substituted.

11. The Humber Battleships.—The four old battleships which were to be placed at the disposal of the Admiralty of Patrols for the defence of the Humber were the "Inflexible," "Victorious," "Hannibal," and "Maeve." These had been reduced to reserve complement after the Test Mobilisation, but on July 27th orders were issued that they were to be brought up to active (nucleus) complement at Sheerness. On July 30th Commodore Ballard issued orders to Captain Roland Nugent, H.M.S. "Victorious," instructing him to proceed with the four ships to Grimsby and act in concert with Captain D. S. for the defence of the Humber. The special function of the Squadron was to protect the oil fuel depot at Killingholme from all forms of sea attack, and three seaplanes were placed at Captain Nugent's disposal for use against hostile aircraft.

The four battleships left Sheerness on July 31st and arrived in the Humber the next day where the crews were gradually completed for full complement.

12. Submarine Flotillas.—Four submarine flotillas6 were originally allotted for service under the Admiralty of Patrols on the East Coast of England, and their general disposition was not dissimilar to that of the destroyer flotillas. The 1st and 4th Flotillas were definitely assigned to the Dover Patrol, and the greater part of the 7th Flotilla—being stationed in the Firth of Forth—came under the orders of the Admiralty Commanding the Coast of Scotland as in the case of the 9th Destroyer Flotilla.

At the end of July it was estimated that the ultimate composition and distribution of these flotillas would be:—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Flotilla</th>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Home Base</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3rd and 4th Flotillas</td>
<td>B Class</td>
<td>Dover</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Flotilla</td>
<td>C Class</td>
<td>Humber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Flotilla</td>
<td>D Class</td>
<td>Firth of Forth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tyne</td>
<td>3rd Class</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus part of the 7th Submarine Flotilla was under the orders of the A.O.P. and part under the Admiral of Patrols. Owing to their small size and low speed, these submarines could not carry out extensive operations, and with the exception of those at Dover they seem to have remained in their ports in readiness to assist the shore batteries and local defence divisions in repelling an enemy raid.

It must be remembered that at the outbreak of war the Admiral of Patrols had administrative charge of the whole submarine service, including the 8th Submarine Flotilla, which carried out operations under Commodore S. His operational responsibility, however, was confined to the stations at sea under his orders.

13. Patrol Flotillas take up their Stations.—The mobilisation of the various destroyer flotillas was completed by July 30th, on which day the 7th sailed from Devonport for Grimsby, to relieve the 8th which had received its balance crews at the latter port. The 9th left Harwich in the evening for the Tyne, and by August 1st all the patrol flotillas were at their war bases with the exception of the 8th Flotilla, which was still on its way to the Firth of Forth from Grimsby. The arrival of the four battle-ships in the Humber and the concentration of the 6th Flotilla at Dover completed the preliminary movements.

14. Commencement of Hostilities.—The first orders from the Admiralty relative to the patrol flotillas were sent on the evening of August 1st, and were to the effect that the patrol flotillas and local defence flotillas were to patrol during the night until further Orders.1

This was followed on August 3rd by an order to the patrols to take up their war stations, that is to say, presumably those described in the A.O.P.'s orders of July 27th, and in accordance with these instructions the flotillas proceeded to sea.2

The declaration of immediate war led to no further immediate orders, except that the patrols were directed not to leave their stations in order to warn fishing vessels of the outbreak of hostilities,3 and it would appear that the patrol divisions were expected to remain at definite points in readiness to repel a raid as described in the orders of July 27th. It is, however, difficult to be certain whether or not they actually remained at anchor by day.

15. Orders for Continuous Patrol, August 6th.—The first activity of the enemy after the commencement of hostilities was the minelaying operation carried out by the auxiliary "Koenigliche" on August 6th when a minefield was successfully laid off the Outer Gabard, though the German ship was immediately afterwards sunk by the Harwich force. The patrol flotillas played no part in the episode, but it nevertheless had a great influence on their future employment. Hitherto the principal object of the patrol flotillas had been the prevention of raids, but on August 6th the Admiralty issued orders that the coast was to be patrolled day and night to prevent minelaying.4 Thus the whole function of these flotillas was changed and a great additional strain thrown on the personnel and material of the old vessels which were all the Admiral of Patrols had at his disposal. This strain was increased by the fact that a division of the 9th Flotilla, from the North East coast, had been ordered on August 6th to join the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, and assist in the defence of the Northern bases.5 The battleships "Hannibal" and "Magnificent" were also withdrawn from the Humber on the 9th August for the same purpose.

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Chapter I.1

1 Appendix A. 2. 2 Appendix A. 4. 3 Appendix A. 5. 4 Appendix A. 6. 5 Appendix A. 7. 6 Appendix A. 8. 7 Appendix A. 9. 8 Appendix A. 10. 9 Appendix A. 11. 10 Appendix A. 12.
Next day (11th), in a signal timed 1100, the "Spanker" reported that wireless indications showed that German ships were in the neighbourhood of Smith's Knoll apparently including one battleship. The alarm was passed along the coast, and at 1250 the Admiral of Patrols at Dover pointed out that the patrol had left the coast to sink mines and asked whether the two battalions in the Humber and the remainder of the 7th Flotilla should search for the enemy. It was soon discovered that the alarm was false, and when informing Commodore Ballard, it is the Admiralty directed that patrol flotillas should not move to find floating mines, apparently not realising that the action taken only the previous day had been in pursuance of their own orders.

In connection with this false alarm it should be noted, firstly, that the position of the Admiral of Patrols at Dover rendered it very difficult to keep touch with events further north, and secondly, that there was evidently a certain vagueness, even at the Admiralty, as to the precise function of the patrol flotillas.

On August 19th there was another false alarm. The destroyer "Orwell" of the 7th Flotilla reported detecting a hostile cruiser chasing her off the Outer Dowsing at 1545. The "Orwell" was apparently alone, and later reported that the cruiser was of the "Königsberg" or "Emden" class, and stopped near the Outer Dowsing. As this was lost just before the "Skirmisher" proceeded to sea from the Humber at 1740 she sighted nothing and returned to harbour.

This so-called enemy cruiser turned out to be the minelayer gunboat "Speedy," but this was not known till three days later, and it was generally believed at the time that the alarm was genuine.

Under these circumstances it will be seen that the original conception of using the patrol flotillas was breaking down. The single destroyer which sighted the enemy could not deliver an attack, there seem to have been no reserves at hand to support, and it was two hours after the first sighting before the "Skirmisher" left the Humber. Under these circumstances the flotilla could neither have prevented the laying of mines nor have delivered a prompt attack on a hostile raiding force. After the experience the 7th Flotilla issued an order that every enemy vessel sighted off the British coast, and if not capable of being followed across the North Sea, should be reported to the nearest local authority. It tended to emphasise the importance of the patrol flotillas as scouting and reporting squadrons rather than flotillas to be employed in tactical offensives.

17. The German Operations.—After the minelaying operation of August 6th there were a number of reports of neutral vessels being stopped and examined off the Dogger Bank. Trawlers had sighted a German minelayer and reported various hostile movements of importance in the Northern Bases. On August 15th a German was sighted by one of our submarines off Smith's Knoll Light Vessel at daylight, and shortly afterwards the 1st Flotilla, which was patrolling from Harwich, sighted a four-funnelled enemy destroyer in the Broad Fourcault area. These reports caused some anxiety.

On August 21st and 22nd the enemy carried out a sweeping operation in the direction of the Humber and Tyne, and it was then believed that these mines had been laid by disguised auxiliaries, the first of which might result from a minefield near the Northern bases, he requested that the patrol should be increased to at least 12 destroyers might be sent to strengthen the local patrols off the fleet bases. It was not possible to grant this request as the destroyers available were even then insufficient for an adequate patrol of the East Coast, and on this day Rear-Admiral Ballard issued orders to the 7th and 9th Flotillas to meet the situation. These orders marked the definite abandonment of the original policy regulating the employment of the patrol flotillas, and they will be described in the next chapter, together with the gradual development of the auxiliary services which endeavoured to preserve a safe channel for shipping through the coastal waters off Eastern England.

18. British View with regard to Minelaying.—The fact that the first enemy minefield had been laid by a converted merchant steamer (Königin Luise) acting without an escort seems to have convinced the British authorities that all enemy minefields would be laid in a similar manner. Reports received from neutral steamers, which had left German ports after the outbreak of war, lent colour to the belief, numerous trawlers and steamers being reported as loaded with mines and ready to sail.

There were also constant reports from wireless stations and coastguards, of "suspicious vessels" seen off the coast, and, though investigation generally showed them to be unfounded, they doubt, left a certain residue of suspicion.

The first news of the Tyne minefield was received at the Admiralty in the morning of August 27th, and further reports during the day showed that it was of considerable extent, two steamers and a sailing vessel being sunk, together with two trawler minesweepers, which were engaged in investigating the area.

Shortly after the news of the Tyne field had been received mines were reported north of the Outer Dowsing, and there could be little doubt that the enemy had carried out extensive operations off our coast.2

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1. Appendix A12.
2. Appendix A13, 14, 15.
3. Appendix A16.
4. Appendix A17.
5. Appendix A18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25.
6. Appendix A26. The details of this episode are not quite clear as no special report was made on it.
8. As a result of this report and the supposed cruiser on the same time, "New Zealand" and "Invincible" were sent to the Humber to act as a support to the vessels in the Southern North Sea, then engaged in covering the passage of the original Expeditionary Force. See C.B. 1557, Naval Movements, August 1914.
THE EAST COAST OF ENGLAND: AUGUST 31ST TO OCTOBER 11TH.

20. Revised Orders for Patrol Flotillas, August 31st.—On August 27th, Rear-Admiral Ballard proceeded in a destroyer from Harwich to the Humber to examine the conditions off the East Coast of England, and visit the patrol flotilla bases at Grimsby and in the Tyne. This visit to the North-East Coast was almost coincident with the discovery of the Tyne and Humber minefields, and the Admiral of Patrols was able to investigate the circumstances connected with the laying of the spot. As a result of his enquiries he formed the opinion that they had been laid down by trawlers or disguised merchant ships unescorted by warships, and in view of this the fleet had come to issue new instructions with regard to the duties of the 7th and 9th Flotillas.

These directed that their whole attention should be devoted to the prevention of mine laying, since raids were apparently not part of the enemy’s policy. As it was believed that the minelayers were neither armed nor escorted, it would be quite possible for a single destroyer to deal with one and dispersion to the fullest extent was required.

The patrol system was therefore completely re-organised. Instead of the destroyers operating in divisions, each responsible for repelling a raid on a particular portion of the coast, it was now arranged that they should be scattered singly along a 10-mile wide strip, roughly coinciding with the main route of shipping up and down the coast. This route passed inside the enemy minefields and across the mouth of the Wash, and for patrol purposes was divided into six portions, two watched by the 9th Flotilla from the Tyne and the remaining four by the 7th Flotilla, half of which was to be based on Grimsby and half on Yarmouth.

21. To provide a force adequate to carry out these orders the Local Defence divisions at the Tyne and Humber were abolished, and the torpedo boats composing them were added to the strength available for general patrol service. The total force was then divided into six divisions of six boats each, two divisions being stationed at each base—Tyneham, Grimsby, and Yarmouth. One half of each division (three boats) was to be on patrol at a time, the remaining vessels feigning and resting in harbours. There would thus be three boats in each of the six patrol areas, and they were ordered to patrol singly at 10 knots in such a way as to cover the whole area for which they were responsible.

These orders came into force in the flotillas on September 1st, but it was not certain for a time as to whether the Admiralty would confirm them, there being some doubt as to whether they would be accepted as to whether they met the case. All the enemy mines had been laid more than 10 miles from the coast, and the Inspecting Captain of Minesweepers (Captain T. P. Bonham) believed the mines must have been laid by a large vessel, and not by fishing boats.

On September 1st Rear-Admiral Ballard left the Tyne in H.M.S. “Patrol,” and after calling at Grimsby for the night, next day continued his journey South in the “Skirmisher” and attended a Conference at the Admiralty on September 3rd.

22. Development of the War Channel.—The orders of August 31st had the effect of confining the efforts of the patrol flotillas to the prevention of minelaying in a channel about 10 miles wide off the East Coast of England, and it will be convenient here to describe briefly the development of the buoyed channel known as the “War Channel,” which roughly coincided with the boats patrolled by the flotillas.

After the first hostile minelaying operation on August 5th, it was recognised that it would be desirable to have a definite and restricted route for men-of-war and important vessels which could be patrolled and swept regularly. It was, therefore, decided at the Admiralty to buoy a channel from the Downs to the Outer Dowsing following the line of the light vessels, and on August 10th it was arranged to print special track charts showing the route to be followed by all ships drawing over 12 feet of water. By August 11th all the buoyed channels had been laid and arrangements were made for the channel to be patrolled continuously by 24 steam drays hired for the purpose, and on August 15th all men-of-war and certain specified auxiliaries were ordered to draw the special track charts before proceeding up or down the East Coast. The Channel was considered secret, the track charts had to be returned at the end of each passage and no notification was made to the mercantile marine regarding it.

The Admiral of Patrols was at Dover at this time and did not learn of the existence of the channel till August 20th, when he happened to receive news of it from the King’s Harbour Master at that port. He requested that in future any special charts issued affecting the area for which he was responsible might be supplied to him.

By September 3rd the buoyed channel had been extended from the Outer Dowsing Light vessel to Flamborough Head, but in view of the Humber minefield this route was considered dangerous and was soon abandoned in favour of a channel further inshore. This ran from the Haisboro Light vessel to the Inner Dowsing Light vessel and thence to Flamborough Head. After being swept and buoyed this was substituted for the outer route on September 12th.

The war channel remained unchangeable from this date until December 18th, when as a result of the Scarborough minefield it was decided to continue the buoyed channel to a position off Hartlepool, but the method of patrol underwent considerable changes as the auxiliary patrol and the submarine menace developed.

23. The Minesweeping Service.—The work of the patrol flotillas was naturally affected to some extent by the growth of the auxiliary services, and it is necessary to give an outline of their origin and development.

As early as 1908 it had been decided to make arrangements to hire trawlers for minesweeping in the event of war, and the scheme was gradually developed, a special branch of the Royal Naval Reserve, known as the Trawler Section, being established for the purpose.

By December 3rd, 1913, it was anticipated that 80 trawlers with crews would be available at any time. The work of training and organising this service was entrusted to the torpedo-gunboats employed on Fishery Protection duties in the North Sea (S.N.O., Captain Ellison of H.M.S. “Puffin”) under the supervision of Captain Bonham, Inspecting Captain of Minesweepers.

In accordance with his Orders the Admiral of Patrols was in general charge of the minesweeping arrangements on the East Coast after the commencement of hostilities, but it soon became evident that the service would expand greatly. On August 7th it was decided to form a minesweeping flotilla of 80 trawlers to ensure a clear channel from the Downs to the Outer Dowsing (see paragraph 22) and Captain Ellison was ordered to take charge of the Flotilla and organise it at Lowestoft.

By August 13th it was estimated that 100 trawlers were available for minesweeping service. On September 13th Rear-Admiral Charlton was appointed as Assistant-Chief of the Auxiliary Service (A.M.S.), and was entrusted with the task of coordinating the work in all areas.

24. The Auxiliary Patrol.—In the pre-war arrangements it was contemplated that hired fishing vessels would only be employed for minesweeping duties, but a very short experience of war conditions indicated that they were required for other purposes. The first of these was their use as patrol vessels, and on the advice of the Admiral Commanding the Coast of Scotland, dated August 7th, stating that the S.N.O., Invergordon, had been authorised to hire trawlers for patrol duties in the Moray Firth owing to the shortage of destroyers.

In connection with the patrol of the war channel 30 drifters were employed by August 15th as already described. These drifters were without signal appliances or armament, and their only method of communicating information was either verbally to a destroyer or by affecting a landing near some coastguard station.

It was fully realised by this time after a fortnight of war what an important role auxiliary craft might play. Besides the minesweeping trawlers and the War Channel

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1 Appendix A 41a. 2 Appendix A 42.
dispersing torpedo craft at considerable intervals along the coast was as suitable for operations against submarines as for checking the activities of hostile minelayers.

26. **Recalls on East Coast previous to October 12th.**—The work of the 7th and 9th Flotillas after the re-distribution of August 31st, was not marked by any incidents of great interest. In pursuance of the idea that the flotillas should not be confined to coast defence, the "Patrol," after taking the Admiral of Patrols from the Tyne to the Humber on September 1st, carried out a sweep with two divisions of the 9th Flotilla to the south-west of the Dogger Bank.

When the "Pathfinder" was sunk on September 5th, it was at first believed that her loss was due to enemy mines, and in view of the fact that the Grand Fleet was at that time carrying out an extensive sweep of the North Sea, the 9th Flotilla was ordered to proceed from the north-east coast to Peterhead, with a view to establishing a patrol of the approaches to the Moray Firth.

The 7th Flotilla thereupon took over the whole coast from the Farne Islands to Harwich and were instructed to establish the best patrol practicable. However, on September 7th the Tyne Flotilla were ordered to return to their base carrying out a sweep for minelayers on their way south, and arriving on September 9th they resumed their original patrol. The "Forward" was at the same time withdrawn from the Humber and joined to the 7th Flotilla.

In the middle of the month the A.O.P. visited the North-East Coast and carried out a tour of inspection. (See para. 27.)

On October 6th and 7th the 9th Flotilla searched an extensive area off the North-East Coast in order to ascertain whether the regulations restricting the activities of neutral fishing vessels were being obeyed.1

The "Patrol" with one destroyer and two torpedo boats proceeded from Tees Bay on September 5th between St. Abb's Head and May Island while in charge of the destroyers stationed on the line St. Abb's Head to Gogness, which formed the Outer Patrol of the Forth Local Defence.2

The episode indicated the danger which attended ships patrolling in a limited area, and on September 5th Admiral Ballard issued a general order to the vessels under his command instructing them as to the precautions to be taken when on patrol and the methods to be adopted in attacking hostile submarines. In reality the only effective method of attack at this time was ramming, as the equipment of destroyers and submarines was not approved till later in the month.

All patrol vessels were ordered to alter course constantly while on their beats and heavy ships on passage were to be screen. If the presence of a hostile submarine was discovered all other objects were to be subordinated to dealing with it. A sweep consisted of a number of destroyers and submarines, and heavy ships on passage were to be screened. If the presence of a hostile submarine was discovered all other objects were to be subordinated to dealing with it.

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Admiral Ballard visited the Admiralty on October 10th to arrange for the transfer, and on the 13th Admiral Hood took over his new command. On September 3rd, where he attended the Conference already mentioned, and thence proceeded to Dover. There Admiral Ballard remained until September 14th, when he left for Harwich to commence another inspection of the East Coast. He embarked in the “Forward,” and, accompanied by two destroyers of the 7th Flotilla, proceeded to Grimsby on September 15th, carrying out a sweep outside the Swarte Bank and German mine areas on the way. On September 19th he left the Humber for the Tyne, examining on the way the area to the south-west of the Dogger Bank with two destroyers of the 8th Flotilla.

On September 22nd he left Jarrow (Tyne) in the “Skirmisher” and passed down the East Coast channel, communicating with all patrols on the way. One night was spent at Yarmouth, and on the 25th Admiral Ballard visited the Admiralty, afterwards proceeding to Dover, where he remained until October 10th.

28. The Dover Command.—If the period of 63 days between August 5th and October 10th is considered, it will be seen that the Admiral of Patrols had only been able to spend 29 days on the East Coast where the major portion of the forces under his command were stationed and a considerable number of these days had been occupied in travel.

The remainder of his time had been spent at Dover, where constant attention was required, first in connection with the passage of the Expeditionary Force and later in regard to the problems arising from the advance of the German armies.

The position became acute in the beginning of October. The first British minefield had been laid in the southern portion of the North Sea on October 3rd, and this operation had involved a great deal of work on the part of Admiral Ballard and his staff at Dover. The decision to land the 7th Division of the army at Ostend and Zeebrugge added greatly to the complexity of the situation, while the critical situation of Antwerp and the influx of Belgian refugees all contributed to absorb Admiral Ballard’s attention.

He had intended to leave Dover on October 5th for another visit to the East Coast, but the questions connected with the transport and disembarkation of the Seventh Division rendered this impossible and his departure was indefinitely postponed.

All these events indicated that there was ample scope at Dover for a flag officer untrammelled by other responsibilities, and on October 7th it was proposed that a Rear-Admiral should be appointed to command the Dover Patrol. The suggestion was accepted, and Rear-Admiral the Hon. Horace Hood was selected for the post. Admiral Ballard visited the Admiralty on October 10th to arrange for the transfer, and on the 13th Admiral Hood took over his new command.

CHAPTER IV.

THE DOVER PATROL, AUGUST 1914—JANUARY 1915.

29. The Main Function of the Dover Patrol.—The underlying policy of our strategy was the closure of the northern and southern approaches to the North Sea to the passage of all enemy shipping, whether mercantile or naval. The task of watching the northern entrance was carried out by the Grand Fleet and squadrons working directly under the orders of its Commander-in-Chief, while that of controlling the Dover defile was entrusted to a force under the command of the Admiral of Patrols.

1 They were disembarked at Ostend and Zeebrugge, October 6th and 7th.
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decrying the wholly northern approach to the Straits of Dover dangerous. This proposal had already been considered by the Admiralty and the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet, and it was decided to adopt it.

Though the cruisers remained in harbour after September 27th, the submarines still maintained the patrol by day until, on October 2nd, a torpedo was fired at one, which led to their being withdrawn and kept in harbour ready to proceed to sea should an attack by enemy surface craft appear probable. The destroyers carried on the original patrol system for a few days longer, but the pressure of events soon compelled the abandonment of these methods.

34. Proposed Scheme by Admiral Ballard.—The Admiralty had some time previously given approval to a proposal that the Tribal destroyers at Dover should be fitted with the modified (explosive) sweep, but the fitting of this took time. After the attack on the "Attentive," Admiral Ballard had suggested that when fitted they should patrol continuously with sweep out from the East Goodwin to the South-west Ruytingen Buoy, the control of the old sweep being carried out by the older destroyers assisted by French torpedo craft. This suggestion was renewed on October 5th, the Admiral of Patrols remarking that the British minefield, which had been laid on October 3rd, necessitated some revision in the disposition of the Dover Patrol.

It was anticipated that enemy surface vessels attempting to pass through the Dover, while submarines would cross the minefield on the surface and make of the light vessels before submerging. To deal with these new conditions it was proposed that four "Tribals," towing the modified sweep, should patrol the line East Goodwin to South-west Ruytingen Buoy. The commander of the 6th Flotillas destroyers would maintain a patrol between the South Goodwin and the North-east Varne Buoy, the channel south of the Varne being protected by the French. Four submarines were to be stationed off the South Goodwin to guard the Downe channel, and four more spread on a line joining Folkstone and the Varne Light Vessel.

A general approval was given by the Admiralty on October 17th to these proposals, but by that time Dover had become a separate command, conditions had greatly changed, and they were never actually carried out.

35. Dover Area a Separate Command.—In the first days of October, immediately after the laying of the British minefield, it was decided to land the 7th Division of the Army at the Belgian ports of Ostend and Zeebrugge in the hope of checking the German advance to the north coast. This operation necessitated a revision of the naval authorities at Dover, and the Admiral of Patrols was forced to postpone a proposed visit to the N.E. Coast.

The continued German success in Belgium and the impending fall of Antwerp both led to an increased press of business at Dover, and it was evident that the Office Commanding would have to devote his whole attention to the problems arising from the occupation by the enemy of the Flemish coast line. Rear-Admiral the Hon. Horace Hood was accordingly appointed to command at Dover, to date October 11th, and the A.O.P. transferred the command to him on October 12th.

36. Method of Patrol in October.—On arrival at Dover, Admiral Hood's energies were at once absorbed by events on the Belgian coast, where the Germans had occupied Ostend and Zeebrugge on October 15th, and the principal activities of the Dover force were now for some time confined to supporting the left flank of the Belgian army. But all this time the watch on the Straits had still to be maintained, and in view of the reduced number of vessels available as well as the conditions resulting from the British minefield, a new system of patrol was devised.

This is described in Revised War Orders for the Dover Patrol issued by Captain D 6 on October 26th, but the actual method described seems to have been brought into force previous to that date.

According to these orders the primary duty of the 6th Flotillas lay in the formation of a cordon across the entrance of the North Sea to watch for and attack

1 The light cruisers night positions were known as A, B, and C. See Chas., p. 70.
2 Orders in the Event of an Attack.—The patrol at the outbreak of the war was organised solely with a view to meeting an attack by surface craft on the Channel coast until conditions were such as to provide for the prospective transport of the British Expeditionary Force to France. That German submarines should attempt the passage of the Straits does not seem to have been contemplated, and two months elapsed before they actually made their appearance in the vicinity.

3 If a strong force of enemy surface craft appeared it was intended both to attack them in the Straits and maintain contact until they could be brought to action by the Channel Fleet cruising to the westward under Vice-Admiral Burney. By day two of the cruisers on patrol were to place themselves ahead of the enemy the remaining cruisers following. If the destroyers, with heater torpedoes, were to carry out long range attacks in the Straits, those with cold (short range) torpedoes keeping close at hand. They would carry out close range attacks on the enemy vessels. The reserve division was to proceed to the westward and attack the enemy after they had passed the Varne Light Vessel, the area to the eastward being reserved for the submarines from Dover which were to act as surface torpedo craft.

4 After expending their torpedoes all destroyers were ordered to return and re-establish the patrol line across the Straits as soon as possible.

5 The Patrol as Maintained till October.—The method of patrol instituted at the outbreak of war was carried out with slight modifications until the early days of October, and, owing to the inactivity of the enemy, this period was for the most part uneventful.

6 In August light buoys were placed in positions A, B, and C to assist the cruisers in maintaining their position at night, and mooring buoys were placed near A and B buoys for the submarines to lie at during the day. After the transport of the main body of the British Expeditionary Force had been completed, Admiral of Patrols suggested that the destroyers should be ordered to proceed to the westward and attack the enemy after they had passed the Varne Light Vessel, the area to the eastward being reserved for the submarines from Dover which were to act as surface torpedo craft.

7 The growth of the submarine menace led to orders being issued in September that the enemy's approaches would keep constant moving when on their beats in order to render an attack by the enemy's underwater craft more difficult. The necessity for this precaution was shown on September 27th, when H.M.S. "Attentive" was attacked by two cruisers. By day two of the cruisers on patrol were to place themselves ahead of the enemy the remaining cruisers following. If the destroyers, with heater torpedoes, were to carry out long range attacks in the Straits, those with cold (short range) torpedoes keeping close at hand. They would carry out close range attacks on the enemy vessels. The reserve division was to proceed to the westward and attack the enemy after they had passed the Varne Light Vessel, the area to the eastward being reserved for the submarines from Dover which were to act as surface torpedo craft.

8 In a report of an incident Admiral Ballard stated that "the actual presence of submarines in the Straits of Dover appears to justify the assumption that in the course of time they will push their way down channel and possibly threaten the approaches to the Solent or Portland." He stated that he saw no way of preventing this by a patrol of the Straits of Dover as there was nothing to prevent submarines running the whole distance submerged. To hamper the movement of the enemy it was proposed that the Sandettie, Ruytingen, West Hinder, and East Goodwin Light Vessels should be removed and the South Foreland and Dunkirk Light houses reduced in visibility. It was hoped that this would prevent the submarines getting a good departure before submerging for the run through the Straits, but at the same time it was pointed out that a still more effective bar would be provided by running a line of mines N.W. from the Ruytingen Light Vessel and

9 Appendix A, 57. About this time the French submarines were withdrawn from the Grisons to Yarmouth and remained in readiness to reinforce the South Foreland. The first hostile submarines appeared on the Southampton to Havre route on October 15th.

10 Appendix A, 58, 59.

11 Appendix A, 60, 61.

12 Appendix B. 5. These orders concerned with a general description of the functions of the Patrol Flotilla, evidently issued to A.O.P. See Chas. V.

13 Appendix A, 59, 60.

14 Appendix A, 60, 61.
enemy vessels of war which might attempt to pass the Straits. The general instructions with regard to the procedure to be adopted in the event of enemy surface craft to break through resemble those issued in August (see para. 32), but are not so definite, and in view of the reduced numbers on patrol and theilikelihood of the enemy heavy ships risking a passage through the minefields lay more stress on maintaining the "cordon" than following the enemy.

The actual patrol line to be maintained was not described in the body of the orders, but an addendum of the same date (October 26th) ordered the destroyers on patrol to hold both by day and by night the line from S. Goodwin Light Vessel through A., B., and C. buoys. The destroyers (normally five by day) were to distribute themselves equally along this line and cruise independently, keeping a good look-out for submarines.1

A further memo., dated November 6th,2 describes the destroyers as cruising by day to the N.E. of the patrol line, and at night and in thick weather steaming at right angles to it as far as the line E. Goodwin to Outer Ruytingen Buoy and back.

37. Admiral Hood's Scheme.—On November 10th Rear-Admiral Hood reported to the Admiralty that he had not been able to introduce Admiral Ballard's scheme of October 8th for a modified sweep patrol (see para. 34), owing to the fact that there were not sufficient sweeps available, and also that the line S. Goodwin to Varne Buoy was undesirable owing to its proximity to Dover and the risk of collisions.3 In a further letter of the same date he forwarded "a modified scheme to compete with the measure.4 In introducing these proposals he regretted that "there was small doubt "that the present patrol of the Dover Straits was quite inefficient in preventing the "free passage of enemy submarines by day or night," though it had probably been successful in preventing the passage of surface craft, both commercial and naval.

He now wished to hold the whole area of the Straits from the Mined Area to the line Dungeness-Boulogne with destroyers both by day and by night, and in order to carry this out, proposed to divide the whole Straits into areas according to the number of destroyers available, each being patrolled by a single boat.

Diagrams were attached dividing the Straits into eight, ten, and twelve areas. Admiral Hood considered that this scheme would render it difficult for a submarine to pass through the Straits without being observed at some point of its journey and urged also in favour of this method that the risk of collision between the destroyers would be reduced, the modified sweep could be used in connection with it, and if at a future date it was decided to use drift nets in the Straits as an anti-submarine measure the arrangements would still be suitable.

It will be seen that this scheme was purely an anti-submarine one, and Admiral Hood recognised by pointing out that at night or in thick weather it might be desirable to revert to the single "cordon" across the Straits in order to ensure surface craft being sighted and reported.5

This scheme was apparently never brought into force. The advent of the winter gales, which greatly reduced the value of the older destroyers and constant demands for various convoy services, left few destroyers available for the Channel Patrol, and the method introduced in October (see para. 36), was continued during the winter months until the introduction of indicator drift nets in January 1915, led to a general modification of the patrol arrangements.6

On December 5th Rear-Admiral Hood reported that he was not satisfied with the efficiency of the patrol of the Straits in bad weather, and that owing to calls on his available destroyers for convoy service to Havre or in the North Sea the patrol in the Straits had at times been reduced to a single boat.7 He therefore "earnestly requested" that more destroyers of a modern type might be sent him in order to carry on his orders relative to the patrol of Dover Straits. The need was recognised at the Admiralty, but no destroyers were available to comply with Admiral Hood's request and the patrol had to be maintained as efficiently as possible with the boats already allocated to Dover.

1 H.M.S. Hermes "was sunk by a submarine in mid-channel, October 31. 6 M. 03569/14. 8 Not given in Appendix.
2 M. 05669/14. 8 M. 04149/14. 9 Papers collected as X. 3766.
3 Appendix A. 65, 66.
4 Appendix A. 65.
40. General Conditions of Patrol, October.—The principal duties of the Patrol Flotillas in October were described as being:

(i) To prevent any raiding expeditions from attaining a landing;

(ii) To prevent the laying of mines off the coast, while various other tasks, such as the protection of certain harbours, the capture of enemy transport ships, and the supervision of light vessels were also to be performed.

The method of patrol adopted to comply with these instructions was in accordance with orders of Admiral Ballard on August 31st, the destroyers patrolling singly and keeping a constant watch on a line about 10 miles wide through which most of the coast was covered by the destroyers, and the months of September and October passed almost without incident. In so far as no mines were laid it may be assumed that the dispositions adopted at the end of August were highly successful, the isolated patrol destroyers forming a chain of observation posts in the coastal channel, but on November 3rd an event occurred which raised the whole question of the proper function and employment of the patrol flotillas in a new aspect.

At dawn on November 3rd, the six destroyers of the Seventh Flotilla stationed at Yarmouth were three, the "Lively," "Leopard," and "Success" on patrol. The two former had anchored for the night near the entrance to the Humber Channel into Yarmouth Roads, the "Success," being to the northward of the west of Long. E., the Newcastle area between two lines bearing N.E. and S.E. from Tynemouth and between the distances 20 miles and 60 miles from Tynemouth, an area off Falmouth from Lat. 53° 21' N. to 54° 15' N. and between two lines parallel to the coast 8 miles and 10 miles out. In October the Admiral of the Flotillas drew the attention of the Admiralty to the fact that there was every reason to believe that the areas described as dangerous were unnecessarily large as vessels of the patrol Flotilla had traversed portions of them safely on several occasions and numerous fishing craft used them without meeting with disaster. The Admiralty, however, had decided not only to leave these areas unswept, but to reinforce gradually the enemy mines with British ones, and to form a barrier off the coast, in accordance with this decision the limits of the dangerous areas were not amended.

41. The First Hostile Raid on the Coast.—Since the hostile operations in August, which resulted in the laying of the Humber and Tyne minefields, the enemy had displayed little activity in the North Sea to disturb the routine patrols carried out by Admiral Ballard's forces. The months of September and October passed almost without incident. So far as no mines were laid it may be assumed that the dispositions adopted at the end of August were highly successful, the isolated patrol destroyers forming a chain of observation posts in the coastal channel, but on November 3rd an event occurred which raised the whole question of the proper functions and employment of the patrol flotillas in an acute form.

At dawn on November 3rd, the six destroyers of the Seventh Flotilla stationed at Yarmouth were three, the "Lively," "Leopard," and "Success" on patrol. The two former had anchored for the night near the entrance to the Humber Channel into Yarmouth Roads, the "Success," being to the northward of the west of Long. E., the Newcastle area between two lines bearing N.E. and S.E. from Tynemouth and between the distances 20 miles and 60 miles from Tynemouth, an area off Falmouth from Lat. 53° 20' N. to 54° 15' N. and between two lines parallel to the coast 8 miles and 10 miles out. In October the Admiral of the Flotillas drew the attention of the Admiralty to the fact that there was every reason to believe that the areas described as dangerous were unnecessarily large as vessels of the patrol Flotilla had traversed portions of them safely on several occasions and numerous fishing craft used them without meeting with disaster. The Admiralty, however, had decided not only to leave these areas unswept, but to reinforce gradually the enemy mines with British ones, and to form a barrier off the coast, in accordance with this decision the limits of the dangerous areas were not amended.

42. Fresh Admiralty Orders.—The fact that a strong force of the enemy had been able to approach our coast and lay mines without being in any way harpered by the scattered patrol destroyers raised once again the whole question of the duties performed by the patrol flotillas. In a paper put forward by the Operations Division of the War Staff on November 6th, it was pointed out that while the functions of the vessels employed on the Dover, Thames, and Firth of Forth Patrol were fairly well defined and understood, the conditions along the East coast were by no means so satisfactory. The isolated destroyers on patrol were unlikely to sight an enemy approaching the coast under cover of darkness, while in daylight, if the enemy was in force, our patrol vessels could do nothing and ran grave risks of being destroyed piecemeal.

This view was adopted, and a memorandum on the working of the patrol flotillas was sent to Admiral Ballard on November 7th. This directed that the patrol flotillas should be kept concentrated at selected points along the coast ready to proceed to any point where the enemy were attempting to land, that no routine patrol was to be maintained and that the prevention of minelaying was to be left to the destroyers. It was to be recognised that nothing in our dispositions prevented an enemy from approaching the coast and commencing to land troops, but that if the various flotillas were properly handled, the enemy forces attempting to land themselves continually increasing until long before any considerable force had been landed the enemy would be overwhelmed. The coast itself was to be the line of observation and the policy approved for the Patrol Flotillas was the concentration of his flotillas at fixed points where they were to be maintained ready for action.

This memorandum completed the conception of the patrol flotillas as an observing and reporting force which had governed their employment since the end of August, and confined their activities to offensive action against a possible attempt at invasion. In fact reverted to the system suggested by Admiral de Robeck in April 1914, which was more or less original, and this fact was recognised in the telegram sent to Admiral Ballard prior to the despatch of the detailed instructions. This directed him to discontinue the present system of patrols and keep the vessels concentrated in divisions as originally laid down.

43. The Grand Fleet Requirements.—The same telegram which enjoined Admiral Ballard to resume the system of patrol in force at the outbreak of war contained orders which considerably reduced the force at his disposal, as 12 destroyers were to be detached from his command and sent to Scapa Flow to work under the Commander-in-Chief, Irish Station, and the Grand Fleet. This order was the outcome of a Conference held at the Admiralty on November 2nd at which Sir John Jellicoe discussed and explained his requirements of patrol vessels for the local defence of the Grand Fleet bases. He was informed that 12 destroyers would be detached from the patrol flotillas and sent north, and in spite of the incident off Yarmouth next day, it was decided to comply with this arrangement.

1 See Appendix B, 5, first portion. Though these are contained in a Dover order similar instructions appear to have been issued to all flotillas.
2 Appendix A, 69, 70.
3 Appendix B, 5.
4 Appendix A, 72.
The attrition of the patrol flotillas was carried a stage further by orders issued on November 10th that one of the depot ships attached to the patrol flotillas was to be sent north to work with the destroyers detached to the Grand Fleet for the local defence of the Orkneys.

Admiral Ballard selected the "Leander," depot ship of the 7th Flotilla in the Humber, and she sailed for Scapa about the middle of the month.1

44. The A.O.P.'s Orders.—On receipt of the telegram from the Admiralty on November 7th, Admiral Ballard, who was then in the Humber, detached 12 destroyers of the 7th Flotilla to Scapa Flow and proceeded to re-organise the patrol to be carried out by his remaining destroyers in accordance with the Admiralty instructions, although, as he pointed out, the reductions in the strength of his forces rendered it impossible to re-establish the arrangements made at the outbreak of war.2 The principle of concentration by divisions was complied with, however, in the new dispositions.

The 7th and 9th Destroyer Flotillas were each organised in four divisions of four boats each, and one division of each flotilla was always kept with drawn fires to permit of beelers being cleaned and machinery refitted. Of the remaining three divisions of the 7th Flotilla, two were kept at Yarmouth in readiness for immediate service day and night, and one in the Humber. The latter division patrolled the entrance during the dark hours.

The 9th Flotilla sent one division to the Humber to work under the Captain D 7 and assist in the Humber patrol, and another division patrolled the coast between Flamborough Head and Hartlepool. The remaining division lay in the Tyne ready for immediate action.

Thus there were eight boats at Yarmouth, eight in the Humber, and eight on the coast north of the Humber, and these destroyers were ordered to confine their activities to the prevention of any hostile landing. Patrolling against hostile mine-layers, convoy work, and supervision of the fishing areas were not to be considered as part of their work.

45. Events up to November 13th.—The Admiralty Memorandum of November 7th had indicated that the patrol flotillas should occasionally undertake "bold reconnaissances" some 60 miles from the coast with the whole available force. An opportunity for such an operation soon presented itself, as on November 9th, from information received at the Admiralty, it was believed that a German light cruiser would be patrolling near the Outer Gabbard during the nights of the 9th and 10th November. Admiral Ballard accordingly sent the "Skirmisher" with seven destroyers of the 7th Flotilla to search the neighbourhood in which the enemy was expected, leaving only six T.B.'s in the Humber; but nothing was sighted, and the vessels returned to their patrol stations.8

In the Admiral of Patrols' orders of November 8th one division of the 9th Flotilla was stationed in the Humber to work under the Captain D 7, and this indicated a tendency to amalgamate the flotillas, which was accentuated by the decision on November 10th to send the "Leander" to Scapa. On November 11th Admiral Ballard informed the Admiral that he proposed to move the "St. George," depot ship of the 9th Flotilla, from the Tyne to the Humber, as, owing to the reduced numbers, the two flotillas could be administered as a whole, and from this date the Humber becomes the centre of the Patrol Flotilla system, the extensive docks of the Humber having been utilised for destroyers undergoing overhaul and repairs.

46. Admiral Ballard's Appreciation, November 13th.—After receiving and considering the Admiralty Memorandum of November 7th, Admiral Ballard forwarded on the 13th a detailed appreciation of the situation which would arise in the event of their war plans.1 After a careful analysis of the forces available and the distances they would have to travel, he points out that the enemy appear either off one of the undefended northern ports, or off the Norfolk or Suffolk coast, he could only be attacked by successive detachments of the patrol flotillas, each consisting of one light cruiser and six or seven destroyers, with several hours separating each attack, while the submarines, owing to their slow speed, could only be considere
5. From Admiralty, To A.O.P. and Captains D.
Patrol flotillas are to warn any fishing boats met with that war is declared against Germany. The flotillas should not leave their stations for this purpose.

6. From C-in-C., H.F.
To Admiralty,
Danger of submarines off Portland is increasing. My E. class destroyers fully employed guarding station. Can sight more destroyers be sent up from Coast Patrol to guard the approaches in view of despatch of Expeditionary Force?

7. From Admiralty, To A.O.P.
9th Flotilla is to send one division of E. class to reinforce C-in-C., at Scapa Flow.

Coast must be patrolled day and night to prevent enemy mining.

To Admiralty,
Collier "Airmy " reports passing slate-coloured mines, apparently drift, in 52° 10' N., 3° 05' E., at 9.30 a.m. 9th. Circular in shape, with tube 6 ins. to 9 ins. in diameter, 2 ft. long protruding. Strong S.W. wind. S.N.O., Clayholme.

10. From A.O.P.
To Admiralty,
Floating mines pointed grey reported drifted 9.30 a.m., 9th, 52° 10' N., 3° 05' E. Send out torpedo craft to destroy them with grenade.

11. From "Halcrow," Yarmouth.
To Admiralty,
"Spanker" proceeding in morning to investigate mines reported by collier.

To Admiralty,
Following intercepted from "Spanker" to "Halcrow." Heading back to Smith's Knoll at slow speed. Exchanged W/T with several German naval vessels, including battleship "Schlesien" and gunboat "Jaguar." Latter appears very close. I have seen nothing. My full speed only 13 knots: but if I can get in touch and communicate accordingly (1100).

13. From Admiralty, To S.N.O., Yarmouth.
Your patrol should keep a good look-out for the enemy as it is anticipated they are near.

To Admiralty,
Following intercepted from Captain D. 7 to 7th Flotilla, 2 p.m. "Spanker" reports German warships, including battleship "Schlesien" and gunboats, off Smith's Knoll Light Vessel. Look out.

15. From A.O.P. (at Dover), To Admiralty.
"Skirmisher" reports German battleship reported by "Spanker" off Smith's Knoll. Destroyers detailed for patrol of Norfolk coast were ordered yesterday to search for drifting mines elsewhere in accordance with Admiralty telegram received. Submit whether "Victorious" and "Maree" may be sent out from Humber with remainder of 7th Flotilla to search for enemy, as there is now no patrol on Norfolk coast (1750).

16. From Admiralty, To A.O.P.
7. "Spanker" has now reported that no enemy are near.
Patrol flotillas are not to be ordered to leave their beats to search for floating mines, but to look out for them when on their beats.

17. From A.O.P. (at Dover), To Admiralty,
With reference to your telegram 7, orders received by me yesterday to send destroyers to sink floating mines in 52° 10' N., 3° 05' E., which is 53 miles seaward of Yarmouth and therefore well outside their beat. It was to these that I referred in mentioning that no patrols are now on the Norfolk coast.

18. From Patrol. To 9th Flotilla.
Following received: "Orwell" to Captain "D. 7." Cruiser previously reported giving chase appears hostile. I do not know which part of patrol is (remainder not received) . . . . (1545).
From Vice-Consul, Bergen. August 28th, Received 0344.
To Admiralty.
Captain of Norwegian steamer, which arrived to-day from Grimsby, states that he was stopped late at night, August 25th, by three German cruisers 70 miles east of Flamboro' Head.

From A.O.P. Grimsby. August 28th, Received 1550.
To Admiralty.
Steam trawler reports vessel purporting to be " Linwood " of Middlesbro', flying signals of distress, but refused assistance when offered. Position E.N.E. 22 miles from Spurn Head. It seems probable was mine-laying. Trawler " Martha " at about 1000, August 25th, observed two cruisers and one mine-laying vessel 15 miles, 4° 07' E. Steering S.W. by N. (1500.)

From Captain D. 9. September 28th, Intercepted 1757.
To T.B. 22.
Hartlepool Customs report that steam trawler " Excelsior " reports German lugger " A.E. 24 " of Emden seven last night. From conversation of German prisoners it appears that " Kolberg " and " Stettin " were out at 0115. Following received from H.M.S. " Liverpool " noon to-day.

From Newcastle Naval Centre. August 23rd, Received 2330.
Admiralty.
Admiralty.

To
From
To
From

C.-in-C., Home Fleet.
Admiralty. September 7th, Sent 1940.
To Admiral, Rosyth.

APPENDIX A.
94. From Admiral.
To A.O.P. and C-in-C.'s, Home Ports.

A 99

95. In making a passage from Rosyth to the Tyne and Humber all ships are to keep within 10 miles of the coast.

96. From A.O.P., " Victorious."
To Admiral.

APPENDIX A.

To A.O.P.

97. Propron strong W/T signals having been heard apparently within 100 miles of Tynemouth, have arranged for patrol and two divisions of 9th Flotilla carrying out sweep outside mine area to south-west portion of Dogger Bank, returning to their inner patrol to-morrow. (1600.)

98. From Admiral. September 4th, Sent 1800.
To Admiral.

To Admiral.

577. It is now evident that the Germans are using vessels disguised as neutrals or even British ships for the purpose of laying mines in the North Sea. Commanding officers are therefore directed to use the utmost vigilance in stopping and searching every vessel they encounter in these waters.

To Captain D. 9, H.M.S. " Patrol."

579. " Patroa " with all available E class destroyers is to proceed as soon after daylight as possible to Petrohead, with a view to establishing a constant sweep of approaches to Moray Firth. Flotilla should hug the coast as far as the Farne Islands, then stand out 45 miles to seaward and steer for Petrohead; " St. George " to remain at Darrow and take charge of T.B.'s and submarines for protection of Tyne and coast. Orders for patrol will be sent to Petrohead.

580. From A.O.P. September 6th, Sent 1940.
To Admiral.

A.O.P. Received 1952.

581. 7th Destroyer Flotilla has been ordered to carry out host patrol practicably of whole of coast from Farme Islands to Harwich. Torpedo Boats of 9th Flotilla left in River Tyne have been ordered to act under orders of Captain D. 7, Destroyer Flotilla.

582. From A.O.P., " Victorious."
September 1st, Received 1858.

583. From Admiral. August 2nd, Sent 2334.
To Admiral.

584. Admiral, Rosyth. October 7th, Sent 2237.

585. From Admiral. September 1st, Sent 1202.

586. From Admiral. August 2nd, Sent 2334.

587. It is now evident that the Germans are using vessels disguised as neutrals or even British ships for the purpose of laying mines in the North Sea. Commanding officers are therefore directed to use the utmost vigilance in stopping and searching every vessel they encounter in these waters.

To Captain D. 9, H.M.S. " Patrol."

589. " Patroa " with all available E class destroyers is to proceed as soon after daylight as possible to Petrohead, with a view to establishing a constant sweep of approaches to Moray Firth. Flotilla should hug the coast as far as the Farne Islands, then stand out 45 miles to seaward and steer for Petrohead; " St. George " to remain at Darrow and take charge of T.B.'s and submarines for protection of Tyne and coast. Orders for patrol will be sent to Petrohead.

590. From A.O.P. September 6th,Sent 1940.
To Admiral.

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592. From Admiral. August 2nd, Sent 2334.
To Admiral.

593. Admiral, Rosyth. October 7th, Sent 2237.

594. From Admiral. September 1st, Sent 1202.

595. In making a passage from Rosyth to the Tyne and Humber all ships are to keep within 10 miles of the coast.

596. From A.O.P., " Victorious."
To Admiral.

597. Propron strong W/T signals having been heard apparently within 100 miles of Tynemouth, have arranged for patrol and two divisions of 9th Flotilla carrying out sweep outside mine area to south-west portion of Dogger Bank, returning to their inner patrol to-morrow. (1600.)

598. From Admiral. September 4th, Sent 1800.
To Admiral.

599. It is now evident that the Germans are using vessels disguised as neutrals or even British ships for the purpose of laying mines in the North Sea. Commanding officers are therefore directed to use the utmost vigilance in stopping and searching every vessel they encounter in these waters.

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APPENDIX A.

99. From Admiral.
To A.O.P. and C-in-C.'s, Home Ports.

A 99
CHAPTER V.

The patrols are to remain at anchor at their allotted stations with steam on the engines in immediate readiness to proceed to any point ordered. They are to remain in constant touch with the nearest war signal station except No. 7, which is to keep in wireless touch with Grimsby W/T station. Their principal duty will be to prevent hostile raids on any part of the section of coast for which they are responsible.

**APPENDIX A.**

**APPENDIX B.**
As a result of the minelaying off Harwich at the beginning of the war.

The following statement, which should be given as wide a circulation all over the world as may be thought advisable.

The mines of the Tyne were laid 30' to seaward. They were not laid as part of a military operation or by German ships of war. They were laid by German trawlers, of which a considerable number appear to have been engaged in this work. The number of one such trawler actually seen to be doing this operation or by German ships of war. They were, laid by German trawlers, of which a considerable number appear to have been engaged in this work. The number of one such trawler actually seen to be doing this.

The mines of the Tyne were laid 30' to seaward. They were not laid as part of a military operation or by German ships of war. They were laid by German trawlers, of which a considerable number appear to have been engaged in this work. The number of one such trawler actually seen to be doing this.
Orders for Vessels under Captain D, 6th Flotilla.

"The 6th Destroyer Flotilla and the 3rd and 4th Submarine Flotillas acting under the immediate orders of the Senior Officer are to form a cordon across the entrance to the North Sea to watch for and attack any of the enemy vessels of war which may attempt to pass through the Straits of Dover, and to capture her merchant vessels."

Instructions with regard to Directing Traffic to the Downs and to the Examination Service established there.

"Circumstances may arise in which the 6th Flotilla requires the support of other destroyers, in which case the Senior Officer is to communicate with the Commander-in-Chief, the Nore, by the quickest available method, and ask for assistance from the Thames Patrol. Conversely, the latter may require support from him, in which case he is to furnish it without delay, but always leaving not less than six destroyers on the cordon."

Patrol of Straits of Dover.

"A patrol will be divided into two parts, a night patrol and a day patrol."

"No vessel is to pass to the eastward of a line joining East Goodwin Light to Outer Ryehaven Buoy or to the westward of a line joining Folkstone and Yarmouth Buoy, except under very urgent circumstances."

Night Patrol Destroyers.

"The usual number will be 8 in the Straits and 6 in Reserve."

"The method of patrolling will be arranged by the Senior Officer on the line according to the weather and visibility, destroyers must keep on the move on the submarine menace. If a boat leaves the line the adjacent boats will close the gap."

"Day Patrol Destroyers."

"Five destroyers will carry out this duty, and in wet weather their number will be increased."

"They will also act as scouts for the submarines, who have left our port for enemy.""

"Submarines by Day."

"Two groups in harbour ready for sea. Remainder at short notice. One group will always take up position between Folkstone and Yarmouth, the remainder as may be ordered."

Cruisers.

"Duty to assist Destroyers and obtain Information if Enemy appears."

(Here follows a section giving details of the duties to be performed by the patrol vessels, by day and by night in the event of attack by surface craft.)

General.

"The Dover Straits Patrol is always to endeavour to maintain the patrol line by day and night; if driven off or dispersed by superior numbers the line is to be re-established with as little delay as possible."

"The destroyers in reserve at night see to the event of the enemy breaking through the line and proceeding west—to keep in touch with them until opportunity offers for attack. They are not, however, to proceed west of the meridian of the Downs."

APPENDIX B 6.

MEMORANDUM TO THE WORKING OF PATROL FLOTILLAS,
Dated November 7th 1914.

(To cancel previous Arrangements).

1. The coast with its cyclists, signal stations, and watch is the line of observation and the only line of observation which can certainly report the arrival of an enemy.

2. The patrol flotillas, both of submarines and destroyers, instead of being frizzled away on useless cotton and parolling duties should be kept concentrated and ready for action at selected sally-ports along the coast, ready to proceed in force to any point where on sure information an enemy is attempting to land.

3. There is to be nothing like routine or sentry-go patrolling, except at the mouths of harbours, and from time to time occasional good bold reconnaissances 60, 70 and 80 miles out to sea should be pushed from each sally-port by the whole of the boats available varied occasionally by the scouting of a single destroyer.

APPENDIX B 6.

LETTER FROM ADMIRAL OF PATROLS,

(New System of Patrol.)

H.M.S. "Leander,"
November 8th, 1914.

Sir,

I have the honour to report that in accordance with Admiralty telegram No. 196 of November 7th, 1914, the 12 under-mentioned destroyers were despatched for duty at Scapa Flow next day—


I have the honour to report in accordance with Admiralty telegram No. 196 of November 7th, 1914, the 12 under-mentioned destroyers were despatched for duty at Scapa Flow next day—


APPENDIX B 7.

REVISED WAR ORDERS FOR DESTROYER PATROL FLOTILLA ON THE EAST COAST, ISSUED BY ADMIRAL OF PATROLS.

Memorandum.

H.M.S. "Leander," November 8th.

Orders having been received from the Admiralty to despatch 12 destroyers from the patrol flotillas to Scapa Flow and revert to the war policy of concentrating the remainder at important points, the following revised War Orders are issued for the guidance of the vessels left in the 7th and 9th Destroyer Flotilla:

APPENDIX B 6.

M. 0361/14.

APPENDIX B 7.

M. 0081.
4th Flotilla.

The 4th Flotilla is to be organised in four divisions. Two divisions will be in Tyne, one with fires drawn for the usual period of cleaning boilers and one with steam in constant readiness for immediate service and hawsers ready for shipping.

One division will patrol the coast in company in the daytime between Hartlepool and Flamborough Head maintaining continual wireless touch with Tynemouth or the ships at Jarrow. This division may anchor at night with lights out, but in a position at least 10 miles from where they were at sunset. They will be known as the Whitby Patrol. One division will lie in the Humber off Immingham by day and form part of the Humber Patrol at night. This division will be temporarily under the orders of the Captain D. 4th Flotilla while so employed as regards their movements and dispositions.

All four will work on a regular roster arranged by Captain D. 4th Flotilla, changing stations in turn so that each may have a periodical stand off at Jarrow.

From henceforward the two 4th Flotillas will be confined to acting as a guard against the landing of raiding forces of the enemy. Patrolling, assisting convoy work and supervision of the fishing areas are not to be considered as part of their duties as the number of vessels now available does not permit of their being carried out without impairing the effectiveness of the coast protection which they might be able to afford.

B. 8.

APPENDIX B 8.

LETTER FROM ADMIRAL OF PALETS.

(Appreciation of Situation.)

H.M.S. "St. George,"
November 13th,

Sir,

As regards paragraph 2 of their Lordships' Memorandum as to the working of Patrol Flotillas, I respectfully submit that the frittering away of flotillas on useless patrol duties which is therein referred to was carried out as a direct result of orders received by me to maintain a continuous wide for traffic clear of mines.

"With reference to paragraph 4, I submit that in the reduced state of the two patrol flotillas which are available at present, the enemy cannot be "overwhelmed", before he has had time to land any considerable force, if his escort consists of even three or four light cruisers. A period of six or eight hours may very possibly elapse in spite of the best arrangements before the defending force of one light cruiser and seven or eight destroyers can be reinforced at the point of attack. A detailed statement of the composition of the two flotillas as they now stand would make this clearer."

[Summary.—On 22 old destroyers available, with heaviest gun 12-pdr. There are also 12 torpedo boats, only ready for part of the port defence duties.

Of those 34, only 15 are always on call for amphibious duty and from two to six are always away due to breakdowns or accidents. Therefore, at the most, there are only from 18 to 20 boats available for the immediate defence of the 300 miles of coast line from Harwich to St. Abbe, at any given moment.

It is proposed to dispose of these as follows: 8 in the Humber, 8 north of the Humber, 8 south of the Humber, 8 lighter cleaning.

There are also three light cruisers. One of these is always under drawn fires. One is in Tyne and one is in Humber for immediate service."

"It will thus be seen that if an enemy arrives off the Tyne or one of the undefended northern ports the worst force which can attack him, exclusive of submarines, will be one light cruiser and six or seven destroyers or T.B.'s, until about six or seven hours have elapsed, allowing time for the transmission of the news. If the Humber was not simultaneously threatened the local defence divisions could reach the point of attack after that period, and would represent the first reinforcement, consisting of one light cruiser and seven torpedo boats, arriving about an hour before dark, if the enemy had appeared off the port about an hour after daylight on a winter morning.

"The next reinforcement would come from Tynemouth and require about 10 hours to reach the spot. This would consist of another six or seven destroyers, and possibly the third light cruiser if she could close up unmolested and raise steam in time. This reinforcement would not arrive till well after dark in winter. The final six or seven could arrive next day."

"It is evident that if the enemy's escort consists of no more than three or four light cruisers he will have little difficulty in dealing with such opposition as the Patrol Flotillas can offer to his landing. The first small detachment might arrive on the scene within an hour of his appearance, but would be easily driven off or sunk, and for at least six hours more his disembarkation would represent the first reinforcement, consisting of one light cruiser and seven torpedo boats, arriving about an hour before dark if the enemy had appeared off the port about an hour after daylight on a winter morning."

"This reinforcement would not arrive till well after dark in winter. The final six or seven could arrive next day."

[Summary.—On 22 old destroyers available, with heaviest gun 12-pdr. There are also 12 torpedo boats, only ready for part of the port defence duties.

Of those 34, only 15 are always on call for amphibious duty and from two to six are always away due to breakdowns or accidents. Therefore, at the most, there are only from 18 to 20 boats available for the immediate defence of the 300 miles of coast line from Harwich to St. Abbe, at any given moment.

It is proposed to dispose of these as follows: 8 in the Humber, 8 north of the Humber, 8 south of the Humber, 8 lighter cleaning.

There are also three light cruisers. One of these is always under drawn fires. One is in Tyne and one is in Humber for immediate service."

As regards paragraph 2 of their Lordships' Memorandum as to the working of Patrol Flotillas, I respectfully submit that the frittering away of flotillas on useless patrol duties which is therein referred to was carried out as a direct result of orders received by me to maintain a continuous wide for traffic clear of mines.

"With reference to paragraph 4, I submit that in the reduced state of the two patrol flotillas which are available at present, the enemy cannot be "overwhelmed", before he has had time to land any considerable force, if his escort consists of even three or four light cruisers. A period of six or eight hours may very possibly elapse in spite of the best arrangements before the defending force of one light cruiser and seven or eight destroyers can be reinforced at the point of attack. A detailed statement of the composition of the two flotillas as they now stand would make this clearer."

[Summary.—Only 22 old destroyers available, with heaviest gun 12-pdr. There are also 12 torpedo boats, only ready for part of the port defence duties.

Of those 34, only 15 are always on call for amphibious duty and from two to six are always away due to breakdowns or accidents. Therefore, at the most, there are only from 18 to 20 boats available for the immediate defence of the 300 miles of coast line from Harwich to St. Abbe, at any given moment.

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There are also three light cruisers. One of these is always under drawn fires. One is in Tyne and one is in Humber for immediate service."

APPENDIX C.

NAVIGATION LIGHTS IN 1914.

1. Light Vessels.—The following Light Vessels were in the positions given in August 1914, and are either not shown on the present charts (1919) or are in different positions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Light Vessel</th>
<th>Approximate Position</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saudettic (French)</td>
<td>51°14'N. 2°54'E.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoyyio (French)</td>
<td>51°14'N. 2°15'E.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Hinder (Belgian)</td>
<td>51°22'N. 2°27'E.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Hinder (Dutch)</td>
<td>51°53'N. 2°38'E.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galloper</td>
<td>51°43'N. 2°47'E.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Longlad</td>
<td>51°57'N. 2°50'E.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outer Gabbard</td>
<td>52°01'N. 2°06'E.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shipwash</td>
<td>52°02'N. 1°42'E.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corten</td>
<td>52°31'N. 1°45'E.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross Sound</td>
<td>52°38'N. 1°54'E.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith's Knoll</td>
<td>52°43'N. 1°57'E.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holпочт</td>
<td>53°15'N. 0°58'E.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cromer Knoll</td>
<td>53°16'N. 0°19'E.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inner Dowseing</td>
<td>53°29'N. 0°45'E.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swarte Bank</td>
<td>53°28'N. 2°44'E.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outer Dowseing</td>
<td>53°34'N. 1°00'E.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. All lights on the East Coast of England and Scotland between Nessa Head (near Wink) and Orford Ness were extinguished after September 7th, as described in the following telegram from the Admiralty to all ships dated September 6th:

"To-morrow, Monday, and until further orders no lights on the coast and on light vessels on the East Coast of England and Scotland from Nessa Head to Orford Ness inclusive will be lighted.

"The Shipwash, Outer Gabbard, and entrance to Thanes lights will not be extinguished for the present. The Swarte Bank Light Vessel is being removed. Dodgerum and Cromer Knoll Light Vessels will be removed. Outer Dowseing and Smith's Knoll Light Vessels will be removed and replaced by pillar lights."

3. The lights of the entrance to the Thames were dealt with on October 27th when certain traffic regulations were introduced prohibiting navigation during dark hours and confining merchant shipping to specified channels. The following telegram was transmitted to all ships on this date:

"All light ships, light boats, and boats are being removed from Thames approaches between the meridians of 1°25'E. and 6°50'E. and between parallels of 51°40'N. and 51°55'N. with the exception of the Tongue Light Vessel and those marking the Edinburgh Channels and Black Deep and Channel south of Knoll John and Knoll Buoy and the Oaze Deep.

"All light vessels west of 2° E. will not show their usual lights or riding lights at night between 7 p.m. and 6 a.m."
THE BATTLE OF HELIGOLAND BIGHT, 28th AUGUST 1914.

SOURCES.

(a) "Heligoland Box" in Hist. Secn., C.I.D. X 3933 1914

Contents.

2. Summary of information obtained from German wounded.
10. Lance's track chart.
11. Allegations re firing on Germans in the water.
12. Services of submarines since 4th August.
13. Information obtained from a German officer, 30th November 1914.
14. Despatches of Comm. (T.), Capt. (D), and destroyers of 1st and 3rd flotillas.


This box is supplementary to the "Heligoland Box," and chiefly contains translated, extracted, or copied information.

1. Summary of evidence used in constructing charts. (This has been compiled in the H.S./C.I.D. mainly from signal, W/T, and deck logs of ships engaged, but times have been adjusted from the original.)
4. Comm. (S)'s report of submarine reconnaissance. 16th-23rd August.
5. Letter of Commodore (S) reference submarine work, including reports of 1st B.C.S. Signal logs.
8. Track chart of ships by R.A. Christian.
10. Lance's track chart.
11. Allegations re firing on Germans in the water.
12. Services of submarines since 4th August.
13. Information obtained from a German officer, 30th November 1914.
14. Despatches of Comm. (T), Capt. (D), and destroyers of 1st and 3rd flotillas.

Bound in volume X. 3933/1914.

(c) Telegrams (see Hist. Secn. C.I.D.).

(2) H.S. 68. 28th-31st August.

These volumes contain the full text of the telegrams bearing on the operations.


Contains a few telegrams supplementary to Operation Orders.


NOTES ON SOURCES.

1. Despatches and reports were written largely from signal logs and general memory and are not always accurate as regards times or details.

2. The following are considered the most important records:

   Lt. (N.), Arethusa's plan. (Up to 1040.)
   Lark's plan.
   Lookout's despatch.
   Lizard's
   Leert's
   Goshark's signal log.
   Fearless
   Lark's
   Lookout's
   Comm. (S.)
   1st B.C.S. Signal logs.
   1st L.C.S.
   Arethusa's despatch and signal log.
   Fearless
   Lizard's
   Arethusa's plan.

3. Ship's D.R. positions cannot be relied upon.

4. German Official History.—This work is designed to comprise the following series—the North Sea, the Baltic, Turkish Operations, the Cruiser War, the U. Boats Campaign. Volume 1 of the War in the North Sea appeared in July 1920, and covers the first month of the war. It emanates from the Marine Archives, and is issued by Vice-Admiral E. v. Mante, Superintendent of Archives, compiled by Korvetten Kapitän O. Groos. Its narrative is clear and the work appears to be accurate and is written in a moderate tone. The charts and plans are drawn somewhat approximately and the movements of British Ships seem to be plotted largely from conjecture. The principal discrepancies are in the Arethusa and Frawndob action which in the Great Britain runs east and west and not north and south. The Frawndob evidently came up from the south of Heligoland. The action attributed in the C.I.D. history 1 to the Stralsund was with the Strassburg. In the Hannover's action the 1st L.C.S. and Fearless are credited with damaging her and disabling the rudder before she met the Arethusa.

There is a valuable appendices (Appendix 21) of the wireless signals on August 28th. This has been reproduced (see Appendix "B").

Note.—All times in the German Official History and German Wireless Signs have been converted into G.M.T. (that is one hour earlier).

Abbreviations—(S) = Signal Log; (R) = Report or Despatch; (L) = Ship's Log; (W) = Wireless Log.

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1 Corbett: Naval Operations i, 110.
HELIGOLAND BIGHT—THE ACTION OF AUGUST 28th, 1914.

CHAPTER I.

THE SITUATION AND ORIGINAL PLAN.

1. During the early days of the war the German High Sea Fleet was known to be lying in its North Sea harbours, but none of its heavy ships had been met at sea. Its menace had hung darkly over the despatch of the expeditionary force, but in spite of the far-reaching results it might have achieved from a sudden and heavy blow aimed at the Channel Passage, it did not stir.

Our own strategical dispositions were based on a policy of "containing" the German Fleet in Heligoland Bight. In the north was the Grand Fleet, including 29 battle ships, 4 battle cruisers, 8 armoured cruisers and 6 light cruisers. In the Channel was the Channel Fleet of older battleships; Dover Straits was patrolled by the 6th Flotilla supported by submarines, while the Narrows were watched by the 1st and 3rd Flotillas at Harwich and the 8th Submarine Flotilla with Cruiser Force "C" in support.1

2. August 16th, the Grand Fleet, led by its battle cruisers and light cruisers, had pushed to within some 40 miles of Heligoland, whilst Cruiser Force C and the Harwich flotillas swept up from Terschelling Light, but the sweep had been barren of results, and not a wisp of enemy ship had been seen. It was considered at the time that the passage of the Expeditionary Force would offer a tempting objective to the German Cruiser Forces and a sudden raid by them was confidently expected, but by the 21st August the main body of our troops had moved across without incident or mishap, and the tension of the first few weeks began to relax.

On the East Coast however, the appearance of one or two cruisers had aroused considerable apprehension, and on August 21st the Invincible and New Zealand were formed into a squadron designated Cruiser Force K, and were stationed in the Humber to support Cruiser Force C and the Harwich flotillas and to "strong offensive operations possible."2

3. Proposals for a Sweep. As days passed and the German battle fleet still showed little signs of activity, the prospect of another sweep suggested itself to the senior officers in the North Sea, and proposals were submitted independently by the C.-in-C., Rear-Admiral Christian, and Commodore (S). Their substance was briefly as follows:—

The C.-in-C., Grand Fleet, on August 17th proposed "a sweep in force at dawn on August 24th, to within 30 miles of Heligoland, the flotillas leading, covered by cruisers with the battle fleet supporting, and submarines keeping east of longitude 5° 40' E. and south of 54° N."3

The Admiral, however, were evidently not inclined to use the Grand Fleet for this purpose at the moment, and replied on August 29th that no sweeping movements would be carried out at present. Rear-Admiral Christian proposed apparently about the same time, a sweep to the eastward commencing on a line from Terschelling.

The Harwich flotillas were to lead in and be supported by the armoured cruisers of Cruiser Force C with submarines stationed off the Ems. The sweeping was to commence at 1500 from a position in latitude 54° 45' N., longitude 6° E. The destroyers were to proceed towards Heligoland, endeavouring to inflict the utmost damage possible on any detached bodies of small craft or minelayers, but were not to seek or accept action with distinctly superior forces. Commodore (S)'s proposals were put forward in conjunction with a written report on the reconnaissance work carried out by his submarines in the Bight from August 16th to 23rd, 1914, which indicated that during the day a large number of destroyers were usually patrolling north and south of Heligoland at a speed which did not permit of submarine attack. This destroyers for might work out about 4 p.m. or 5 p.m., being escorted by light cruisers, and then, spreading out like a fan, proceeded to sea at good speed, returning at daylight. The majority of destroyers had been seen round about a position some 40 miles N.N.W. (true), and Commodore (S) therefore suggested a sweep from east to west off these patrols. He did not enter into details, but the essence of his plan was to surprise and cut off the enemy by a flank and rear attack, and it differed therefore from those of the C.-in-C. and Rear-Admiral Christian's, which were essentially of the nature of drives or frontal attacks. The plan actually adopted embodied this conception of a sweep from east to west, and was evidently based on the suggestions of Commodore (S).

These operations were apparently conceived independently of those on the Belgian coast, for the orders were issued on August 25th, and must have been in draft on the 24th at least, before the question of Ostend became acute.4

An Admiralty telegram of August 26th informed the C.-in-C. that it had been decided to occupy Ostend, and also that a destroyer sweep was "in orders for Friday," but there was no definite indication that the two operations were associated in any way, and the C.-in-C. in his telegram proposing co-operation made no reference to the Ostend operations. In fact, it seems to have been an improbability that the Ostend operations would interfere with the sweep, for the Admiralty telegram of August 26th at 1130 to R.A., Euryalus, to say "that the destroyer sweep ordered will be carried out as arranged."5

It may therefore be accepted that though the two were coincident, they were independently conceived and were independently executed.

4. Original Plan of Operations. According to the original plan of the operations, the business was to consist of the Arundel, Fearless, and two flotillas of 36 boats in all, with the Invincible and New Zealand in support, and in reserve Cruiser Force C, the Euryalus, Sapphire, and Amethyst.

The destroyers were to be in a position latitude 56° 20' N., longitude 6° 45' E. (Position II), about 30 miles from Horn's Reef, at 4 a.m. on the 28th, thence to sweep down towards Heligoland on a course S. S. E. (magnetic), so as to arrive at latitude 54° 5' N., longitude 7° 33' E. (Position III), at 8 a.m. on the 28th. There they were to turn to W. 1 S. (magnetic), and on a 9-mile front sweep towards Terschelling steering W. 1 S. at 20 knots, so as to cut off any craft patrolling to the west of Heligoland.

Supporting the destroyer flotillas, which had only the two flotillas with them, were to be two battle cruisers, the New Zealand and Invincible, constituting Cruiser Force K, from the Humber, who were to be given four destroyers by Commodore (T) for screening purposes.

This supporting force was to be in latitude 55° 10' N., longitude 6° E. at 5 a.m., was then to turn to south (magnetic) and proceed to a position latitude 53° 35' N., longitude 6° 20' E. by 0830, which was approximately 80 miles N.W. of Heligoland, and 50 miles from the position where the flotillas were to turn to W. 1 S. at 0800.

1. From Passage of British Expeditionary Force, Appendix A, 188, 189, 190.
2. M. 0022 of 19th August 1914, Rear-Admiral Christian was in command of Harwich Flotillas and Overes submarines. See Passage of British Expeditionary Force, Appendix A, 188, 189, 190.
Cruiser Force C, with the Euryalus and Ashleigh, was to form a reserve force, and to be off Terschelling Light- vessel at 5 a.m., and to patrol to the N.W. in line abreast. The original orders included directions for a seaplane carrier—the Engadine—to be ready with seaplanes, two fitted with bombs and one with a torpedo, to leave the Nore at 9.30 a.m. on the evening of the 26th, and proceeding at about 12 knots escorted by the Sapphire, to be in a position latitude 55° 35' N., longitude 5° 30' E. (about 40 miles true west of Borkum), by 2.30 a.m. on the 28th. The seaplanes were to proceed to the Western Ems to attack a cruiser lying 4 miles N.W. of Rotterdam Lightvessel.

The Sapphire and Engadine were then to prepare for the return of the seaplanes, and as soon as the latter had been re-embarked, were to retire behind Cruiser Force C.

The orders included general instructions for the disposition of submarines. They were to be in position by 4 a.m. on the 28th, three inshore by Heligoland to the eastward of the destroyer course, one to be off the Western Ems, and three in positions to be arranged by Commodore (S) in latitude 6° 45' E. Commodore (S) on August 26th issued further orders for the submarines to take up the following positions, and added another submarine off the Eastern Ems:

Inner Line E 4, 10° S.S.W. of Heligoland. Outer line E 6, latitude 54° 14', longitude 6° 48' E.

E 5, 10' north

E 6, latitude 54° 18' N., longitude 6° 48' E.

E 9, 25' north

E S, latitude 54° 24' N., longitude 6° 48' E.

D 2, 7 miles north of Western Ems.

D S, 7 miles north of Eastern Ems.

There were therefore to be two lines of submarines, an inner line north and south of Heligoland, and an outer about 40 miles west of the Island.

The object of the inner line was to attack any enemy cruisers that might come out to drive off the destroyers, and they were therefore to remain unseen till the destroyers turned to the westward. The object of the outer line was to drive off any submarines away from Heligoland and the submarines in it were therefore to cruise on the surface, bearing in mind that the flotilla would probably pass over them when course was altered to the westward.

The submarines off the Ems were to attack any enemy entering or leaving the river. The Lurcher and Firebrace were to steer a course to keep well clear of the destroyer flotilla, and at least 20 miles southward of the battle cruisers, and during the southerly course of the latter, between 0500 and 0830, would keep a good look-out for enemy submarines and give warning of any to the battle cruisers. It is noticeable that the original orders did not specifically place the operation under the direction of a single commander, and it was apparently understood that within the limits prescribed each would play a more or less independent part.

There is little doubt that both Commodore (S) and the Admiralty regarded the former's rôle as an independent one, and though Commodore (T) and Commodore (S) were nominally under Rear-Admiral Christian, and both sent in their reports to him, the relationship seems to have been a somewhat loose one. consisting of Cruiser Force C, Commodore (T) and Commodore (S), Admiral Beatty—composed of Cruiser Force C, Commodore (T) and Commodore (S). Admiral Beatty telegrams on August 13th, 0005, however, only stated that the two latter "will come under his command temporarily." The command never received an official designation, and although Corbett refers to it as the "Southern Force," this was not its official title, and it is very rarely referred to in this way. The Chief of the War Staff occasionally used the term "combined force."

There was therefore no means of communication between the two forces, and the Admiralty never received any signals containing these amendments, and the latter never heard of them, which naturally led to considerable misunderstanding and confusion fortunately unattended by any serious consequences.

6. Information as to the Operations. The First Battle Cruiser Squadron was then at Scapa, and apparently the operation orders were not telegraphed in full to the C-in-C. or to Sir David Beatty. The C-in-C., however, apparently saw the Vice-Admiral on the evening of the 26th and gave him the general outline of the operations, so far, at least, as he knew them.

Admiral Beatty when he sailed at 0520 on the 27th, had therefore a rough idea of the plan proposed and a knowledge of the rendezvous of the Humber Cruiser Force contained in the Admiralty telegram of approval which arrived at Scapa in the early hours of the 27th, but he was still very much in the dark as to what the submarines were to do, and to the precise part to be played by the Euryalus and Cruiser Force C. At 8 a.m. he had told his squadron all he knew himself, namely, that they were to rendezvous with the Invincible and New Zealand in latitude 55° 10' N., longitude 6° E., at 5 a.m., to support destroyers and submarines, and he concluded by saying that he knew very little but hoped "to learn more as they went along."

Nearly 12 hours passed and about midnight of the 27th an important series of orders was despatched from the Admiralty. Rear-Admiral, Euryalus, and Rear-Admiral, Invincible, were first of all informed at 1105 of what Commodore (S) intended to do, namely, to scout with the Lurcher and Firebrace for submarines towards the enemy coast, and to keep a good look-out south and south-east for enemy submarines. At 1300 the Vice-Admiral, 1st B.C.S., was told that the light cruisers were to support and follow the destroyers and to keep to the northward of the destroyer sweep. The same signal gave him the rendezvous and movements proposed for the Harwich Flotilla. The C-in-C. and Commodore (T) and Commodore (S) stated that Beatty with

Chapter II.

Altemations to plans.

5. On August 26th the C-in-C. was told that it had been decided to occupy Ostend in order to relieve pressure on the Allied arm ratio which might cause some movement of the High Sea Fleet, and the same message informed him that a destroyer sweep of the 1st and 3rd Flotillas with submarines was "in orders for Friday" from east to west, commencing between Horn Reef and Heligoland, with battle cruisers in support. This message went out at 1305, and the C-in-C. replied at once with a proposal to co-operate in the sweep by moving the Grand Fleet cruisers and destroyers to a suitable supporting position with the battle fleet in the neighbourhood, and in the meantime, steam was ordered for the 1st B.C.S., 1st L.C.S., 2nd and 4th Flotillas for 5 a.m. The Admiral seem to have been preoccupied at the time with the prospect of the Germans gaining Calais and Dunkirk and the changes of disposition which this would necessarily require, and possibly they did not care to see the Grand Fleet involved in operations in the Bight. In any case they replied that the co-operation of the battle fleet was not required, but that the battle cruisers could be sent in support, and gave the rendezvous allotted to the Humber battle cruiser force.

The C-in-C.'s action was fully justified by subsequent events, but the signal made about midnight on August 26th-27th necessitated important amendments to the operation orders at the last moment with the possibility that these might never reach the commands involved. This is precisely what happened. Commodore (T) and Commodore (S) did not receive the signals containing these amendments, and the latter never heard of them, which naturally led to considerable misunderstanding and confusion fortunately unattended by any serious consequences.
three battle cruisers and six light cruisers was on his way to support the two battle cruisers and was steering for the Invincible's 5 a.m. position. The light cruisers were steering for the destroyers' 4 a.m. position, and would keep to the northward of the destroyers, supporting them during the sweep. The Euryalus and Invincible received the signal; Commodore (T) and Commodore (S) did not. The former had left Harwich at 5 a.m. that morning (the 27th); the latter at 10.30 p.m. the night before (the 26th). The messages lay at Harwich till they came back, and neither the Euryalus nor Invincible seems to have repeated them or asked the Commodores whether they had received them. Commodore (T) fell in with Goodenough at the rendezvous the next morning and received a brief account of the later arrangements, but Commodore (S) remained unaware of Beatty's and Goodenough's co-operation till after the commencement of operations, and accordingly never informed his submarines.

At 1754 Beatty informed the Admiralty of his proposed dispositions for the light cruisers.

These were very simple. At 0500 they would be 10 miles N. 8° W. of the destroyers, steering S. 8° E. until 0800, when they would turn W. 4 S. until noon, when they would retire north on the 1st B.C.S. The battle cruisers from the 5 a.m. rendezvous would conform to the movements of the flotilla, keeping north-west of them. Their position at 0800 would be latitude 54° 19' N., longitude 6° 34' E. They would then steer W. 4 S. until noon.

A couple of hours later, at 1830, Beatty issued a final signal to the 1st B.C.S. and 1st L.C.S. This gave the destroyers' rendezvous and ordered the 1st L.C.S. to support them, the eastern pair to be 10 miles N. 8° W. of the destroyers 5 a.m. position at 0500. The light cruisers were to alter course to W. 4 S. at 8 a.m. and to preserve their position in support to the northward until noon or till the signal to retire was made.

Beatty was still in the dark as to the movements of the submarines, but received information as to their general position from Rear-Admiral Moore when they met early in the morning, and also a message that the Admiralty had signalled the evening before (August 27th), "Commodore (S) reports enemy submarines and warns battle cruisers of the area in which they were seen." It may be accepted then that when the operations commenced, Rear-Admiral Moore and Rear-Admiral Christian were conversant with the proposed dispositions; Commodore Tyrwhitt knew that Beatty and Goodenough were behind him, but was probably rather vague as to the intended movements of the former, while Commodore (S) and his submarines were still quite unaware of the arrival of Beatty and Goodenough on the scene.

In these circumstances there was a possibility of the submarines making a determined attack on the 1st L.C.S. and 1st B.C.S., but, in actual practice, the simplicity and brevity of the instructions and signals issued by the Admiralty and the various senior officers tended to make the situation clear, and the quickness and commonsense of the Submarine Commanders compensated for the poor visibility and their imperfect knowledge of the forces present.

After these alterations to the original plan the forces employed in the operations consisted of:

Supporting Force:

(a) Grand Fleet Detachment—
First Battle Cruiser Squadron (Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty), Lion, Queen Mary, Princess Royal.
First Light Cruiser Squadron (Commodore Goodenough), Southampton, Birmingham, Nottingham, Lowestoft, Plymouth, Liverpool.
(b) Cruiser Force K. (Rear-Admiral A. G. Moore), Invincible, New Zealand, and four destroyers.

In Reserve:
(c) Cruiser Force C. (Rear-Admiral Christian), Euryalus, Aboukir, Bacchante, Oeannay, Hogue.

1 The signal was sent to Rear-Admiral Moore by wireless direct at 1205 and repeated at 1310 with a slightly different wording to Rear-Admiral, Euryalus, Commodore (T) and Commodore (S). A pp. 11, 12a.
2 Admiralty, 27th August 1914, 1754.
3 A 21h, Lion (S). This signal evidently refers to A 11.
4 For complete list, see Appendix C.

1 Tywhitt says in his report, "a disaster was narrowly averted." Tywhitt's report, 30th August 1914, X 3933/14.
2 Aboukir, Cressy, Bacchante, Oeannay.
3 Hogue, Cressy, Bacchante, Aboukir.
4 Southampton (S).
Plan of operations (M0073/14) and German patrols.

Aug 28th 1914.

B.C.S. Position A. 55° 10' N., 6° 20' E.

B.C.S. Post B. 54° 30' N., 6° 20' E.

Grand fleet battle fleet was at sea off the Orkneys, but was not in immediate support.

Cruisers: Georg C. Tegetthoff, Euryalus, Christoph von Bismarck, Greif, Leipzig, Prinz Eugen.

Destroyers: Jäger 7, 8, 9, 10, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22.

C.4. (Dreadnought Cruiser) Kronprinz.

C.2. (Cruiser) Seydlitz.

Fleet flagship: Seydlitz.

Rear Admiral Schloen, Seydlitz, Moltke, Von der Tann at Wilhelmshaven also Strassburg, Stralsund, Rostock, Hamburg (dock).

Danzig, Munchen in the Elbe.

Elbe L.S. 47° 36' N. 8° 16' E.

Helgoland, Kolberg in mouth of Jade.

Wreck (1309) ult 0000 on 27th Aug.

The 33° 34' S. S. S. is 15° 30' W. of Orkney.
The signal was sent to Hear-Admiral Moore by wireless direct at 1205 and repeated at 1310 with a slightly different wording to Bear-Admiral, Euryalus, Commodore (T) and Commodore (S). App. A 12, 13.

Admiralty, 27th August 1914, 1754.

A 21b, Lion (S): This signal evidently refers to A 11.

For complete list, see Appendix C.

Sweeping Forces:
(d) Arethusa, Commodore Tyrwhitt. Fearless, Captain Blunt.
III. Flotilla 16 "L" Boats.
I Flotilla 15 Achelron class boats.

(e) Submarines.
By Heligoland—E 4, E 5, and E 9.
Outer Line—E 6, E 7 & E 8.
Off the Ems—D 2, D 8.

(f) Submarine Tenders:
Lurcher, Commodore Keyes, Commodore (S), Firedrake.

7. Movement to Initial Positions.—On August 26th the submarine flotilla began to move, and by August 27th all forces were on the way to their appointed positions. The Arethusa had only hoisted Commodore Tyrwhitt's broad pendant in the forenoon of August 26th, and on the 27th, at 0500, the pendant had been 24 hours at her masthead, she sailed with the 1st and 3rd Flotillas, picked up the Fearless, which had left Sheerness at 0633, at 1400, and passing through the first position, latitude 54° N., longitude 4° E., shaped course for the 0400 second position in latitude 55° 20' N., longitude 6° 45' E.

At 0545 on the 28th, as day was breaking, three grey hulls were seen indistinctly on the port bow, and were at first thought to be the enemy. But the challenge was made and answered; the cruisers turned out to be Goodenough's squadron, and there was a brief interchange of signals. Tyrwhitt asked, "Are you taking part in the operations?" and Goodenough answered, "Yes, I know your courses and will support you. Beatty is behind us."

Tyrwhitt now knew that Beatty and Goodenough were supporting the flotillas, and shortly afterwards turned S. 8 E. on the initial course.

Commodore (S) and the Submarines.—Commodore (S) was away to the southward. The Firedrake had left Harwich with E 4, E 5, and E 9 (the inner and eastward line of submarines) at 2230 on August 26th, followed two hours later by the Lurcher, escorting E 6, E 7, E 8 (the westward or outward line). On arriving in the Bight, the submarines went on to take up their stations, and the Lurcher and Firedrake cruised during the night of the 27th-28th to the southward of the positions allotted to the battle cruisers and waited for the morning.

Rear-Admiral Christian's Force, consisting of the Eagle, Cruiser Force C, and Amethyst, left the Nore at noon on the 27th, and, after an uneventful voyage, arrived off Terschelling at about 5 a.m. on the 28th.

Vice-Admiral Beatty's Force.—The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron left Scapa at 0520, and proceeding at 17 knots for most of the time, met the Invincible and New Zealand at 0115 and arrived at the prearranged position, latitude 55° 10' N., longitude 6° E., at 0500. The Light Cruiser Squadron left Scapa with them and apparently drew off to the eastward about 2000, steering for the position where they were to meet Tyrwhitt and the Harwich Flotilla. They had come down spread 2 miles apart, but at nightfall formed three divisions in line ahead disposed 1000 yards, columns 2 miles apart.

Nothing had disturbed the journey. The 10th Cruiser Squadron had been passed soon after leaving Scapa, and the 3rd Battle Squadron had been sighted early in the afternoon.

Rear-Admiral Moore's Force.—The Invincible and New Zealand left Grimsby at 1030, and proceeding quietly at 15 knots, sighted the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron at 0415 on the 28th, and took station on the Lion's starboard beam. Orders had been issued that no wireless signals were to be made except to report the enemy or on matters of the utmost importance, and the night had passed uneventfully.

Situation at 0500.—By 0500 on the 28th the forces taking part in the operation were in their initial positions. Commodore (T) with the 3rd Flotilla had reached the second position (latitude 55° 20' N., longitude 6° 45' E.) at 0400, and was now pro-

1 Tyrwhitt says in his report, "a disaster was narrowly averted." Tyrwhitt's report, 30th August 1914, X 3933/14.
2 ip Hugon, 1700, S. 31 E.; speeds 0725, 17 knots; 1955, 16 knots.

1 This signal was sent to Rear-Admiral Moore by wireless direct at 1205 and repeated at 1310 with a slightly different wording to Rear-Admiral, Euryalus, Commodore (T) and Commodore (S). App. A 12, 11.
2 Admiralty, 27th August 1914, 1754.
3 A 21b, Lion (S): This signal evidently refers to A 11.
4 For complete list, see Appendix C.
ceeding S. E. at 20 knots, with the III. Flotilla in divisions disposed abreast on each side, and the Fearless and I. Flotilla 2 miles astern. The 1st L. C. S. was 8 miles astern of the Fearless, the Battle Cruiser Squadron some 30 miles to the westward.

1st L. C. S.<8>טאש Co. S.S. E. (magn.) 20 kts.

---1 ---------i

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Co. S.S. E. (magn.)

---2 ---------i

GERMAN STRATEGICAL POLICY AND DISPOSITIONS IN THE BIGHT.

8. German Policy.—The Germans from the first adopted a policy of the defensive, and the German view of the general naval situation may be briefly summarised as follows:—The British fleet by concentrating at the outlets of the North Sea had performed its task, for this concentration covered the great lines of maritime trade, cut off Germany from the ocean, secured the British Isles against invasion, and simultaneously covered its task, for this concentration covered the great lines of maritime trade, cut off Germany 

The Admiral Staff adopted the idea of a defensive policy with the reservation that Encflish prestige would not permit her to renounce the policy of a blockade and to give her fleet to come out and fight.

His Majesty the Kaiser issues the following orders for the conduct of war in the North Sea:—

(a) From dawn to dark, a U-boat patrol on the line Wangeroog—Heligoland—

The idea of a blockade of the North Sea instead of one of the Bight had been mooted by contemporary naval writers, but was met by the answer that neutrals, especially the U.S.A., would not tolerate such a blockade and that England would discover that without a close blockade of the North Sea coasts they would neither be able to hamper the activities of the German Fleet, especially of its minelayers, nor attain their object of cutting off German imports. In pursuance of this idea, Vice-Admiral Scheer in his spring manoeuvres report of 1914 expressed the opinion that English prestige would not permit her to renounce the policy of a blockade and close observation of the German Bight. The patrol of the Bight was therefore closely associated with a fundamental aspect of German naval policy, and was consequently a service to which they would naturally devote a large amount of attention.

10. Patrol of the Bight.—On 1st August, 1914, Vice-Admiral Hipper, flying his flag in the Seydlitz, assumed command of the Bight Patrol and issued the following orders for its execution:—

(a) From dawn to dark, a U-boat patrol on the line Wangeroog—Heligoland—

On 1st August, 1914, Vice-Admiral Hipper, flying his flag in the Seydlitz, assumed command of the Bight Patrol and issued the following orders for its execution:—

1. G.O.H. 44.


2. G.O.H. 34.


5. A German Staff memorandum drawn up about 1913 gives the policy which it was thought England would adopt.


8. Gross quotes this at length, p. 58 et seq.


10. At night the U-boat to lie in Heligoland Harbour.
(b) The 8th Torpedo Boat Flotilla to be relieved at 8 p.m. by the 9th, to cruise to and fro on a look-out line, Spiekeroog—Heligoland—Schnell Deep.

c) Three light cruisers, the Stralsund, Mainz, Kolberg, to push out in the afternoon on the radii of a circle 90 miles from Heligoland.

d) Battle cruisers in the Bight.1

From August 3rd a look-out service (Vorpostendienst) of capital ships was arranged, consisting of one ship of the 1st and 3rd Squadron, or a battle cruiser, ready for action at anchor in Schillig Roads, but this service was intended merely for the defence of the Jade against torpedo attacks, and not for the support of the patrols at sea.

11. On August 1st, the C-in-C, arrived at Wilhelmshaven, and, as a result of a conference held on board the Friedrich der Grosse, issued the following instructions for the patrol of the Bight. The S.O. (Scouts)2 was to be responsible for the patrol of the Bight. By day, an outer line was to be stationed consisting of a torpedo boat flotilla 70 miles, and an inner line consisting of a minesweeping division 23 miles from Elbe Lightship I.3 U-boats were to lie between the two lines, and light cruisers to be at hand behind the inner line.

By night, the outer line, and the U-boats were to be withdrawn, and the inner line replaced by a torpedo boat flotilla.

All cruisers, torpedo boat flotillas, U-boat flotillas, M.S. divisions, and aircraft were placed under the S.O. (Scouts).4

General principles were issued at the same time dealing with the object and execution of the patrol.

The work was to be performed largely by the older light cruisers in accordance with the conception then prevalent that the war would be short, and the newer and valuable ships were to be used for a decisive action.5

By day, the patrols were to act, first, against submarines, secondly, against mine-sweepers.

The former were to be opposed by torpedo boats and the minesweeping division (of older torpedo boats), who were to retire on the approach of destroyers. Light cruisers were to be used against destroyers but not against submarines.6

At night, the patrols were to protect the Bight against mines. The U-boats were to retire before light cruisers, resuming their posts as soon as possible, but were to attack mine layers vigorously. The use of aircraft was mentioned, but the number available at the time was small, consisting of only six, and later of nine, which were not to be flown more than 70 miles from Heligoland.

Only one airship (L 3) was available, and was employed in practice flights along the coast. These orders were excellent so far as they went, but there was one vital omission; they did not overlook the very contingency which was regarded as probable, namely, the incursion of a force of heavy cruisers into the Bight, and the necessity in that contingency of supporting the light cruisers.

In accordance with these instructions, on August 5th, when war was declared, the system of patrol consisted by day of an outer and inner circle, each of one torpedo boat flotilla, the outer being 35 miles, and the inner 23 miles, from the Elbe Lightship. Between them lay a flotilla of U-boats on a concentric arc of 29 miles radius.

Behind each wing was stationed a light cruiser and another off Heligoland Harbour. In the Weser was a cruiser (flotilla leader) with a T.B. flotilla ready to go out, and in the river were three T.B. flotillas standing off.7

By night the torpedo boats of the outer line and the U-boats were withdrawn, leaving only the inner torpedo boat line.8

On August 6th, on the urgent representations of the chief of the 1st U-Boat Flotilla, the U-boats were withdrawn, and the majority allotted to high seas work. Their withdrawal placed a heavier strain on the torpedo boats, and the tax on the latter proved too great. On August 7th, the inner patrol line was abandoned in order to release a flotilla for offensive purposes, and to compensate for this, the outer line was ordered to cruise in the area between the 25- and 35-miles and 29-miles and 39-miles instead of cruising at right angles to the outpost line. The state of instant readiness of the T.B. flotilla in the Weser had to be relaxed, and the demands on men, boilermakers, and engineers necessitated the abandonment of the T.B. flotilla in reserve. It was

1 G.O.H., 29.
2 i.e., Rear-Admiral Hipper, Seydlitz.
3 G.O.H., 34.
4 G.O.H., 139.
5 G.O.H., 22, longitude 8° 15'.
6 Korvettenkapitan (Commander) Hermann Becker, Bremen.
7 Latitude 54° N, longitude 8° 15'.
8 Korvettenkapitan (Commander) Hermann Becker.
9 * G.O.H., 194 of the First T.B. Flotilla. The signal as logged is "Chase X.W. positive." It may be that G. 194 was to the S.W. and ran off S.E. She was steering a north-west course.
11 Small island half a mile east of Heligoland.
12 G.O.H., 139. On account of a submarine attack on G. 111.

CHAPTER IV.

THE FIRST PHASE.

13. Enemy Sighted—Laurel and III/4 go in the chase. It was light at four and the sun rose above five. The sea was smooth, visibility poor, and the sky overcast. A light wind was blowing from the north-west. The flotillas left their rendezvous at 0800 on their course S. 8° E., and at 0835 sighted an enemy destroyer on the port bow to the south-east in the direction of Heligoland.9 The 4th Division (Laurel, Liberty, Leander and Laurel) was at the port wing and received orders to chase. The Laurel increased to full speed, and forming her division in single line drew off to the south-west. Fire was opened some five minutes later at 0850 at a range of not less than 7,000 yards. The destroyer made off at full speed to the south-east in the direction of Heligoland, returning our fire. The Laurel followed, but could not gain on her, and the range was held to permit of effective fire.

723. Commodore (T) joins in the chase. As the 4th Division moved off, Commodore (T) warned the Laurel not to lose touch with him, and continued his generally felt that the employment of the flotillas on this service was a deviation from their true offensive purpose; but they could not be released from it till it was decided to close the Bight against enemy craft by mines—-a policy not adopted till September.

Instructions of August 15th. On August 18th, 12 trawlers were added to the patrol for use against submarines, and new instructions were issued by the S.O. (Scouts).1 These were on much the same lines as before.

By night a torpedo boat flotilla was to be stationed on the circumference of a circle with a radius of 20 miles from the Elbe Lightship, 1 cruizing to and fro in the direction of the outpost line. Between Heligoland and South Hever there were to be five, and between Heligoland and Spiekeroog, seven look-outs (trawler) cruising perpendicular to the direction of the outpost line, and behind the look-outs there were to be some three light cruisers and a flotilla leader cruiser in one of the river entrances.

A light cruiser for the protection of Heligoland Harbour was to be behind the Sand Islands10 with a torpedo boat flotilla ready to proceed and U-boats inside the harbour.

A look-out ship (battleship or large cruiser with nets) was stationed in the Jade at No. 9 buoy for purposes of anti-torpedo craft attack.

In the Ems lay a light cruiser and a torpedo boat flotilla in addition to the old cruiser Arcona and four trawlers. The patrol forces at night in the Bight mustered, therefore, five light cruisers.

The task of covering Heligoland by day fell to submarines, and on August 25th, the Chief of the I. U-Boat Flotilla issued instructions for 5 U-Boats to lie for this purpose on a line running 12 miles south of Heligoland and four on a line running 9 miles east, for the protection of Heligoland and the Bight, the remainder to assemble south-east of Heligoland.

On the same day, in view of representations made by the C-in-C, the patrol service was strengthened and a threefold circle was again instituted for the day with a double circle for the night consisting of an outer line of torpedo boats at 25 miles from Heligoland, and an inner line of minesweeping craft 12 miles behind them. These were supported by the three cruisers mentioned in S.O. (Scouts) orders of August 18th.

This was the system of patrol in force on the night of August 27th-28th. There were two important points it overlooked; one was an attack by capital ships; the other was the tide flowing quietly seaward on the bar of the Outer Jade.
course S. 5° E. at 20 knots. At 0718 he signalled to her to rejoin, but the signal was not received. Other destroyers were sighted about this time to the S.E., and fearing that she might get too deeply engaged Commodore (T) turned at 0726 4 points to port with his flotilla and joined in the chase. A few minutes later at 0729 the Laurel signalled that the first destroyer had been joined by two more and at 0740 Commodore (T) turned another 2 points to port, formed his three divisions separately in line abreast to bring the destroyers' guns to bear, and increased to full speed with the intention of cutting off the enemy from Heligoland.

As the chase proceeded, bringing the 4th Division and 3rd Flotilla nearer to Heligoland, several enemy torpedo boats (belonging to the inner patrol) were occasionally sighted ahead and on the starboard bow; the whole 3rd Flotilla were now in line abreast with ships somewhat strung out as the divisions altered course at intervals to bring their guns to bear, but the enemy was able to keep his distance, and the range remained too great for effective fire. The Laurel's division, some 8 miles to the north-east, were still pursuing their chase.

14. Fearless joins chase.—The Fearless, 2 miles astern, continued on the original course S. 5° E. until 0725, when some destroyers were sighted on the port bow, and Captain (D) turned 4 points to port. A few minutes later he formed his division into line abreast and increased to full speed, then at 0740 altered course another 3 points to port. He was now on the port quarter of the Arethusa, some 4 miles north-west of her. The enemy were practically out of range, and though the L.6th on the port wing opened fire, the 1st Flotilla was too far off to take any real part in the engagement.

Commodore (T) had meanwhile been chasing steadily to the eastward firing intermittently but without much result, when at 0757 he suddenly sighted two cruisers ahead coming up from the eastward, and turned 6 points to starboard to engage the nearest—the northward—at 7,000 yards. This was the Stettin, and her appearance brought the chase abruptly to a stop.

The Arethusa, after turning 6 points, appears to have swung back 4 points to port and engaged the Stettin on opposite courses for a few minutes apparently without result.

Fearless and Stettin.—The Fearless, some 5 miles north-west, had turned the 1st Flotilla 4 points to starboard at 0739 and shortly afterwards, at 0758, sighted the Stettin in her turn, and altering course to S. by W. at 0805, opened fire.

The Stettin turned 10 points to starboard and retired in a south-easterly direction. The range was about 8,000 yards and spotting was difficult in the haze; under these circumstances many destroyers did not open fire at all, nor did the 1st and 2nd Divisions on the Fearless starboard hand, as their fire was masked. Firing continued till about 0814, when Captain (D) received signal, W. 3 S., and breaking off the action, which seemed purposeless at the long range, turned to the new course. This was in accordance with the operation orders, and Captain (D) re-formed the 1st Flotilla in cruising order, divisions in line abreast, disposed abreast to port, reduced speed to 20 knots, and commenced the westerly sweep.

15. Arethusa and Frauenlob.—Meanwhile the two funnelled cruiser, which turned out to be the Frauenlob, had been closing from the southward and Commodore (T) instead of turning W. 4 S. according to plan turned to engage her on a south-westerly course. The Frauenlob turned to port on a parallel course at almost 9,000 yards. By 0810 the range had closed to 6,000 yards, and the action became close and severe.

Note in German account of the Stettin having been in action with Arethusa.—
G. O. H. 149.

Fearless (R) 0805 S. by W. (S) 0756, Goshawk (S) 0755.
Fearless (R) 0805 S. by W. (S) 4 to S., Lucifer (R) 0806, Ferret 0758.
Fearless (S) 0811, Ferret (R) 0815, Livelings (R) 0816, Goshawk (S) 0815.
G.O.H. also Leonidas (R), Leon (R), Laforet (sloth)
HELIGOLAND BIGHT
AUGUST 28th 1914
PLAN 2.
STETTIN, FRAUENLOB and V187.
0730 - 0900.

HELIGOLAND BIGHT
AUGUST 28th 1914
PLAN 2.
STETTIN, FRAUENLOB and V187.
0730 - 0900.

ARETHUSA and Flotilla
with 19th L.C.S.
Approach

S.E.
20 Knots.
0728 4 to Port.
0735 Full.
0800
0830
0840
0850
0900
0910
0920
0930
0940
0950
1000
1010
1020
1030
1040
1050
1100
1110
1120
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1700
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1740
1750
1800
1810
1820
1830
1840
1850
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
1950
2000

ARETHUSA and III Flotilla

FEARLESS and I Flotilla

FEARLESS and II Flotilla

NOTTINGHAM and LOWESTOFT

STETTIN

FRAUENLOB

ARETHUSA and III Flotilla

ARETHUSA Closes away.

FEARLESS

STETTIN

FRAUENLOB

HELIGOLAND.

SCALE
2000 Yards
600 1200 1800 2400

10 Sea Miles

Continuous Survey, August 1920.

Naval Staff (T.S.O.D.)
The 3rd Flotilla boats were assisting the Arethusa, and some of the German boats which had formed the southerly wing of the outpost circle were streaming in on the starboard side; but the real fight lay between the two cruisers. The enemy’s fire was heavy and accurate. The Arethusa was repeatedly hit by the Frauenlob’s shell, and was only hitting the enemy occasionally. By 0815 the enemy’s fire was telling heavily. P.I. and P. 3 4-inch guns had jammed; the Q.D. 6-inch gun could not be trained, and at P. 2 an enemy shell had caused a big cordite blaze. The signal officer (Lieutenant E. P. Westmacott) had been killed on the bridge beside the commodore. Only the forecastle 6-inch gun remained in action, and at 0820 the commodore ordered both torpedoes to be fired; the Lance and Lawford each fired three at about the same time, but none of them hit. The gunfire of the destroyers was of little avail, though the Landrail on the Arethusa’s port quarter drew the Frauenlob’s fire for a few minutes. About this time a German torpedo boat was sighted ahead of the 3rd Flotilla trying to cross their line of advance and reach the shelter of Heligoland. She was engaged by several destroyers at close range and badly damaged. On fire from end to end and shrouded in smoke she was left on the port hand apparently sinking, but succeeded later in reaching port. A merchant steamer flying the Norwegian flag was unfortunate enough to come on the scene from the north at this time, and tried to make to the eastward across the Arethusa’s bows. She was the Kong Guttorm on her way from Christiania to Bremen, but the destroyers took her for a minelayer (as the Stettin had done half an hour before), and opening fire on her forced the crew to take to their boats. Meanwhile the action continued, and the Arethusa’s situation was beginning to look critical. No support could be expected from the Fearless, which had turned W. 4 S., at 0812, and was now some distance off to the north-west; the 1st L.C.S. was away to the westward, and Heligoland was unpleasantly close. But at 0825 the situation was suddenly relieved. With her remaining gun the Arethusa obtained a 6-inch hit by the Frauenlob’s forebridge, and the enemy hauled off to port, whereupon Commodore (T) turned to West by South and reformed the flotilla in close cruising order. The Fearless at this time was some 8 miles to the north-west.

The disposition of the destroyers during the action had been approximately in single line ahead, the III/1st and III/2nd ahead of the Arethusa, the III/3rd astern and the III/4th under the Laurel closing on the starboard quarter from the northward after their detached chase and engaging both enemy cruisers distantly on their way.

The casualties incurred in this phase of the action were inconsiderable except in the case of the Arethusa. The destroyers were at times under heavy fire and some were straddled and occasionally hit, but their losses amounted to only one man wounded in the flotilla. The material damage was also negligible; all boats were left with full steaming powers and only two had so much as a gun out of action, though they had expended a good deal of ammunition. The Arethusa suffered more severely; she had 1 officer and 8 men killed, and 10 wounded, and most of her armament was out of action, though this damage was mostly of a temporary nature and except for two 4-inch guns was soon repaired. In the engine room more serious injury had been sustained; a shell had entered the main feed tank; the forward engine room was flooded to a depth of 3 feet and the ship gradually lost speed and by 10.30 could do no more than 10 knots. Her wireless and searchlights were out of action and she was left with flags and semaphore as the only methods of signalling, and for the former there were hardly any halyards left. The Frauenlob too had suffered severely; she received some 10 hits, one on the port edge of the conning tower, another on the after control position, and another in the foremost which destroyed the wireless; she lost 5 dead and 32 wounded. Of the enemy’s torpedo boats several had been hit, and D. S. badly damaged; but none had been sunk. Both flotillas had now turned to the prescribed course and were steering W. 4 S. at 30 knots.

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1 2 D. 8 belonging to the minesweeping division in the inner patrol line.
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2 According to one destroyer’s report, the actual speed of the 3rd Flotilla was only 12 knots.

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German Account of Phase I. 0530-0830.

16. German Dispositions. The Light Patrol consisted of an outer line consisting of a torpedo flotilla of new destroyers and an inner line of older boats as in the plan below.

**German Patrols.**
August 28th, 1914 (not to scale).

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These were the arrangements in force on August 28th. Unfortunately the patrol cruisers that day were very weak vessels, namely, Frauenlob, Stettin, and Helo, of which the last was quite incapable of joining in a serious engagement. The Cöln had gone to Wilhelmshaven to coal; the Stralsund and Danzig, and were ordered to support; the Kolberg to get steam up; the Stralsund to proceed to the Roads; the Danzig and Düsseldorf to come down the Elbe. The Cöln and Stralsund, both in Wilhelmshaven, were ordered to support; the Kolberg to get steam up; the Stralsund to proceed to the Roads; the Danzig and Düsseldorf to come down the Elbe. The Cöln and Stralsund, both in Wilhelmshaven, were ordered to support; the Kolberg to get steam up; the Stralsund to proceed to the Roads; the Danzig and Düsseldorf to come down the Elbe. The Cöln and Stralsund, both in Wilhelmshaven, were ordered to support; the Kolberg to get steam up; the Stralsund to proceed to the Roads; the Danzig and Düsseldorf to come down the Elbe. The Cöln and Stralsund, both in Wilhelmshaven, were ordered to support; the Kolberg to get steam up; the Stralsund to proceed to the Roads; the Danzig and Düsseldorf to come down the Elbe. The Cöln and Stralsund, both in Wilhelmshaven, were ordered to support; the Kolberg to get steam up; the Stralsund to proceed to the Roads; the Danzig and Düsseldorf to come down the Elbe. The Cöln and Stralsund, both in Wilhelmshaven, were ordered to support; the Kolberg to get steam up; the Stralsund to proceed to the Roads; the Danzig and Düsseldorf to come down the Elbe.

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Meanwhile, at 0657, G. 194, after evading the submarine attack, had turned to a N.W. course, when shots falling close at hand revealed the presence of enemy craft, though these at first could not be made out. Kapitän-Leutnant Busch turned and ran on a S.E. course, and from this time a succession of signals began to pass between G. 194, G. 196, and V. 197 reporting the appearance of hostile surface craft, and clearly indicating that an enemy force had broken through the outer line.

By 0710 G. 194 could make out that the enemy numbered about 8 T.B.D.'s and 2 Light Cruisers, but unfortunately the wireless report to S.O. (T.) did not get through to the Cöln till 0725.

The next patrol to the north, the G. 196, leader of the 2nd T.B.F. Flotilla, had not sighted G. 194 at the patrol distance of 7½ miles on account of the low visibility; but hearing firing to westward at 0705 he ran towards it, and sighting the enemy, sent a wireless to the Cöln at 0715: "G. 194 chased by cruiser in 142 e." The Stettin and Frauenlob had already been ordered to chase destroyers, for which purpose the former had weighed and proceeded from behind Heligoland.

The Cöln and Stralsund, both in Wilhelmshaven, were ordered to support; the Kolberg to get steam up; the Stralsund to proceed to the Roads; the Danzig and Düsseldorf to come down the Elbe. G. 194 and G. 196 were now running for Heligoland, chased by the Laurel's division.

Fire was opened at 7,000 metres on G. 196, but discontinued after about 14 shots.

The 5th T.B. Flotilla were meanwhile on their way at 21 knots to hunt the submarine when at 0725 G. 9, their forecast boat, sighted several destroyers ahead and observed the flash of guns. Doubtful whether the vessels were his own or the enemy, he went on a little till he could clearly make out they were English. He immediately turned round and opened fire. The boats behind him at first took the shells bursting near him to be his guns firing on the submarine, but soon afterwards saw the profiles of four destroyers.

The first wireless from G. 196 had not got through to them; they were strung out irregularly and were not in close formation. For a time the enemy's fire was practically ineffective. At first the shots fell 800 metres short—a further advantage in the fact that most of the destroyer's shells did not burst and could be clearly distinguished from the 6-inch shots of the cruiser. The Fearless could now be seen on the right wing of the enemy, and the number of destroyers had increased by 0738 to 10, then to 15 or 20. The commencement of fire had been reported to the Cöln, and received by her at 0725; and at 0733 the number and position of the enemy were reported, viz., a cruiser and 20 T.B.D.'s in 142 e. (54° 25' N., 7° 35' E.). The situation shortly afterwards began to grow more serious as V. I and S. 13 could not maintain their speed. The fire burst down in the latter, and her speed fell to 30 knots; her range dropped to 5,500, and at 0740 the flotilla leader asked for cruiser support. S. 13 remained undamaged, but V. I, on the left wing, was surrounded by enemy salvos.

At 0750 the first shell, apparently from a 4-inch, hit her on the upper deck and put out irregularly and were not in close formation. For a time the enemy's fire was practically ineffective. At first the shots fell 800 metres short—a further advantage in the fact that most of the destroyer's shells did not burst and could be clearly distinguished from the 6-inch shots of the cruiser. The Fearless could now be seen on the right wing of the enemy, and the number of destroyers had increased by 0738 to 10, then to 15 or 20. The commencement of fire had been reported to the Cöln, and received by her at 0725; and at 0733 the number and position of the enemy were reported, viz., a cruiser and 20 T.B.D.'s in 142 e. (54° 25' N., 7° 35' E.). The situation shortly afterwards began to grow more serious as V. I and S. 13 could not maintain their speed. The fire burst down in the latter, and her speed fell to 30 knots; her range dropped to 5,500, and at 0740 the flotilla leader asked for cruiser support. S. 13 remained undamaged, but V. I, on the left wing, was surrounded by enemy salvos.

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Heligoland batteries joining in though it was within their range, and the chief of the 5th T.B. Flotilla had asked for their fire.

At 0735 the Stettin opened fire at 8,500 metres on the middle group of the enemy and reported to the S.O. (Scouts), "Am in action with destroyers," but, due to a mistaken report that the vessels fired on were German, fire was interrupted for a time.

About 0835 there was seen behind the enemy a cruiser with four funnels, which was joined by no more than a T.B. (Scouts). Shells were falling freely round the Stettin by this time. The 5th T.B. Flotilla was retiring to Heligoland, confirmed in this decision by a signal at 0810 ordering it and the 1st Flotilla to get under the Heligoland guns.

The Stettin had already received one hit at No. 4 gun the starboard side, which had killed two men and wounded five, but her speed had fallen to 15 knots at 0810 and the captain decided to turn back to Sellebronnenu buoys to get all boilers well alight. A merchant vessel was seen at this time behind the enemy's line and a signal was accordingly made reporting 154c and 155c as suspected mine areas. She turned out later to be the Norwegian steamer Kong Gottorf carrying out her regular trip between Christiania and Bremen, and about to take up a German pilot north of Heligoland. The Stettin had been in time to cover the retirement of the northern wing of the 1st and the 5th T.B. Flotillas, and these got safely into harbour.

18. The Minesweeping Division on the Inner Patrol. —The retirement of the Stettin was regrettable as it left the III. Minesweeping Division exposed, and from 0740 D.S., the leader's boat, was under a lively fire. The delay in passing G. 194's signal brought the enemy down on the inner patrol as a surprise. At 0735 they saw German boats making at full speed for Heligoland and shortly afterwards sighted English craft behind them and shaped course for Heligoland. Fire was opened on D. 8 at 0740 and the 1st L.C.S. was constantly under fire, but sustained most of her damage when she came within close range of the 3rd Flotilla destroyers. She was saved, however, by the low visibility and received only five hits, of which one 6-inch hit the bridge, killing the captain. Two men and a lieutenant, disabling 15 to 20 men and damaging the auxiliary steam piping, which shrouded the ship in a protective cloud of steam. The engines were still working, however, and just at this moment Heligoland loomed up out of the mist, the Frauenlob was sighted and the enemy drew off. The other boats of the 3rd Minesweeping Division, T. 34 to the north and T. 33, T. 35, T. 37 to the south, came under the enemy's fire in the same way. None received any wireless report of the enemy; all took the firing at first to be gun practice and were suddenly surprised, and as they had a speed of only 15 knots would have been lost if the Frauenlob had not saved them. So soon as the 5th Flotilla in the north, and the Frauenlob in the south, had enabled them all to escape in safety, except D. S. and T. 35, which were so severely damaged that they had to be towed into Heligoland. The latter had seen T. 34 at 0710 in the N.N.E. being chased by the enemy and steering for Heligoland. She ran to the southward but was hit at 8 a.m. by a shell which killed one man and wounded another, when the Frauenlob appeared steering northerly course and engaged the enemy. Two more shells struck her, one hitting a ventilator, and one entering the engine-room wounding five men and killing two men and wounded five, but her speed had fallen to 15 knots and at 0810 the cruiser disappeared with her destroyers in the mist. The Frauenlob did not escape unharmed. She received about 10 hits, and lost 5 dead and 32 wounded, chiefly belonging to the guns and gun control. One shell struck the port edge of the cruiser, another the foremost fighting top, but the fighting capacity of the ship was not seriously impaired; all guns remained in action. T. 33 was slightly damaged in sight and was taken in tow, and the Frauenlob arrived at Wilhelmshaven at 1030.

Another vessel of the outer patrol, V. 188, had received G. 194's signal reporting the presence of enemy destroyers and had steered for Heligoland at full speed about 0520. Sighting the 1st L.C.S. on the port beam at 0750 she had turned two points to starboard and again to starboard on sighting the Nottingham and Lowestoft; then six points to port shortly afterwards, when she met V. 190 who followed her. About 0825 they were joined by V. 190, V. 101, and G. 197, and shaped course for the Jade. By half-past eight from the German point of view the sweep was practically over. The patrols had been driven in, but with the exception of V. 187 all had returned or were returning and only three out of 22 had been seriously damaged. But this was only the beginning of the day.

CHAPTER VI.

PHASE II.—THE FIRST L.C.S. AND THE FLOTILLAS SWEEP TO THE WESTWARD.

20. The Light Cruiser Squadron.—It will be remembered that the 1st L.C.S. were following astern of the flotillas, some eight miles behind the Fearless. At 0750 Commodore Goodenough might have thought it advisable to engage with enemy destroyers, and at 0805 Commodore Goodenough increased to full speed and detached the Nottingham and Lowestoft to support them. These two cruisers drew off to the eastward and shortly afterwards (0812) opened fire at long range apparently without effect on the enemy destroyers running towards Heligoland. The 1st L.C.S. were at this time well to the westward of the flotillas, for while the latter had been chasing to the eastward from 0726 to 0812, the former had continued on the original course, sighted some destroyers, by N. about 0820, and at 0830 altering course to W.N.W. and shortly afterwards reducing speed to 20 knots.

The Nottingham's and Lowestoft's movements are rather more doubtful. They ran to the eastward for a short time, but must then have returned to southward, for at 0840 they were on a south-westerly course and engaged V. 187 to the south-eastward.

1 G.O.H. 125.
2 G.O.H. 158.
3 In the analysis of losses the numbers given are killed, 28 wounded (possibly includes 4 died of wounds).
4 V. (Orden Goteborg) D.A. T. 35 (Inner Patrol). Speed 23 knots, Southampton (S) 0755.
5 Nottingham (S) 0903, Lowestoft (S) 0800.
6 Probably C. 108 and M. 209.
7 Lowestoft (S) "Two destroyers bearing W. by N.
8 These were apparently the Lowestoft and Fearless, which were keeping touch with the 1st L.C.S., mistaking them for the Frauenlob."
9 Liverpool (S) 0810, Southampton (S) 0830.
10 This is apparently the moment which Goodenough referred to when he says that at 0815 on receipt of Larcher's signal he went off to support her.
11 Corbett's plan (Vol. 1, Map 5) makes them appear to sweep astern of V. 187, but the German Official history is quite explicit and states that "suddenly at 8.45 there appeared in the north-west two light cruisers with four funnels, steering the same course (i.e., south-west) at high speed," who opened a lively fire at 3,500-4,000 metres.
12 Larcher's (prisoner-of-war) account says, "At 0840 she was steaming north, about the same number ahead of her, evidently light cruisers turning enemy destroyers."
At 0900 they sighted the Fearless, were challenged by her and passed her and the Flotillas (see Plan); then at 0907, as there was nothing in sight to the southward, altered course N. by W. and reduced to 22 knots.

21. The First Flotilla and V. 187.—At 0812 the Fearless had turned with the first flotilla to W. § S. in accordance with Com. (T)’s signal, and shortly afterwards* sighted an enemy destroyer appearing about S.S.W. some 6,000 yards almost right ahead and sent the 1st/5th division in pursuit. This was V. 187 firing to the eastward. She had sighted the 1st L.C.S. about 0729 and again at 0805 on the port beam about 5 miles off, and having no information of the flotillas to the eastward had proceeded at full speed, sending a W.T. signal to the Coln. At 0855 gunfire was heard to E.N.E. and four English destroyers were sighted two points on the port bow of the enemy. She turned accordingly to the south to reach the Jaden, then as the destroyers came gradually up altered course to S.W. The destroyers were firing at 6,000 metres and V. 187 opened fire at 4,500. The position was not considered unfavourable and the captain hoped that the mist and her own thick smoke would enable him to escape. Suddenly at 0835 there appeared in the north-west two light cruisers with four funnels steering the same course at a high speed which were at first taken to be German, but a lively fire opened by them at 3,500–4,000 metres left no doubt as to their character. It was now seen that only a bold onset could save the boat. The midshipman was trained to starboard, the torpedo set for 1 metre, and life-saving vests strapped on. The helm was put over, and the boat turned sharp round in an attempt to break through to the north and eastward. She passed the 5th division at about 2,000 yards range with little damage, and the captain hoped that he had got through, when there appeared on the port bow another destroyer division coming down at full speed; meanwhile the division behind (3rd/5th) had turned and re-opened fire. V. 187 was now in a trap encountering a heavy fire from north-west and south-east. One shell struck the foremost gun, another entered the fourth boiler, another entered the fourth boiler, another the bridge, then hits rained everywhere shrouding the boat in smoke, flame and gas. She turned helplessly round and was brought to a dead stop at 0856 by the point blank fire of the 1st/5th Division which passed her at 600 yards range. All the boilers were hit, the captain was badly wounded, the boat was laden with damage and she fought bravely to the last. Ignoring a signal ‘surrender’, blazing with only her after gun in action, she still fired desperately on the Goosehawk as the latter closed to save survivors. The Goosehawk, Phoenix, and Ferret opened fire again and sank her at 0910.

* Fearless “0900 cruisers ahead and on port bow challenged. L.C.S. replied.” The Fearless states she sighted Southamton, but this is evidently a mistake, for Southamton had been well to westward of her at 0800 and had been steering S.N.W. since thens.

1 Lurcher 0820, Fearless (R) 0835, Lizard (R) 0825, G.S.H. 0835.

2 Captain (D) reports he recalled the close thinking the T.B.D. was the Lurcher which was reported to be coming in from seaward. "No enemy chosen was not made, however, till 8.35 a.m. and it is doubtful if the Goosehawk received it. Anyhow she did not not upon it.

3 Lizard (R) says “enemy turned to West,” but did not appear to be doing more than 25 knots.

4 To starboard at 0815 to the north-west on the same course at high speed two light cruisers with four funnels apparently accompanied by torpedo boats. G.S.H. 161. The cruisers must have been Nottingham and Lowestoft; the torpedo boats if seen probably belonged to Lurcher.

5 Lizard (R) says turned to N. for a short time, then turned and came down on an opposite course to Goosehawk.

6 The H.G.22 detailed aont 0937.

7 Ferret (R) Goosehawk (R), gives time about 10 minutes later. Above account largely from German official History 5, 124-126. G.O.H. says she was sunk by explosive charges, but this seems to have been a work of supererogation.

8 To starboard at 0845 to the north-west on the same course at high speed two light cruisers with four funnels apparently accompanied by torpedo boats. G.S.H. 161. The cruisers must have been Nottingham and Lowestoft; the torpedo boats if seen probably belonged to Lurcher.

9 In the German account the British destroyers were reported at 0800 and fire opened at 0808.

10 See Plan 2.

11 Captain (D) calls them Southamton and a cruiser, but they were evidently the Nottingham and Lowestoft. What was their bearing? Did they have the Goosehawk on the starboard or port beam? How far off were they from the Goosehawk? These are points of the logs say nothing and on which further information is desirable.

12 Probably the westward division of the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron.

13 Goodenough’s account was at 0815 to proceed in support of the Lurcher, but he did not alter course till 0930.

Stettin attacks 3rd and 5th Divisions of 1st Flotilla 0915.—The destroyer’s boats were still engaged in picking up survivors from V. 187 when at 0915 a German light cruiser suddenly appeared from the south-eastward and opened fire on their destroyers and their whalers in the waters. This was the Stettin, which had received at 0830 a wireless that the 1st T.B. Flotilla was being attacked and had proceeded at full speed (22 knots) to its assistance.

The two divisions recovered their boats’ crews and proceeded at full speed to the N.W., but the enemy had appeared so suddenly that the Defender had to abandon two of her boats full of wounded prisoners and containing one of her own officers and nine men.

The Stettin’s fire was not very accurate and she did not seriously damage the Ferret, which closed and fired a torpedo, nor the other boats which were stopped or just getting way on, though she herself received 3 hits which killed 2 and wounded 9 men.

By 0937 the 1st/3rd and 5th had drawn out of range and firing had ceased; they proceeded to rejoin the Fearless and the rest of the flotillas who were now steering to the Westward.

22. The Fearless rejoins Arethusa 0900.—The Fearless had meanwhile continued on a W. § S. course till 0830 when she altered course to S.W. by W. § W. About this time she received a signal to say that the Lurcher and Phoenix were in coming in from seaward, and under the impression that V. 187 might be the Lurcher she made a signal to the 1st/5th to negative chase, which was not acted upon as the vessel’s hostile character was now unmistakable. The Fearless did not herself support the two divisions, but left them to deal with V. 187 by themselves. At 0849 she altered course 6 points to port and at 0855 sighted the Arethusa and took station. Two of the 1st L.C.S. were in sight and passed not far off. The operations up to 0900 had resulted in one German destroyer being sunk and three damaged, with the retirement of the German cruisers with four funnels apparently accompanying them, and V. 187 had been reduced to 10 knots and her gunfire reduced by two 4-in. guns, but no other damage had suffered any serious damage. The situation of the flotillas was satisfactory, although they could not hope to cut off any more patrols; they were some 12 to 15 miles west of Lowestoft and steering W. § S. with the 1st L.C.S. and battle cruisers available in support. Our light cruisers had no doubt been reported to the German C-in-C, and the destroyers fired on at 8 a.m. but the presence of our battle cruisers was probably still a secret, though the prevailing low visibility it was always possible that strong enemy forces might suddenly appear without range. But though the situation was not unsatisfactory the results had hardly fulfilled expectations; but before going further with the flotillas, it is necessary to say something of the movements of Commodore (S), who was unaware of the presence of the 1st L.C.S. and whose signals were tending to confuse the situation.

23. Commodore (S) with the Lurcher and Firebrace.—Commodore (S)’s signals between 8 a.m. and 10 a.m. added a distinct element of excitement to the operations. He had sighted at 0745 two 4-funnel cruisers to the north-west steering to the southward, and not knowing that British light cruisers were taking part in the operations had reported them to Comm. (T) as enemy craft and had shadowed them until 0840. This signal intercepted by Goodenough gave him the impression that two enemy cruisers lay to the westward of him, and the Vice-Admiral of the supporting force was no doubt misled in the same way, but no immediate action seems to have been taken on this information. At 0910 Commodore (S) began to suspect the presence of British light cruisers, for he asked Commander (T) if our light cruisers had entered the area, but at 0915 sighting Goodenough’s four ships, forming the main body of the light cruisers, coming round on a W. § S. course, he reported to the Irish塘 that he was being chased by four enemy light cruisers and was leading them towards him.
Commodore (T.) by this time on a westerly course with the Fearless and flotillas received the signal and turned 16 points to the support of his apparently hard-pressed friend. But at 1000 in a momentary lift of the haze Commodore (S.) saw the cruisers more clearly, challenged them by searchlight and was answered. He closed the Southampton and the misunderstanding was soon explained; but the explanation left both Commodores concerned for the mutual safety of the light cruisers and submarines. The Southampton at 0930 had already sighted one of our submarines, E 6, and had attempted to ram her, and Goodenough was sufficiently impressed by the mutual risks of the situation to signal at once to the Lion at 1015 proposing to withdraw. This he proceeded to do and the 1st L.C.S. accordingly withdrew some 15 miles to the westward and remained there till 1125 when Beatty sent them in again in answer to an urgent call for help from the flotillas then in action with the Strassburg.

24. Commodore (T)'s Flotillas.—Commodore (T) after his action with the Frauenlob had turned to W. 4 S. at 0825. The Fearless and 1st Flotilla were on his starboard bow steering a similar course, and the former after detaching the 1st/3rd and 1st/5th to deal with the V. 187 joined Commodore (T) at 0900. Meanwhile Beatty and the Euryalus were “marking time” near their prearranged rendezvous, watching the situation as well as they could and waiting the development of events.

Commodore (T) proceeded on his way west till 0945. When he received the Lurcher's signal “I am being chased by four light cruisers,” and, turning the 1st and 3rd Flotillas 16 points, steered eastward again to support, sending a W/T asking Goodenough to do the same. A few minutes later (0954) the 1st/3rd and 1st/5th divisions came in sight to the eastward rejoining the Fearless after the sudden interruption of their rescue work by the Stettin’s attack. At 0900 the Stettin herself had been sighted by the Fearless, who at once chased, but in moving off the latter almost collided with one of our destroyers and having to go astern lost ground and fired only a few shots at long range before the enemy disappeared in the mist.

The Fearless now closed the Arethusa, which had been fully occupied since 0830 in repairing the damages received from the Frauenlob. By 1000 she had all her guns except P3 and S3 4-inch ready for action again, but her speed had gradually dropped so that she could steam only 10 knots even at that speed was liable to break down. Her searchlights and wireless were still out of action, and from 1017 to 1039 she and the Fearless stopped engines and communicated by semaphore. The 3rd Flotilla was ordered to continue west at 10 knots in charge of the Senior Officer (Commander A. B. S. Dutton of the Lookout), and the Fearless also made a signal that any boats which were short of ammunition could continue to the westward, but none of them thought it necessary to do so.

As they lay close to one another, Commodore (T) asked the Fearless whether the Lurcher or Firedrake was with her, which she answered in the negative, and that nothing had been seen of them. Tyrwhitt then concluded that the Lurcher must have been reporting our own ships (signals 0745, 0945) and decided that no further movement should be made to the eastward till the situation with regard to the Lurcher was cleared up. The Flotilla was lying only some 20 miles west of Heligoland, after having been in touch with the enemy for over three hours; and with the prospect of attack by a strong force at any moment, it looked as if the time had come to retire. Accordingly at 1039 the Arethusa with the Fearless and 1st Flotilla got under way again and followed the 3rd Flotilla steering N. 75 W. 20 knots, the Fearless being warned to keep the Arethusa in sight, as the temporary repairs made in the engine-room might not permit of that speed being maintained.

CHAPTER VII.

PHASE III., FLOTILLAS IN ACTION WITH STRASSBURG AND COLN.
1046—1140.

25. Strassburg appears from S.E.—The Arethusa and Fearless had hardly got under way before a fresh action developed.
At 1016 a German light cruiser was sighted to the S.E. coming up on the port quarter on a N.N.W. course, and the Arethusa at once engaged her, altering to about south-west (mag.) to bring the enemy on the port beam. This was the Strasbourg, and she opened a heavy fire on the Arethusa. The Fearless on the Arethusa's disengaged side turned to close the enemy, hoisting the "disregard" to her flotillas; the 3rd Flotilla which had gone on to the westward under Commander A. B. S. Dutton, hearing the firing turned 10 points and made for the sound of guns. Comm. (T) ordered the Fearless and 1st Flotilla to attack with torpedoes, and three divisions of the 1st Flotilla (2nd, 3rd, and 5th) then turned to the south-west to follow Fearless. But the Strasbourg evidently did not intend to close. She circled to port and held on to the northward again, passing the Arethusa on an opposite course, and disappeared into the mist without having appreciably closed the range from the 6,000 to 7,000 yards at which she was first sighted. The Fearless and her flotilla moved at full speed towards the enemy, passing astern of Arethusa, but Commodore Tyrwhitt neither wished to make further ground to the eastward nor to have his Flotillas separated, so he recalled the Fearless at 1100, and the latter turned to rejoin the Arethusa.

26. 1105. A second German Light Cruiser.—As they did so, another German cruiser, the Köln, was sighted to the S.E. on their port quarter and they turned to engage her at 1105. Had these enemy cruisers been concentrated and fought as fiercely as the Frauenlob had done earlier in the day, our light forces might have suffered very severely; but on this occasion, and again later on, the Germans, appearing one by one out of the mist, fired a few salvoes and passed on, apparently unwilling to fight the British Flotillas single-handed. The Köln disengaged and about 1110 the Fearless once more turned to the westward and the Arethusa signalled to her "I am proceeding my utmost speed now, please keep me in sight."

27. Strasbourg reappears.—It was fortunate that Commodore Tyrwhitt had decided to keep his forces together, for soon afterwards at 1110, the Strasbourg reappeared to the northward on his starboard quarter and steering the same course to the westward opened a heavy fire on the Arethusa. "We were receiving," Commodore Tyrwhitt reports, "a very severe and almost accurate fire from this cruiser; salvo after salvo was falling between 10 and 30 yards short, but not a single shell struck; two torpedoes were also fired at us, being well directed, but short."

28. Battle Cruisers asked to support; 1100 and 1130.—When the Köln first appeared at 1105, Tyrwhitt, taking the newcomer for a ship of the Roon class, had sent an urgent signal to Beatty stating that he was attacked by a large cruiser, and a few minutes later again asked for support.

When the Strasbourg reappeared to the northward at 1110 and the Fearless and her flotilla were becoming heavily engaged, Captain Blunt, appreciating that the arrival of another cruiser might be of serious consequence, sent another signal to Beatty stating that assistance was "urgently required."

Fortunately, the Köln did not join the Strasbourg; but the two engagements resulted in the despatch of three signals to Beatty between 1100 and 1130, asking for support.

29. Third Flotilla Attack with Torpedoes.—Meanwhile, the action between the Strasbourg and Arethusa continued, both ships running to the westward.

The Arethusa altered a little to starboard and brought her 6-inch guns to bear on the enemy, whose salvoes were falling for the most part between her and the 1st and 2nd divisions of the Third Flotilla on her starboard beam. These two divisions, led by Lookout, the 1st division, and then opened out to starboard, and at 1135, when the Commodore hoisted a general signal to the destroyers to attack with torpedoes, the Lookout led the 1st division off at full speed on a northerly course to close the Strasbourg. The 2nd division followed the 1st a few minutes later, and the eight

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1 1016 in Arethusa's plan; 1055 in Commodore (T)'s despatch.
2 Strasbourg, completed 1912, speed 26.7 knots, 12-4.1-inch guns, 6 on broadside.
3 Signals from Commodore (T) to 3rd Flotilla; 1116 "Open fire." 1118 "Cease firing."
4 Lookout, Leonidas, Legion, Lennox.
5 Lark, Leven, Lenore, Lornet.
HELIGOLAND BIGHT
AUGUST 28th 1914.
PLAN 3.
"ARETHUSA" and "FEARLESS" v "STRASSBURG",
"FEARLESS" v "KÖLN".
1046-1105.
Compiled from signal logs and despatches of Ships engaged.
Evidence is not sufficiently detailed to plot exact movements of Ships.

2000 Yards  100  2  4  8  9  3  2  1  2 Sea Miles.

1/121
I/1st distant about 9 miles; rejoining "FEARLESS"

I/123
III Flotilla turn from Westward to form on "ARETHUSA"

1046 Getting under weigh from stopped.
"ARETHUSA" out of sight.

"FEARLESS"
boats, closing to a range of about 4,500 yards, swung slowly to port to bring their tubes to bear, fired their torpedoes, and then turned sharply to the southward to reform on the Arethusa. Astern of the 3rd division came the Fearless; she had been on Arethusa’s port quarter after engaging the Cola, and crossing over to her starboard beam she engaged the Strassburg heavily, “bringing a most effective fire to bear.” Following the Fearless were the 3rd/3rd and 3rd/4th divisions, which had crossed from the port beam of the Arethusa when the signal to attack with torpedoes was made, but being too late to reach a position of advantage, turned back to reform on the Arethusa, without delivering an attack.

About this time the 1st/1st division, which had been detached and was several miles ahead of the other ships, had come down on an easterly course to rejoin the Fearless and had sighted the Strassburg on the port bow. This division, led by the Acheron, closed the enemy, fired torpedoes from their port side as they passed, and then turning to starboard, closed the Strassburg without suffering appreciable damage. The delivery of these torpedoes in the extreme range, and at about 1140–1145 she broke off the engagement, and turning to the northward disappeared in the mist. Before turning she fired two torpedoes at Arethusa, but they came to the surface short, and in turning away she evaded the torpedoes of our own destroyers, which must have passed ahead of her. The engagement had lasted from 1125 to 1140. At about 1145, in accordance with a signal, all destroyers and Fearless turned again to close the Arethusa and take up cruising order. The flotillas had driven off the Strassburg.

CHAPTER VIII.

MOVEMENTS OF SUPPORTING FORCES.

31. During these various flotilla actions the supporting forces had been waiting and watching as far as they could the course of events. Vice-Admiral Beatty had learnt from Comm. (T)’s report at 0750 that our flotillas were in touch with enemy destroyers, and knew that the sweep had started, but up to 1125 was unable to judge of what was happening. The confusing reports of the Acheron first at 0745 (received 0810) reporting two enemy cruisers and then at 0941 reporting four cruisers chasing him had been intercepted, together with various other signals from Comm. (S) and Comm. 1st L.C.S., which indicated that

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1 Acheron, Attack. Reel, Acheron.
2 German Official History, I., 173 et seq.
3 Arethusa and Fearless.

The position of the Grand Fleet at noon was Lat. 58° 19’ N., Long. 0° 21’ E., proceeding to the southward.
HELIGOLAND BIGHT
AUGUST 28th 1914.

PLAN 4.

"ARETHUSA", "FEARLESS" and Flotillas v "STRASSBURG".
1116 - 1143.

Compiled from signal logs and despatches of Ships engaged.

2000 yards 0 1 2 3 4 5 Sea Miles.

I/1 turns to rejoin "FEARLESS".
Sights "STRASSBURG".

Delivering torpedo attack.

"STRASSBURG" turns away to avoid torpedo attack.

1135 Fires Torpedoes.

1142 1135 1146 1116

"ARETHUSA" open fire.

"FEARLESS"  "STRASSBURG"
enemy cruisers were to westward of the flotillas, and that the 1st L.C.S. were seeking for them; but nothing appeared in sight, and the Vice-Admiral waited at his rendezvous up to 0930 for the situation to become clearer, circling round by four point alterations of course to guard against submarine attack. It was difficult to appreciate correctly what was happening to the eastward, and at 0930 the Vice-Admiral, as he had no news of Comm. (T)'s position since 0815, assumed that the whole sweep was moving west, and proceeded West South at 20 knots with the 1st B.C.S. spread. But at 0941 he received the signal from Lurcher referred to above: "Am being chased by four light cruisers, am leading them in your direction," and on the strength of it at 1000 the Vice-Admiral reduced to 16 knots and "marked time" in a D.R. position about 54° 28' N., 6° 25' E.

32. View of Situation by Vice-Admiral at 1000.—Two conclusions appeared likely to Admiral Beatty. First, that the Lurcher had probably mistaken our light cruisers for the enemy, an assumption supported by an intercepted signal 0945 and confirmed by another at 0951, and, secondly, "that something was wrong," as no definite report from Commodore (T) had been received since he was first engaged at 0750. To avoid further confusion between the forces the Vice-Admiral signalled to S.O., 1st L.C.S., at 0955: "Do not get too far to the southward, keep well to the northward of destroyers." When Goodenough after meeting the Lurcher at 1000 suggested that the light cruisers should withdraw Beatty made no answer, evidently considering that his signal of 0955 would meet the occasion; but to make it quite clear that the 1st B.C.S. was waiting and ready to support, if required, the Vice-Admiral signalled to all ships and destroyers present his 10 a.m. position 54° 26' N., 6° 14' E., and added "remaining here."

These two brief signals 0955 and 1000 were the only signals made by the Vice-Admiral and were intended to meet the contingencies which he thought had arisen, first that the Lurcher was mistaking our own for enemy cruisers; secondly, that something had gone wrong with the flotillas.

33. The Battle Cruisers, 1130.—The Battle Cruiser Squadron waited for over an hour in the position it had taken up at 10 o'clock, steaming on various courses at 24 knots, and during this time, except for a submarine attack at 1100, which was avoided by speed and helm, nothing eventful occurred. A lull took place in the fighting at this time, and between 10 o'clock and 1040 all forces had a "breathing space." From 1017 to 1040 the Arethusa and Fearless had been stopped carrying out temporary repairs and communicating with each other as to the state and movements of the flotillas. The two divisions, 1st/3rd and 1st/5th, detached to deal with V. 187, had rejoined the Fearless, the Lurcher had recognised and joined the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron at 1000, and as the Fearless had sighted the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron at 0903 all our forces were comparatively clear as to the general situation and their positions relative to one another. At 1050 the Battle Cruisers had sighted the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron and completed the link of communication between all forces present.

This was most fortunate, for the most decisive and most critical phase of the action was about to begin.

At 1046 Commodore (T) had sighted and engaged the Strassburg, then at 1105 a second light cruiser had appeared which the Fearless had attacked, and at 1116 the Strassburg had reappeared and was firing heavily on the Arethusa. The Arethusa's W/T was out of action from 0825, and the Fearless and destroyers previous to Beatty's signal of 0900 were probably only vaguely aware of his position and movements. It will be remembered that Tyrwhitt had learnt of Beatty's presence only that morning at 4 a.m., and probably many destroyers knew nothing about it.

1 Arethusa's W/T was out of action from 0825, and the Fearless and destroyers previous to Beatty's signal of 0900 were probably only vaguely aware of his position and movements. It will be remembered that Tyrwhitt had learnt of Beatty's presence only this morning at 4 a.m., and probably many destroyers knew nothing about it.

2 Not mentioned in German accounts.

3 Nottingham and Lowestoft.

4 Beatty's despatch.
Admiral Beatty had already ordered the whole of the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron at 1120 and then the Invincible to go to Tyrwhitt's assistance.

At this moment another urgent appeal came in from Captain D (Fearless), implying that the position of the flotillas was critical, and Beatty decided to take his whole force into the Bight.

34. V.-A., B.C.'s Appreciation.—It was now 1130, and the situation as it appeared to Admiral Beatty can be best described in the words of his despatch.1

VICE-ADMIRAL'S DESPATCH.

"11.25 a.m.—Received signal from Commodore (T):—

"Am attacked by large cruiser, 54° O', N, 7° 13' E. No course received."

"11.28 a.m.—Received signal from Commodore (T):—

"Respectfully request that I may be supported. Am hard pressed."

"11.30 a.m.—Received from Captain D, 1st Flotilla:—

"Assistance urgently required, 54° 9', N, 6° 5' E."

"At 11.30 the B.C.S., in 54° 9' N., 6° 5' E., turned to E.S.E. and worked up to full speed."

"These signals, received 11.25, 11.28, and 11.30, were practically the first news we had got since 7.55 a.m. as to the movements of the flotillas, or the result of an action which had apparently been in progress for 3 hours. The situation appeared to me to be extremely critical, the flotillas had advanced on their sweep only 10 miles since 8 a.m., and thus were only 26 miles from an enemy base in their rear, with another base 25 miles on their flank to the westward of them, Arethusa was already reduced to 10 knots, and there was the possibility of a grave disaster.

"At 11.30, therefore decided that the only course possible was to take the B.C.S. at full speed to the eastward. To be of any value the support must be overwhelming and carried out at the highest speed possible, and as there were indications of the presence of 3 or 4 enemy ships, one of which was reported a large cruiser, I did not deem the L.C.S., two of whose ships were detached, to be strong enough to deal with the situation sufficiently rapidly.

"I had not lost sight of the danger to my Squadron from the following:—

"(1) Enemy submarines; (2) our own submarines; (3) the possible sortie of a large enemy force from their bases, especially in view of the state of the weather, which to the south-east was misty.

"(1) I discounted by the fact that our high speed made their attack difficult, and the smooth state of the sea made their detection easy when keeping a good look-out.

"(2) I discounted, partly for the same reason and partly because I had now been able to communicate with Comm. (S), who was now in sight, and informed me at 11.55 a.m. that our submarines were 20 miles ahead, i.e., to the Eastward. This gave room to manoeuvre, and his presence with me was some measure of protection.

"(3) I discounted because our force was so powerful that we could only have been stopped by a Battle Squadron, which was unlikely to be out in time if we were sufficiently rapid in our support.

Judging then that the occasion justified the risks to be taken, at 1135 Admiral Beatty turned his squadron to the south-east and increased to 26 knots. At 1124 he formed the battle cruisers in single line ahead with the Lion leading, worked up to full speed (27 knots), and proceeded E.S.E. to throw the weight of his whole force into the balance of the day.

CHAPTER IX.

PHASE IV.—ENGAGEMENT WITH MAINZ AND ARRIVAL OF 1st LIGHT CRUISER SQUADRON.

35. 1st 2nd, 3rd, and 5th Divisions sight Mainz 1130.—The 2nd, 3rd, and 5th Divisions of the 1st Flotilla had taken little part in the second engagement with the Strassburg,6 for they had continued to the westward at 1105, when the Arethusa recalled the Fearless and the flotillas after the Strassburg's disappearance

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1 This was written on 30th August after the action, when Admiral Beatty had considerably more information than on 28th August, but it embodies his appreciation of the situation at 1130.
2 Not in signal logs, Lion or Arethusa.
3 Heligoland and/or Wilhelmshaven.
4 Emden.
5 Viz.: Nottingham and Lowestoft detached at 0805 by Commodore L.C.S. on receipt, at 0800, of signal from Comm. (T) that he was engaged with enemy destroyers.
6 Most of the destroyers report firing a few rounds at Strassburg at long range.
to the northward in the mist. At 1130 these 11 boats were 4 or 5 miles ahead of Arethusa when they sighted, almost ahead of them, a three-funnel German light cruiser making to the northward. This was the Mainz, which had left the Ems at about 3:00 that morning when reports were coming in of the presence of our ships in the Bight. As our 1st Flotilla sighted her they altered course to the northward, formed into single line ahead, with the Ariel leading the 3rd division, followed by the 3rd and 5th divisions, and all 11 boats opened fire. The Mainz returned the fire and quickly found the range, placing salvoes all round the destroyers, whereas our boats, owing to the long range and difficulty of spotting in low visibility, were unable to develop an effective fire. The Ariel led the three divisions round to starboard, first to the north and then to the northeast, the destroyers still firing ineffectively and still receiving an accurate return fire from the Mainz.

Between 1135 and 1150 the Ferret, Defender, and Phoenix fired torpedoes at the enemy, but, as might be expected against a single ship target, without success; in fact, despite the great numerical odds in their favour, viz., 11 ships to one, the destroyers found the limitations of their armament too great to enable them to stand up against a light cruiser, and they steered to open the range and escape her fire.

From 1140-1150 the Mainz was practically chasing the 1st Flotilla to the northward, and the latter were edging away to starboard to open the range. The danger to our destroyers lay in the chance of a lucky salvo hitting her boiler or engine rooms, but fortunately, despite the number of shells that fell all around them, no damage was done. Meanwhile, the Mainz was being led away clear of the westward line of retreat of the main flotillas, which had an important bearing on the situation, for if she had joined with the other German cruisers, viz., Strassburg, Stralsund, Stettin, Ariadne, Dresden (from the Jade), and Strassburg (which fired on the 1st Division at 1150), and had these all concentrated on the already hard-pressed destroyers, there can be little doubt that matters would have gone very hard for them and the crippled Arethusa.

36. The Light Cruiser Squadron Arrives, 1130.—The Mainz continued to drive our 1st Flotilla to the northward, when at 1150 the situation underwent a dramatic change.

From out of the mist on the port bow of the 1st Flotilla there appeared four cruisers, steaming S.S.E. in quarter line at high speed. This was Goodenough coming down from the north-west in pursuance of Beatty's signal, Support Commodore (T). For a moment the flotilla was uncertain whether they were friend or foe; then the British forces recognised each other and with a feeling of relief the two leading destroyer divisions turned to port and joined the cruisers.

TheMainz must have sighted the light cruisers (or perhaps heard their W/T) two or three minutes before they were seen by the destroyers, for at 1150 she had turned sharp about and steered to the southward. The 1st L.C.S. sighted her almost ahead and opened fire with their bow guns at about 10,000 yards. For a few minutes they engaged the Mainz and were hitting her. She replied with her starboard and after guns. She then apparently increased about and steered to the southward.

Acheron's, 4,300 tons, completed 1901, speed 17 knots, 6-inch guns, five broadside, and two 18-inch torpedoes. 

1 The German account states that the Mainz had already been damaged by the fire of the
others' fire, whilst the 3rd/4th division on the port wing swung to port and steering to the southward closed the "Mains.

The firing became general at a range of between 4,000 and 5,000 yards, and our ships at once commenced to hit the "Mains.

The "Mains" concentrated on the 3rd/4th division, who were about 5,000 yards away, steaming only 15 knots. The leading boat "Laurel" was hit with her first salvo, and the fourth salvo detonated the lyddite shell in the ready racks at No. 2 gun and put the gun and all its crew out of action, blow away half the after funnel, wounding the captain seriously, and doing other considerable damage. Smoke and steam poured out from the after funnel and engine room, and saved the ship by so completely enveloping her in smoke that the enemy lost the range and she was able to crawl slowly away.

The Liberty, the "Laurel"'s next astern, ran into the zone of fire and was hit in a number of places, chiefly forward. The mast was shot down, the bridge almost blown away, and the captain was killed.

These two ships were hit just as they were turning away after firing two torpedoes each at the "Mains", but the third in the line, the "Lancer", had been compelled to haul out to port when the Liberty had stopped in order to avoid a collision, and in doing so just escaped a salvo from the enemy. "Laurel", the rear ship of the division, fired a torpedo, but as she turned away after firing she ran into the same barrage and was hit. The range now was only 4,000 yards, but the German guns were so well calibrated that from this salvo the "Lancer" received four separate hits, a ricochet at the bow, one in No. 2 boiler room, a third at the base of the centre funnel, and a fourth aft in the captain's cabin. No water was left in the boiler, the "Lancer" was stopped dead and was cut off from the rest of her shattered division.

38. Mainz Torpedoed and Sunk.—But in spite of these losses, the destroyers had done effective work. Of the torpedoes they had fired one (at least) hit the "Mains", and this added to the effect of the gun fire of the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, the "Arethusa", the three other destroyer divisions and the "Fearless", which had come down from the starboard side of the "Arethusa" across the latter's bow to reinforce "Laurel"'s division, left the "Mains", despite her spirited defence in a crippled condition.

At 12.15 she turned away to the westward pursued by the flotillas and steaming at much reduced speed; then the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron came up to her again; she had fought gallantly, but was now doomed.

The light cruisers opened an overwhelming fire upon her, no more than 5,000 yards away, and soon reduced her to a wreck. No ship could stand the punishment she received; lyddite shell set her on fire, she was down by the bows, her mainmast and two after funnels were blown away, and her upper works were wrecked. An "indescribable" slaughter filled her decks, where dead and wounded men had been hit time and again by the stream of shells that came on board.

At 12.25 Goodenough ordered "Cease fire" and the Liverpool, "Firedrake", and "Lancer" closed to rescue survivors. Our men boarded her and saved as many as they could; there were still 87 officers and men, the "Lancer" took off 87 officers and men, the "Arethusa" 224, and "Firedrake" 33, but there were still a few living on board her, when at 8 minutes past one she settled more deeply by the bows, hung for a moment with her screws above water, then sank head first.

39. The German Account.—The "Mainz" in the Elbe had raised steam for full speed on receipt of W/T reports of the engagement of the patrols with enemy light forces, and was underweigh shortly after 0900. In the river were also 6 boats of the 2nd torpedo flotilla (the other 4 with the flotilla leader were at Rends, steaming), but they were ordered to remain to protect the Elbe.

The "Mainz" steered a northerly course with the intention of meeting the enemy on their withdrawal westward and soon after ran into thick weather. The Borkum aeroplane was sent to scout ahead, but returned after a short flight without sighting the enemy, and it was on the W/T report of the "Strassburg" that "Mainz" realized she might expect to meet the enemy at about 11.30.
HELIGOLAND BIGHT
AUGUST 28th 1914.

PLAN 6.
"ARETHUSA" and III Flotilla v "MAINZ"
1205 - 1235.

Compiled from signal logs and despatches of Ships engaged.
"FEARLESS" track approximate owing to lack of exact evidence.

"MAINZ" slowly sinking.
rudder damaged

"LAUREL", "LIBERTY" and "LAERTES" damaged.

"ARETHUSA" crosses "MAINZ"'s track about 1210 then turns and engages "STRASSBURG" and "KÖLN" (1230).

"FEARLESS" about 1210 steering to rejoin "FEARLESS" (about 1230).

Avoiding torpedo.

"MAINZ" turns about 1230.

B.C.S. S.80.E.

L.C.S.

1200

1228

1231

1230

1208

1205

1230

"MAINZ" enganges "MAINZ".

1/2nd and 3rd about 1210.

1/3rd about 1210.

Torpedo attack on "MAINZ".

NAVAL STAFF (1920).
At 11.30 the *Arethusa* and 8 destroyers appeared to the N.E. 7,000 yards distant, on a westerly course. *Mainz* altered course to the S.W. to bring her guns to bear, and the enemy turned away to the north after the first salvo; the visibility was poor, and *Arethusa* altered course slightly to starboard to keep the enemy in range, and continued the engagement, remaining unhit, though hits were observed on two of the enemy destroyers. At 11.45 smoke was suddenly discovered to the north-west, and a few minutes later three *Town* class cruisers were discerned. The *Mainz* immediately turnedhard-a-starboard, but in spite of this began to be hit. She shifted her fire to the new arrivals, the flotillas being by now out of sight in the mist.

By 11.55 the enemy could only be discerned by the flashes of his guns, and shortly afterwards fire ceased. The *Mainz* steered a north-westerly course for the Eastern Flotilla, but now, another cruiser (the *Fearless*) appeared on the port beam, with six destroyers in close formation, slightly ahead of her. An engagement developed, many torpedoes being fired at the *Mainz*, when about 1200 the rubber suddenly jammed 10° to starboard. No damage to the steering gear could be discovered, and it was concluded that a shell bursting under water had bent the rudder.

The port engine was stopped, but the *Mainz* continued to turn slowly to starboard. By now, three guns with their crews were totally out of action, and the three *Town* cruisers and the *Arethusa* and her eight destroyers were able once more to come up, until *Mainz* was in action with no less than 5 cruisers and 29 destroyers. On the other side, the concentration of her fire at close range and scored a number of hits. But she had suffered terribly; by 12.20 almost all the guns and their crews were out of action, the upper deck was a shambles, the ammunition supply had stopped, and many of the compartments had been reduced to half-speed with one engine.

The ship was then struck by a torpedo, port side amidships, apparently in the 4th boiler room, and most of the communications to the conning tower were destroyed. The captain ordered the vessel to be sunk and the crew to save themselves by swimming.

As a consequence of the torpedo hit the guns ceased fire, but fire was opened again with two guns through the exhausters of the 1st Lieutenant (Lieut.-Commander Fladeau) who had not heard the Captain’s order; three torpedoes, too, were fired, but without success, as the ship could not be steered and the enemy were now almost astern and out of torpedo range.

The enemy, who had ceased fire at the same time as the *Mainz*, reopened with a 12-inch (sic) shell, according to one report, penetrated to the main deck without bursting, and huge bursts were raising great splashes around the ship.

At 12.35 the order to sink and abandon the ship was repeated. Two minutes later the enemy ceased firing, the seachocks were opened in the port engine and torpedo rooms, and the men came up from below.

The state of the *Mainz* at this time was indescribable; she had been hit 200 to 300 times. The WTC Office was destroyed, two funnels were down, and huge holes had been made in the ship. The index of the upper deck were glazed over with green and yellow stuff from bursting shells, which emitted suffocating gas. At the last, one gun only was firing, secured by the single survivor of its crew. When the final round was expended, the enemy also ceased fire.

Down below, the ship was equally helpless.

At about 12.15 she was struck by a torpedo. The lights gradually went out until electric torches were the only means of illumination. The engines stopped, and the ship was found to be sinking slowly by the head. Attempts to locate the leak proved in vain, as no replies could be got from various departments. Communication was broken with the conning tower; water poured out of the speaking tubes, showing that it had risen above the armoured deck, and that the ship was doomed.

Directly the order the enemy made every effort to save the survivors. The *Lurcher* saved herself along the side of the ship, (for up to 1200 the *Mainz* took no list, the port bunkers being full of coal) and all the wounded were transferred to her.

At 1310, shortly after she had taken a list to port, the *Mainz* sunk, with colours flying.

In the Western Zone the 3rd Flotilla, which could clearly hear the sound of the action, was held in readiness just outside the straits. At 12.30, E. 160 (Lieut.-Commander Larchean) sighted a periscope and at 1317 a torpedo was fired at him, missing him ahead only by 10 metres.

At 1350, E. 165 (Lieut.-Commander Bodine) sighted smoke in the north-north-west, steamed towards it, and at 1400 made out an enemy cruiser with two destroyers in 6/14, 35 miles from Borkum. He reported the fact by W/T, but lacking the support of cruisers, and orders from the command, no action could be taken.

#### CHAPTER X

### THE BATTLE CRUISER SQUADRON COMES IN.

**Situation at 1225.**—It was now 1225. Commodore (T), seeing the *Mainz* in flames and sinking, recalled the *Fearless* and the destroyers, and was about to resume his retirement to the westward.

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1. Actually, the 12th, 3rd and 5th divisions, via 11 destroyers, detached from the flotillas.
2. There is no mention in British sources of the battle cruisers firing on the *Mainz*. They did not do so. The German Official History discounts the fire of the *Arethusa*, and states that it was from the light cruisers she received the first hit, and she fell a victim only to their superiority. G.O.H., 199.
3. At 1305 according to D.T.'s dispatch.
The flotillas were scattered. Between him and the Mainz was the 3rd/3rd Division; to the southward were the Laurel and Liberty badly damaged, standing by each other. Near them was the Arethusa lying helpless and unable to move from the spot where she had met the full blast of the Mainz's fire. To the north of the Arethusa were the 3rd/1st and 3rd/2nd Divisions. The Fearless with the 1st/5th Division had been to the northward where she had engaged the Mainz for some 5 to 10 minutes, then coming down to cover the 3rd/4th Division had crossed the Arethusa's track, astern of her, about 1210 when the Light Cruiser Squadron appeared, and was now standing by the Laurel, which the Lapwing was trying to take in tow. But the Germans had not yet drawn off. About 1235 as the Arethusa was reforming her flotilla, a German cruiser now known to be the Strassburg, appeared to the north-east; shortly afterwards the Coin was seen in the same direction, and steering down towards the Fearless, opened a heavy but ineffective fire. The Arethusa was still a vulnerable target, and to cover her the Fearless, with the Gokhant, Lizard, and Phoenix of 1st/4th Division, formed in single line, and boldly engaged the two cruisers, leaving the Lapwing to stand by the Laurel. The German light cruisers appeared to be concentrating to the northward, and the situation again took on a critical aspect, when suddenly out of the mist there emerged, vast and terrific, the form of a great cruiser steaming at full speed. It was the Lion with the Battle Cruiser Squadron behind her, and their arrival transformed the whole situation, and decided the issue of the day.

They passed to northward of the Mainz, sighted the Arethusa and challenged her; then swept on to the north-east, Grosvenor with the Southampton, Birmingham, and Falmouth joining in their wake, leaving the Liverpool to look after the Mainz. A minute later the Lion sighted a cruiser on the port bow firing at the Fearless. This was the Coin, and at 1237 the battle cruiser opened fire on her at 7,800 yards. The Coin, when she saw this unexpected and tremendous enemy, turned to port, and fled desperately to the north-east, the Lion behind her in relentless chase. The Fearless seeing that the day was won turned to the south to rejoin the Laurel, and the situation again took on a critical aspect, when suddenly out of the mist there emerged, vast and terrific, the form of a great cruiser steaming at full speed. It was the Lion with the Battle Cruiser Squadron behind her, and their arrival transformed the whole situation, and decided the issue of the day.

41. The Sinking of the Coin and Ariadne.—The chase at full speed, which started at 1245, soon strung out the Battle Cruiser Squadron, and the Invincible and New Zealand with 2 knots less speed soon dropped behind. The Coin going at full speed kept on the fringe of the haze, and was never a clear target. It took several salvos to find the range, but eventually she was hit by one or two heavy shells, lost her speed, dropped astern, and ceased firing. Then she gained a brief respite, for another cruiser appeared in sight and drew the Lion's fire. This was the Ariadne, coming at full speed on a south-easterly course from port to starboard across the Lion's bows, making a desperate effort to escape towards Wilhelmshaven. It was too late; her end came quickly; she was hit in the first two salvos and disappeared in the mist burning furiously with a heavy list, and evidently sinking. Beatty did not follow. He had done what was necessary, and did not wish the light forces to get entangled in an action in the fog. But there was still the Coin to settle with. She had last been seen disappearing on a north-east course on the Lion's port bow, just after fire had been opened on the Ariadne at 1306; the Invincible, which had fallen behind, had altered to port to the northward to prevent her doubling back to the west.

At 1310 the Lion altered course to the northward, and circling round to port, sighted the Coin again at 1325, steaming slowly to the south-east. Fire was opened on her once more and the target was immediately found. She was hit by two 15·5-in. salvos from the Lion, and sank with her colours flying at 1335. She had made a brave fight, and had fired some 200 rounds at the Lion, scoring five hits, but doing no
HELIGOLAND BIGHT
AUGUST 26th 1914.
PLAN 7.
Sinking of "KÖLN" and "ARIADNE"
1238–1310.
Compiled from signal and deck logs, and dispatches of Ships engaged. Track of B.C.S. shows times at which "LION" altered course.

B.C.S.
Course S.10.5.
Full speed.

Sighted "KÖLN" 1231.
B.C.S. تمام 6000' apart, ship opened fire.

1237.
"KÖLN" alters course to W.

1243.
"FEARLESS" in action with "KÖLN" & "STRASBURG".

"LYSANDER" & 1/5th
assisting "LAERTES".

"MAINZ" sinking.

"STRALSUNO" sighted.

"ARIADNE" disappears on fire
and sinking.

"KÖLN" sinks.

L.C.S.
1320.
L.C.S. 10' running 12.5.

1326.
"MAINZ" sinking.

1420.
"LYSANDER" & 1/5th
assisting "LAERTES".

About 1400.

"INVINCIBLE" steers to head off "KÖLN" from westward (S.D.S.)

1220.
"KÖLN" alters course to N.E.

"FEARLESS" in action with "KÖLN" & "STRASBURG".

1236.

1336.
"ARIADNE" 1226.

1305.
"ARIADNE" disappears on fire
and sinking, 1225.

1250.

1350.

1400.

1430.

1450.

1500.

1515.

1530.

1545.

1600.

1615.

1630.

1645.

1700.

1715.

1730.

1745.

1800.

1815.

1830.

1845.

1900.

1915.

1930.

1945.

2000.

2015.

2030.

2045.

2100.

2115.

2130.

2145.

2200.

2215.

2230.

2245.

2300.

2315.

2330.

2345.

2400.

2415.

2430.

2445.

2500.

2515.

2530.

2545.

2600.

2615.

2630.

2645.

2700.

2715.

2730.

2745.

2800.

2815.

2830.

2845.

2900.

2915.

2930.

2945.

3000.

3015.

3030.

3045.

3100.

3115.

3130.
damage beyond breaking a few electric circuits. Four destroyers passed over the area without seeing any trace of survivors, and only one man was saved. Of the other German ships, the Strassburg and Stralsund had disappeared, though at 1310 during a lift in the mist, the Light Cruiser Squadron had sighted a four-funnel German cruiser away to the southward near the German coast. The squadron was then steaming to the eastward in wake of the Inevitable, about 4 miles astern of the Lion. A few shots were interchanged with her, but the battle cruisers did not open fire, and after a few minutes she disappeared in the mist, and was not seen again.

42. Retire at 1310.—The general situation of the forces was not without danger, for though the cruiser squadrons had sunk the Mainz and Cecil, damaged the Ariadne irretrievably, and by their opportune arrival extricated the flotillas from an unfavourable situation, the day was not over. The Battle Cruiser Squadron was only 25 miles from Heligoland, and the Arethusa and three or four destroyers were crippled and would have to be escorted home. Our forces had been engaged with the enemy for over six hours, and strong German reinforcements might arrive at any moment. The risk from mines and submarines was also an appreciable one, and in view of these considerations, Admiral Beatty decided that it was time to withdraw, and at 1310 made the general signal to retire. Fifty minutes later the German battle cruisers were crossing the bar of the Outer Jade.

CHAPTER XI.

THE GERMAN ACCOUNT.

43. The German view of the situation can best be studied in the wireless signals which passed during the day. Three distinct phases can be discerned in them, for it was only gradually that the nature and magnitude of the attack began to be appreciated. The steps taken early in the morning up to 0630 were directed merely against the submarine which had fired at G. 194. Then came reports of the appearance of light cruisers and destroyers and finally the receipt of the Mainz's signal at 1200 made it clear that battle cruisers had penetrated into the Bight. It may be as well to summarise once more the cruiser and battleship forces in the Bight.

These were:

- Stettin, Heligoland (patrol at anchor).
- Frauenlob, off the Jade (patrol at anchor).
- Ariadne, off the Jade.
- Helgoland, off Heligoland.
- Kolberg, Wilhelmshaven Roads.
- Mainz, of the Ems.
- The battle cruisers Moltke, Von der Tann, Bliicher and Seydlitz, were in Wilhelmshaven Roads. The last-named was having her port condenser retubed.

The squadrons were disposed as follows:—

Friedrich der Grosse Fleet Flagship in dock, Wilhelmshaven.


1 The German Official History states that one man was picked up on 30th August by one of their torpedo boats (flotilla and boat not specified).
2 Of German account which states that at 1350 Strassburg passed the First Battle Cruiser Squadron at 7,500 yards.

III. Squadron—Four ships, Kaiser class, in Wilhelmshaven Roads.

IV., V., VI. Squadrons in the Baltic at Kiel, also the Town class.

The Light Cruisers.—As the light cruisers proceeded and worked independently, it is desirable to give a brief review of the movements of each.

The engagements between the Stettin and Fearless, and between the Frauenlob and Arethusa have already been described. The Frauenlob, after breaking off action with the Arethusa, picked up T. 3 and towed her to Heligoland, then proceeded to Wilhelmshaven where she arrived at 1030.

44. The Stettin, after engaging the Fearless, returned to Sellebrunn, buoy (N.W. of Heligoland) to get steam up in all boilers, which prevented her coming to the return of the 3rd Minesweeping Division as she had done that of the 5th T.B. Flotilla. At 1030 she received a wireless signal that hostile cruisers were chasing the 1st T.B. Flotilla in 133e (54° 9' N., 7° 25' E.), and proceeded thither at her full speed of 32 knots, sighting, at 0906, the eight destroyers which had just sunk Y. 652, gathered in a bunch; turning to port she opened fire at 0916 at about 7,000 metres; at the fourth salvo the destroyers scattered, and at 0919 the Stettin turned to the N.E. to avoid a torpedo attack. The destroyers, however, left their mark on her. She received a shot through the W/T rigging, which put it out of action till 1100, one in the after funnel and one by the third gun starboard. Her casualties in this short fight were two killed and nine wounded.

She remained in the vicinity of Heligoland repairing her wireless and giving orders to the submarines, for she had the Chief of the 2nd U-Boat Flotilla on board. At 1100, her wireless was ready again, and as the signals coming in showed the other cruisers to be steering more or less for the same spot, she shaped course to the westward at full speed. She arrived in time to see the end of the Ariadne, which she sighted at 1240 and took at first for a British cruiser. At 1245 she heard firing, which at 1253 she recognised as coming from heavy guns. A few minutes later the guns had ceased and she sent a无线 signal to the Stettin turned 10 points to starboard. As she turned she recognised the Lion, which, she stated, opened fire on her without result at 1305. At 1320 the Danzig was sighted to the southward on the starboard beam on a westerly course, but turned east on being informed that the Stettin was being chased by a battle cruiser. Ariadne was now seen in flames, but the British had ceased to engage, and as the Danzig had gone to her assistance, the Stettin returned to Heligoland to get in touch with the submarine flotillas.

45. The movements of the Strassburg.—The Colin, Strassburg, and Stralsund had all been at Wilhelmshaven, and the Colin which had gone there to coal stayed at 1030 that she was proceeding in support.

The Strassburg passed the Outer Jade at 0034, proceeded on a W.N.W. course, avoiding the squares reported as possibly mined, and at 1055 met the Fearless and Arethusa accompanied by 10 to 12 destroyers; these attacked her immediately, forcing her to turn to port. Fire was opened on the foremost cruiser, and after the third salvo three thick brown pillars of smoke were seen rising from her stern; and turning to the northward she ran behind her destroyers. This brief action took place at 8,400 to 6,800 metres, and the British were now disappearing in the mist. The Stettin turned to follow the destroyers and 10 minutes later sighted them again on the port bow at 8,000 yards. The same manœuvre was repeated. The destroyers attacked; the Strassburg turned to starboard and opened fire at a range of 7,800–5,400 metres; one torpedo ran parallel to port, a second passed by the stern and the destroyers then disappeared in the mist. The captain then decided to attempt to drive them to the westward on to the Menz, but his intention was frustrated by the sudden appearance of enemy forces to starboard! At 1127, and a new onset drew the ship further and further to the north.

After a final attack at 1204 by the flotilla to the northward heavy gunfire was heard to the south or south-west and she steered in that direction, running into another bunch of destroyers and by 1240 was in action with five groups Heavy firing was heard to the south-east and she steered for the sound of the guns. Twice she asked the Mains for her position, but no answer was returned. Suddenly at 1300 a battle cruiser appeared ahead to the south-east steering north-east, but the Strassburg turning to the north escaped without fire being opened on her. At 1315 two Town class cruisers were sighted at 8,000 metres on the port quarter, but an alteration of one point to starboard took her clear of them. She now commenced a big circle to the north-east to join the other German cruisers to the south, when at 1330 there appeared suddenly in 104e (54° 16' N., 6° 45' E.) to the south-east, four battle cruisers in single line on a south-westly course, 8,000 metres off. Freigatten Kapitan Retzmann every moment expected them to open fire and meanwhile kept a steady course to make them believe he was a friend and sent a wireless signal, "1st B.C.S. 117e course S.W."

The stratagem succeeded. The British made a searchlight signal (apparently a challenge, U.A.R.) which he did not answer, and they passed out of sight about 1345. Almost at the same moment came the wireless from the C-in-C, "Recall all light cruisers." (R. 161) and the Strassburg making a wide circle came down on a southerly course and met the German heavy cruisers on their way out at 1515.

1 G.O.H., 159.
3 Strassburg, 1190 in 1259; it is actually the only signal about that time.
4 R. 14.
5 Freigatten-Kapitan Retzmann.

According to the chart of her movements (G.O.H., Karte 27) these constituted one English cruiser with destroyers; they appear to the northward again in 1149 (English destroyers) and at 1204 (two English cruisers with destroyers) and cannot be identified with any forces in the British accounts.

1 This engagement rests on Strassburg's author-ity only and must not be confused with an engagement of the Arethusa and Fearless.
2 The Strassburg was evidently on the northern edge of the mine's final phase and this is her account of it. G.O.H., 191.
3 G.O.H., Chart 27.
4 G. 191 had reported a large enemy cruiser at 0705 (B. 19), and the Mains at 1200 (B. 120).
5 G.O.H., the Strassburg gave her position by wireless regularly during the forecast. These were: 1935; 1020, 1355 north-west, 24 knots; 1055, 1235 in action Arethusa and Frauenlob; 1106, 1225, in action two enemy cruisers; 1125, 1216; 1145, 1175, course west; 1150, 1175 course east; 1215, 1446, co. south-south-west; 1335, 1056, co. west; 1300, 1056 co. north-south-west 24 knots; 1320, 1046, co. east.
46. The movements of the Cöl.-The Cöl. followed the Strassburg out of the Jade at full speed about 1000, and they must have drawn together when the Strassburg came into action with the Ariadne at 1055.

The Cöl. was then some 7 miles astern of her with the Mainz apparently some 20 miles to the westward in the same latitude. Till 1150 the Cöl. followed the Strassburg gaining a mile or two on her as the latter brought up to the action, and then turned back as the gunfire died away. Off "9 and received an order from the suspected areas separate engagements had developed, two of which proved fatal to the position for attack. Snortly afterwards gun-fire was heard on the port bow, and just 11 seemed to be taking the same course. At about 1200 an enemy submarine was sighted, and shortly afterwards made out three British cruisers of the Strassburg's engagement with the destroyers, only some 9 miles off on the port beam. It is almost self-evident that a S.O. (T) to the Strassburg might have altered course in order to encircle the British destroyers, for at 1230 she sent a wireless to say she was in action with them on a northerly course. This was the last heard of her 3.

47. The Stralsund.—The Stralsund left Wilhelmshaven look about 1000, and on passing the Sylt entered a signal "Proceed at once to assist Cöl." Later about 1030 came a report from the Cöl. that 132 and 135 were believed to be mined an error arising from incorrect transmission of the squares in the Cöl.'s earlier signal. No reply was received to several signals made to the Cöl.; nor was touch made with the Stettin on the starboard side, and the Stralsund, shaping course to the westward, was in 28° 54' N., 15° 1' E. when at 1206, two points on the starboard bow, she sighted gun flashes, and shortly afterwards made out three British cruisers of the Town class on a north-easterly course in action with some opponent on their further side. The Stralsund turned at once to east-north-east, parallel to them, and opened fire at 7,200 metres on the foremost ship; the fire was returned, and one of the first salvos damaged the wireless aerial; another passed through the ship's side, without bursting, and further hits were only avoided by rapid alternations of course. Apparently at this time the action with the unseen ship ceased, for the fire of the three cruisers was now concentrated on the Stralsund, which was forced to turn away, without being followed by the foe. At about the same moment, in a circle of only 3 miles, 1000, at a position 15 miles S.W. of the English firing in salvos at fairly long intervals. The effect of the shells was mainly incendiary. Forward and aft the living spaces were in flames, which could not be quenched on account of the violence of the fire and the destruction of fire equipment above the armoured deck. At 1320 the enemy turned suddenly west, no doubt because the Ariadne, enveloped in smoke, could no longer be seen in the mist. Up to this moment the Ariadne had continued to fire, the gunlayers firing independently towards the end, as all means of communication were destroyed. All attempts to extinguish the fires failed; the wounded were removed; the magazines were flooded, the foremost being already filled with water; access to the after magazine was impossible. The ready racks began to explode. The engines, boiler, and rudder were still intact, but smoke and heat made the ship more and more unbearable. It was decided to abandon the ship, and the two cutters, which had not suffered much, were lowered. Just before 1400 the Danzig closed and sent boats. The wounded were lowered into them; the rest of the crew swam overboard, swimming, some to the Danzig, some to the Stralsund. The non-swimmers were taken into the boats. The captain had gone over to the Stralsund to arrange for his being taken in tow when the ship suddenly listed heavily and capsized at 1520, with her flag flying. The keel remained above water for a little while 4.

48. The Ariadne.—On August 28th the Ariadne was senior officer's ship of the Jade and Weser Harbour flotillas. She had gone out on the cruiser support at 0810, but had turned back as the gunfire died away. Off the "9 she had continued to fire, the gunlayers firing independently towards the end, as all means of communication were destroyed. All attempts to extinguish the fires failed; the wounded were removed; the magazines were flooded, the foremost being already filled with water; access to the after magazine was impossible. The ready racks began to explode. The engines, boiler, and rudder were still intact, but smoke and heat made the ship more and more unbearable. It was decided to abandon the ship, and the two cutters, which had not suffered much, were lowered. Just before 1400 the Danzig closed and sent boats. The wounded were lowered into them; the rest of the crew swam overboard, swimming, some to the Danzig, some to the Stralsund. The non-swimmers were taken into the boats. The captain had gone over to the Stralsund to arrange for his being taken in tow when the ship suddenly listed heavily and capsized at 1520, with her flag flying. The keel remained above water for a little while 5.

49. The other Light Cruisers, Hela, Kolberg, Danzig.—It will be seen that between 0930 and noon the light cruisers all left harbour independently as soon as they were ready to proceed. The movements of all have been described except the Danzig, Kolberg, and Hela.

The Hela (Fregatten-Kapitan Paul Wolfram), already on patrol in the morning, on receiving the first report of the enemy in her position, north-east of Helfgoland, had steamed west at full speed, but her slow speed of 22 knots made her unable to overtake the British. The Kolberg at 1200 joined the Stralsund, and at 1230 joined in the engagement with the destroyers, and the Danzig later joined in the battle. The latter came in sight about 1320 and the Kolberg turned east, as further progress to the west seemed impracticable on account of the large cruisers reported by the Strassburg and Stettin. The burning Ariadne then came in sight and the captain of the Kolberg decided to push to the north-west in order to cover her against further attack, a measure all the more necessary as signals made the British armoured cruisers only 14 miles away. The S.O. (Scouts) was informed of this movement, and at 1445 the Strassburg appeared from the north with news that the four enemy cruisers had last been seen in 117°; soon afterwards the German battle cruisers Möller, Von der Tann, and Sylt entered the action.

The Danzig's Movements.—The Kolberg and Danzig had received orders at 1121 to proceed and join the Strassburg. The Danzig proceeded west in fulfilment of this order and found herself at 1309 close to the scene of the Ariadne's action. The sound of heavy gunfire was heard and she turned to N.W. by W. to endeavour to join her own forces. On this course she met the Stettin with the following to the north-east; behind her the Ariadne came in sight and the Danzig turned on a parallel course to
the Sestim, and received from her an account of the situation. At 1320 a wireless came in from the Solaun stating she was in action with three enemy cruisers, and the Dandeig turned again to S.S.W. to join her. But shortly afterwards the Ariadne made a signal, “Assistance urgently required.” She was on fire fore and aft, and out of control, and the Dandeig turned towards her and set about saving her crew.

The München had been sent towards Amrum to guard against an enemy incursion from the north.

50. The Battle Cruisers.——Between 0745 and 0900 it had become clear that a formidable force of cruisers and destroyers had invaded the Bight. Up to that time the conduct of operations remained in the hands of Rear-Admiral Hipper, the S.O. (Scouts), but at 0820 the Commander in Chief intervened and ordered the Battle Cruisers to raise steam and prepare to proceed immediately.

The opportunity of the reconnaissance to a search for the Cöln and Mains. Wireless calls to them failed to elicit any reply, and unfortunately they did not push on to the spot where the Cöln had sunk, though at the northern limit of their advance the battle cruisers reached the Mains, and one of the light cruisers reached a point only 3 miles away.

It was regarded as certain that the British would have saved all survivors, and this is the only explanation for neither light craft nor torpedoes being despatched on a further search of the area. At 1000 the Blücher had joined the battle cruisers, and in view of the danger from submarines and the necessity of making the entrance of the Jade before dark and getting in before low water, they broke off the movement and shaped course for home. Aircraft having reported no enemy ship visible within 100 miles north-west of Heligoland, the dispositions for the night patrol were made. The 8th T.B. Flotilla took up the outer line and the patrol vessels the inner line, with the cruisers, Kolberg, Helia and München, in support. At 2003 the Seydlitz anchored in Wilhelmshaven Roads and Rear-Admiral Hipper proceeded on board the flagship to make a verbal report.

CHAPTER XII.

SUBMARINES.

51. At a speed of 25 knots and accompanied by the 8th Torpedo Boat Flotilla the battle cruisers reached the Ariadne at 1425, and the 16th Half Torpedo Boat Flotilla was immediately sent to the westward to supplement the patrol already instituted by the Kölner, and at 1400 an hour later the Ariadne capsized and sank in Lat 54° 6 N, Long 7° 14'E. Rear-Admiral Hipper arrived on the scene with the Seydlitz at 1510 and carried out a short reconnaissance movement to the north-north-west, with the Kolberg, Solaun, Solaub and 8th Torpedo Boat Flotilla forming an advance guard, while the heavy ships followed in a broad formation of 8,000 metres apart. The 3rd Torpedo Flotilla was ordered to hold itself in readiness for night operations.

At 1441 the Commander in Chief had sent a signal ordering the large cruisers not to become engaged with the enemy’s armoured cruiser squadron.

This limited the purpose of the reconnaissance to a search for the Cöln and Mains. Wireless calls to them failed to elicit any reply, and unfortunately they did not push on to the spot where the Cöln had sunk, though at the northern limit of their advance the battle cruisers reached the Mains, and one of the light cruisers reached a point only 3 miles away.

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CHAPTER XII.

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51. Interwoven with the actions of the surface craft on 28th August, there runs the thread of the submarine movements. The Operation Orders had detailed E 4, E 5, and E 9 for inner positions close to Heligoland, E 6, E 7, and E 8 on the outer line West of it, and D 2 and D 8 off the Ems. The particular task of the outer group was to attract the enemy’s destroyers westward towards the sound of firing. E 7 of the Outer Group commenced the day by firing an unsuccessful shot shortly after 0430 at G. 194, who was on patrol. From 0700 the sound of firing was heard by the group leader and louder as the destroyer chase swept by to the eastward, and at 0730 the Fearless passed over E 7, but although enemy destroyers were sighted flying from the flotillas no opportunity to attack presented itself. Throughout the day the very calm sea and the high speeds of the enemy vessels ranging over a wide area, militated against the successful attack of anything except enemy destroyers on patrol.

The inner group heard the destroyer action proceeding from 0700 to 0830, and the boats steered westwards towards the sound of firing. At 0830, E 4 sighted one of the German destroyers flying from the British, but as in the case of the outer group at this time, no opportunity of attack presented itself.

The enemy destroyer sighted by E 4 was V 187, being chased by the 1st Flotilla, for shortly afterwards she was seen sinking, and the destroyers lowering boats to pick up survivors. Shortly afterwards when the Sestim appeared on the scene, and scattered the flotilla, E 4 attacked her, but she turned away before E 4 could get into position. Twenty minutes later (0928) E 4 came to the surface and saw some pulling boats full of men lying deserted on the water. These were the Defender’s boats which had been left behind in the scurry of withdrawal and whose crews were now to be rescued in this unexpected manner. They clambered gaily on board, and Lieutenant Commander Leir, taking “as a
sample" of the Germans, one officer, petty-officer and a stoker, left the remainder with provisions and a compass to find their way to Heligoland. Hearing heavy firing to the south-west he then proceeded in that direction, and at 1210 attacked a cruiser of the "Hela" class but without success; later, at 1315, this cruiser, accompanied by the "Stettin" passed him once more, but the distance of 3 miles was too great for attack.

Meanwhile E 6 (Lieutenant Commander Talbot) and E 7 (Lieutenant Commander Feilmann) had both met Goodenough's light cruisers, and the former had attacked them three under the impression that they were hostile. In her first attack on the easternward, E 6 was sighted by the light cruisers and they attempted to ram her, but she dived in time. In a second attack, at 1115, Lieutenant-Commander Talbot had reached a position only 400 yards on the beam of his target when he recognised the colour of the ensign and fired his fire. These incidents account for the anxiety felt by Commodore Goodenough and Keyes at 1000, when they met and realised the nature of the misunderstanding that prevailed.

E 7 had also sighted the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron at 1003, but did not close to attack as Lieutenant Commander Feilmann recognised by the silhouette that they were our own ships. An hour and a half later, 1340, he saw a German 3-funnel cruiser (probably the "Coln") but did not close to attack her.

D 2 and D 8 off the Ems had seen a ship of the "Kolberg" class, followed by fire T.B.D.'s, leave harbour at 1000 and patrol off the mouth of the Ems, and had made unsuccessful attacks on them. At 1015 the cruiser, which was evidently the "Mainz", suddenly turned from the north-westerly course on which she had been steaming at moderate speed, to east, and proceeded along the coast at high speed, having presumably received orders to reinforce the German ships engaged to the eastward, and later she turned to the north, and came into action with the "Arethusa" soon after noon. This was apparently the only reinforcement that came from the Ems; and those that came from Wilhelmshaven offered no opportunity for attack; the submarines therefore did not play a very great part in the operations, a circumstance which was largely due to the unfavourable weather conditions and the absolutely calm sea which added to the difficulty of attack.

52. German Submarines.—Two attacks stated to have been made by German submarines on our battle cruisers during the operations, namely, at 1100 and 1400, both unsuccessful. The first is reported to have been made by three submarines shortly after noon. This was apparently the only reinforcement that came from the Ems; and those that came from Wilhelmshaven offered no opportunity for attack; the submarines therefore did not play a very great part in the operations, a circumstance which was largely due to the unfavourable weather conditions and the absolutely calm sea which added to the difficulty of attack.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE RETIREMENT.

53. With the sinking of the "Coln" the day's fighting ended and there remained only to withdraw safely from the Bight. The battle cruisers with the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron remained on the starboard quarter (roughly, N.N.E.) of the flotillas steering to the north-westward, until 1600, when the "Inincible" and New Zealand were detached to reinforce the "Euryalus" on the direct line of the flotillas' westerly retirement.

Cruiser Force C had been off Terschelling light vessel throughout the action and had not moved to the Eastward in support, as the battle cruisers had done.

At 1600 they steered to the eastward for half an hour, and at 1630 sighted the "Lutterer", "Friedrada", "Laurel", and "Liberty", whose wounded and prisoners were transferred to them for medical treatment. The "Laurel" was in tow by the "Amethyst".

At 1715 the "Fearless" with "Laertes" in tow and with five other boats had stopped and collected the wounded; at 1830 she met the "Aboukir", received medical assistance, and was conveyed to the west through the night.

1 They were picked up at noon by G 12.
2 G.O.H. states that no attacks by submarines were made.
3 The Arethusa.
4 The Euryalus.
outcome, for after the threatened outposts were once in safety, the cruisers ought not to have been allowed to follow the enemy to the west; this incident was the great mistake of the day. The responsibility was not so much with the cruiser commanders as with the command. Even if the conduct of the war prescribed an independent working of the patrols, it was the business of the command to concentrate the patrols, when it was evident that at times they were insufficient, to a point of no return, to which they could be concentrated by the command. This happened in the Jade Bight, where the enemy was known to have a fine fleet, and the commander-in-chief concentrated the available forces to a point of no return, in order to prevent a repetition of the situation in the Heligoland Bight. The commander-in-chief knew that the enemy was likely to send a fleet to the Bight, and that it would be a serious reverse. Under similar weather conditions we expect a repetition of this. The first lesson may be taken for granted that the submarines repeatedly seen in the Bight since August 21st had reported the position of our patrols and that the enemy waited for the cruisers to escape. The outcome of the action between the latest big ships and old battleships could not long remain in doubt; the latter must have been overwhelmed even though they might have damaged the enemy severely.

55. German Commander-in-Chief's Report. In his report of August 30th, the Commander-in-Chief said the enemy had been in a position to learn of the Bight outposts and to make use of the information. He had not the means of discovering the enemy's intention in an attack or in a flank movement. The German Staff History goes on to say that curiously enough in not a single down. The enemy, when he comes will come only with his latest craft and in such superiority as to secure him from a serious reverse. Under similar weather conditions we expect a repetition of this undertaking and our own measures must ensure that previous to the decisive action no vessel of any importance shall fall a victim to the enemy in such incursions, but the order for the immediate withdrawal of the patrols on the approach of danger did not go to the heart of the matter, for unless big ships were available for an immediate counter attack, there still remained the danger of the outposts being caught or captured, which would expose them to submarine attack. The real weakness lay in the system and the failure of previous operations to keep the enemy on the move.

56. German Staff View. (continued). The mistake which lay in the employment of light craft in positions comparatively far from their bases was not yet clearly recognised. The report of the Chief of the 1st torpedo boat flotilla is interesting on this point, for he stated that the comparatively great distance of the outpost line from its base, Heligoland, was disadvantageous to torpedo boats, and this handicap would always remain in thick weather with a slow flotilla. He recommended that the outpost line should be close to Heligoland, and the flotilla cruisers should be held in readiness there. Another commander was of opinion that a strengthening of the patrols by day and night was urgently necessary, and the Chief of the 5th flotilla asked for armoured cruisers as supports of the outpost line.

The German Staff History goes on to say that curiously enough in not a single war diary, nor even in that of the Chief of the Squadron, can any allusion be found to the fact that the reverse was due rather to the weakness of the system than to the particular measures taken. However much the patrols were strengthened by small cruisers or even big ships, it would always remain possible for an enemy, previously informed by submarines of the necessarily more or less systematic disposition, to attack them with surprise and success. The commander-in-chief, in his report of the Chief of the Admiral Staff, von Pohl. Any increase too of the patrol vessels must find a limit in the number of available ships and their necessary relief for coaling, overhaul and rest. The use of big ships in fixed patrol positions would expose them to the risk of destruction if the real weakness of the system lay in the absence of a fear that the balance of strength, which the Germans strove for, would by a repetition of such attacks slowly but surely tend to the disadvantage of Germany.

It was necessary therefore to investigate whether the protection of the Bight could not be more especially assured by measures more properly secured by other means. The first lesson may be taken for granted that the submarines repeatedly seen in the Bight since August 21st had reported the position of our patrols and that the enemy waited for the cruisers to escape. The outcome of the action between the latest big ships and old battleships could not long remain in doubt; the latter must have been overwhelmed even though they might have damaged the enemy severely. The commander in chief decided in favour of the proposal, and, after the necessary preliminaries, began to lay mines off Heligoland in September. The S.O. (Scouts) further proposed that aeroplanes, airships, and submarines should undertake the patrol of the minefields as well as the service of scouting outside the range of the guns of the bases, in order to report in time the approach of enemy forces. His further proposal for a line of submarines 60 miles out would have greatly interfered with their much needed employment in offensive operations. The closing of the Bight by minefields set free a large portion of the light craft for other duties; instead of being tied to patrol lines they could support the reconnaissance of airships and aeroplanes and also by sudden and unexpected movements make it more difficult for enemy submarines to lie in the Bight. In the event of an enemy raid, too, there would be a larger force available for counter attack and a better prospect of attaining the desired balance of strength. One thing, however, remained essential—not only light cruisers, but big ships, ready for immediate attack, must in such cases be available to cover the torpedo boats.

This gave rise to the following consideration. The 25th of August had shown that the English if they came would come with fast ships in strong force. If battle occurred, a squadron of battleships were sent out to support our own outposts, an engagement between big ships might develop at any moment, from which it might be difficult to withdraw once any damage had been sustained, for then the entry of other squadrons might be unavoidable, and a battle might develop under conditions unfavourable for us, or at a time not in conformity with the political point of view.

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1 Flottenleitung.
2 Seekriegsanleitung.
3 It is obvious that ordinary visibility would have assisted the light cruisers to escape.
4 Seekriegsanleitung.
5 Cf. Torpitz Diary, M.I.C., No. 13, 22. "If this kind of thing continues we shall soon be exhausted by attrition."
These limitations dictated our policy of operations in the North Sea and found their expression in the holding back of the big ships. The severest injury sustained on the 28th August was less in the material than in the psychological field. The failure of the big ships to support them was bitterly felt by light cruisers and torpedo boats.

The resistance offered by the older ships, the shooting, the behaviour of their crews left no doubt that with a little more favourable adjustment of the relative strength, victory would have been found on the German side. The responsibility was laid at the door of the command. To the disappointment that the big ships had not taken the offensive was added the feeling difficult to suppress that they had not been energetically led in their defensive role. Instead of seeking in the fault in the organization of the patrol, the fleet felt itself in pointing out and exaggerating deficiencies in details—typical outcome of an unfortunate first collision with the foe.

57. Conclusion.—The real import of the action lay not in the sinking of three cruisers, but in its ultimate effect on the naval policy of Germany. The events of August 28th not only confirmed the Kaiser in his decision that the fleet was to be held in reserve, but encouraged his fatal inclination to circumscribe the initiative of the C.-in-C., to the extent even of suggesting to the Chief of the Admiral Staff that Ingenohl should ask for his consent before joining in decisive action.

Tirpitz, the Minister of Marine, wore himself with protests and petitions. He was in favour of a bold policy; his son had been in the Maia, and was now a prisoner in England, so he had a personal interest in studying the details of the action.

"It seems to me," he wrote, "that they allowed themselves to be surprised." He saw a picture of the German fleet—his fleet—shut up in a "great half-tide; Liege had fallen; the Germans were drawing daily closer to Paris; and in what ships, so that I can communicate with submarines suitably placed is in orders for Horn Reef and Heligoland, with battle cruisers in support." 1835.

5. From Commodore (S.H.F.).

28th August. To Adm. (H.F.)

"I am deciding last night to occupy Ostend with 3,900 marines to relieve the German pressure on the left wing of Allied army. Belgian forces have broken out of Antwerp and are attacking German communications. The ships will come off Ostend this afternoon, landing commencing to-day or to-morrow morning. This fleet attack may cause some confusion on the High Sea Fleet."


26th August. To Adm. (H.F.)

"Propose to cooperate in sweep on Friday (28th), leaving Grand Fleet Cruisers and Destroyers to suitable supporting position with Battle Fleet near. Hoopoe may be given full details of proposed operations by land wire this evening. I am leaving at 6 a.m. to-morrow." 1835.

216. "Your 577. Until I know the plan of operations I am unable to suggest the best method of battle operation, but the breadth of sweep appears to be very great for two flotillas. I will send two flotillas, holding a fourth in reserve, and can support by light cruisers. What officers will be in command of operations, and in what ships, so that I can communicate with them."

6. From Commodore (H.F.).

28th August. To Adm. (H.F.)

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15. From Commodore. 27th August.

14. From Admiralty. 27th August.

13. From Commodore. 27th August.

12. From Admiralty. 27th August.


10. From Commodore (T). To Commodore (S).

9. From Commodore (T). To Commodore (S).

8. From Commodore (T). To Commodore (S).

7. From Commodore (T). To Commodore (S).

6. From Commodore (T). To Commodore (S).

5. From Commodore (T). To Commodore (S).

4. From Commodore (T). To Commodore (S).

3. From Commodore (T). To Commodore (S).

2. From Commodore (T). To Commodore (S).

1. From Commodore (T). To Commodore (S).
57. From Y.A., 1st Light Cruiser Squadron. 1526.
To Commodore (T).
Support Commodore (T). 1120.

56. From Y.A., 1st Light Cruiser Squadron. 1526.
To Commodore (T).
Support Commodore (T). 1120.

55. From Y.A., 1st Light Cruiser Squadron. 1526.
To Commodore (T).
Support Commodore (T). 1120.

54. From Y.A., 1st Light Cruiser Squadron. 1526.
To Commodore (T).
Support Commodore (T). 1120.

53. From Y.A., 1st Light Cruiser Squadron. 1526.
To Commodore (T).
Support Commodore (T). 1120.

52. From Y.A., 1st Light Cruiser Squadron. 1526.
To Commodore (T).
Support Commodore (T). 1120.

51. From Y.A., 1st Light Cruiser Squadron. 1526.
To Commodore (T).
Support Commodore (T). 1120.

50. From S.O., 1st Light Cruiser Squadron. 1526.
To Commodore (T).
Support Commodore (T). 1120.

49. From S.O., 1st Light Cruiser Squadron. 1526.
To Commodore (T).
Support Commodore (T). 1120.

48. From Commodore (T).
To Commodore (T).
Support Commodore (T). 1120.

47. From Commodore (T).
To Commodore (T).
Support Commodore (T). 1120.

46. From Commodore (T).
To Commodore (T).
Support Commodore (T). 1120.

45. From Commodore (T).
To Commodore (T).
Support Commodore (T). 1120.

44. From Commodore (T).
To Commodore (T).
Support Commodore (T). 1120.

43. From Commodore (T).
To Commodore (T).
Support Commodore (T). 1120.

42. From Commodore (T).
To Commodore (T).
Support Commodore (T). 1120.

41. From Commodore (T).
To Commodore (T).
Support Commodore (T). 1120.

40. From Commodore (T).
To Commodore (T).
Support Commodore (T). 1120.

39. From Commodore (T).
To Commodore (T).
Support Commodore (T). 1120.

38. From Commodore (T).
To Commodore (T).
Support Commodore (T). 1120.

37. From Commodore (T).
To Commodore (T).
Support Commodore (T). 1120.

36. From Commodore (T).
To Commodore (T).
Support Commodore (T). 1120.

35. From Commodore (T).
To Commodore (T).
Support Commodore (T). 1120.

34. From Commodore (T).
To Commodore (T).
Support Commodore (T). 1120.

33. From Commodore (T).
To Commodore (T).
Support Commodore (T). 1120.

32. From Commodore (T).
To Commodore (T).
Support Commodore (T). 1120.

31. From Commodore (T).
To Commodore (T).
Support Commodore (T). 1120.

30. From Commodore (T).
To Commodore (T).
Support Commodore (T). 1120.

29. From Commodore (T).
To Commodore (T).
Support Commodore (T). 1120.

28. From Commodore (T).
To Commodore (T).
Support Commodore (T). 1120.

27. From Commodore (T).
To Commodore (T).
Support Commodore (T). 1120.

26. From Commodore (T).
To Commodore (T).
Support Commodore (T). 1120.

25. From Commodore (T).
To Commodore (T).
Support Commodore (T). 1120.

24. From Commodore (T).
To Commodore (T).
Support Commodore (T). 1120.

23. From Commodore (T).
To Commodore (T).
Support Commodore (T). 1120.

22. From Commodore (T).
To Commodore (T).
Support Commodore (T). 1120.

21. From Commodore (T).
To Commodore (T).
Support Commodore (T). 1120.

20. From Commodore (T).
To Commodore (T).
Support Commodore (T). 1120.

19. From Commodore (T).
To Commodore (T).
Support Commodore (T). 1120.

18. From Commodore (T).
To Commodore (T).
Support Commodore (T). 1120.

17. From Commodore (T).
To Commodore (T).
Support Commodore (T). 1120.

16. From Commodore (T).
To Commodore (T).
Support Commodore (T). 1120.

15. From Commodore (T).
To Commodore (T).
Support Commodore (T). 1120.

14. From Commodore (T).
To Commodore (T).
Support Commodore (T). 1120.

13. From Commodore (T).
To Commodore (T).
Support Commodore (T). 1120.

12. From Commodore (T).
To Commodore (T).
Support Commodore (T). 1120.

11. From Commodore (T).
To Commodore (T).
Support Commodore (T). 1120.

10. From Commodore (T).
To Commodore (T).
Support Commodore (T). 1120.

9. From Commodore (T).
To Commodore (T).
Support Commodore (T). 1120.
1. From G. 194. Despatch 0630.
   To I. Torpedo Boat Flotilla. Receipt 0631.
   Fired at by enemy submarine in 142e, enemy craft steering north-west.

2. From G. 194. Despatch 0625.
   Fired at, at 0500, by submerged submarine 142e, 54° 22', 7° 35'; two torpedoes, did not hit. Now proceeds, 200 metres off, false alarm impossible. Enemy boat is steering north-west.

3. From Sfcplts. Despatch 0612.
   To Heligoland Islands. Receipt —
   To Air detachment. Look for enemy submarines, if possible.

   To Cdr. Receipt 0614.
   Vth Torpedo-Boat Flotilla hunt enemy submarine 142e.

5. From Cdr. Despatch 0610.
   To Vth Torpedo-Boat Flotilla. Receipt 0622.
   Vth Torpedo-Boat Flotilla, hunt enemy submarine, dived 142e (54° 22', 7° 35'). Proceed as soon as possible.

6. From Cdr. Despatch 0610.
   To V. 185 (read G. 194.) Receipt —
   Why was enemy submarine not reported immediately?

7. From Heligoland Islands. Despatch 0623.
   To Fleet Command and Sfcplts. Receipt 0630.
   Two submerged submarines 139e (54° 3', 7° 45'); steering south-west.

   To Cdr. Despatch 0707.
   Cdr. 154e (54° 22' N., 7° 55'E.) 155e suspected mined.

   To Cdr. Receipt 0725.
   Cdre. 154e, steering north-east.

    To Cdr. Despatch 0707.
    To Order support please.

    To Cdr. Receipt 0725.
    Fired at, at 0500, by submerged submarine 142e, 54° 22', 7° 35'; two torpedoes, did not hit. Now proceeds, 200 metres off, false alarm impossible. Enemy boat is steering north-west.

12. From G. 197. Despatch —
    To Cdr. Despatch —
    To Aircraft scout to north-west. Report class of enemy cruiser.

    To Cdr. Despatch 0731.
    Cdr. Enemy forces reported steering south south-east.

14. From G. 196. Despatch —
    To Cdr. Receipt 0731.
    Enemy forces reported steering south south-east.

From G. 196. Despatch —
To Cdr. Receipt 0725.
Single enemy forces 142e, left middle. Am being fired at.

From Vth Torpedo-Boat Despatch 0629.
Flotilla. 142e. (54° 22', 7° 35').

From 10th Torpedo-Boat Half Despatch —
Flotilla. 142e.

Run into Heligoland.

From G. 9. Despatch 0725.
To Cdr. Receipt 0728.

Despatch —
To Cdr. (T). 4 Destroyers in 142e, steering south.

From G. 194. Despatch 0704.

G. 194 is attacked by enemy large cruiser.

From Yth, Torpedo Boat Flotilla. Despatch 0725.

As soon as possible proceed to the roads.

From Sfcplts. Despatch 0817.
To Cdr. (S.O. (Scouts)). Receipt 0817.
Assistance urgently required, 145e. Enemy cruiser behind the enemy flotillas.

From V. 187. Despatch 0725.
To Cdr. Receipt 0814.
Beside the enemy forces reported, two enemy cruisers 153e (54° 22' N., 7° 23'E).

From V. 187. Despatch 0600.
To Cdr. Receipt 0814.

Enemy forces reported out of sight; course South-east.

From G. 12. Despatch —
To Cdr. Despatch 0600.

Friedrich der Grosse is engaged with destroyers in 146e (54° 3', 7° 45').

From V. Torpedo-Boat Flotilla. Despatch —
To Cdr. Receipt 0746.
A cruiser and 20 destroyers chasing Vth Torpedo-Boat Flotilla.

From V. 187. Despatch 0625.

Cdr. 154e, steering north-east by east.

From Cdr. Despatch 0610.

To Cdr. Receipt 0747.

Seydlitz is attacked by enemy cruisers.

From Sfcplts. Despatch 0620.

Steptoe hunt destroyers.

From V. Torpedo-Boat Flotilla. Despatch —
To Cdr. Receipt 0620.

A cruiser and 20 destroyers chasing Vth Torpedo-Boat Flotilla.

From V. 187. Despatch 0625.

To Cdr. (T). Two enemy light cruisers in 132e (54° 24', 7° 28').

Two more enemy cruisers, in 131e (54° 34' N., 7° 23'E).

From Sfcplts. Despatch 0620.

To Steptoe. Receipt 0747.

Friedrich der Grosse is engaged with destroyers in 146e (54° 3', 7° 45'), steering south-west.

From V. Torpedo-Boat Flotilla. Despatch —
To Cdr. Receipt 0620.

A cruiser and 20 destroyers chasing Vth Torpedo-Boat Flotilla.

From V. 187. Despatch 0625.

To Cdr. (T). Receipt 0620.

Two more enemy cruisers, in 131e (54° 34' N., 7° 23'E).

From Sfcplts. Despatch 0620.

To Steptoe. Receipt 0747.

Friedrich der Grosse is engaged with destroyers in 146e (54° 3', 7° 45'), steering south-west.

From V. Torpedo-Boat Flotilla. Despatch —
To Cdr. Receipt 0620.

A cruiser and 20 destroyers chasing Vth Torpedo-Boat Flotilla.

From V. 187. Despatch 0625.

To Cdr. (T). Receipt 0620.

Two more enemy cruiser, in 131e (54° 34' N., 7° 23'E).

From Sfcplts. Despatch 0620.

To Steptoe. Receipt 0747.

Friedrich der Grosse is engaged with destroyers in 146e (54° 3', 7° 45'), steering south-west.

From V. Torpedo-Boat Flotilla. Despatch —
To Cdr. Receipt 0620.

A cruiser and 20 destroyers chasing Vth Torpedo-Boat Flotilla.

From V. 187. Despatch 0625.

To Cdr. (T). Receipt 0620.

Two more enemy cruiser, in 131e (54° 34' N., 7° 23'E).

From Sfcplts. Despatch 0620.

To Steptoe. Receipt 0747.

Friedrich der Grosse is engaged with destroyers in 146e (54° 3', 7° 45'), steering south-west.

From V. Torpedo-Boat Flotilla. Despatch —
To Cdr. Receipt 0620.

A cruiser and 20 destroyers chasing Vth Torpedo-Boat Flotilla.
From Heligoland Island. Despatch 0900.
To Sculpits. Receipt 0922.
An enemy light cruiser, 20 (she probably be 20 destroyers in the west action with Seydlitz and our torpedo boat flotillas. Enemy destroyer, one hit in bow, observed with certainty. Aircraft 21 and 29 fired at in 600 metres height without success—flying station.

61. From L. Z. Despatch 0930.
To S.O. (Scouts). Receipt 0992.
To S.O. (Scouts). 0720 retired in face of enemy cruiser in 142. Am returning to Kiel with damage on account of engine troubles.

To Sculpits. Receipt 0940-0952.
Aeroplane 21 left. Flying station.

63. From Strassburg. Despatch 0955.
To Sculpits. Receipt 1000.
My position 13K. Please course and position.

64. From Sculpits. Despatch Searchlight, 1000.
To Strassburg. Receipt 1000.
Proceed at once to support Cols. 1300. in 120. 1st Torpedo Boat Flotilla.

65. From V. P. Despatch 1030.
To Cols. Receipt 1010.
At 0900 fired at two submerged submarines in 120. 1st Torpedo Boat Flotilla.

66. From L. Z. Despatch 1040.
To Cols. Receipt 1020.
To S.O. (Scouts). Two more enemy cruisers 128, turned west. 1st Torpedo Boat Flotilla.

67. From Strassburg. Despatch 1042.
To Heligoland Island. Receipt 1022.
What is Stettin's position?

68. From Strassburg. Despatch 1052.
To Heligoland Island. Receipt 1022.
My position, course and speed, 133K, north-west 24 Kts. Strassburg.

69. From Heligoland Island. Despatch 1052.
To Strassburg. Receipt 1022.
Out of sight to westward.

70. From S.O. (Scouts). Despatch 1025.
To Dusszig und Curhavon. Receipt 1030.
Proceed to mouth of Elbe at once S.O. (Scouts).

71. From Sculpits. Despatch 1052.
To C. in C. Receipt 1031.

72. From Sculpits. Despatch 1023.
To Arched. S.O.'s ship of Jade-Weser harbour flotilla) and Nodle. Receipt 1030.
If possible proceed in support. S.O. (Scouts).

73. From Intelligence Service. Despatch Telephone. To C. in C. Receipt 1023.
Following received from Heligoland for C. in C.-High Seas Fleet: Wind east north-east, strength 1, sea calm, visibility 4 miles. Telephone connection with Wilhelmshaven not yet established. N.B. 121.

74. From S.O. (Scouts). Despatch 1053.
To Moltke and Von der Tann. Receipt 1033.
Anchor at Schillig, in readiness to proceed.

75. From Cols. Despatch 0955.
To C-in-C. (II. Squadron received 0912.)
1328 and 1336 suspected mined. S.O. (T).

76. From Cols. Despatch 1045.
To V. i. T.
Report position.

77. From W. Torpedo Boat Flotilla. Despatch 1046.
To Cols. Despatch 1046.
Collect minesweepers, 133K, 137K.

78. From Dusszig. Despatch 1045.
To Sculpits. Receipt 1045.

79. From Cols. Despatch 1050.
To Cols. Despatch 1050.
From Heligoland Island. Despatch 0920-0940.
To Sculpits. Receipt 0940-0952.
Aeroplane 21 left. Flying station.

80. From Sculpits. Despatch Searchlight, 1000.
To Strassburg. Receipt 1000.
Proceed at once to support Cols. 1300 in 120. 1st Torpedo Boat Flotilla.

81. R.A. (Scouts) time.

82. From Moltke. Despatch 1046.
To Strassburg and Stettin. Receipt 1050.
My position, course and speed, 88K, N, 28 Kts. Moltke.

83. From Strassburg. Despatch 1055.
To Cols. Receipt 1055.
In action with two submerged submarines in 120. 1st Torpedo Boat Flotilla.

84. From L. Z. Despatch 1090.
To Cols. Receipt 1010.
To S.O. (T). Two more enemy cruisers 128, turned west. 1st Torpedo Boat Flotilla.

85. From Heligoland Island. Despatch 1052.
To Strassburg. Receipt 1022.
What is Stettin’s position?

86. From Heligoland Island. Despatch 1052.
To Strassburg. Receipt 1022.
My position, course and speed, 133K, north-west 24 Kts. Strassburg.

87. From Heligoland Island. Despatch 1052.
To Cols. Receipt 1022.
Out of sight to westward.

88. From S.O. (Scouts). Despatch 1025.
To Dusszig und Curhavon. Receipt 1030.
Proceed to mouth of Elbe at once S.O. (Scouts).

89. From Sculpits. Despatch 1052.
To C. in C. Receipt 1031.

90. From Sculpits. Despatch 1023.
To Arched. S.O.'s ship of Jade-Weser harbour flotilla) and Nodle. Receipt 1030.
If possible proceed in support. S.O. (Scouts).

91. From Intelligence Service. Despatch Telephone. To C. in C. Receipt 1023.
Following received from Heligoland for C. in C.-High Seas Fleet: Wind east north-east, strength 1, sea calm, visibility 4 miles. Telephone connection with Wilhelmshaven not yet established. N.B. 121.
To bring under escort to Wilhelmshaven.

From

To S.O. (Scouts).

Receipt 1234.

S.O. (Scouts) read 'large cruisers. 
Stralsund and S.O. (Scouts) are standing by.'

Am in action with destroyers... Last signal made by Cibs.

Submarines attack the enemy off Heligoland. Chief of submarine flotillas.

From Stettin to Cibs. Receipt 1238.

Seydlitz, S.O., north-west, 24 knots. Am chased by an enemy armoured cruiser.

Stralsund and S.O. (Scouts) read 'large cruisers.'

Am in action with two enemy armoured cruisers. Report when I. Division and III. Squadron are ready to proceed.

Danzig's W/T was in action again at 1220.

Despatch 1314.

Ariadne is on fire in 126e right bottom. Stettin.

Despatch 1400.

From Seydlitz to Stettin. Receipt 1312.

Am saving the Ariadne survivors.

To Seydlitz and Helgoland I. Receipt 1340.

To Seydlitz. Receipt 1325.

To Seydlitz and Seydlitz. Receipt 1328.

To Seydlitz. Receipt 1325.

From Seydlitz to Stettin. Receipt 1322.

From Seydlitz to Seydlitz. Receipt 1319.

From Seydlitz to Seydlitz. Receipt 1315.

From Seydlitz to Seydlitz. Receipt 1311.

From Seydlitz to Seydlitz. Receipt 1305.

From Seydlitz to Seydlitz. Receipt 1302.

From Seydlitz to Seydlitz. Receipt 1309.

From Seydlitz to Seydlitz. Receipt 1306.

From Seydlitz to Seydlitz. Receipt 1303.

From Seydlitz to Seydlitz. Receipt 1300.

From Seydlitz to Seydlitz. Receipt 1297.

From Seydlitz to Seydlitz. Receipt 1294.

To Seydlitz and Seydlitz. Receipt 1290.

To Seydlitz. Receipt 1287.

To Seydlitz. Receipt 1285.

To Seydlitz. Receipt 1283.

To Seydlitz. Receipt 1280.

To Seydlitz. Receipt 1277.

To Seydlitz. Receipt 1275.

To Seydlitz. Receipt 1273.

To Seydlitz. Receipt 1270.

To Seydlitz. Receipt 1268.

From Seydlitz to Seydlitz. Receipt 1265.

From Seydlitz to Seydlitz. Receipt 1260.

From Seydlitz to Seydlitz. Receipt 1256.

From Seydlitz to Seydlitz. Receipt 1252.

From Seydlitz to Seydlitz. Receipt 1248.

From Seydlitz to Seydlitz. Receipt 1244.

From Seydlitz to Seydlitz. Receipt 1240.

From Seydlitz to Seydlitz. Receipt 1236.

From Seydlitz to Seydlitz. Receipt 1232.

From Seydlitz to Seydlitz. Receipt 1228.

From Seydlitz to Seydlitz. Receipt 1224.

From Seydlitz to Seydlitz. Receipt 1220.

From Seydlitz to Seydlitz. Receipt 1216.

From Seydlitz to Seydlitz. Receipt 1212.

From Seydlitz to Seydlitz. Receipt 1208.

From Seydlitz to Seydlitz. Receipt 1204.

From Seydlitz to Seydlitz. Receipt 1200.

From Seydlitz to Seydlitz. Receipt 1196.

From Seydlitz to Seydlitz. Receipt 1192.

From Seydlitz to Seydlitz. Receipt 1188.

From Seydlitz to Seydlitz. Receipt 1184.

From Seydlitz to Seydlitz. Receipt 1180.

From Seydlitz to Seydlitz. Receipt 1176.

From Seydlitz to Seydlitz. Receipt 1172.

From Seydlitz to Seydlitz. Receipt 1168.

From Seydlitz to Seydlitz. Receipt 1164.

From Seydlitz to Seydlitz. Receipt 1160.

From Seydlitz to Seydlitz. Receipt 1156.

From Seydlitz to Seydlitz. Receipt 1152.

From Seydlitz to Seydlitz. Receipt 1148.

From Seydlitz to Seydlitz. Receipt 1144.

From Seydlitz to Seydlitz. Receipt 1140.

From Seydlitz to Seydlitz. Receipt 1136.

From Seydlitz to Seydlitz. Receipt 1132.
10. From Borkum. Despatch 1850.

To C.-in-C. To Heligoland. Seydlitz.

C.-in-C.'s minute. "At S.O. (Scouts) discretion to place two flotillas in outer patrol line to-night."

\[ 10. \]


C.-in-C.'s minute. "At S.O. (Scouts) discretion to place two flotillas in outer patrol line to-night."

\[ 10. \]

From Flotilla No. 2. Jutland. Despatch 1853.

From C.-in-C. Despatch 1545. To T.B. Flotilla at 1615 in 128e, steering S.S.E.; sortie over Schillig; aircraft scout possible. 

From Borkum. Despatch 1855.

Proceed with eight boats. Despatch 1510. To S.O. S.O. (Scouts). Arnheld.

From Borkum. Reception 1835.

I. Division will be ready to proceed at 1630. Despatch 1545. To T.B. Flotilla. VII. T.B. Flotilla take up right outpost position. S.O. (Scouts).

From Borkum. Despatch 1853.


C.-in-C.'s minute. "At S.O. (Scouts) discretion to place two flotillas in outer patrol line to-night."

\[ 10. \]

From C.-in-C. Despatch 1545. To T.B. Flotilla at 1615 in 128e, steering S.S.E.; sortie over Schillig; aircraft scout possible. 

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From Borkum. Despatch 1855.

Proceed with eight boats. Despatch 1510. To S.O. S.O. (Scouts). Arnheld.

From Borkum. Reception 1835.
Trial Speed 24 Knots.

Ariel - Cdr. Dashwood F. Moir
Lucifer - 1st Flotilla, 2nd Division.

Archer - Lt.-Cdr. Geoffrey Mackworth
Hind - Lt.-Cdr. Montague G. J. Legge

Defender - Lt.-Cdr. Walter J. Fletcher

Ariel - Cdr. Henry F. Wakefield
Lucette - Cdr. Michael L. Goldsmith

1st Flotilla - Capt. D.J.

Fearless - Capt. Wilfred F. Hunt

Armament, 16-4 in.

1st Flotilla - 1st Division

Acheron - Lt.-Cdr. Cyril Callaghan
Hind - Lt.-Cdr. Geoffrey Cookett

Armament, 10-4 1-in.; 1-7-pr.; 2 S.T. (18-in).

Commander - Lt.-Cdr. Alfred H. Watts

Liberry - Lt.-Cdr. Herbert B. Little

Surasinies

28-0

27-0

16-4 in.

28-0

15-3 knots

Armament, 2-15-pr.; 4 T (19•7-in).

Commanding Officer - Lt.-Cdr. Frederick B. Legge

4 Quarterly Return of War Vessels, August, 1911, gave 3 Ships not engaged have been omitted.

III. H-1SH.

Couting

II. S D.

Ariel - Cdr. Dashwood F. Moir

Armament — 12—4 1-in.; 1—7-pr.; 2 S.T. (19•7-in).

Commanding Officer — Korvettenkapitan Retzmann.

Speed — 28•3 Knots

Commanding Officer — Rear-Admiral Wallis.


Commanding Officer — Kap. Leut. Wolfram.

Armament — 1—4-pr.; 1 S.T. (14-in.) 1 T. (14-in).

Commanding Officer — Kap. Leut. Wolfram.

1st Flotilla - 5th Division.

Goban - Cdr. Horst Herbert Mona


Armament, all 2-4-in, 2—12-pdr.

Commanding Officer — Rear-Admiral painstaking.

III. H-1SH.

Couting

II. S D.

Ariel - Cdr. Dashwood F. Moir

Armament — 12—4 1-in.; 1—7-pr.; 2 S.T. (19•7-in).

Commanding Officer — Korvettenkapitan Retzmann.

Speed — 28•3 Knots

Commanding Officer — Rear-Admiral Wallis.


Commanding Officer — Kap. Leut. Wolfram.

Armament — 1—4-pr.; 1 S.T. (14-in.) 1 T. (14-in).

Commanding Officer — Kap. Leut. Wolfram.


Reserves (being equipped)—

Kiel—T. 28.

Minesweepers.

Naval minesweepers—Kapitanleutnant Wolfd. 16

III. HARBOUR FORCES.

E. Minesweeping Division.—Kapitanleutnant Wolfd. 16

Minelayers.

Assistant Minelayers—Kapitanleutnant Werth. 16

Minesweepers.

1st Minesweeping Division.—Kapitanleutnant Roberts.


1st Minesweeping Division.—Kapitanleutnant Schumann.


2nd Minesweeping Division.—Kapitanleutnant Wolfram.


Note.—1. Konig and Greaser Konigst were appropriated to III. Battle Squadron 12th August 1914, although not yet ready for sea. B.A. Schumann hoisted his flag on board Konig 17th August 1914.

2. IV. Battle Squadron were not yet ready for sea on 10th August. V. Squadron was fitting out at Kiel. VI. Squadron incorporated 12th August 1914.

3. Destroyers joined 1st Scouting Group at beginning of September 1914.

4. IV. Scouting Group was not ready for sea on 10th August. It became later the III Scouting Group.

V. Scouting Group was formed on 12th August 1914.

APPENDIX F.

AMMUNITION EXPENDED AND DAMAGE.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship</th>
<th>Expended.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lion</td>
<td>3—12-in.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principe Real</td>
<td>6—12-in.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queen Mary</td>
<td>6—12-in.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron</td>
<td>6—12-in.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>6—12-in.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Expended.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship</th>
<th>Expended.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lau</td>
<td>214 lyd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberty</td>
<td>214 lyd</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX G.


2. Several destroyers reported that a number of steel splinters came on board, but damage was immaterial.

3. Ninety-three rounds up to 2,800.
NAVAL OPERATIONS CONNECTED WITH THE RAID ON THE NORTH-EAST COAST, DECEMBER 16th, 1914.

(Short Title—SCARBOROUGH RAID)

INTRODUCTION AND NOTE ON SOURCES.

1. The narrative which follows deals with the naval operations connected with the German raid on the North-East Coast on December 16th, 1914, which is commonly known as "The Scarborough Raid"—a somewhat misleading title, as Hartlepool suffered more from the hostile fire than Scarborough.

In order to explain the general situation in December 1914, the first chapter gives a brief account of the enemy's attack off Yarmouth on November 3rd, which was the first occasion on which German capital ships approached the English Coast. This chapter is only an introductory sketch and is not intended to deal with these operations in detail.

The following papers in the custody of the Historical Section, Committee of Imperial Defence, have been consulted for this chapter:

- M. 0081/14: Various papers relating to the Patrol Flotillas and their method of working.
- M. 0081/14: Signal Logs of "Undaunted" and "Halcyon." Admiralty telegrams bound up in Historical Section, Volume 72.
- M. 01718/15: Reports from various trawlers which sighted the enemy on December 16th, and gave valuable information with regard to the German movements, were forwarded by the Admiral of Patrols in—M. 04794/14, M. 042/15.
- M. 01718/15: A valuable German report is in N.I.D. 0117/20.

3. The Ships' Logs of the following vessels have been examined:


4. The Signal and W/T Logs of the following vessels have been examined:

5. The Signal Logs only of the following vessels have been seen, but these contain signals made by wireless as well as visual signals:—

Second Battle Squadron.  
Battle Cruiser.  
"Monarch."  
"Lion."  
"Conqueror."  
"Centurion."  
Light Cruisers.  
Third Cruiser Squadron.  
"Southampton,"  
"Antrim."  
"Nottingham."  
"Roxburgh."  

6. The principal signal logs for December 16th are:—

(a) King George V. W/T log, December 8th-22nd. Even day log, Deptford No. 17857. This is carefully written up in pencil.

(b) King George V. Signal log, November 16th-December 26th. Even day log, Deptford No. 16105. This is carefully written up in ink and contains most of the W/T signals.

(c) Lion Signal log, November 20th-December 22nd. Even day log, Deptford No. 11241. This log contains both W/T and visual signals but a number of important signals are not logged though they were evidently received. It is carelessly written up in pencil, and a number of signals covering 54 pages and timed between 0657 and 1540 have been inserted out of their proper order after 1600.

7. In view of the frequency with which times have to be mentioned in the text, the twenty-four hour system has been adopted throughout, but it was not in use at the time, and therefore a.m. and p.m. times are used in the signals given in the appendices. All times are G.M.T.

In this connection it may be observed that there is frequently difficulty in deciding the actual time a signal was made or received. The times entered in the wireless logs are more or less synchronous but there are very considerable differences in the times attached to signals passed visually. (See note at commencement of Appendix B.)

8. Attention is drawn to the Note on the determination of positions which follows. Besides the track charts which accompany this monograph, a copy of Chart 2182 North Sea, Southern Portion, is essential for reference.

NOTE ON THE DETERMINATION OF POSITIONS.

1. When endeavouring to reconstruct the movements of various ships and squadrons employed in each tactical operation there are four factors to be considered:—

(a) Their tracks, i.e., courses and distances run.

(b) Their estimated geographical positions by observation or dead reckoning.

(c) Their relative positions.

(d) Their actual geographical positions.

2. One of these factors, the first and second are comparatively easy to determine if the courses, speeds and times have been accurately recorded. The actual track of a ship for a limited period should not differ greatly from that obtained by using the data in the ship's log, due allowance being made for currents and tidal streams.

By comparison with the estimated positions given in logs, signals &c., which are presumably based on the same data it is not difficult to arrive at a reasonably accurate estimate of the actual courses and distances covered.

3. The determination of the relative positions of different squadrons proceeding independently is not so simple unless records of bearing and distance have been kept, which is not always the case even when they are in sight of each other. If they are not in visual touch the difficulties are considerably increased.

In the present case there are only two direct items of information with regard to the relative positions of the 2nd Battle Squadron and the Battle Cruiser Squadron—one being the report from the "Southampton" at about 0610 that the Battle Squadron was bearing N.N.W. and the other a signal from the "New Zealand" to the "Shark" stating that at 0930 the Battle Squadron bore S. 30° W. 8 miles from the battle cruisers. Unfortunately this latter bearing is almost certainly wrong and so reduces the value of the information.

There are, however, other indications of the relative positions which have been used in compiling the accompanying track chart. In the first place it must be stated that the reckonings of the "Lion" and "King George V." are of little assistance in solving the problem. Their D.R. positions at 0800 are 11 miles apart when in point of fact the "Lion" was maneuvering to take up station 5 miles 270° from the "King George V." and the flagship were then and until 1015 in visual signal touch.

In adjusting the relative positions of the tracks the following facts have also to be borne in mind:—

(a) The two squadrons were not in sight of each other about 1300, and though the visibility was reduced at this time they must have then been at least five miles apart.

(b) The enemy last seen by the "Southampton" at 1155 bearing S. by E. 5 miles was sighted by the battle cruisers at 1205 bearing N. by W. The probably track of the enemy if plotted acts as a check to the relative positions of the two British Squadrons.

(c) The destroyers "Hardy" and "Spitfire" were detached from the battle cruisers about 1315 to proceed to the Humber. They came into visual touch with the battle cruisers about 1345 and this agrees with the relative positions as shown on the chart.

It must be realised, however, that absolute accuracy is almost impossible to obtain, and there is bound to be a certain margin of error. 4. With regard to the actual geographical positions, it is still more dangerous to be dogmatic, and only an approximate solution can be attempted. There are two conditions, however, to be satisfied:—

(a) The "Conqueror" at 1145 and 1200 obtained soundings in 16 and 18 fathoms, which indicates that the Second Battle Squadron must have been to the southward of the southwest patch of the Dogger Bank.

(b) Shortly before altering course to the northward at 1315 the battle cruisers were steaming over the Dogger Bank Patch, and were in shoal water.

The geographical positions as adjusted on the accompanying chart comply with these requirements.

NOTE.

Admiral Scheer's book, "Germany's High Sea Fleet in the World War" (Cassell & Co., 1920), which sheds a good deal of light on the German movements during these operations, was published after this monograph was in the press. It has, however, been possible to insert a few references and notes regarding the subjects which were mentioned, but only to a limited extent.

Admiral Scheer's work is of the nature of an apologia and is at times distinctly unreliable. So far as these operations are concerned, however, there seems no reason to doubt the general accuracy of his account, which is in substantial agreement with British authorities, though unfortunately the amount of information given is often insufficient. Positions are mentioned without times, courses without speeds, and the general outlines can be deduced with reasonable accuracy.

The account of the operations on December 16th will be found on pp. 67-72. A crude diagram of the movements of the High Sea Fleet is given on p. 65.
CHAPTER I.

THE YARMOUTH INCIDENT.

1. The Enemy's Minelaying Policy. — German activity in the North Sea during the first three months of the war was practically confined to minelaying operations off the East Coast of England. These commenced immediately after the outbreak of war, when the converted merchant ship "König Luise" laid a minefield 30 miles off Orford Ness on August 5th, but was speedily intercepted and sunk by the Harwich force. This seems to have convinced the enemy that stronger forces were required, for in the next enterprise light cruisers and destroyers were employed, and it would appear that a preliminary reconnaissance was made, for on August 18th the "Strassburg" was sighted off Smith's Knoll. The "Strassburg" was sighted by the Harwich force when returning, and there was no further enemy activity in the southern part of the North Sea, though on the night of August 25th-26th minelaying operations were carried out in the eastern approaches to the Tyne and Humber.1

In these operations the light cruisers "Stuttgart," "Mainz," and the minelayer "Albatross," with numerous destroyers, are known to have been employed, and several fishing vessels were sunk and their crews captured. About 200 mines were laid in each area.

The action off Heligoland followed on August 28th, when the "Mainz" and two other light cruisers were sunk, and shortly afterwards the situation in East Prussia forced the enemy's fleet to turn its attention to the Baltic.

2. British Intelligence as to German Mining. — That the enemy would devote much attention to minelaying was not unexpected, and before the outbreak of war intelligence had been received which indicated that a number of minefields would be laid off the East Coast in the approaches to the various ports. The mines actually laid were discovered by ships striking them, and on August 25th and 26th the Admiralty promulgated to all ships information that the three areas described below were dangerous, and should be avoided.

(a) The Southold Area, extending between 51° 30' and 51° 55' N. to the west of 3° E. to within 10 miles of the coast.

(b) The Flamborough Head Area, extending between 54° 15' and 53° 30' N., from 5° 30' to 6° 30' E. to within 10 miles of the coast.

(c) The Tyne Area lying between lines running N.E. and S.E. (magnetic) from the mouth of the Tyne and between 20 and 50 miles from the coast.2

It was not the Admiralty policy to attempt any clearance of these mines, which were considered to form a protection to the coast, and they preferred to concentrate attention on sweeping an inshore channel 10 miles wide. The fact that the Germans were using warships to lay mines was not credited at the time, and it was generally thought that fishing trawlers and merchant vessels under a neutral flag were employed for the purpose, a view which had an important bearing on the policy of preventing minelaying from unarmed ships within a distance of about 10 miles from the coast.

3. Sweep Channels. — The minelaying service was rapidly developing during the first months of the war, but the system of sweep channels was then only in its initial stage. The route for coastwise traffic was swept periodically, but to the eastward there was only one regular channel, running from the Cross Sand Light Vessel off Yarmouth to a pillar buoy which had replaced the Smith's Knoll Light Vessel. Another channel running from the Haisbro' Light Vessel, about 30 miles due east, to a position in 54° 55' N., 2° 22' E., had been buoyed and was swept occasionally. The Harwich force when proceeding to the

1 See C.B. 1549, "The Patrol Flotillas at the commencement of the war," for further details.
2 Admiralty telegrams 491 and 518 of August 17th, for further details.

4. British Mining. — In the first days of October a British minefield had been laid in the southern portion of the North Sea to cover the approaches to the Channel, and additional fields were required to extend the operations against the enemy on the Belgian coast developed during the month. The area described as dangerous lay between the parallals of 51° 40' N. (Kentish Knock) and 53° 30' N. (Goodwins), within the meridians of 1° 40' E. and 3° E., but at first only a small portion of this area was considered safe, though obstructions and nets were being hurriedly improvised, and reports of submarines in the Channel had led the Commander-in-Chief to transfer the fleet base to Lough Swilly and Loch-na-Keil (Mull) on October 22nd. While in these waters H.M.S. "Audacious" was sunk by striking a mine off Tory Island on October 27th. This minefield, the first laid by the enemy outside the North Sea, was the result of operations undertaken by the converted liner "Berlin," which was interned at Trondheim, in Norway, on her return journey.

By the end of October the war was already spread to the North of England. The Admiralty telegrams 491 and 518 of August 17th, for further details.

5. The Grand Fleet. — At this time Scapa Flow was still unprotected against submarine attack, though obstructs and nets were being hurriedly improvised, and reports of submarines in the Channel had led the Commander-in-Chief to transfer the fleet base to Lough Swilly and Loch-na-Keil (Mull) on October 22nd. While in these waters H.M.S. "Audacious" was sunk by striking a mine off Tory Island on October 27th. This minefield, the first laid by the enemy outside the North Sea, was the result of operations undertaken by the converted liner "Berlin," which was interned at Trondheim, in Norway, on her return journey.
resumed, apparently with a view to covering the Belgian coast operations, and denying the use of Ostend and Zeebrugge to the enemy's naval forces. In pursuance of this intention it was intended that on the night of November 3rd two mine layers from Portland were to carry out a detached force from Harwich and sweep a minefield between Thornton Ridge and the Scheldt mouth off the south of the German port of Zeebrugge.

LOCAL SITUATION, MORNING OF NOVEMBER 3rd.

9. The Harwich Force.—Meanwhile Commodore T. had been maintaining a patrol in the Broad Fourteens to cover the operations on the Belgian coast, and on November 2nd had received a signal from the Channel Fleet, ordering the force to proceed to Scapa. The “Undaunted” (Capt. A. W. St. John-Williams) and the “Aurora” (Capt. A. G. Hothara), with nine destroyers of the 3rd Flotilla (I class), left Harwich at 0700 on November 3rd to rejoin the Channel Force. The “Aurora” had three destroyers proceeding on the southern channel past the North Light Vessel (off Lowestoft) and was on her way from Yarmouth to Smith’s Knoll.

Admiralty received the first news of the enemy in the form of a signal addressed by Commodore T., which was on her way from Yarmouth to Smith’s Knoll, finding it clear. She had anchored in Yarmouth Roads for the night, and was in charge of the group of trawler minesweepers working from Yarmouth (Gorleston), and on November 2nd had swept the channel from Cross Sand to Smith’s Knoll, finding it free. She had made it fairly clear that the Channel Fleet was proceeding to Scapa, to be followed by the “Iron Duke,” which remained behind for Sir John Jellicoe, then on his way from London after the conference of November 1st and 2nd.

Admiral Beatty was directed to use his discretion as to proceeding from Cromarty to Yarmouth with his battle cruisers, in order to cut off the enemy, and the light cruisers from Scapa were ordered to join him. He sailed at noon that day.

The Channel Fleet was ordered from Portland to Spithead, and the “King George V,” which had just arrived at Portsmouth for refit, was ordered to join it. The “Irresistible” from Dover and the “Queen” from Sheerness were to concentrate at the Tongue Light Vessel, and four submarines from Sheerness were sent to join them.

The Dover and French submarines were to take up their stations in the Channel. Admiral Hood on the Belgian coast did not receive the news till the afternoon, when he apparently returned from Dunkirk with all destroyers.

12. The Movements of the Harwich Force.—On intercepting the “Halcyon’s” first signal at 0721 on November 3rd, Commodore Tyrwhitt ordered the “Undaunted” and “Aurora,” to proceed towards Smith’s Knoll and support her, but at 0805, after hearing that the enemy had cleared off, he ordered the forces on patrol to proceed towards Terschelling in order to intercept the enemy. The “Aurora,” however, did not receive this signal.

The Commodore himself with the “Arethusa,” “Fearless,” and five destroyers had returned about 0900 and proceeded by the inshore channel towards position Y 53° N. 3° 13’ E. Meanwhile, the “Undaunted,” on her way to Terschelling, had sighted four enemy cruisers in 53° N. 3° 30’ E. (some 45 miles west of the Texel), which chased her north and which she reported as two Roan class and two “Room” class, as far as the light cruisers from Scapa were ordered to join him. He sailed at noon that day.

The Harwich Force remained in the Broad Fourteens to cover the operations on the Belgian coast; and on November 2nd had swept the channel from Cross Sand to Smith’s Knoll, finding it clear. She had anchored in Yarmouth Roads for the night, and was in charge of the group of trawler minesweepers working from Yarmouth (Gorleston), and on November 2nd had swept the channel from Cross Sand to Smith’s Knoll, and in the neighbourhood during the night, being actually in position Y at 0800 November 3rd.

The “Undaunted” with six destroyers proceeded on the southern channel past the North Light Vessel (off Lowestoft) and was on her way from Yarmouth to Smith’s Knoll.

10. Yarmouth.—The torpedo-gunboat “Halcyon” (Commander G. N. Ballard) was in charge of the group of trawler minesweepers working from Yarmouth (Gorleston), and on November 2nd had swept the channel from Cross Sand to Smith’s Knoll, finding it clear. She had anchored in Yarmouth Roads for the night, and at 0630, November 3rd, got under weigh to investigate a report of drifting mines near Smith’s Knoll. At 0706 she was in 52° 34’ N. 1° 57’ E., about 8 miles from Sheerness, chased by sighted vessels to the eastward, and at 0710 she distinguished two four-funnelled cruisers, four four-funnelled and two more cruisers, all steering S.S.W., which, after making a sharp right turn, were sighted about 0730 a heavy fire on her.

The “Lively” (Liet. Builloc-Crofton) was about 2 miles to the southwest of the “Halcyon,” patrolling the eastward, and two miles astern of her, near the South Scroby buoy, was another destroyer, the “Leopard.”

The “Halcyon” on coming under fire at once turned back, and the “Lively” took station on her port quarter and made a smoke screen. The “Leopard” also closed, and both destroyers came under a heavy fire, but were not hit. The “Halcyon” was slightly damaged, but at 0740 the enemy turned away to the E.S.E. and ceased fire. The destroyers endeavoured to keep touch, but the German ships were soon lost to sight.

According to reliable German accounts their squadron on this occasion included the battle cruisers “Seydlitz,” “Moltke,” and “Von der Tann,” the armoured cruisers “Bliicher” and “Yorck,” and the light cruisers “Kolberg,” “Graudenz,” and “Strassburg.”

11. Admiralty Intelligence and Orders, Nov. 3rd.—At 0721, November 3rd, the Admiralty received the first news of the enemy in the form of a signal addressed by Commodore T., to all ships, stating merely that she was engaged by superior force and required reinforcement. No details of the composition of the enemy’s force were given, but the enemy herself was already known to have been in sight of Lowestoft.

At 0745 (“Halcyon,” Commander G. N. Ballard) received a signal from Lowestoft S.S., received Admiralty 7.42 a.m. “Enemy have now cleared off. Am now coming into Roads.” in support of the operation ordered for that night. (See para. 8.)

13. Resumption of Normal Conditions.—The report from the “Undaunted” at 0940 had made it fairly clear that the enemy had cleared off, and that the situation was therefore eased.

On October 17th the forces engaged in this action had sunk four small German T.B.’s.

On October 24th the force in action had sunk four small German T.B.’s.

On October 24th these reports were confirmed by the sinking of the Torpedo-gunboat “Halcyon” to Lowestoft S.S., received Admiralty 7.42 a.m. “Enemy have now cleared off. Am now coming into Roads.” (0745) (sic.)

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It appears to have been the first time a smoke screen was actually used in action.

“Halcyon” to all ships: “Am engaged by superior force, four, require reinforce-
ments.”

“Halcyon” to Lowestoft S.S., received Admiralty 7.42 a.m. “Enemy have now cleared off. Am now coming into Roads.” (0745) (sic.)

1 On October 17th the force engaged in this action had sunk four small German T.B.’s.

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3 “Halcyon” to all ships: “Am engaged by superior force, four, require reinforce-
ments.”
CHAPTER II.

PRELIMINARY ORDERS AND DISPOSITIONS.

17. The news of Admiral Sturdee's victory off the Falkland Islands reached the Admiralty on the evening of December 9th, and disposed of any anxiety as to our foreign stations, but it was evident that some time must elapse before its full effects could be felt in the home theatre of war. It might be expected that the Germans would realise this fact and attempt to take advantage of our temporary weakness, and on December 11th a telegram was despatched to Sir John Jellicoe giving an appreciation of the situation.

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[Excerpts from the text]
in-Chief to the forces originally specified by the Admiralty, in order to compensate for the two light cruisers "Liverpool" and "Lowestoft."

The position (54° 10' N. 3° E.) selected for the rendezvous is on the line joining Heligoland-Tyne and Heligoland-Humper, and barely seventy miles north of the track between the German fortress and Yarmouth.

At 7.30 a.m., December 16th, the detachment from the Grand Fleet would therefore be in a most favourable position for intercepting any enemy squadron returning from the English coast.

Orders to Harwich Force.—At 0155, on December 15th, orders were sent to the Commodore (S.) at Harwich to concentrate all available overseas submarines off Gorleston (Yarmouth) by 1000 as a preparative measure. If they were then told to carry out the plan ordered they were to spread on a line running S.S.E. from a position (53° 30' N. 4° 30' E.) (thirty miles north-west of Terschelling) to the ten fathom line off the Dutch coast.²

As the Commodore (S.) was reluctant to proceed during the dark hours with so many submarines through the channel led from the Haisboro' Light Vessel north of the Southwold mine area, the Admiralty ordered the submarines to leave by the most suitable route in order to take up the patrol line ordered by daylight on December 16th, and at 1400 eight submarines left Harwich to proceed to their station by the southern route sid the North Hinder Light Vessel.

The Commodore followed at 1700 with the "Lancaster" and "Firedrake," which were to scout to the eastward.²

At 1100 on December 15th, orders were sent to Commodore (T.) instructing him to concentrate the First and Third Flotillas with all available light cruisers off Yarmouth by daylight. They were to be under weigh and ready to move to any point where the enemy might be reported, in order to get in touch with them and keep the Grand Fleet Detached Force informed of their movements.²

Orders to other Forces.—The orders to the main forces engaged in the operations having been despatched, the Admiralty proceeded to arrange for certain precautionary measures on the part of the various patrol forces. Admiral Ballard was instructed that the flotillas under his command should be specially alert on the morning of December 16th, being under weigh off their bases before daylight in positions suitable for rapid communication.³

20. Orders to Harwich Force.—At 0155, on December 15th, orders were sent to the Commodore (S.) at Harwich to concentrate all available overseas submarines off Gorleston (Yarmouth) by 1000 as a preparative measure. If they were then told to carry out the plan ordered they were to spread on a line running S.S.E. from a position (53° 30' N. 4° 30' E.) (thirty miles north-west of Terschelling) to the ten fathom line off the Dutch coast.²

21. Orders to other Forces.—The orders to the main forces engaged in the operations having been despatched, the Admiralty proceeded to arrange for certain precautionary measures on the part of the various patrol forces. Admiral Ballard was instructed that the flotillas under his command should be specially alert on the morning of December 16th, being under weigh off their bases before daylight in positions suitable for rapid communication.³

22. Summary of Admiralty Dispositions.—It will be seen that in order to meet the situation which would arise from the appearance of enemy battle cruisers accompanied by light cruisers and destroyers, the Admiralty ordered the Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet, to proceed to the south of the Southwold mine area, half-way between the English and Dutch coasts, the southern route sid the North Hinder Light Vessel. The Harwich Force of light cruisers and destroyers were to assemble off Yarmouth at dawn ready to move to any point and get in touch with the enemy. In this position they were over 100 miles to the south-westward of the rendezvous of the main forces. Two isolated destroyers were detached in the hope of gaining early information, one to the north of the Southwold mine area, half-way between the English and Dutch coasts, the other to the south of the same area near the North Hinder Light Vessel.

In addition to these forces eight submarines were spread on a line stretching 30 miles offshore from the north-western corner of Holland across the route from the German ports to the southern portion of the North Sea.

23. Details of Forces:

Second Battle Squadron, Vice-Admiral Sir George Warrender.

Battleships:
- "King George V." (Flag).
- "Tigre." (Flag).
- "Orion." (Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot.)
- "Centurion." (Flag.)
- "Monarch." (Flag.)
- "Dauntless." (Flag.)
- "Conqueror." (Flag.)

Note. — "Thunderer" was refitting at Devonport.
Attached cruiser — "Boadicea."

Battle Cruiser Squadron, Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty.

"Lion." (Flag.)
"Tiger." (Flag.)
"Queen Mary." (Flag.)
"New Zealand." (Flag.)

Third Cruiser Squadron, Rear-Admiral W. C. Pakenham.

"Aurora." (Flag.)
"Devonshire." (Flag.)
"Arly." (Flag.)

First Light Cruiser Squadron, Commodore W. E. Goodenough.

"Southampton." (Broad Pendant.)
"Falmouth." (Broad Pendant.)
"Blanche." (Broad Pendant.)

Two Divisions of Fourth Destroyer Flotilla (seven boats).

"Lynx." (Commander R. Parry.)
"Shark." (Commander Loftus W. Jones.)
"Ambuscade." (Flag.)
"Arista." (Flag.)
"Hasty." (Flag.)
"Spitfire." (Flag.)

Harwich Force, Commodore Reginald Tyrwhitt.

Light Cruisers:
- "Aurora." (Broad Pendant.)

¹ A. 24, 27, 28, 50.
² A. 23.
³ A. 29.
Warrender altered the speed to be maintained after reaching the rendezvous to too slow in view of the submarine menace, and he also asked when and where hostile flotillas in the event of Commodore T. with the Harwich Force failing to join.5 * special attention was drawn to the danger which might be anticipated from the strong cruisers in action would be to engage the German light cruisers and destroyers, and the battle squadron while steering east, precede it when steering west, and make every concentrated.

after joining the battle squadron he was informed by Sir George Warrender of the 

Squadron from Rosyth were sighted, so that before dark the whole force was returned to the original rendezvous, when if nothing had been reported he would steer 90° at 14 knots till

position ordered at 0730, December 16th, he intended to steer 90° at 14 knots till

1030, and then, turning 16 points, would steer 270° until by 1330 he would have

149° from a point in latitude 56° on the meridian of Greenwich as dangerous. That is to say, all the waters within 50 to 60 miles of the English Coast were regarded as being possibly mined, and the whole area was considered as a minefield, and is so marked in signal.

In reply to Sir David Beatty's signal, the Vice-Admiral of the Battle Squadron informed him of the limiting line, and that mines had been reported just outside it.

Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty meanwhile left Invergordon with his four battle cruisers at 0600, the seven destroyers of the 4th Flotilla proceeding independently, and at 1100 he effected his junction with the 2nd Battle Squadron in a position 58° 20' N., 1° 30' W. off the Moray Firth. At 1500 the four ships of the 3rd Cruiser Squadron from Rosyth were sighted, so that before dark the whole force was concentrated.

29. The Destroyer Action, December 16th.39—During the night the destroyers apparently steered a course somewhat more easterly than that of the main body, and the commander of the leading destroyer sighted a destroyer* on her port bow, which, when challenged, replied with

* A. 11. 1 A. 12.

18 knots, and requested the Admiralty to order the Commodore T. to join him at 0730, December 16th.3

26. The Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet, when detailing his dispositions early on December 15th had stated that it was very desirable that the Harwich Force should join the Detached Force, and on the morning of the 15th, when reporting the return of the "Boadicea" and "Blanche," repeated that it was "very important" that the Commodore T. should join in the event of an engagement. This reached the Admiralty at 1219 on December 15th, and an hour later the signal from Sir George Warrender was received asking that the Harwich Force should be directed to join at 0730, December 16th.2

As it was believed that three German flotillas—33 boats at full strength—might be present, whereas there were only seven destroyers with the Grand Fleet detachment, this anxiety was natural, but the Admiralty order to Commodore T. Archib, sent out at 1405, only directed him to be under weigh off Yarmouth at daylight, in which position he would be 100 miles as the crow flies and 115 by the sweep channel from the Second Battle Squadron's rendezvous.

27. The German Minefields.—In December 1914 the method of promulgating information with regard to German minelaying had not been elaborated, and no periodical mine charts were issued, the only special charts in existence being those showing the swept war channel up the East Coast of England.4 The Vice-Admiral of the Battle Cruiser Squadron had not been able to obtain these before leaving Cromarty Firth, and accordingly at about 1400 on December 16th asked Sir George Warrender for information with regard to the method of approaching the English Coast south of latitude 55° north.4

As described in Chapter L, it was definitely known that German minefields were in existence off the Tyne, the Humber, and the Norfolk and Suffolk coasts, and the areas to be considered dangerous had been promulgated to all ships. In addition to these, however, it was believed that the enemy would probably lay other mines off the North East Coast, and the information supplied to Sir John Fisher, which he sent to the whole of the North Sea lying to the west of the line from 149° from a point in latitude 56° on the meridian of Greenwich as dangerous.

That is to say, all the waters within 50 to 60 miles of the English Coast were regarded as being possibly mined, and the whole area was considered as a minefield, and is so marked in signal.

in reply to Sir David Beatty's signal, the Vice-Admiral of the Battle Squadron informed him of the limiting line, and that mines had been reported just outside it.

28. Night Cruising Disposition.—Before nightfall the various squadrons took up their stations for the night. The Battle Cruiser Squadron was placed five miles ahead of the "King George V." with the light cruisers five miles on Beatty's starboard beam, and the Third Cruiser Squadron disposed similarly to port. The destroyers were stationed ten miles distant on the port beam of the "King George," and soon lost touch with the big ships, the night being overcast and moonless.

Before darkness rendered visual signalling almost impossible, Sir David Beatty informed the cruiser squadron that at 0730, December 16th, he intended to alter course to the northward in order to reach the rendezvous at 0750, and would then follow the battle squadron toward the eastward. Both cruiser squadrons were to close in at daylight and establish visual communication with the "Lion."9

The course during the night of December 15th was S. 17° E. (148°), the speed 14^1/2 knots, and the position of the "King George V." at 2000, 56° 30' N., 0° 40' E.

The Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet, when detailing his dispositions early on December 15th had stated that it was very desirable that the Harwich Force should join the Detached Force, and on the morning of the 15th, when reporting the return of the "Boadicea" and "Blanche," repeated that it was "very important" that the Commodore T. should join in the event of an engagement.
green and white lights. The Captain of the "Lynx," concluding that she was hostile, opened fire and chased her to the northward, being followed by the other destroyers.

At 0610, however, an important signal with regard to the enemy had been received, though Sir David Beatty was not yet aware of it. At about 0700 the "Shark" reported that she was in touch with the "Lion" and five destroyers steering east, and gave her position at 0705 as 54° 22' N., 3° 20' E., or 16 miles south-east of the battle squadron. Sir David Beatty ordered the battle cruisers to alter course 16 points to follow them. Seven minutes later course was altered to 54° 10' N., 3° E., and then turned to the eastward. The battleships proceeded to zigzag at 18 knots on a mean course of 90°, while the battle cruisers, which were to the southward of them, altered course 10 points at 0730 in order to take up the pre-arranged position five miles astern of the battle squadron. Sir David Beatty and Sir George Warrender's plan (para. 25) of steering to the eastward, followed by the cruiser squadron, had been confirmed, and they continued to spread to the northward, but the Second Battle Squadron were not at the time affected by the destroyer action. The High Sea Fleet were to the effect that the Fleet was to be held back and to avoid any action in which heavy casualties might be suffered. The Fleet was not to accept action outside the German Bight. Von Ingenohl's screening forces were weak, consisting only of the 4th Scouting Group, and he considered they were unable to prevent the British light craft from keeping touch during the day.

31. Movements of Sir George Warrender's Force.—The movements of our main force were not at the time affected by the destroyer action. The Second Battle Squadron and its attendant cruiser squadrons had continued on the pre-arranged course during the night, and the first news indicating the presence of the enemy was received at 0540 from the "Lynx" to the effect that she was chasing hostile destroyers to the north-west. A series of intercepted signals showed that German cruisers had been sighted, and both the "Ambuscade" and "Hardy" damaged. Though a large number of signals were received by the flagship the situation remained obscure, especially as no position had been given to the various reports. The "Lion" had observed gunfire to the north-eastward between 0550 and 0600, which must have given some idea of the position of the destroyer action, but nothing could be done till daylight to support our destroyers, and in view of the strict orders against the use of wireless, Sir George Warrender refrained from making any signals to the destroyers or reporting the action to the Commander-in-Chief.

The cruiser squadrons commenced to close in on the "Lion" at daylight, and by 0710 the squadrons under Sir David Beatty were in visual touch with the Second Battle Squadron, which at 0717 had by their reckoning reached the rendezvous (54° 10' N., 3° 20' E.), and then turned to the eastward. The battleships proceeded to zigzag at 18 knots on a mean course of 90°, while the battle cruisers, which were to the southward of them, altered course 10 points at 0730 in order to take up the pre-arranged position five miles astern of the battle squadron. Sir David Beatty and Sir George Warrender's plan (para. 25) of steering to the eastward, followed by the cruiser squadron, had been confirmed, and they continued to spread to the northward, but the Second Battle Squadron were not at the time affected by the destroyer action. The High Sea Fleet were to the effect that the Fleet was to be held back and to avoid any action in which heavy casualties might be suffered. The Fleet was not to accept action outside the German Bight. Von Ingenohl's screening forces were weak, consisting only of the 4th Scouting Group, and he considered they were unable to prevent the British light craft from keeping touch during the day.

As a result, therefore, of the intelligence received from the "Shark," Sir George Warrender's plan (para. 25) of steering to the eastward, followed by the cruiser squadron until 1030 and then returning towards the English coast, with Sir David
Beatty’s force ahead of the battleships, had been abandoned, and the battle cruisers and light cruisers were engaged in chasing to the north-eastward in an endeavour to establish contact with the German forces which had attacked our destroyers and were actually a portion of the High Sea Fleet.

News of the German Raid on the Coast.—Hilberto there had been no news of the anticipated hostile operations on the East Coast of England and attention had only been directed to the German forces to the north-east of the Great Yarmouth. At 0842, however, a signal was intercepted from the light cruiser “Patrol” of the Ninth Destroyer Flotilla, reporting that she was being heavily engaged with hostile light cruisers and a signal from Scarborough to the Admiralty stating that this place was being shelled at 0830. In view of this intelligence, Sir David Beatty, at 0854, altered course to north, which had the effect of closing the “Shark,” and also prevented his force drawing away from the English coast.

Between half-past eight and nine two signals were despatched from the Admiralty to Admirals Warrender and Beatty giving information of an enemy attack on Scarborough. One was sent at 0835 and another at 0839 (B. 49, 59). The first reached the “Lion,” at 0836, but apparently was not received by the “King George V. till 0.91. It stated that Scarborough was being shelled at 1820, an error which caused some misunderstanding but did not affect subsequent operations. The second, sent at 0900, was received by the “Lion” at 0911, and in view of these two signals Admiral Beatty turned some six points to port and shaped course W.N.W. for Scarborough.

The “King George” had meanwhile intercepted the signal from the “Patrol” (0842) and Sir George Warrender immediately ordered Admiral Beatty to rejoin him (0906) and steered in his direction, evidently under the impression that the attack was being delivered off the Humber, and with the intention of shaping course thither, for he informed Admiral Beatty at 0907 that he was steering in that direction. Beatty replied that in view of Admiralty signal 0900 he was steering W.N.W., and Sir George Warrender immediately ordered Admiral Beatty to rejoin him (0906).

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Battle Squadron, which was already proceeding to sea to carry out firing off the Firth of Forth, was directed to join the Second Battle Squadron. The latter was described as steaming for the Humber—an error evidently due to Sir George Warrender’s signal (para. 32).

These orders to the Third Battle Squadron, however, were superseded by a signal from Sir John Jellicoe, ordering Admiral Bradford to proceed to position 55° 50' N., 1° 10' W., (off York) with all available cruisers, except the three from the Firth of Forth, in order to intercept the enemy if they came north. Sir John Jellicoe reported later that the Grand Fleet, which had been at one hour’s notice for steam since 0400, would be leaving harbour between noon and 1300. None of these forces, however, succeeded in establishing contact with the enemy.

Sir David Beatty directed Commodore Goodenough that his principal duty was to prevent hostile light cruisers sighting our main forces. Sir George Warrender at 0930 informed Admiralty Beatty that the light cruisers must get in through the supposed minefields to locate the enemy. Almost simultaneously, Sir David Beatty directed Commodore Goodenough that his principal duty was to prevent hostile light cruisers sighting our main forces.

Shortly afterwards Admiral Warrender asked the Admiralty whether it would be safe to go straight across the minefields, and meanwhile continue on his course. The battle cruisers, however, which were somewhat to the northward, at 1000 altered course to N. 40° W., in order to avoid passing over the south-west patch of the Dogger Bank, a bad bit of ground with a least depth of seven fathoms and several wrecks scattered over it. Sir David Beatty, when informing Admiral Warrender of this, added that the enemy appeared to be working up the coast, an opinion probably based on the fact that the enemy had been reported first off Scarborough, then his light cruisers off Hartlepool, and finally his destroyers off Hartlepool, for the signals received had not made it clear that the Germans had bombarded both places almost simultaneously.

Sir George Warrender apparently agreed with this opinion, as, in replying to Admiral Beatty’s signal, he expressed a hope that the battle cruisers might cut off the enemy north of the Dogger Bank, and altered course to follow them.

Very shortly after this, however, an important signal was received from the Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet, informing the Admirals Commanding that it was believed a gap existed in the German minefields between 54° 40' N. and 54° 20' N., which had been attacking the coast would come out there.9 This was the first indication received of the probable movements of the enemy after leaving the coast.

184 and at 1035 the Second Battle Squadron altered course to 270° as to steer straight for the southern portion of this “Gap,” passing south of the Dogger Bank. At 1035 the battle cruisers were ordered to keep south of the Dogger Bank and go through the “Gap,” of which intelligence had been received, but by this time they had proceeded too far on their north-westerly course and could not return to the southward. Sir David Beatty replied that at 1100 he would alter course to W.N.W., and proceed with his light cruisers spread ahead to fill the gap.1 Thus the Second Battle Squadron and Third Cruiser Squadron were proceeding south of the Dogger Patch, while the battle cruisers with the light cruisers were about to pass north of it.

The two portions of the Grand Fleet force seem to have lost sight of each other shortly after 1030. At about 1050 Sir George Warrender received from the Admiralty the answer to his request as to whether he should enter the minefields. He was directed to remain outside the minefields and endeavour to intercept the enemy on his way back to Heligoland.2

37. At 1100 the Battle Cruiser Squadron altered course to W.N.W., passing to the northward of the Dogger Patch with the light cruisers spread ahead. The order of the light cruisers from south to north was “Southampton,” “Birmingham,” “Nottingham,” and “Falmouth,” the first two being on Sir David Beatty’s port bow and the latter on the starboard bow. The interval between each ship was about 4 miles, and the line on which they were spread was 5 miles ahead of the flagship. It was Sir David Beatty’s intention to alter course to west at noon and steer straight for the “Gap.”3 At 1100 he sent his Senior Officer a brief appreciation of the situation, to the effect that the “Gap” between the minefields should be blocked, and the light cruisers working to the northward and the Third Cruiser Squadron to the southward. The Third Battle Squadron would be off the Farne Islands in case the enemy on the north-eastward was entirely overshadowed by the news from the English coast, as it was not realised that the High Sea Fleet was at sea and close at hand.

36. The Battle Cruisers proceed to North-eastward.—The Grand Fleet detachment was now steering at nearly full speed towards the boundary of the supposed German minefields. The enemy had no information as to where the two portions of the Grand Fleet force seem to have lost sight of each other shortly after 1030. At about 1050 Sir George Warrender received from the Admiralty the answer to his request as to whether he should enter the minefields. He was directed to remain outside the minefields and endeavour to intercept the enemy on his way back to Heligoland.

38. The Harwich Force.—The exact movements of the various components of the Harwich Force need not be given as they exercised no influence on the course of events. The cruisers and destroyer flotillas under Commodore T. left Harwich at 0200 in accordance with Admiralty orders, which had directed them to be under weigh off Yarmouth by daylight. On receiving information of the German raid, the “Fearless” with the Third Flotilla and the “Furious,” with the First Flotilla, were ordered at 0115 to proceed at full speed to join the Battle Fleet.4 The Admiralty orders to get in touch with the enemy off Scarborough were apparently received later, and at 0945 Commodore T., then off the Would Light Vessel and steering N. 26° E., requested Sir George Warrender, when he intercepted this signal just before the battle cruisers lost touch with the Battle Squadron, expressed a hope that the Harwich Force might be ordered to join, and at 1040 Sir George Warrender directed Commodore Tyrwhitt to proceed with all despatch to a position 54° 20' N., 1° 30' E. This position was on the southern edge of the “Gap,” 65 miles east of Scarborough, and 90 miles from the “Aethusa’s” 0945 position.5 At 1100 the Commodore T. reported his position as being 55° 14' N., 1° 47' E., course N. 5° E. 25 knots. If it had been possible to maintain this speed, the Harwich Force would have reached the appointed rendezvous at about 1245, but the weather grew rapidly worse, the destroyers had to be
sent back to Yarmouth, and the cruisers were forced to reduce speed. At 1320 the Commodore reported that he expected to reach the rendezvous at 1500, but it was too late then to hope to intercept the enemy, and he was ordered to return to his base.

39. The first Contact with the Enemy.—In December, 1914, the various vessels composing a force, when making reports, &c., did not use any system of "reference" positions, but reported their reckoning, as was usual in the days of the war. The result of this was that when—as in the present case—two portions of a force lost sight of each other, there was soon considerable uncertainty as to their relative positions, since the reckonings of the two flagships were in all probability different.

If both flagships had proceeded as anticipated, the situation at noon would have been the battle cruisers in D.R. position 54° 41' N., 1° 43' E., steaming west at 24 knots, with the Battle Squadron distant about 20 miles on the port quarter in D.R. position 54° 24' 30" S., 1° 32' 30" W. Various causes, however, combined to disturb the plans. At 1111 Sir David Beatty reduced the speed of his squadron to 18 knots, probably on account of the change in the weather, which, as already mentioned, was becoming thick. About this time the "Nottingham" lost touch with the "Birmingham", to the southward, and altered course to close inwards—an apparently minor incident which had a considerable consequence.

At about 1115 the "Nottingham" sighted a vessel in the mist to the southwestward, apparently steaming N.W. This unidentified vessel seems to have been soon lost sight of, but at about 1210 the "Southampton", being then 6 miles west of the "Lion", sighted a number of light cruisers and destroyers right ahead. These were identified as a hostile squadron consisting of "one armoured cruiser, two or three light cruisers, and numerous destroyers", which at once altered course to the southward and opened fire. The "Southampton" turned and engaged them on a similar course, and was supported by the "Birmingham", but a choppy sea had already been raised by the increasing wind, and the fire of both sides was ineffective.

About this time the "Nottingham", closing down from the northward, came in sight of the "Lion", and at 1150 was ordered by the Vice-Admiral to resume her look-out station. Unfortunately this signal was addressed to both Light Cruiser Squadrons instead of to the "Nottingham" alone, and the latter ship duly repeated it to the "Birmingham" and "Southampton", which accordingly broke off the action at about 1155, and altered course to the northward to take up their original stations. While steering north the "Southampton" exchanged shots on opposite courses with a three-funnelled German cruiser, believed at the time to be the battleship "Stralsund", but which was actually the "Graudenz", and this vessel followed the others to the southward, where they disappeared in the mist. The enemy was not sighted from the "Lion", nor apparently from the other battle cruisers, though an entry in the "Tiger's" log seems to indicate something of the kind.

41. Situation at Noon.—While steering to the southward the "Southampton", sent two signals reporting that she was engaged with the enemy, but did not make it clear that she had sighted more than one cruiser and a few destroyers. When returning towards the "Lion" after reporting the bearing of the last enemy sighted, Commodore Goodenough was asked by Sir David Beatty what had happened to the other enemy. The commodore evidently read the "position, course, and speed at noon" to the "Lion", and we are therefore given the impression that the enemy had been away from the "Southampton", and were identified as the British cruiser "Humber". The senior British officer, however, does not seem to have been questioned at the time.

The eastward of the battle cruisers. Sir David Beatty considered that the vessels sighted by the "Southampton" were probably a screen of light forces in advance of the German battle cruisers, and continued to steer to the westward in the hope of engaging the enemy's main force.

The Second Battle Squadron had continued to steam along the parallel of 54° 24' without incident. The Third Cruiser Squadron was spread on a line S.S.W. from the "King George V." Sir George Warrrender reckoned that at 1120 he would reach the line of the Dogger Bank Patch, and be then intended to cruise back and down parallel to the limit of the minefields and about 10 miles outside them. The Battle Squadron would alter course every 15 minutes, and the Third Cruiser Squadron was to steer to the north-westward.

42. Second Contact with the Enemy.—At about 1200 the "King George V." sighted a number of hostile destroyers and light cruisers on her starboard bow, steering south-eastwards at high speed, and changed course to the north-westward, and at 1215 he ordered the Second Battle Squadron, Sir George Warrrender ordered the Third Cruiser Squadron to follow him, and hauled round to N.E. by E., in an endeavour to bring the enemy to action. The German force was identical with that engaged by the "Southampton" ten minutes previously, viz., the light cruisers of the 2nd Scouting Group, and the 1st and 9th Destroyer Flotillas. The enemy were only visible intermittently between rain squalls, and though it was nearly half-an-hour before they were finally lost sight of, it was considered impossible to engage them effectively and fire was not opened. The Third Cruiser Squadron had been ordered to take station ahead and attack the enemy destroyers, but they had not sufficient reserve of speed to carry out these orders, and at 1240 Sir George Warrrender, having been outpaced by the enemy light craft, altered course to return to the position south of the Dogger Bank Patch, which he had previously intended to take up.

43. Movements during Afternoon.—Meanwhile Sir David Beatty, after the "Southampton"'s contact with the hostile light cruiser screen, was pressing on to the westward in the hope of sighting the German battle cruisers, which he probably would have done about 1 p.m. had he held on, when at 1225 he received intelligence that the Battle Squadron had sighted the enemy, and were steering south-westward.

The battle cruisers at once altered course 16 points and steered E.S.E. till 1315, when the squadron found itself on the Dogger Bank Patch, and course was altered to the northward to get into deeper water. It was now known that the Battle Squadron was engaging the enemy's light cruisers, but Admiral Beatty was of opinion that the main body of the enemy were still to the westward, and he intended when clear of the bank to patrol to the westward and spread the light cruisers in that direction to search for the enemy. But before this could be done intelligence was received which put a different aspect on the situation. The Admiralty at 1345 informed all ships that the enemy battle cruisers had been in a position 54° 33' N., 1° 07' E., at 1215, steering to the eastward at high speed. This indicated that the enemy were apparently about to pass right over the Dogger Bank Patch, which Sir David Beatty had lost touch with the enemy, but Admiral Beatty was of opinion that the main body of the enemy were still to the westward, and he intended when clear of the bank to patrol to the westward and spread the light cruisers in that direction to search for the enemy.

At 1345 a message was received from the Admiralty stating that the High Sea Fleet was believed to be to the eastward, and warning our squadrons not to go too far in that direction. A further message from the Admiralty was received shortly after 1500, indicating that at 1425 the German battle cruisers had altered course to

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1 B. 160, 113, 163, 176.
2 B. 116, 117, 163, 176.
3 B. 112. This signal evidently read "position, course, and speed at noon," &c., and was the last signal given to the "Lion" at 1100 a.m. This signal, however, does not seem to have been questioned at the time.
4 B. 115. It was probably a cruiser.
5 B. 116, 117, 163, 176.
6 B. 109. "Lion's" position at noon by D.R. 54° 37' N., 1° 45' E. The High Sea Fleet was in approximately 54° 30' N., 5° 40' E. at 1200.
7 B. 163. Sir David Beatty reduced the speed of his squadron to 18 knots, probably on account of the change in the weather, which, as already mentioned, was becoming thick. About this time the "Nottingham" lost touch with the "Birmingham", to the southward, and altered course to close inwards—an apparently minor incident which had a considerable consequence.
8 B. 155. The German force ascribes its escape without loss to the "Southampton"'s contact with the hostile light cruiser screen, was pressing on to the westward in the hope of sighting the German battle cruisers, which he probably would have done about 1 p.m. had he held on, when at 1225 he received intelligence that the Battle Squadron had sighted the enemy, and were steering south-westward.
9 B. 161, 164.
north. It was now impossible for Sir David Beatty’s force to meet them before dark, and at 1545 Sir George Warrender ordered the battle cruiser squadrons to relinquish the chase and rejoin the Battle Squadron in the morning. Both portions of the British force steered to the northward during the night.

44. It was due to the intelligence of our movements furnished by their screen of light forces that the battle cruisers were enabled to avoid our battleships. After bombarding Whitby they seemed to have united somewhere East of that place shortly after 0900. At one o’clock the “Stralsund” signalled that the enemy was out of sight and that the light forces were proceeding on an Easterly course in close order. They held no longer the support of the battle cruisers. C-in-C, saw that the submarine force was within range and at 400 yards range the torpedoes ran harbours. Germans at all, who in the course of December 17 arrived safely back in their own of the German battle fleet, came in sight and he shaped course to the North-West to cut them off; they were zigzagging, and he had to turn with them before he could.

6.20 a.m. An hour later Nasmyth observed a destroyer flotilla coming from the in time. The four submarines, however, were in position. E ll (Lieutenant–till 1.20 a.m., when he was 200 miles from the Bight and could not possibly get there on their return. On the way, another Admiralty message reached him; it was

1.20 a.m. When the submarines’ depot ship and the “Firedrake,” which was the route he had

1. Though the term Grand Fleet had been in general use since the outbreak of war, in the addresses of telegrams and signals the Commander-in-Chief was frequently referred to as C.-in-C., H.F. 2. The term N.I.D. 0117/20 is not to be sent by W/T.
14. From Admiralry.  
To Commodore (S.).  
Date, December 15th.  
Telephone sent, 0826.

Your telephone message.  Remain at Harwich ready for sea.

To Admiralry.  
Date, December 15th.  
Sent, 0816.  
Received, 0900.

65. Seven "E" class, one "D" class, one "S" class, two "C" class, and "Archimede" (French) standing by at Harwich.  
Two "D" class standing by at Yarmouth.

10. From Admiralry.  
To Commodore (S.).  
Date, December 15th.  
Sent, 1115.

137. Your 63. Eight submarines will be sufficient.  Leave by most suitable route in time to be spread on patrol line by to-morrow, daylight.  Passed line extends S.E. to the 10-fathom line from 53° 20' N., 4° 30' E.  Submarines to remain on look-out from darkbreak to nightfall on Wednesday, and then to return to Harwich.  They are also to be ordered to return if weather gets too bad.  Warn them that British ships will also be at sea.  Report whether orders are understood, also time of sailing and proposed route.

11. From C.-in-C., H.F.  
To Admiralry.  
Date, December 15th.  
Received, 1219.

408. Be your 523. "Boudicca" and "Blanche" returned.  "Boudicca" considerably damaged by heavy seas.  Now only four light cruisers with force.  Probably destroyers will be forced to return.  Very important.  (T.) should effect junction in event of engagement.

12. From V.A., 2nd B.S.  
To V.A., 1st B.C.S. (Visual).  
Date, December 15th.  
Passed, 1440.  

German Squadron, four Battle Cruisers, five Light Cruisers, and three Flotillas leave Jade River daylight to-day, return Wednesday night.  Am proceeding to R.V. 54° 10' N., 3° 5' E., 7.30 a.m.  Have to get news from Commodore T. and join him.  If nothing heard at 7.30 a.m., shall steer 90° till 10.30, 270° till 1.30, speed 14 knots, and then return North.  Considering your strength do not get more than five miles from me.  Steering 90° I want you astern, otherwise ahead with 3rd C.S.

13. From V.A., "Lion."  
To V.A. 2.  
Date, December 15th.  
Passed, 1530.

Submit that 14 knots is too slow for menace from submarines after daylight.  Assume when you steer 90° you want B.C.S. and Cruiser Squadrons to westward of you.  Where and when will Commodore T. be expected to join you?  (1320.)

14a. From S.O., 2nd B.S.  
To Admiralry and Aberdeen.  
Date, December 15th.  
Received, 1259.

Having for C.R.D.'s with me.  Commodore T. should join me at 7.30 a.m.

14b. From V.A., "Lion."  
To V.A. 2.  
Date, December 15th.  
Passed, 1547.

I will steam at 18 knots to the eastward and probably zig zag.  I want cruisers astern to West of me as I anticipate enemy coming from English coast.  Commodore T. is to shadow enemy and inform me.  I have asked for him to join me at 7.30 a.m. at rendezvous.  90° means East true, 270° means West true. (1355.)

15. From Admiralry.  
To Commodore T.  
Date, December 15th.  
Sent, 1403.

273. There is good probability of German Battle Cruisers, cruisers, and destroyers being off our coast to-morrow about daylight.  One "M" class destroyer is to patrol vicinity of N. Hinder Light Vessel from midnight till 9.00 a.m.  A second destroyer is to patrol a line extending S., (mag.) from position 53° 5', 3° 2' E. from midnight to 9.00 a.m.  The duty of duty destroyers is to look out for and report the enemy and trust to their speed to escape.  If the weather is too bad they are to return to Harwich.  Report their names.

The First and Third Flotillas with all available light cruisers are to be under weigh off Yarmouth before daylight to-morrow ready to move to any place where the enemy may be reported from, whether it is to the northward or southward.  Their duty is to shadow in touch with the enemy, follow him and report his position to the V.A., 2nd B.S. and V.A., 1st B.C.S.

16. From V.A., "Lion."  
To V.A. 2.  
Date, December 15th.  
Passed, 1416.

Have you any recent information re approaching English Coast, South of 55°?  Special swept Channel Chart was not obtained before sailing. (1350.)

17. From V.A., 2.  
To V.A., "Lion."  
Date, December 15th.  
Passed, 1415.

Do not go inside a line drawn 149° from a position 56° N., 0° E.  Mines have been reported just outside this line, especially on one between 1st Lt. 54° 9', 2° 30' W. (1355.)

18. From V.A., 2.  
To V.A., "Lion."  
Date, December 15th.  
Passed, 1420.

Warn your ships to look out for our destroyers at 7.30 a.m. and that the destroyers distinguishing sign is a Y shape. (1555.)

19. From Commodore S.  
To Admiralry.  
Date, December 15th.  
Sent, 1443.  
Received, 1520.

64. Your 137. Orders understood.  "Archimede" and seven "E" class left 2.30 p.m., Hinder Ruytingen (West End).  It is believed some German ships will be sent out to-night.  "Lancher" and "Firedrake" leaving 5 p.m. will steer eastward of line.  Please inform me what British ships may be sent.

20. From V.A., "Lion."  
To "Southampton," Antrim.  
Date, December 15th.  
Passed, 1455.

If no other orders are received by 7.30 a.m. I shall alter course to the northward to arrive at rendezvous 54° 10' N., 3° 0' E. at 7.30 a.m., when course will be altered 90° to follow 2nd B.S. You will then alter course to southward and get in visual touch with me.  Report if all instructions are clear.  That is all I have received. (1450.)

To V.A., "Lion."  
Date, December 15th.  
Passed, 1500.

Course and speed will be altered without further signal to 141 kts, at 4 p.m. and S. 17° E. and will be maintained during night. (1539.)

(Passed to cruiser squadrons.)

22. From V.A., 2.  
To "Shark."  
Date, December 15th.  
Passed, 1555.

Destroyers take station ten miles on port beam, closing in at daylight.  Squadron may be altering to East true at 7.30 a.m.  My present course and speed is 8. 14° E.  16 kts.

23. From Admiralry.  
To Admiral of Patrols.  
Date, December 15th.  
Sent, 1605.

305. All patrol flotillas should be specially alert to-morrow, Wednesday, morning.  Weather permitting they are to be under weigh off their harbours before daylight in such positions that they can be communicated with quickly.

24. From Admiralry.  
To Commodore T.  
Date, December 15th.  
Sent, 1726.

Weather permitting all available destroyers and submarines are to be under weigh to-morrow, Wednesday, before daylight.  The submarines should be spread between S. Goodwin and Outer Ruytingen (West End).  It is believed some German ships will be sent out to-night.  The French should be asked to have their patrols out also.

25. From Commodore T.  
To Admiralry.  
Date, December 15th.  
Received, 1730.


26. From Commodore T.  
To Commodore T.  
Date, December 15th.  
Received, 1919.

430. I do not consider "Galatea" fit for service and have not included her in my orders for to-morrow.

27. From S.O., Dover  
To Admiralry.  
Date, December 15th.  
Received, 1937.

235. Your telegram of to-day.  Orders for submarines to be spread in one line across Straits of Dover conflict with arrangements now in force with French by which I have two lines this side and they have two lines the other side.
It appears to be desirable to adhere to existing arrangements now in force with French by which I have two lines this side and they have two lines the other side. It appears to be desirable to adhere to existing arrangements to prevent confusion with French.

Instructions are requested by telegraph.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>Message</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December 15th</td>
<td>From “Lynx”</td>
<td>S.O., 1st B.C.S.</td>
<td>Am chasing enemy’s destroyers in N.W. direction. 0520.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>From “Lynx”</td>
<td>S.O., 1st B.C.S.</td>
<td>“Ambuscade” needs assistance. 0600.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>From “Lynx”</td>
<td>S.O., 1st B.C.S.</td>
<td>At what speed are you able to go? 0612.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>From “Lynx”</td>
<td>S.O., 1st B.C.S.</td>
<td>Am cut off from “Ambuscade” by cruiser. 0615.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>From “Lynx”</td>
<td>S.O., 1st B.C.S.</td>
<td>Ten knots. 0618.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>From “Lynx”</td>
<td>S.O., 1st B.C.S.</td>
<td>“Hardy” W/T and steering gear disabled, steering from engines. 0620.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>From “Lynx”</td>
<td>S.O., 1st B.C.S.</td>
<td>Lower mess is full up, require someone to stand by me. 0615.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**APPENDIX “B.”**

**TELEGRAMS AND SIGNALS.**

**December 16th.**

**Note.—First time given is that at which signal was passed ascertained from log of ship concerned. Times of other ships are added for purposes of comparison. (w) = wireless log. (s) = signal log. Destroyer signals were passed to “Ambuscade” by “New Zealand,” which was keeping destroyer wave.**

1. From “Lynx.” To S.O., 1st B.C.S. Am chasing enemy’s destroyers in N.W. direction. 0520.
4. From “Lynx.” To S.O., 1st B.C.S. Am being chased by enemy’s cruiser; am steering S.S.W. 0601.
   To “Ambuscade.” 0605.

**Note.—Reply to back 0612.**


**From S.O., 1st B.C.S.**

- Do you have any reports to send? 0615.
- Am following you; have lost “Ambuscade.” 0625.
- From “Lynx.” To S.O., 1st B.C.S. Have reason to believe one destroyer sunk. “Ambuscade” damaged, “Unity” standing by her. 0635.
- From “Lynx.” To “Ambuscade.” How are you getting on? 0650.
- From “Unity.” To “Ambuscade.” What is the matter? 0652.
- From “Southampton.” To Flag. Battle Fleet bearing N.N.W. 0675.
- From S.O., 1st B.C.S. To S.O., 1st B.C.S. Take station N. (true), 5 miles from “Lion,” and spread North (true) for look-out. 0725. (A similar signal stationed the 3rd C.S. South (true):)
- From S.O., 1st B.C.S. To General. After course 16 points to port in succession speed, 18 knots. 0730.
- From S.O., 2nd B.S. To General. “Orion” 0735. 1st B.C.S. 0740 n.m. Turn together 8 points to port. 0735.
- From “Ambuscade.” To “Lynx” and “Unity.” Two shells exploded fore lower mess deck; think oil tanks are pierced; keeping water under present moment and maintaining 10 knots. 0742.
- From “Lynx.” To “Ambuscade.” You are to proceed to nearest port and dock. 0742.
- From S.O., 2nd B.S. To General. Turn together 4 points to starboard, speed 18 knots. 0742.
- From “Lion.” To “Tiger.” 0754.
- To Cruisers. Course N. 76 W. 0755.

**Note.—Reply in “New Zealand” 0756—“Queen Mary” 0758.**

15. From “Unity.” To “Ambuscade.” How are you getting on? 0650.
17. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. To S.O., 1st B.C.S. Take station N. (true), 5 miles from “Lion,” and spread North (true) for look-out. 0725. (A similar signal stationed the 3rd C.S. South (true):)
18. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. To General. After course 16 points to port in succession speed, 18 knots. 0730.
19. From S.O., 2nd B.S. To General. “Orion” 0735. 1st B.C.S. 0740 n.m. Turn together 8 points to port. 0735.
20. From “Ambuscade.” To “Lynx” and “Unity.” Two shells exploded fore lower mess deck; think oil tanks are pierced; keeping water under present moment and maintaining 10 knots. 0742.
21. From “Lynx.” To “Ambuscade.” You are to proceed to nearest port and dock. 0742.
22. From S.O., 2nd B.S. To General. Turn together 4 points to starboard, speed 18 knots. 0742.
27. From “Lion.” To “Tiger.” 0754.

**From S.O., 1st B.C.S.**

- Are you going after “Roon”? 0755.

**From S.O., 1st B.C.S.**

- Are you going after “Roon”? 0755.

**From S.O., 2nd B.S.**

- Shall not go South of this line unless enemy are sighted; keep me informed of your movements. 0750.

**From S.O., 1st B.C.S.**

- “Tiger” 0754.

**From S.O., 1st B.C.S.**

-GRESS. My position is Lat. 54° 22’ N., Long. 3° 20’ E.; am keeping in touch with large cruiser “Roon” and five destroyers steaming East. 0705.

**Note.—New Zealand” was keeping destroyers wave. “New Zealand” wireless log gives time of receipt 0730, but her wireless (auxiliary) log gives 0732. “Monarch” (w) 0732. “Orion” 0730. “K.G.V.” was received auxiliary at 0724, passed to “Lynx” at 0726. “Tiger” (w) 0731. “Ichabod” (w) 0719. Signal given to “Lion” as received by wireless 0720, not in war. Repeated same W/T. “K.G.V.” and on auxiliary W/T by “New Zealand.” “Adonis” (w) 0731.
From S.O., 1st B.C.S.
To 1st Light Cruiser Squadron.
Spend next day look out for "Room." 0825.

From "Shark."
To S.O., 1st B.C.S.
My position Lat. 54° 28' N., Long. 3° 40' E., steering East 22 knots, 0730.

From S.O., 1st B.C.S.
To "New Zealand."
Lion, 0832.

From S.O., 1st B.C.S.
To "Lynx."
Preserve your station on battlehips and look out to southward. 0805.

From S.O., 1st B.C.S.
To "Queen Mary."
Course E. ½ N., speed 24 knots. 0810.

From "Lynx."
To New Zealand.
Have been attacked by four enemy cruisers; believed one of our flotillas has been sunk. "Ambuscade" fore mess deck flooded, "Scourge" badly holed forward, fore magazine and shell rooms flooded; No. 2 stb tank no use. Am proceeding Newcastle for repairs, "Unity" escorting. One man badly hurt. 0815.

From S.O., 1st B.C.S.
To "New Zealand."
Signals from destroyers are being delayed in passing in. Why is this? 0816.

From Flag.
To Southampton. 0815.

From S.O., 1st B.C.S.
To S.O., 2nd B.S.
Am leaving 3rd Cruiser Squadron with you. Am proceeding East with Light Cruiser Squadron to try and cut off "Room." 0817.

From S.O., 2nd B.S.
To S.O., 1st B.C.S.
Shall follow you and retire North at 1400. Do not go too far East, inform me your movements occasionally. 0820.

From S.O., 1st B.C.S.
To 1st L.C.S.
Preserve your Compass bearing. 0825.

From Flag "Lion."
To "New Zealand."
This message 0705 from "Shark" received in "New Zealand." 0825.

From S.O., 1st B.C.S.
To "New Zealand."
How fast can you go for a prolonged chase? 0820.

From "New Zealand."
To S.O., 1st B.C.S.
Your 0816. Auxiliary Office interfered with Main Office readings. Has to wait when signals are faint. 0830.

From S.O., 1st B.C.S.
To "Shark."
Report every half-hour enemy's position, course, and speed. 0830.

From S.O., 1st B.C.S.
To S.O., 2nd B.S.
Have you any news of Commodore (T.)? 0840.

From "Shark."
To S.O., 1st B.C.S.
Urgent—I am being chased to Westward by light cruisers; my position, Lat. 54° 34' N., Long. 3° 48' E. 0855.

Note.—"Tiger" has "Are we to chase Lioness W. by two-funnel cruiser?"

* Evidently for "Lynx."
* "Scourge" was in Mediterranean. * "Lion's" log says "Fire Queen," a yacht at Portsmouth.

From S.O., 1st B.C.S.
To 1st B.C.S.
Intercepted "Lion," 0842.

From S.O., 1st B.C.S.
To "Apollon."
Heavy engaged two battle cruisers.

From S.O., 1st B.C.S.
To "New Zealand."
Intercepted "Lion," 0844.

From S.O., 1st B.C.S.
To General.
New Zealand, 0855.

To General.
Southampton, 0859.

From Admiralty (703)
To S.O., 2nd B.S.
"New Zealand," 0855.

From S.O., 1st B.C.S.
To General.
"New Zealand," 0859.

Urgent—Scarborough, being shelled. 0830.

From S.O., 1st B.C.S.
To "New Zealand."
"Queen Mary," 0830.

From S.O., 2nd B.S.
To General.
"New Zealand," 0830.

General. "Queen Mary," 0859.

From S.O., 1st B.C.S.
To Admiralty.
"New Zealand," 0859.

From Admiralty (703 Via Ipswich), 0856.


From Admiralty (703 Via Ipswich), 0856.

Note.—"Lion's" signal log luis

"Fire Queen," a yacht at 0815.

From S.O., 1st B.C.S.
To Admiralty.
"New Zealand," 0859.

From S.O., 2nd B.S.
To General.
"New Zealand," 0859.

To General.
"New Zealand," 0859.

From S.O., 1st B.C.S.
To General.
"New Zealand," 0859.

From S.O., 2nd B.S.
To 1st B.C.S.
Rejoin me. 0844.

From S.O., 2nd B.S.
To 1st B.C.S.
Report of Signal 0845, see No. 33.

From S.O., 2nd B.S.
To 1st B.C.S.
"Lion," 0845.

From S.O., 2nd B.S.
To 1st B.C.S.
Joi. 0844.

From S.O., 2nd B.S.
To 1st B.C.S.
"Lion," 0845.

From S.O., 1st B.C.S.
To 1st B.C.S.
I am steering for Humber. 0854.

From S.O., 1st B.C.S.
To 1st B.C.S.
Evidently screen of enemy light cruisers should like to keep light cruisers. 0905.

From "Southampton."
To S.O., 1st B.C.S.
Three columns of smoke N. ½ W. our destroyers. 0910.

From S.O., 2nd B.S.
To Commodore T.
My position S. 82° E. 23 miles from rendezvous steering S. 77° K., 16 knots. Shall retire N. at 1400. 0950.
From S.O., 1st B.C.S. 0933.
Bring your fleet out.

From "New Zealand." 0936.

From "Shark." 0932.
Hartlepool reports 3 three-funnelled cruisers S.E. Urgent. Prepare to join them.

From S.O., 1st B.C.S. 0939.
Admiralty. Intercepted "Lion," 0937.
To S.O., 3rd B.S. Proceed to sea as soon as you are ready. Take destroyers as submarine screen. Further to follow. 0930.

From S.O., 2nd B.S. 0939.
To S.O., 1st B.C.S. Urgent. Light Cruisers must go in through minefield to locate enemy. 0939.

From S.O., 2nd B.S. 0940.
To "New Zealand." Your duty is to clear enemy light cruisers from our front so they will not obtain information as to our position. Do not close me any more. 0941.

From V.A. 2.
To Admiralty.
My position, 5° 17' N., 3° 35' E. I am steering towards Scarborough. 0920.

From "Southampton." 0941.
To S.O., 1st B.C.S. Add to "Shark's" signal. I have been chased by three light cruisers until 0815. They are probably steering east in company with "Hoon." 0942.

From "Shark." Intercepted, "Lion," 0942.
To "Lynx." Present position, Lat. 54° 18' N., Long. 3° 34' E., "Acasta," "Hardy," and "Spitfire" in company, steering east. 0943.

From "Falmouth." Intercepted, "Lion," 0943.
To "King George V." Position of "Shark" when chased at 0830 was Lat. 54° 37' N., Long. 3° 37' E. 0944.

From S.O., 2nd B.S. 0945.
To Admiral.
Is it safe to go straight across minefields? 0941.

To "Shark" and S.O., 1st B.C.S., via "New Zealand." No. 35, 36, 37.

From S.O., 3rd B.S. 1005.
To Admiral.
Is my position, 54° 17', 3° 35' E. I am steering towards Scarborough. 0929.

From C-in-C., H.F. "K.G.V.," 1011.
To S.O., 2nd B.S. Further to follow. 0930.

From S.O., 2nd B.S. 1003.
To S.O., 2nd B.S. Shall have to haul to N. 40° W. to clear S.W. Dogger Bank Patch. Enemy appear to be working up coast. 0930.

From Commodore T., 0940.
To S.O., 2nd B.S. My position at 9.45 a.m. is by Would Light Vessel steering N. 26° W. 25 knots. Request instructions. 1000.

To "Shark." Proceeding Newcastle for repairs, report casualties. 0940.

From C-in-C., H.F. "K.G.V.," 1011.
To S.O., 2nd B.S. Gaps in minefield between parallel Lat. 54° 40' and 54° 20', and as far as 20' E. Long. 3° 51' E. I am steering towards Scarborough. 0900.
From Col-C. H.F. Intercepted, "K.G.V.", 0922.
To S.O., 3rd B.C.S.
Third Battle Squadron proceed Lat. 55° 50' N., Long. 1° 10' W., to intercept enemy if coming north. Take all available cruisers and destroyers. 0930.

From S.O., 2nd B.S.
To S.O., 1st B.C.S.
Dreadnoughts reported off Hartlepool, also three-funnelled cruisers. 0935.

From S.O., 1st B.C.S.
To "Shark.
What course were light cruisers which chased you steering when last seen. 1015.

From "Shark.
Intercepted, "Tiger" (w) 1025.
To "Lynx.
What destroyers have you in company? 0955.

Reply.—"Tulip" in company. 0955.

95. Deleted as unimportant.

97. From S.O., 1st B.C.S.
To S.O., 2nd B.S.
Hope you can collect Commodore (T.) from south. 1030.

98. From S.O., 2nd B.S.
"Orion," 1037.
"Tiger," 1037.
"Falmouth," 1035.

Urgent. Keep south of Dugger, posthurgh gap between Lat. 54° 40' N. and 54° 20' N. up to 20 E. 1035.

Note.—Not logged in "Lion." 1040.

99. From S.O., 2nd B.S.
To Commodore (T.).
Proceed with all dispatch to Lat. 54° 20' N., Long. 1° 30' E. 1040.

100. From S.O., 1st B.C.S.
To "Southampton.
Light Cruisers take station W.N.W. from "Lion" and spread for look-out duties N.N.E. and S.S.W. Shall steer W.N.W. at 1100. 1030.

101. From S.O., 1st B.C.S.
To S.O., 2nd B.S.
Propose to steer W.N.W. at 1100 with light cruisers spread ahead of me to fill gap through minefields. 1035.

102. From S.O., 1st B.C.S.
To "Southampton.
Shall steer W.N.W. at 1100. Shall steer west at noon. Idea is to block gap between minefields. Act accordingly. 1050.

103. From "Shark.
To S.O., 1st B.C.S.
When last seen steering W.S.W., but they probably turned away to eastward. 1055.

104. From Admiralty.
To S.O., 2nd B.S.
164. Urgent. Enemy is probably returning towards Heligoland. You should keep outside minefields and steer so as to cut him off. 1030.


105. From S.O., 1st B.C.S.
To General.
"Southampton," 1101.
"Tiger," 1109.
Course W.N.W. 1100 (visual). 1104.

106. From Commodore (T.).
To S.O., 2nd B.S.
I have ordered destroyers to Yarmouth. 1103.

107. From "Lynx.
To "Ambuscade.
Have given directions for "Unity" to escort "Ambuscade" to Newcastle. 1105.

108. From S.O., 1st B.C.S.
To General.
Speed 22 knots. 1105.

109. From S.O., 1st B.C.S.
To S.O., 2nd B.S.
Think we should block gap between minefields. Light Cruisers to the northward. 3rd Cruiser Squadron to the southward. 3rd Battle Squadron guard Farnley Islands. Commodore (T.) off Falmouth Head. 1050.
From "Nottingham," 141.
To S.O., 1st B.C.S.
Several smokes S.S.W.
1205.

From "Southampton," 139.
To S.O., 1st B.C.S.
What speed?
Reply, 18 knots.
1206.

From "Southampton," 137.
To S.O., 1st B.C.S.
"Lion," 1210.
Enemy's cruisers bearing N. 60 W.
Note 1.—S. by E. in "Southampton's" log: time of look out 1128.
131.

From S.O., 2nd B.S. 1210.
Interropeped, "Lion," 1210.
To S.O., 2nd C.S.
Urgent. At 12.30 I shall alter course to S. 15 E., speed 18 knots. 3rd C.S. is to spread N. 15 W. from me 5 miles apart by 1220. I shall alter course 16 points every quarter of an hour.
1145.

From S.O., 1st B.C.S.
To "Southampton.
What have you done with enemy light cruisers.
1210.

From Admiral of Patrols, 1215.
To S.O., 2nd B.S. and S.O., 1st B.C.S.
I am off Flamborough Head in "Skirmisher." There is no sign of enemy between Flamborough Head and Humber. 1210.

From S.O., 1st B.C.S.
To "Southampton.
Engage the enemy. 1213.

From "Southampton," 1217.
To S.O., 1st B.C.S.
No enemy in sight. 1217.

From S.O., 2nd B.S. 1215.
To S.O., 3rd C.S.
"K.G.V.," 1215.
Follow. 1206.

From S.O., 1st B.C.S.
To Destroyers.
Close me on completion of present duty. 1215.
(See No. 125.)

From "Falmonth," 1220.
To S.O., 1st B.C.S.
Will you please give me your Noon position.
Reply, 56° 36' N., 1° 34' E.

From C.-in-C., G.F.
To S.O., 2nd B.S.
\[ ? \] left 1000 for 25° 50' N., 1° 10' W. 1220.
Note 1.—Presumably Third Battle Squadron.

From S.O., 2nd B.S. 1225.
To 1st B.C.S.
My course is N.E. by E. 1218.

From "Shark," 1225.
To C.-in-C., H.F.
Intercepted, "Tiger," 1225.

From S.O., 1st B.C.S.
To "Southampton.
When and where was enemy last seen. When you sight enemy engage him. Signal to resume station was made in "Nottingham." 1220.

From "Southampton," 1225.
To S.O., 1st B.C.S.
At 1155 bearing Scutia 5 miles steering about S.E. 1225.
162. From Flag (" Lion ").
From Commodore (T.).
From S.O., 1st B.C.S.
From Admiralty.
From S.O., 2nd B.S.
From S.O., 1st B.C.S.

163. To General.
To S.O., 2nd B.S.
To S.O., 1st B.C.S.
To S.O., 2nd B.S.
To S.O., 1st B.C.S.
To S.O., 1st B.C.S.

164. High Sea Fleet is out and was in Lat. 54° 38' N., Long. 5° 55' E. at 1230 to-day, so do not go too S.O., 1st B.C.S. 1427.
From " Lion ".
" Southampton."
I am going to steer North until clear of Bank and then turn West again. Enemy must be to Westward. I want you to extend your distance from me further West.
From " Shark.

From Admiralty.
Course, North.
Course, E. by S., 22 knots.
From S.O., 1st B.C.S.

166. At 12.15 p.m. G.M.T. enemy battle cruisers were in Lat. 54° 38' N., 1° 7' E., steering E. by S., 23 knots. Urgent. 1325.
From Admiralty.
From S.O., 1st B.C.S.
From S.O., 2nd B.S.
From S.O., 1st B.C.S.

167. Turn together to East by South. Speed, 22 knots. 1355.
From Flag (" Lion ").

168. My position Lat. 54° 25' N., Long. 2° 17' E., steering round and round, 1324.
From Flag (" Lion ").
From S.O., 1st B.C.S.
From S.O., 1st B.C.S.
From S.O., 1st B.C.S.

169. From Admiral. To Commodore (T.).
My position Lat. 54° 35' N., Long. 2° 23' E., steering N. 7° E., 15 knots. Urgent. 1325.
From Admiral. To Commodore (S.) and " Adamant "
From S.O., 1st B.C.S.; S.O., 3rd B.S.; S.O., 3rd C.S.
From S.O., 3rd B.S.

170. What is your position ? I fear battle cruisers were, with remainder, seen by me at 1215. 1414.
From Flag (" Lion ").
From S.O., 2nd B.S.
From S.O., 1st B.C.S.
From S.O., 1st B.C.S.
From S.O., 1st B.C.S.

171. " Lion," 1330.
" Southampton.
Return to your base. 1354.
From S.O., 2nd B.S.
From S.O., 1st B.C.S.

172. Course, N. 15° W.
From S.O., 1st B.C.S.
From S.O., 1st B.C.S.
From S.O., 1st B.C.S.

(708.) High Sea Fleet is out and was in Lat. 54° 38' N., 5° 55' E. at 1230 to-day, so do not go too far East. Acknowledge (through a medium power station). 1350.

174. From Flag (" Lion ").
From Flag (" Lion ").
From S.O., 3rd B.S.
From S.O., 3rd B.S.

175. Chase E.S.E. 1408.
Course S.E. by S., 16 knots. 1430.
From S.O., 1st B.C.S.
From S.O., 1st B.C.S.
From S.O., 1st B.C.S.
From S.O., 1st B.C.S.
From S.O., 1st B.C.S.

176. From Admiral.
To Commodore (T.).
From S.O., 2nd B.S.
From S.O., 1st B.C.S.

177. To General.
To General.
To General.
To General.
To General.

178. 1455.
1456.
1450.
1456.
1450.
1450.
APPENDIX "C."

1. Extract from the Log of H.M.S. "King George V." (Flagship, Second Battle Squadron).

16th December, 1914.

Remarks.
7.17, a/c E.S.E. 7.20, a/c S. 15° E., 16 knots.
7.34, a/c 4 points to port. 7.42, a/c 4 points to starboard, 18 knots.
7.50, a/c N. 15° E. 7.53, a/c S. 75° E., zigzagging.
8.18, a/c S. 77° E. 8.30, a/c S. 25° E.
8.50, a/c N.W.W.
9.38, a/c N.W.
10.3, increased to 19 knots. 10.11, increased to 20 knots.
10.55, a/c N. 75° W.
11.30, wind got up from West accompanied by rain, squalls; visibility at times less than 3 miles. 11.41, reduced to 18 knots.
Position, noon (D.R.), 54° 23' N., 2° 22' E.
11.50, passed an empty whaler. 12.15, a/c E.S.E., increased to 16 knots.
12.18, course S. 16° E. 12.40, a/c N. 75° W., enemy's vessels disappeared in mist.
12.5, a/c S. 6° W. 13.11, reduced to 18 knots.
13.24, a/c to N. 13° W.
14.0, 9.6, a/c North.

2. Extract from the Log of H.M.S. "Centurion" (2nd B.S.).

16th December, 1914.

7.00, extended action. 7.20, a/c E.E. increased to 16 knots.
7.35, a/c S. 17° E. 7.33, a/c N. 73° E. 7.43, a/c E. 62° E.
6.50, 54° 63' N., 3° 30' E.
Hands at action stations.
Noon, position 54° 35' N., 2° 30' E.
Made good, 7.30 to noon, N. 53° W. 31'.
4.0, made good, noon to 4 p.m., N. 20° W. 48'.
4.74, a/c North.

3. Extract from the Log of H.M.S. "Orion" (2nd B.S.).

16th December, 1914.

7.21, a/c 108°, 16 knots. 7.29, a/c 15°. 7.33, a/c 60°.
7.41, course 108°, 18 knots. 7.55, a/c 166°. 7.56, a/c 100°.
8.00, course 55°, 19 knots. 8.20, course 85°.
8.33, course 135°. 8.53, course 227°.
9.38, course 270°.
10.02, course 215°.
10.11, 20 knots.
10.28, course 270°. 11.48, 18 knots.
Noon, position D.R., Lat. 54° 33' N., Long. 2° 30' E.
0.18, course 50°, 21 knots. 0.42, course 270°, 18 knots.
1.04, course 180°, 18 knots. 1.28, course 332°, 18 knots.
4.0.

4. Extract from the Log of H.M.S. "Leviathan" (Flagship, First Battle Cruiser Squadron).

16th December, 1914.

6.00, saw flashes of gunfire to N.E.
1st C.S. and 2nd C.S. joined. 7.35, course N. 17° W., 18 knots.
7.59, N. 76° W.
9.0, a/c N. 26° E. Position, 54° 10' N., 3° 3' E.
8.3, E.N.E., 22 knots. 8.10, E. 31° N.
8.15, speed 24 knots. 8.16 a/c E. 8.54, a/c N.
9.3, a/c W.N.W.
10.0, a/c N. 10° W.
11.4, a/c S.W.
11.17, 22 knots.
11.18, 18 knots. Took up position for intercepting enemy's B.C.'s returning eastward.
11.30, "Skeanymhon" and "Birmingham" opened fire on enemy's light cruisers and destroyers.
11.54, a/c S.S.W.
Noon, position 61°. Lat. 54° 33' N., 1° 56' E.
05, a/c W.N.W. 0.35, a/c E.S.E., 20 knots, endeavoring to intercept enemy's battle cruisers reported making to eastward.
1.3, a/c N. 1.25, 16 knots. 1.38, chased E., 22 knots.
1.5, Lat. 54° 45' N., 2° 0' E. 2.2, 24 knots.
2.6, E.S.E. 200 revs. 2.214, a/c S.E.
3.35, 200 revs. 3.45, a/c N. Abandoned chase.
4.0, N. 15° W., 18 knots.

5. Extract from the Log of H.M.S. "Tiger" (1st B.C.S.).

16th December, 1914.

Noon, position 54° 35' N., 2° 0' E.
12.2, heard gun firing on port bow, rang alarms. Enemy's battle cruisers on port hand between 2nd B.S. and 1st B.S.
12.10, heavy squall came over; visibility, 500 yards. Enemy disappeared. Course and speed as requisite.

6. Extract from the Log of H.M.S. "Queen Mary" (1st B.C.S.).

16th December, 1914.

7.30, course and speed as requisite, searching for enemy's ships in neighbourhood of Dogger Bank.
8.0, course and speed as requisite.
11.40, heard gunfire 54° 53' N., 3° 18' E.
11.50, passed an empty whaler.
Noon, position D.R., Lat. 54° 34' N., Long. 2° 5' E., Variation, 14° W. Course and speed as requisite.
4.0.

7. Extract from the Log of H.M.S. "Astraeus" (Flagship, 3rd C.S.).

16th December, 1914.

6.30, course S.S.W., 102 revs.
7.0, exercised action.
7.15, course S. 16° E.
7.30, course as requisite to take station on 2nd B.S.
8.0.
9.0, course and speed as requisite to conform with movements of 2nd B.S.
Noon, position 54° 07' N., 2° 13' E.
Course and speed as requisite.
4.0.

8. Extract from the Log of H.M.S. "Devonshire" (3rd C.S.).

16th December, 1914.

6.28, a/c S.S.W., course and speed as requisite until noon, following and taking station in 1st B.C.S. and 2nd B.S.
7.30, closed in on port beam of 1st B.C.S. Exercised action.
Noon, position D.R., Lat. 54° 15' N., 2° 25' E.
From noon to 2:33, following 2nd B.C.S., made good, N. 25° W. 21'.
3.10, a/c North, N. 15° W.
3.15, 10 knots to take station astern of "Astraeus." Formed single line ahead.

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1 Ship's log, H.M.S. "King George V."
2 Deptford, No. 19648.
3 Deptford, No. 19727.
4 Deptford, No. 19649.
5 Deptford, No. 19719.
6 Deptford, No. 19727.
7 Deptford, No. 19646.
8 Deptford, No. 19634.
Courses and Distances made good.

6.28-8.04, S. 21° W. 19'.
8.04-9.10, N. 78° W. 12°5'.
9.10-10, N. 30° W. 15'.
10-11, N. 70° W. 19'.
11-morn, S. 85° W. 21'.
Noon-3.50, N. 25° W. 21'.

10 December, 1914.

6.34, altered course S. 5° W.
7.30, course and speed as requisite.
Noon, position D.E., Lat. 54° 23' N., Long. 2° 17' E.
12.15, sounded off action.
2.30, dispersed. Watch at defence stations.
3.30, took station 1 mile S.S.W. from "King George V."
4.10, formed single line ahead in open order.

10. Extract from the Log of H.M.S. "Southampton" (1st C.S.).
16th December, 1914.

7.5, ajo to S. 55° E., 10 knots to close 1st B.C.S.
7.17, N. 18° E., 15-5 knots. 7.25, ajo to N.E.N.
7.35, ajo N. 1 E., 20 knots. 7.43, ajo to N. 30° E.
7.50, ajo to N.W. 7.57, N. 60° W. 8.0, East, 18 knots.
8.6, 22 knots. 8.8, N.E.N. 8.13, 24 knots. 1st B.C.S., speed as look-outs ahead of B.C.S.
8.17, East. 8.20, 25 knots.
8.30 a.m. (position), Lat. 54° 10' N., Long. 3° 24' E., 8.30 a.m. and 4 p.m. on December 16th.
8.5, to S. 55° E., 8 knots to close 1st B.C.S.
8.51, to S.E.N., 8 knots to close 1st B.C.S.
8.54, to S. 45° W., 10 knots. 9.03, to N.E.N.
8.57, N. 30° E., 30 knots. 9.0, N. 30° E., 30 knots.
10, D.E., N. 18° N., 30 knots.
10.40, N. 72° W., 25 knots.
11, a/c to N. 10° E., 20 knots. 11.17, a/c to N. 30° E.
11.30, N. 30° E., 20 knots. 11.38, N. 30° E., 20 knots.
12.06, West. 18 knots. 12.16, W.N.W.
12.40, N. 15° E., 25 knots. 12.45, E.S.E.
12.50, N. 45° W., 25 knots. 12.55, N. 30° W.
1.0, N. 45° W., 25 knots.
1.30, N. 15° W., 20 knots.
1.45, N. 15° W., 20 knots.
2.0, N. 15° W., 20 knots.
2.30, dispersed. Watch at defence stations.
Noon, position D.E., Lat. 54° 23' N., Long. 2° 17' E.
6.34, altered course S. 5° W.
7.30, course and speed as requisite.
Position noon lat. and long, in log.

APPENDIX D.

1. The Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleets.
Submitted.

Sir,

In accordance with the Commander-in-Chief's signal 1800 of 19th December, I have the honour to report my proceedings between 6 a.m. and 4 p.m. on December 16th.

APPENDIX D.

1. Extract from the Log of H.M.S. "Birmingham" (1st B.C.S.).
16th December, 1914.

7.30, course and speed as requisite for searching for enemy's raiding force.
11.15, observed enemy's cruisers and T.B.D.'s bearing West in the mist. "Southampton" engaged with 312 knots, and closed "King George V." 8 knots. 9.0 knots to close 1st B.C.S.
11.15, noticed enemy's cruisers and T.B.D.'s bearing West in the mist. "Southampton" engaged with 312 knots, and closed "King George V." 8 knots. 9.0 knots to close 1st B.C.S.
11.15, observed enemy's cruisers and T.B.D.'s bearing West in the mist. "Southampton" engaged with 312 knots, and closed "King George V." 8 knots. 9.0 knots to close 1st B.C.S.
11.15, observed enemy's cruisers and T.B.D.'s bearing West in the mist. "Southampton" engaged with 312 knots, and closed "King George V." 8 knots. 9.0 knots to close 1st B.C.S.
11.15, observed enemy's cruisers and T.B.D.'s bearing West in the mist. "Southampton" engaged with 312 knots, and closed "King George V." 8 knots. 9.0 knots to close 1st B.C.S.
11.15, observed enemy's cruisers and T.B.D.'s bearing West in the mist. "Southampton" engaged with 312 knots, and closed "King George V." 8 knots. 9.0 knots to close 1st B.C.S.
11.15, observed enemy's cruisers and T.B.D.'s bearing West in the mist. "Southampton" engaged with 312 knots, and closed "King George V." 8 knots. 9.0 knots to close 1st B.C.S.
11.15, observed enemy's cruisers and T.B.D.'s bearing West in the mist. "Southampton" engaged with 312 knots, and closed "King George V." 8 knots. 9.0 knots to close 1st B.C.S.
11.15, observed enemy's cruisers and T.B.D.'s bearing West in the mist. "Southampton" engaged with 312 knots, and closed "King George V." 8 knots. 9.0 knots to close 1st B.C.S.
At 5.25 a.m. my helm jammed, causing ship to turn 16 points to port, the remainder of the flotilla following in my wake, and each ship appeared to engage enemy destroyer throughout this turn. Defect to my steering gear was speedily remedied and the flotilla resumed original course and speed. Between 5.30 and 5.35 a.m. "Ambuscade" reported she was badly holed forward and had to quit the line. At this juncture enemy cruiser came up from the Eastward and commenced firing at the flotilla in general and "Hardy" in particular, and "Unity," which I had ordered to stand by "Ambuscade," was unable to do so, owing to fear of being cut off by enemy cruisers, three of which I sighted on my starboard quarter (6.15 a.m.). The leader challenged me, making five green flashes, to which I replied with four white and five green. This appeared to satisfy enemy and he disappeared to the Eastward. As it was now getting light I deemed it expedient to retire, and ordered flotilla to withdraw to the S.S.W., in the hope of meeting battle squadron at daylight. Flotilla now became scattered, and at dawn I found myself with only "Unity" in company. At daylight none of our ships being in sight shaped course N.W. with the object of returning to port for repairs, as No. 2 oil tank had been put out of action and oil available was thus reduced to between 80 and 90 tons. Shortly after this sighted what appeared to be enemy cruiser steering N.W. and bearing E.S.E., distant about 5 miles. I therefore steered to the Westward at full speed for about 20 minutes, when I was no longer in sight, and I reduced speed and resumed my course. During the course of the day got into communication with remainder of flotilla. Gave "Ambuscade" orders to proceed for repairs, detaching "Unity" about midday to escort her.

In conclusion, I would submit that the use of fighting lights be restricted to ships who for some cause or other have to leave the line, as these lights present too good a target; also that loading lights be reduced in brilliancy as much as possible for the same reason.

H.M.S. "Lynx" and "Ambuscade" arrived at Leith on the morning of the 17th instant and have been taken in hand for repairs. I beg to report that the behaviour of the officers and men in H.M. Ship under my command throughout the action was excellent. Firing was deliberate and well under control.

I wish particularly to bring to your notice the way in which Surgeon Probationer R. P. Langford-Jones, although suffering badly from sea-sickness, attended to the wounded man under the very difficult conditions of the ship rolling and washing down.

He damage to enemy destroyer:—

"H.M.S. 'Ambuscade' reports that Lieutenant Colin S. Thomson observed one 4-inch shell in vicinity of enemy destroyer's forecastle, and shortly afterwards a volume of steam rise from her amidships completely enveloping her."

I cannot report with any certainty that this vessel was sunk.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

(R.S.P.) R. St. P. PARR,
Commander.

The Commander-in-Chief,
H.M. Ships and Vessels,
Coast of Scotland.

BRITISH AND GERMAN MOVEMENTS.
16th. December 1914.

(For fuller details see large Track Chart.)

Positions of H.M.S. King George V tug-0 0000
Hatched Areas indicate Areas described by the
Admiralty as dangerous owing to German Mines.
Dotted Area was dangerous owing to British Mines.

German Movements shown in Red.
Track of High Sea Fleet is taken from Admiral
Scheer's book.
NORTH SEA
16th. DECEMBER 1914.

BRITISH AND GERMAN MOVEMENTS.
16th. December 1914.

(For fuller details see large Track Chart.)

Positions of H.M.S. King George V thus:○ 0000
Hatched Areas indicate Areas described by the Admiralty as dangerous owing to German Mines.
Dotted Area was dangerous owing to British Mines.

German Movements shown in Red.
Track of High Sea Fleet is taken from Admiral Scheer's book.

THE ACTION OF DOGGER BANK—24th JANUARY 1915.

NOTE ON SOURCES.

1. The Dogger Bank box in the custody of the Historical Section, Committee of Imperial Defence, contains, amongst others, the following papers:—

(a) Reports.—Despatch from Admiral Commanding First Battle Cruiser Squadron (M. 01014/15, 01136/15, 01137/15); reports from Rear-Admiral, Second Battle Cruiser Squadron, Commodore, First Light Cruiser Squadron, and Commodore (T) (M. 0843/15, 0849/15), and from commanding officers of certain of the ships and vessels engaged, including Captain Alfred Chatfield (Lion), Captain Osmond Brock (Princess Royal), and Captain H. B. Pelly (Tiger), with remarks by Commander-in-Chief. Copies of plans of phases of the action, mentioned in certain reports, are missing.

(b) Signal Logs, &c.—Copies of signal and W/T logs made for Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet. Copy of Lookout, Navigating Officer’s Notebook; this records all alterations of course and other information useful for purposes of checking.

(c) Papers, Miscellaneous.—Information obtained from prisoners of war, translation of German accounts of the action. These papers are of little historical value. Times given are Central European Time (1 hour fast of Greenwich M.T.).

2. Bound Volume of Telegrams, Home, January 23–24, 1915—(H.S. 87) contains telegrams sent from and to the Admiralty prior to and during the action.

3. The Ship’s Logs of the following vessels have been examined:—

First Battle Cruiser Squadron.—Lion, Princess Royal.
Second Battle Cruiser Squadron.—New Zealand, Indomitable.
First Light Cruiser Squadron.—Southampton, Nottingham, Lowestoft.
Flotillas.—Aurora, Undaunted, Meteor.

The logs of Princess Royal and Lowestoft are valuable for plotting the tracks of the Battle Cruiser Squadron and First Light Cruiser Squadron respectively.

4. The Signal and W/T logs of the Iron Duke and Flag and Senior Officers’ ships of the supporting forces and of all ships and vessels engaged have been examined, with a few exceptions (destroyers).

5. Times in general are much at variance and should be accepted with reserve. A note by Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty (M. 01824/15) states that while the times given in the Lion’s signal log are necessarily approximate, those in his despatch are correct. A report (M. 01137/15) by Rear-Admiral Moore states that the times given in New Zealand’s signal log were found to be six minutes fast. In the copies of signal and W/T logs submitted to Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet (see Dogger Bank Box), times appear in certain cases to have been corrected by the light of subsequent information.

6. The following abbreviations are employed in this monograph:—Ship’s log (1), signal log (s), W/T log (w), Despatch or Report by Officer Commanding a squadron, ship, &c. (r).

7. Positions in the North Sea were expressed in wireless signals by giving a true bearing and distance from various lettered rendezvous. Thus a position 53 miles 220° true from rendezvous H would be signalled as 220 H 5-3, the bearing coming first.

The positions of the rendezvous were given in Home Fleet Memoranda (H.F. 0015—positions occurring in text of W/T messages) and altered from time to time. The earliest dates of these Memoranda are December 22nd, 1914, February 22nd, 1915, April 28th, 1915, June 12th, 1916. The Memorandum of December 22nd, 1914, gives the rendezvous in force at the time of the Dogger Bank actions, and though these positions are not required to reconstruct the action, they are necessary in order to verify the exact position of the supporting force.

1 These are bound as volumes H.S. 303.

2 Difficulty was experienced in finding a copy of the memorandum of December 22nd, 1914, but Mr. H. G. A. Leveson, of the H.S. C.I.D., fortunately obtained a copy from the Queen Elizabeth just before the monograph went to press.
THE DOGGER BANK ACTION.

CHAPTER I.

GENERAL DISPOSITIONS.

1. Situation, January 23rd.—At noon on January 23rd, 1915, the various squadrons and forces which composed the Grand Fleet under the command of Sir John Jellicoe, were distributed as follows:—

Scapa Flow - - 1st, 2nd and 4th Battle Squadrons.

Cromarty Firth - - 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron.

Firth of Forth - - 1st and 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadrons.

Harwich - - - 1st and 3rd Destroyer Flotillas.

The position selected as a rendezvous was 180 miles from Heligoland, nearly on a line between that island and the mouth of the Firth of Forth.

A few days previously the Battle Cruiser Squadrons had carried out a sweep into the German Bight, in conjunction with the Harwich Force, and at dawn on January 19th had reached a position 60 miles north-west of Heligoland. Though hostile aircraft were observed, no German vessels were sighted, and the forces concerned returned to their bases on January 20th.

The Germans apparently entertained serious apprehensions at this time that we would try to block the entrance to their ports, and believed our sweep on the 19th to have been associated with some such plan.2 For this and other reasons it was decided to despatch the 1st and 2nd Scouting Groups in the direction of the Dogger Bank in order to reconnoitre that neighbourhood and capture or destroy any British fishing vessels met with.3

2. Admiralty Dispositions to meet the Situation. — During the forenoon of Saturday, January 23rd, intelligence reached the Admiralty of a hostile movement of this sort. The various components of the Grand Fleet were at once warned to be ready to sail that night,2 and at 1445 a telegram was sent giving an outline of the situation, and the measures to be taken with it.4 These orders were elaborated in later telegrams5 into the following scheme of operations:

The two Battle Cruiser Squadrons (five ships) with the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron were to leave Rosyth and proceed so as to reach a position 55° 13' N., 3° 12' E., 250 miles distant, at 0700 on January 24th. There Admiral Beatty would be joined by Commodore (T) with the Harwich Flotillas. The whole force would then operate under the orders of Sir David Beatty, and endeavour to locate and be joined by Commodore (T) with the Harwich Flotillas. The whole force would then operate under the orders of Sir David Beatty, and endeavour to locate and be joined by Commodore (T) with the Harwich Flotillas.

The 3rd Battle Squadron and the 3rd Cruiser Squadron were directed to leave Rosyth after dark and proceed to a position 55° 35' N., 2° 45'E., some 45 miles to the North-Westward of the Battle Cruiser rendezvous, in order to head off the enemy should he be driven north. The Admiralty orders did not specify the time of arrival at the rendezvous, but as it was 190 miles from Rosyth and the 3rd Battle Squadron could steam at over 15 knots it might be anticipated that it could reach it by dawn; Admiral Bradford subsequently reported to the Commander-in-Chief that he expected to arrive there at 0745 on the 24th.6

To provide for any unforeseen developments, Sir John Jellicoe was directed to proceed with his "main force" towards the 3rd Battle Squadron rendezvous, which was about 250 miles from Pondland Skerries by the shortest route. As the Commander-in-Chief wished to avoid entering the mine-suspected area, he decided not to proceed direct but somewhat to the eastward and reported to the Admiralty that at 0700 he would be in Lat. 57° 28' N., Long. 1° 25'E., 150 miles N.N.W. of the Battle Cruisers' Rendezvous.7 The Commodore S. had been ordered at 1410 on January 23rd to leave Harwich and proceed with Lurcher, Firedrake and four submarines in the direction of Borkum.8 He was informed of the situation and warned that further orders would be sent to him, but as there was some delay in the receipt of this telegram, he did not leave before 1750. By that time it was improbable that the submarines could reach a position to attack the enemy if the latter returned before dusk on the 24th, and the Admiralty accordingly ordered the submarines to be disposed off Heligoland and Norderney in the hope of intercepting the enemy should his return be delayed till the morning of the 25th.9

The above will it be seen that the general dispositions ordered by the Admiralty provided for a force of battle cruisers, light cruisers and destroyers being in a position at dawn on the 24th where they might hope to establish contact with the enemy during the day.

3. The Progress of Operations during Night of 23rd-24th.— The 1st, 2nd and 4th Battle Squadrons with their attendant cruiser squadrons and flotillas left Scapa between 1830 and 2030 on the 23rd and proceeded independently during the night towards a rendezvous in 270° 15' (57° 0' N., 2° 20' E.), where the Commander-in-Chief intended to concentrate his fleet at 0600 on the 24th. The vessels at Cromarty received similar orders, and Sir John Jellicoe intended, after concentrating his forces, to proceed to the southward with the cruisers and the light cruisers spread ahead.

Meanwhile, the battle cruisers with the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, after leaving Rosyth at 1800 on the 23rd, proceeded towards their rendezvous followed by the 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron at 0730. The voyages of both these forces were without incident.

About 0630 Admiral Beatty sent a wireless signal to Commodore (T) directing him, after meeting the battle cruisers, to spread his force on a line North and South to the Westward of them,7 and just before the enemy were sighted, the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, which had been stationed on the port beam of the Lion during the night, was directed to spread on a line North-East by North from the Lion.10 The battle cruisers had to take lay along the edge of an area suspected of containing mines on account of the large number of drifting mines seen in the vicinity. This was
This disposition would have enabled touch to be gained with the enemy, whether he was to the eastward or westward of the rendezvous at daylight.

Commodore (T) had intended that the vessels under his command should leave harbour at 1730 in the order:

- Arethusa, with M class Destroyers (10th Flotilla).
- Undaunted, with 3rd Flotilla.
- Aurora, with 1st Flotilla.

The whole force was to concentrate outside and proceed in company past the North Hinder Light Vessel to the appointed rendezvous. Owing to a dense fog, however, the flotillas became somewhat scattered, and the three divisions proceeded independently, the Arethusa setting course for the rendezvous after rounding the North Hinder at 2140, the Undaunted at 2215, and the Aurora at 2230.

As a result of this dispersion at 0700, when the Arethusa was approaching the rendezvous and almost within sight of our battle cruisers, Commodore (T) had only 7 destroyers in company, the remainder of the Harwich force being still some 14 miles to the southward; the Aurora was nearly astern of the Arethusa; the Undaunted at dawn was in sight of the Aurora on her port bow.

4. The first Encounter with the Enemy and Preliminary Manoeuvres.—At 0700 it was estimated on board the Lion that the rendezvous (53° 13’ N., 3° 12’ E.) had been reached, and course was altered to S. 12° W. at a speed of 18 knots. Shortly afterwards, at about 0710, the Arethusa with the leading destroyers of the Harwich force was sighted right ahead, and had hardly been identified, when flashes of gunfire were observed to the S.E.

Just before sunrise with a calm sea and good visibility the Aurora, in rear of and to the eastward of the Harwich force, had sighted against the dawn a three-funnelled cruiser accompanied by destroyers; she altered course a little towards her and challenged; in reply the stranger flashed a single letter and immediately opened fire, which was returned by the Aurora. The enemy’s ship was the Kolberg. A short engagement ensued, at a range of about 8,000 yards, as a result of which the German cruiser was hit, and at about 0725 broke off the action.

The Undaunted on the port bow was too far away to support the Aurora in this brief encounter, but the firing had been seen in the Lion, and Sir David Beatty at once cancelled the order for the light cruiser squadron to spread to the North-Eastward and ordered them to chase to the Southward.

At about 0730 vessels were sighted by the Southampton on both bows, those to the eastward disregarding the challenge, while on the starboard bow communication was established with the Aurora, who reported that she had distinguished hostile battle cruisers to the south-eastward.

These were soon sighted from the Southampton and at first appeared to be steering to the northward. The light cruisers altered course to the eastward to close them, and when the enemy was discovered to be on a south-easterly course, the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron kept away so as to take up a position on his port quarter. A light north-easterly breeze enabled the enemy’s movements to be observed without interference from the dense smoke clouds pouring from the German ships as they increased to full speed, and the hostile squadron was seen to be composed of light cruisers and destroyers in addition to four heavy ships.

Admiral Beatty with the British battle cruisers had altered course to S.S.E. in the direction of the Aurora’s action at 0735 and commenced to work up to full speed, with the intention of getting to the southward of the Germans if possible. He had two reasons for regarding this as a position of tactical advantage. The first report from the Southampton indicated that the hostile squadron was steering north, in which case there seemed to be an excellent prospect of cutting it off from its base and bringing it to action under conditions which would ensure a decisive result. Even if this could not be achieved and the action resolved itself into a running fight the
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3. The First Encounter with the Enemy and Preliminary Manoeuvres. — At 0710 it was estimated on board the Lion that the rendezvous (53° 15' N., 3° 12' E.) had been reached, and course was altered to S. 12° W. at a speed of 14 knots. Shortly afterwards, at about 0710, the Arethusa with the leading destroyers of the Harwich force was sighted just ahead, and had hardly been identified, when flashes of grenades were observed to the B.S.E.

Just before sunrise with a calm sea and good visibility the Aurora, in rear of and to the eastward of the Harwich force, had sighted against the horizon a three-funnelled cruiser accompanied by destroyers; she altered course a little towards her® and challenged; in reply the stranger flashed a single letter and immediately opened fire, which was returned by the Aurora. The enemy’s ship was the Kolberg. A short engagement ensued, at a range of about 6,000 yards, as a result of which the German cruiser was hit, and at about 0725 broke off the action.

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Admiral Beatty with the British battle cruisers had altered course to S.S.E. in the direction of the Aurora’s action at 1730 and commenced to work up to full speed, with the intention of getting to the southward of the Germans if possible.® He had two reasons for regarding this as a position of tactical advantage. The first report from the Southampton indicated that the hostile squadron was steaming north,® in which case there seemed to be an excellent prospect of cutting it off from its base and bringing it to action under conditions which would ensure a decisive result. Even if this could not be achieved and the action resolved itself into a running fight the

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1. A. 19.
2. A. 20.
4. Undaunted (r).
5. A. 22.
6. A. 27, 28, Southampton (r).
iee-gatige would still be preferable, as the British vessels would be able to engage the enemy without being hampered by the smoke, inevitably produced by coal-burning vessels proceeding at high speed.

As the situation became clearer from frequent reports of the enemy which were coming in, Sir David Beatty gradually altered the course of his battle cruisers to the south-eastward, and by 0800 he had the hostile vessels in sight on his port bow, steering a south-easterly course at high speed. The enemy battle cruisers were probably still occupied in collecting their light forces and covering their retirement; but at 0810 they settled to a south-easterly course and began the long rush towards Heligoland, with their light cruisers and destroyers ahead and on the starboard bow out of reach of the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron. A few minutes later (0837) the British squadron set a course approximately parallel to the enemy and settled down to a long chase.

Meanwhile, as a result of these various manoeuvres the Harwich Force under Commodore (T) found itself to port of and ahead of the British line, and almost between the latter and the enemy. As the battle cruisers increased speed the flotillas, with the exception of the new "M" class destroyers, found it difficult to maintain their position, and at 0813 they were ordered to take station astern in order to avoid fouling the range. The "M" class destroyers under the Meteor, however, were able to maintain their position abreast of the head of the British line, till about 0810 when the Blücher, the rear ship of the enemy, fired a few rounds at the Meteor which had approached within 7,000 yards on her port quarter; the destroyers were not hit, but Captain Meade, who had by now ascertained the number and disposition of the enemy, altered course and took station again on the Arethusa.

CHAPTER II.

THE ACTION.

5. Commencement of the Chase.—The action between the opposing battle cruisers, which was now about to commence, took the form of a long chase, and the maximum speeds of the various vessels are therefore of great importance in endeavouring to reconstruct the course of events. On the German side the ships were apparently in the order—Seydlitz, Derfflinger, Moltke, Blücher, the fastest vessel being the recently completed Derfflinger, with a speed of about 27 knots, and the slowest the Blücher, whose actually and maintained a speed of slightly over 22 knots until 1030 when she was badly hit. The highest speed steamed by the German Squadron during the action was 23 knots, to which V. Hipper increased about 0930. An hour later the "Blücher" has fallen five cables astern of station, rendered accurate judgment of speed impossible are considered, the highest speed recorded is 28.5 knots, which is mentioned in Admiral Beatty's despatch as being attained by the Lion, but the speed of the rear ships was considerably less, and she had to ease down at 0952 to keep them within mutual supporting distance. On the other hand, Lion's log only gives 27 knots.

1 A. 30, 35.
2 Beatty, in his despatch, says that at 0750 the enemy battle cruisers were distant 14 miles, which agrees with the range of slightly over 20,000 yards at 0813.
3 A. 13.
4 A. 46 (see Notes on Sources with reference to times given in Lion's Signal Log).
5 A. 48.
6 Meteor (r).
7 Meteor (r).
8 Seydlitz 28.5 kts., Derfflinger 28 kts., Blücher 25.5 kts., but elsewhere in the volume it is stated that the "Derfflinger" was the fastest of the battle cruisers.
lee-gauge would still be preferable, as the British vessels would be able to engage the enemy without being hampered by the smoke, inevitably produced by coal-burning vessels proceeding at high speed.

As the situation became clearer from frequent reports of the enemy which were coming in, Sir David Beatty gradually altered the course of his battle cruisers to the south-eastward, and by 0830 he had the hostile vessels in sight on his port bow, steering a south-easterly course at high speed. The enemy battle cruisers were probably still occupied in collecting their light forces and covering their retreat; but at 0830 they settled to a south-easterly course and began the long rush towards Heligoland, with their light cruisers and destroyers ahead and on the starboard bow out of reach of the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron. A few minutes later (0837) the British squadron set a course approximately parallel to the enemy and settled down to a long chase.

Meanwhile, as a result of these various manoeuvres the Harwich Force under Commodore (T) found itself to port of and ahead of the British line, and almost between the latter and the enemy. As the battle cruisers increased speed the flotillas, with the exception of the new "M" class destroyers, found it difficult to maintain their position, and at 0843 they were ordered to take station astern in order to avoid fouling the range. The "M" class destroyers under the Meteor, however, were able to maintain their position abreast of the head of the British line, till about 0840 when the Blücher, the rear ship of the enemy, fired a few rounds at the Meteor which had approached within 7,000 yards on her port quarter; the destroyers were not hit, but Captain Meade, who had by now ascertained the number and disposition of the enemy, altered course and took station again on the Arethusa.

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With regard to the speed of our own vessels, there is considerable diversity in the estimates made at the time, which is not unnatural when the conditions which rendered accurate judgment of speed impossible are considered. The highest speed recorded is 28.5 knots, which is mentioned in Admiral Beatty's despatch as being attained by the Lion, but the speed of the rear ships was considerably less, and she had to ease down at 0902 to keep them within mutual supporting distance.

1 A. 30, 43.
2 Beatty, in his despatch, says that at 0720 the enemy battle cruisers were distant 14 miles, which accords with the range of slightly over 20,000 yards at 0852.
3 A. 42, 46.
4 A. 46 (see Notes on Sources with reference to times given in Lion's Signal Log).
5 A. 48.
6 Meteor (c). 
7 Meteor. 
8 Designed 24 knots, trials 25-8 knots. On this point see the note on page 1130. 
9 On the other hand, Lion's log only gives 27 knots.
10 The slowest ship was the Indomitable, which probably did 25 knots and dropped badly astern; the New Zealand is credited with 27 knots by Captain Lionel Halsey, though she had only done 26 knots on her trials two years before. She certainly kept up better than was expected, but until the Lion reduced speed at 0902, the Tiger was the only vessel which can be said to have kept station, and she was probably 5 cables off the whole time. The Germans considered our speed to be "most extraordinary."
At 0830 the hostile squadron bore from the Lion 8, 61° E., or about two points on the port bow, and the Blücher was distant about 11 miles, with the range slowly closing. By 0902 the range of the rear ship had decreased to 20,000 yards, and the Lion fired a single shot from her midship turret, which fell short. The Lion continued to fire single shots deliberately in order to test the range, the Admiral having already ordered the battle cruisers to form on a line of bearing seven points astern of their target. At 0900 the Tiger opened fire, also on the rear ship, and at about 0905, the Blücher being within gun range, the Admiral gave the order for all ships to open fire, and engage the enemy. The Prince of Wales then commenced to fire ranging shots also at the Blücher, but the range was too great for the 12-inch guns of the New Zealand and the Indomitable, which had been gradually dropping astern since 0815 could do nothing. The enemy soon commenced to reply, but for some time without effect.

6. The Action becomes General.—At 0924 the Lion shifted her fire to the third ship in the line (Indomitable). Four minutes later she was hit on the water line aft, the shell penetrating to the bunkers. Three of the enemy's ships were now concentrating on the Lion, and at 0935 the Admiral directed each ship to engage her opposite number in the enemy's line, and shifted his fire to the Seydlitz, the leading ship, at a range of 17,500 yards. This signal clearly meant that the Tiger should engage the next ship, the Bliicher, the Princess Royal the New Zealand, and the New Zealand the Blücher, as it was evident that the Indomitable was a considerable distance astern, and out of range. Unfortunately, the Tiger apparently did not realise that only four British battle cruisers were then in action, and, instead of engaging her opposite number as ordered, she endeavoured to concentrate with the Lion on the Seydlitz. This left the Bliicher without any ship firing at her, and, moreover, tended to confuse the control, as the Tiger apparently mistook the Lion's salvoes for her own, and considered that she was hitting when actually her shots were observed and reported by the light cruisers to be falling more than 3,000 yards over the enemy.

At 0940 the Lion scored an important success by hitting the after turret of the Seydlitz, the resulting cordite fire putting both the after turrets out of action, and necessitating the magazine being flooded. The Blücher also by this time was showing signs that she had been hit several times, and the Tiger had now (0950) transferred her fire to her, so that she was the target of two ships. The situation at this time, therefore, appeared very favourable to us, as none of the British battle cruisers had sustained serious damage, and the Indomitable was available to deal with any damaged craft which might drop astern.

7. The Breaking-off of the Action.—The enemy now repeatedly zigzagged to avoid our salvoes, thus making effective gunfire most difficult, and the range was frequently lost. The German destroyers were very favourably placed for carrying out an attack on the head of our line, and evidently caused considerable anxiety from about 0940 onwards, for the Harwich flotillas were some distance astern, and had not sufficient speed to get ahead and engage them.

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**PLAN 2**

**BANK, 24TH JANUARY, 1915.**

**AN OF ACTION 0700 - 0945.**

**BRITISH.**

- Battle Cruiser Squadron
- Light Cruiser Squadron
- Destroyers

**GERMAN.**

- Battle Cruisers
- Light Cruisers
- Submarines

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1. A. 45.
2. Arethusa and Indomitable considered shot was over.
3. A. 37.
4. A. 32.
5. Indomitable (r).
6. It appears that their gun mountings would only permit of an elevation for some 180 ha. (19,075 yards).
7. A. 54.
8. New Zealand opened fire on Blücher at about 0935.
11. Ranges 0945: Lion, 16,775 yards; Tiger, 20,000 yards.
13. Owing to smoke obscuring the leading battle cruisers. Tiger (r).
14. A. 57.
15. At about 0945 the German destroyers were engaged by the secondary armaments of the Lion and Tiger, after which they once more retired to their positions on the starboard bow of the enemy battle cruisers. The S.O. (Rostock) had orders to attack "if necessary"; but Admiral Hipper did not wish to lose any torpedo boats unnecessarily, nor to use his last reserve until he had drawn the British forces into the Right. In the first phase of the action, viz., until the Blücher left the line, he did not consider it necessary to order the torpedoes to attack. (Information supplied by J.D.)
16. Some of the German destroyers could only maintain the speed of their destroyers, and they dropped astern, crossing over from starboard to port between the lines of the battle cruisers. This seems to have been taken by some of our ships to indicate an intention to attack.
17. Comm. (T) to C.-in-C., H.F.: "1st and 3rd Destroyer Flotillas are astern of battle cruisers 2 miles (0905)." See also A. 50, 61, 53.

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**REFERENCE.**

[Ordnance Survey, December 1920]
The Princess Royal and New Zealand were dropping astern by this time and the
signal at 0945, Admiral Beatty turned his line
a point to port, whilst Admiral Beatty, too, had just
changed course outwards a little. The range was opening
again, and the squadron had to keep clear of the wake of the enemy destroyers which
were supposed, according to intelligence reports, to be carrying mines.
The enemy’s two leading ships now concentrated effectively on the Lion, and
about this time “A” turret received a hit on the roof, which did not penetrate, though
it dented a plate and put the left gun out of action. The Tiger was still firing at
the Bïicher, so that the Derßßiger, the second ship in the German line, was left
unharassed. The Lion’s observation of fire at this time was greatly hampered by
splashes from the enemy’s short shots; only one in every five or six shots could be
spotted, the firing had frequently to be checked, and there was great uncertainty as to
the fall of shot. At 1001 an 11-inch shell from the Seydlitz pierced the Lion’s water-line armour aft and passed through the top of the 4-inch magazine trunk, without
exploding. The after switchboard compartment was flooded and had to be abandoned
shortly; Nos. 2 and 3 dynamos were short circuited, putting the after fire control and
4-inch gun circuits out of action. At 1018 two 12-inch shells from the Derßßiger
hit the ship; one of them pierced the armour near the water line forward, and burst,
blooming the hatches and flooding several compartments up to the main deck.
The other ships were also experiencing difficulties about this time, and both the
Tiger and Princess Royal had to check fire from time to time, owing to the
impossibility of getting a range, smoke interference, &c. The critical period of the
action was now approaching. In order to bring the rear of our line into action again,
Sir David Beatty at about 1022 ordered the battle cruisers to form on a line of
bearing S.N.W. from the Lion, i.e., about six points abaft the beam, and to proceed
at their utmost speed. The repeated hits, however, were now beginning to tell on the
Lion, and at about 1045 she began to drop back, and to be overhauled by the
remaining battle cruisers. The Bïicher had also felt the effect of the prolonged
action, and was now on fire; since about 1006 she had been dropping astern of the
German squadron, being harassed from time to time by the 1st Light Cruiser
Squadron, which had maintained its position on the port quarter of the enemy. At
about 1045 she finally quitéd the enemy’s line and altered course to northward,
apparently in an endeavour to escape; but by this time the Indomitable had come
within range of her; and becoming a target for three ships, she suffered heavy
punishment. Admiral Beatty evidently intended that the Indomitable should deal
with her, for he ordered the Indomitable to attack the enemy breaking away to the
northward.

At 1047 an important signal was made by the Lion “to close the enemy as
rapidly as possible consistent with keeping all guns bearing.” It seems probable
that this signal was only partially received, for the Tiger is the only ship with any
record of it, and in her case only the first part “close the enemy” was logged.
It was evidently, however, the Vice-Admiral’s intention that ships should alter
course to port the requisite amount to comply with this signal, but no ship had yet
done so, and as the Lion was dropping astern with the Tiger on her port side, she
could not alter herself. Just about this time the Lion was badly hit and the shock
was felt throughout the ship. All light and power failed. A minute or so later
(1054) a periscope was sighted on the starboard bow, and the Vice-Admiral gave the
order “eight blue” for the battle cruisers to alter eight points to port together, which
would have swung the squadron towards the enemy as well as keeping it clear of the
submarine. The signal was received by all ships and hailed down at 1102, bringing
the squadron on a N.N.E. course. The German destroyers had just been ordered to

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1 About 1020 the Lion “came down” 4,500 yards.
2 R. 1.
3 At 1005, the Bïicher attacked the 1st L.C.S. and forced them to turn to port for a few
minutes to open the range.
4 Beatty’s despatch, and Rear-Admiral Moore’s report. No record in Lion’s and
Indomitable’s signal log.
5 R. 5.
6 The signal log must of course only be regarded as a rough guide, for in the heat of action
a signal might be made and not logged, or
logged and not made, or made and not
received.
7 Between 10.49 and 10.51 (Captain Chauffin’s report, 27/1/15).
8 Due to No. 1 dynamo (the only remaining one) being thrown off by a short circuit,
probably by water in the submerged flat reaching the ring main. Up to this time
the forward fire control system was in operation, with the exception of Evescho’s
bearing transmitters, which stopped with
No. 2 dynamo between 1002 and 1030.
9 Torpedo and Electrical Report.
10 German submarines were in 54° 37’ N., 5°
35’ W., and 54° 12’ N., 5° 15’ E., about this
time.
The Princess Royal and New Zealand were dropping astern by this time and the Lion reduced speed at 0902 to 24 knots to keep them within mutual supporting distance. It seems that the rear ships of the enemy turned considerably away about this time and increased the range, and though every endeavour was made to close it again, the squadron had to keep clear of the wake of the enemy destroyers which were supposed, according to intelligence reports, to be carrying mines.

The enemy's two leading ships now concentrated effectively on the Lion, and about this time "A" turret received a hit on the roof, which did not penetrate, though it dented a plate and put the left gun out of action. The Tiger was still firing at the Blücher, so that the Indomitable, the second ship in the German line, was left unharassed. The Lion's observation of fire at this time was greatly hampered by splashes from the enemy's short shots; only one in every five or six shots could be spotted, the firing had frequently to be checked, and there was great uncertainty as to the fall of shot. At 0934 an 11-inch shell from the Seydlitz pierced the Lion's waterline armour aft and passed through the top of the 4-inch magazine trunk, without exploding. The after switchboard compartment was flooded and had to be abandoned shortly; Nos. 2 and 3 dynamos were short circuited, putting the after fire control and 4-inch gun circuits out of action. At 1018 two 12-inch shells from the Brotflinger hit the ship; one of them pierced the armour near the water line forward, and burst, blowing open the hatches and flooding several compartments up to the main deck.

The other ships were also experiencing difficulties about this time, and both the Tiger and Princess Royal had to check fire from time to time, owing to the impossibility of getting a range, smoke interference, &c. The critical period of the action was now approaching. In order to bring the rear of our line into action again, Sir David Beatty at about 1022 ordered the battle cruisers to form on a line of bearing N.W. from the Lion, i.e., about six points abaft the beam, and to proceed at their utmost speed. The repeated hits, however, were now beginning to tell on the Lion, and at about 1045 she began to drop back, and to be overhauled by the remaining battle cruisers. The Blücher had also felt the effect of the prolonged action, and was now on fire; since about 1005 she had been dropping astern of the German squadron, being harassed from time to time by the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, which had maintained its position on the port quarter of the enemy. At about 1045 she finally quit the enemy's line and altered course to northward, apparently in an endeavour to escape; but by this time the Indomitable had come within range of her; and becoming a target for three ships, she suffered heavy punishment. Admiral Beatty evidently intended that the Indomitable should deal with her, for he ordered the Indomitable to attack the enemy breaking away to the northward. At 1047 an important signal was made by the Lion "to close the enemy as rapidly as possible consistent with keeping all guns bearing." It seems probable that this signal was only partially received, for the Tiger is the only ship with any record of it, and in her case only the first part "close the enemy" was logged.

It was evidently, however, the Vice-Admiral's intention that ships should alter course to port to the requisite amount to comply with this signal, but no ship had yet done so, and as the Lion was dropping astern with the Tiger on her port side, she could not alter herself. Just about this time the Lion was badly hit and the shock was felt throughout the ship. All light and power failed. A periscope was sighted on the starboard bow, and the Vice-Admiral gave the order "eight blue" for the battle cruisers to alter eight points to port together, which would have swung the squadron towards the enemy as well as keeping it clear of the submarine. The signal was received by all ships and hailed down at 1102, bringing the squadron on a N.N.E. course. The German destroyers had just been ordered to

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1 About 1022 the Lion "came down" 4,300 yards.
2 H. 1.
3 At 1030, the Blücher attacked the 1st L.C.S. and forced them to turn to port for a few minutes to open the range. A. 60.
4 Beatty's despatch, and Rear-Admiral Moore's report. No record in Lion's and Indomitable's signal log.
5 H. 5.
6 The signal log must of course only be regarded as a rough guide, for in the heat of action a signal might be made and not logged, or logged and not made, or made and not received.
7 Between 10.40 and 10.51 (Captain Chatfield's report, 27/1/15).
8 Due to No. 1 dynamo (the only remaining one) being thrown off by a short circuit, probably by water in the submerged flat reaching the ring main. Up to this time the forward fire control system was in operation, with the exception of Evershed's bearing transmitters, which stopped with No. 2 dynamo between 1020 and 1030. (Torpedo and Electrical Report.)
9 German submarines were in 54° 27' N., 35° 15' E., and 54° 9' N., 5° 15' N. E., about this time.
attack (1100), but this sudden alteration of course on the part of our battle cruisers rendered the order futile, and it was cancelled at 1107.

Up to this moment no real difficulty had been experienced in getting signals through, but by this time the *Lion* was in a critical state. She had received 15 hits. With the port engine stopped, all lights extinguished, reduced to 15 knots, listing 10° to port, with only two signal half-hulls, and neither searchlights nor wireless, she was no longer able to perform the duties of flagship. Meanwhile the squadron was rapidly increasing its distance, and it was probable the Second-in-Command was unaware of the reason of the eight-point turn.

It was urgently necessary for the squadron to resume the chase of the fleeing enemy and Sir David Beatty ordered two signals to be hoisted, viz.: "Compass B—Course N.E. and "A.F.—Attack the rear of the enemy," and then a third " Keep nearer the enemy—repeat the signal Admiral is now making." These were hoisted practically simultaneously.

The course of N.E. would have led the battle cruisers clear of any mines dropped by the enemy destroyers and would have cut the enemy's battle cruisers off from the *Blücher* should they turn to support her as Admiral Beatty anticipated they would; should they leave her to her fate our ships could again have turned to a parallel course when clear of the track of their torpedo craft.

Instead, however, of being understood as two separate signals, they were read as one signal "A.F.—Compass B."—attack the rear of the enemy bearing north east."

By the time the *New Zealand* received it, she had been steering for several minutes on a N.N.E. course, and according to Rear-Admiral Moore's despatch, as the *Blücher* then bore about North-East with the remainder of the enemy about East by North, he took the signal to mean that the *Blücher* was to be attacked. All ships therefore continued to steer towards her roughly in line abreast, with the *Tiger* drawing ahead and coming up on the starboard wing, and the *New Zealand* on the port.

As they proceeded in this direction Scheer states that the three remaining German battle cruisers altered course to S. by W. for a time, in order to enfilade our line at right angles, and concentrated their fire on the *Tiger*, which was the only ship able to engage them, as she had drawn ahead and was fouling the range of the *Princess Royal*. This they may have done for a short time. In any case the *Tiger* received a concentrated fire and suffered considerable damage, being hit seven times in about fifteen minutes, and having one turret put out of action. The enemy then resumed their S.E. course, and rapidly drew out of range. The *Lion* was lying crippled, and as no further orders were received from the Second-in-Command, the battle cruisers continued to engage the *Blücher*, while the enemy drew every minute further away.

5. Sinking of the *Blücher*—The eight-point turn at about 1100 had brought the fleet into an irregular line abreast steaming about north by east, with the *Blücher* on the starboard bow, and the *Lion* astern. The *Tiger* and *Princess Royal* seem to have been steaming considerably faster than the *New Zealand* and slightly more to port, as they both crossed the bows of Admiral Moore's flagship, and then steered to circle round the *Blücher*, leaving her on the port side of the *Tiger*. The *Indomitable* coming up passed under the *New Zealand*'s stern, and then altered to port in order to follow the remainder in their circle round the *Blücher*. The condition of the German ship was now hopeless, but she continued to show fight. Besides the four battle cruisers firing at her, she was engaged by the First Light Cruiser Squadron from the northward, and the four "M" class destroyers on the starboard side of the *Tiger* now delivered a torpedo attack. But the *Blücher* was not yet silenced; she opened fire on the leading destroyer (*Meteor*) with both her main and secondary armament, and hit her five times. Three of the five shells failed to burst, but an 8inch shell wrecked the foremost boiler room, killing four men; and the *Meteor* had to be towed back to the *Humber*.5 But the *Arethusa* was now coming up with the Harwich flotillas, and at 1138 she fired two torpedoes into the *Blücher*, and effectively silenced her.

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2 From information supplied by I.D.
3 Beatty's despatch.
4 B.T. S. 9.
5 Rear-Admiral Moore's despatch. H.S. 300, p. 66.
6 Scheer states, p. 92, that at 1100 the German battle cruisers "took up a southerly course, intending to open an exciting fight with the enemy, and, if possible, render help to the *Blücher*," and that after steaming for a short while on this course, they again turned S.E. to break off the fight. This is quite possible, but in the British reports there is no evidence to this effect. Scheer's diagram is wrong in showing the British cruisers turning to starboard instead of port. But see J.S.
7 Probably at 1114, when the *Neptun* ceased fire.
8 She was taken in tow by the *Liberty* at about 1240.

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Ordnance Survey, December 1920.
DOGGER BANK, 24TH JANUARY, 1915.

PLAN OF ACTION 0945 - 1206.

REFERENCE:

BRITISH.
Battle Cruiser Squadron
Light Cruiser Squadron
"Arethusa"
"Undaunted"
"Aurora"
Destroyers

GERMAN.
Battle Cruisers
Light Cruisers
Submarines
Destroyers

/s.e.e./
1007
N.E.
1012
SE
Seydlitz
1036
16,500
1054
Bliicher
1130
1137
SE
Seydlitz
1005
1200
NW.
25 Kts.
EN. E.
1011
SE.
26 Kts.

/Tiger/
/indomitable/
N.
46
/indomitable/
Moltke
1030
1

S.E. 1005
1200
S.W.
25 Kts.
EN. E.
1011

Rate 100 opening 1044
/o/o - N.Z.
"Enemy made a large % to the Northward for a considerable time before resuming course."

1204
1215
Bliicher sinks
1040
(No Rate of change of range)

1030
1045
/indomitable/

Lion
1035
a 7 Pt. to Port
(1030-1040 Rate opening fast)

1054
Periscope

Moltke

Ordnance Survey, December 1920
Results of the Action.—When the action was broken off the German battle cruisers were some 80 miles from Heligoland. The sinking of the Blücher and the serious damage inflicted on the Seydlitz, though satisfactory in themselves, by no means represent the results which might have been achieved had the signal to attack the rear of the enemy not been misinterpreted, and the action consequently been broken off.

The evidence leaves no doubt that before the action was discontinued the Seydlitz had been damaged. Tyrwhitt stated that “fires were observed in all ships except the Moltke,” and that the Derfflinger and Seydlitz were “blazing at the end of the action.”

Meanwhile, the battle cruisers had circled round the Blücher, passing her from 4,000 to 6,000 yards off, and by 1140 had resumed a south-easterly course in pursuit of the remaining ships of the enemy. Our battle cruisers appear to have either followed the Tiger’s movements or acted independently. At about 1140, Commodore Tyrwhitt signalled that the Blücher appeared to have struck; the battle cruisers ceased fire, and the Arethusa closed the enemy ship to rescue survivors.

While thus engaged, a Zeppelin which had been sighted and fired at by the Southampton at about 1030 was hovering overhead; and now (1200), in conjunction with a German seaplane which had arrived on the scene, commenced to drop bombs indiscriminately on the men struggling in the water and on the rescuing ships and boats, though without hitting any of the latter. The seaplane was engaged by the Arethusa, and at 1240 Commodore Goodenough, returning from shadowing the German battle cruisers, and seeing the situation, ordered the rescuing ships and destroyers to leave the spot at once. It is probable that most of the survivors who had not been killed by the bombs of their own countrymen had by this time been picked up.

9. Rear-Admiral Moore assumes Command.—The Blücher had sunk, listing heavily to port, with fires “raging between decks through the enormous shot-holes in her sides”; the battle cruisers, having carried out the supposed intentions of the Vice-Admiral, were now steaming in no particular formation in the direction of Heligoland, drawing every moment further away from the Lion, which had last been seen with a heavy list. For half an hour no W/T communication had been received from Beatty; at 1152 Rear-Admiral Moore assumed active command of the battle cruiser squadron, and directed them to form single line ahead and steer west; he had made a signal at 1112 for destroyers to close, and at 1125 had transferred his flag to the Arethusa, and directed them to form single line ahead and steer west, he “had grave fears for the safety of the Lion” and decided to return to her. The battle cruisers were ordered to cease firing, and at 1202 Commodore Goodenough, who had just reported that he had lost touch with the enemy, was directed to retire north-westward.

10. Beatty hoists his Flag in the “Princess Royal.”—Meanwhile in the Lion, Beatty had made a signal at 1112 for destroyers to close, and at 1125 had transferred his flag to the Attack, ordering Commodore (T) to form a submarine screen round the Lion. Proceeding at utmost speed to rejoin the squadron, he met them at noon retiring N.N.W., and at once ordered them to turn 16 points to resume the chase. Going alongside the Princess Royal he hoisted his flag in her about 1220, but it was soon realised that, owing to the start the enemy had gained, there was no hope of overtaking them. Moreover, the High Sea Fleet was coming out, enemy submarines were in the vicinity, and the Lion, reduced to ten knots, was nearly 300 miles from Rosyth. At 1246 the squadron turned back, and steered to close the Lion.

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MOVEMENTS OF THE SUPPORTING FORCES AND SUBMARINES.

11. At this time (1245) the Grand Fleet was some 125 miles distant to the north-westward, steaming at 19 knots along the shortest line to close the battle cruiser squadrons. The various units composing the main fleet, steering a south-easterly course from Scapa Flow, passed through their rendezvous in 57° 36' N., 10° 25' E. at 0700. Half an hour later the Aurora's signal was intercepted, reporting that she was in action with the German fleet,1 followed in quick succession by reports of sighting the enemy from Goolecough and Beauty respectively.2 Jellicoe, at once (0736) altered course to support the battle cruisers, ordering Vice-Admiral Bradford with the Third Battle Squadron and Third Cruiser Squadron (0820),3 to steer towards P (55° 33' N., 3° 25' E.) at full speed 4 to act in immediate support.5 The Second Light Cruiser Squadron was sent on to join Admiral Beatty's force, which it was expected they would do about 1400. Jellicoe himself increased speed, and by 1021 the main fleet was steaming 19 knots. As the fleet passed the northern limit of the suspected minefield, floating mines were continually seen.

12. The Meeting with Beatty. On receipt of Jellicoe’s signal, Admiral Bradford had altered course and steered towards Heligoland at 16 knots, disposing the Third Cruiser Squadron 15 miles ahead of him. The Battle Cruiser Squadrons were met retiring at 1345, and Admiral Bradford turned N.N.W. to conform to their course, the Second Light Cruiser Squadron being placed under Beauty’s orders for screening the retirement.

The main battle fleet had been steaming at full speed to close the battle cruiser forces; at 1530 Bradford, and an hour later Beatty, was sighted, and Jellicoe reduced speed and turned northward in their company. The Lion, meanwhile, had developed trouble in her remaining boilers; and at 1530 the Lion was ordered to take her in tow by the First and Second Light Cruiser Squadrons, the Second and Fourth Destroyer Flotillas,2 and in company with the battle fleet and the Harwich Flotillas (except such as were short of fuel), the Lion proceeded in tow of the Indomitable at 1724. At dusk the battle fleet and the battle cruisers stood to the northward to be clear of torpedo attack. The night passed without incident, the First and Second Light Cruiser Squadrons joining the battle cruisers during the dark hours. The Indomitable towed the Lion throughout the whole of the next day, the weather fortunately remaining calm, and reached Rosyth in the early hours of the following morning.

13. Movements of Submarines. Commodore (S) with the Lurcher, Firedrake, E4, E7, F1, and S in the way to their stations to intercept the returning German vessels were apparently sighted about 4 p.m., when 22 miles North of Borkum by a Seaplane which made off towards the East. Shortly afterwards a periscope was seen; the Commodore in the Lurcher endeavoured to ram the battle cruiser but failed over it without a collision. He did not reach his station North of Heligoland till 5.44 p.m. About 8.15 p.m. he had seen in the distance a glare of searchlights on the island, but they were extinguished at 8.50 p.m., and he assumed from this that the fleet had got in before his arrival. Though E11 was in position at Nordelay at 6.30 p.m. on the 24th she saw no men-of-war; the three other submarines passed Heligoland about 8.30 p.m., and as they also saw no large ships they were presumably too late. E8, however, to the N.N.W. of the island, had a shot in the early morning of the 25th at a destroyer Flotilla in close order in quarter line, which gave a continuous target; but the torpedo set at 6 feet, did not take effect.

APPENDIX A.

TELEGRAMS AND SIGNALS.

2. "38. Negative Plan Z. All your destroyers and light cruisers will be wanted to-night.


4. "200. 1st, 2nd, and 4th Battle Squadrons, Cruisers, and Light Cruisers should be ready to sail after dark this evening. Acknowledge."

5. "39. Proceed with Lurcher, Firedrake, and four submarines in the direction of Borkum Rd., but do not get out of wireless reach and await any orders you may receive.

6. "After battle cruisers have sailed after dark, 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron are to proceed to a rendezvous in 55° 35' N., 3° 25' E., and be prepared to intercept enemy if they are headed off by our battle cruisers and attempt to escape north.

7. "All available forces will call in before sailing and to-morrow. Commodore (T)."

8. "You should send any light cruisers you can spare to join V.A. Lion, to-morrow morning to increase his chances of getting in touch with enemy. Acknowledge. This telegram has been sent to C.-in-C., Home Fleet, and V.A. Lion."

9. "213. Proceed with your main fleet towards the 3rd Battle Squadron's rendezvous, 55° 35' N., 3° 25' E., and act as you think best to intercept the enemy. Avoid using wireless if possible until after daylight to-morrow, or until enemy is reported. Acknowledge. Telegram has been reported to V.A., 3rd Battle Squadron, and V.A. Lion, for information."

10. "214. We attach great importance to V.A., Battle Cruiser Squadron, having as many light cruisers as possible to-morrow morning. Telegraph, if you have time before sailing, the position your battle squadrons will be in at 7.0 a.m. to-morrow."

11. "13. Your 30 received on returning with submarines. I am proceeding with four submarines as ordered."

12. "21. In case German ships are delayed re- turning on Tuesday evening and return on Monday morning, send four submarines to the following positions:

13. One to sweep Channel near Nordelay Oil.
14. One to N.E. of Heligoland.
15. One to N.W. of Heligoland.
16. One to N.W. of Heligoland, and are to return on Monday evening. You are to return at once if bad weather comes in. Reply if it is possible for them to get to their stations by Monday morning."

14. "13. After reaching rendezvous use your discretion to find and engage enemy, taking under your orders Commodore (T) and give instructions to him about 6.0 a.m., when he will have passed enemy’s probable line of advance. Acknowledge."

15. "214. Your 214. Battle Squadron, 7.0 a.m. 35° 30' N., 10° 20' E.

15. From Commodore (T) to Admiral. Jun. 23rd. Sent 2126.

Footnotes:
1 This telegram also conveyed information that an enemy force, including battle cruisers, was expecting to sail that night to scout on the Dogger Bank.
Signals, January 24th, 1915.

19. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. To Commodore (T).
   "18. From S.O., 1st B.C.S."
   "To Commodore (T)."
   "A. 14."

23. From S.O., 1st L.C.S. To C-in-C., S.O., 1st B.C.S.
   "15. From Commodore (S)."
   "(a) 56° 30' N., 0° 56' W.
   (b) 56° 30' N., 0° 56' W.
   (c) 56° 30' N., 0° 56' W.

26. From Commodore (T). To Admiral.(A).
   "14. From C.-in-C., H.F."
   "S. 12° W., 20 knots."
   "To 1st L.C.S."
   "Neither of these signals are logged in Lion."
   "To Commodore (T)."
   "(0700.)"

30. From S.O., 1st L.C.S. To Commodore (T).
   "33. From S.O., 1st B.C.S."
   "103 D 43 at 7 a.m.?"
   "(0717.)"

34. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. To Commodore (T).
   ""We have three flotilla cruisers and 39 destroyers."
   "(0745.)"

38. From Lion. To B.C.S.
   "37. From Lion."
   "To C.-in-C., S.O., 1st B.C.S."
   ""(0745.:"

42. From S.O., 1st L.C.S. To S.O., 1st B.C.S.
   "41. From S.O., 1st B.C.S."
   ""To C.-in-C., S.O., 1st B.C.S."
   ""("0752.

46. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. To S.O., 1st B.C.S.
   "45. From S.O., 1st B.C.S."
   ""To C.-in-C., S.O., 1st B.C.S."
   ""("0758.

50. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. To C.-in-C., S.O., 1st B.C.S.
   "49. From S.O., 1st B.C.S."
   ""To S.O., 1st B.C.S."
   ""("0800.

54. From S.O., 1st L.C.S. To C.-in-C., S.O., 1st B.C.S.
   "53. From Lion."
   ""To C.-in-C., S.O., 1st B.C.S."
   ""("0808.

58. From S.O., 1st L.C.S. To C.-in-C., S.O., 1st B.C.S.
   "57. From S.O., 1st B.C.S."
   ""To S.O., 1st B.C.S."
   ""("0816.

62. From S.O., 1st L.C.S. To S.O., 1st B.C.S.
   "61. From S.O., 1st B.C.S."
   ""To S.O., 1st B.C.S."
   ""("0824.

66. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. To C.-in-C., S.O., 1st B.C.S.
   "65. From S.O., 1st B.C.S."
   ""To S.O., 1st B.C.S."
   ""("0832.

70. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. To C.-in-C., S.O., 1st B.C.S.
   "69. From S.O., 1st B.C.S."
   ""To S.O., 1st B.C.S."
   ""("0840.

74. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. To C.-in-C., S.O., 1st B.C.S.
   "73. From S.O., 1st B.C.S."
   ""To S.O., 1st B.C.S."
   ""("0848.

78. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. To C.-in-C., S.O., 1st B.C.S.
   "77. From S.O., 1st B.C.S."
   ""To S.O., 1st B.C.S."
   ""("0856.

82. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. To C.-in-C., S.O., 1st B.C.S.
   "81. From S.O., 1st B.C.S."
   ""To S.O., 1st B.C.S."
   ""("0904.

86. From Lion. To B.C.S.
   "85. From Lion."
   ""To C.-in-C., S.O., 1st B.C.S."
   ""("0912.

90. From Lion. To B.C.S.
   "89. From Lion."
   ""To C.-in-C., S.O., 1st B.C.S."
   ""("0920.

94. From Lion. To B.C.S.
   "93. From Lion."
   ""To C.-in-C., S.O., 1st B.C.S."
   ""("0928.

98. From Lion. To B.C.S.
   "97. From Lion."
   ""To C.-in-C., S.O., 1st B.C.S."
   ""("0936.

102. From Lion. To B.C.S.
   "101. From Lion."
   ""To C.-in-C., S.O., 1st B.C.S."
   ""("0944.

106. From Lion. To B.C.S.
   "105. From Lion."
   ""To C.-in-C., S.O., 1st B.C.S."
   ""("0952.

110. From Lion. To B.C.S.
   "109. From Lion."
   ""To C.-in-C., S.O., 1st B.C.S."
   ""("1000.

114. From Lion. To B.C.S.
   "113. From Lion."
   ""To C.-in-C., S.O., 1st B.C.S."
   ""("1008.

118. From Lion. To B.C.S.
   "117. From Lion."
   ""To C.-in-C., S.O., 1st B.C.S."
   ""("1016.

122. From Lion. To B.C.S.
   "121. From Lion."
   ""To C.-in-C., S.O., 1st B.C.S."
   ""("1024.

126. From Lion. To B.C.S.
   "125. From Lion."
   ""To C.-in-C., S.O., 1st B.C.S."
   ""("1032.

130. From Lion. To B.C.S.
   "129. From Lion."
   ""To C.-in-C., S.O., 1st B.C.S."
   ""("1040.

134. From Lion. To B.C.S.
   "133. From Lion."
   ""To C.-in-C., S.O., 1st B.C.S."
   ""("1048.

138. From Lion. To B.C.S.
   "137. From Lion."
   ""To C.-in-C., S.O., 1st B.C.S."
   ""("1056.

142. From Lion. To B.C.S.
   "141. From Lion."
   ""To C.-in-C., S.O., 1st B.C.S."
   ""("1064.

146. From Lion. To B.C.S.
   "145. From Lion."
   ""To C.-in-C., S.O., 1st B.C.S."
   ""("1072.

150. From Lion. To B.C.S.
   "149. From Lion."
   ""To C.-in-C., S.O., 1st B.C.S."
   ""("1080.

154. From Lion. To B.C.S.
   "153. From Lion."
   ""To C.-in-C., S.O., 1st B.C.S."
   ""("1088.

158. From Lion. To B.C.S.
   "157. From Lion."
   ""To C.-in-C., S.O., 1st B.C.S."
   ""("1096.

162. From Lion. To B.C.S.
   "161. From Lion."
   ""To C.-in-C., S.O., 1st B.C.S."
   ""("1104.

166. From Lion. To B.C.S.
   "165. From Lion."
   ""To C.-in-C., S.O., 1st B.C.S."
   ""("1112.

170. From Lion. To B.C.S.
   "169. From Lion."
   ""To C.-in-C., S.O., 1st B.C.S."
   ""("1120.
### APPENDIX B

**Signals Made Between 1057 and 1115 by V.A., 1st B.C.S., During the Crisis of the Action.**

| Time | Figure 1 | Figures 2-3-5 | Figures 6-8-10 | Figures 11-12 | Figures 13-14-15 | Figures 16-20 | Comments
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1057</td>
<td>Form on a course line of bearing N.N.W. and proceed at your utmost speed. (Flag.)</td>
<td>1058</td>
<td>Form on a course line of bearing N.N.W. and proceed at your utmost speed.</td>
<td>1059</td>
<td>Close the enemy as rapidly as possible consistent with keep all guns bearing. (Flag.)</td>
<td>1060</td>
<td>Close the enemy. (Flag.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
1. New Zealand's time was 6 minutes fast (M. 01137).
2. Course: the signal was received as logged in Lines.
3. Admiral Beatty's dispatch says 1056.

---

### APPENDIX C

**British Forces: Dogger Bank—January 24th, 1915.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Flotilla</th>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Officer Commanding</th>
<th>Speed</th>
<th>Kts.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Flotilla</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>Commodore Reginald Y. Tyrwhitt</td>
<td>25-5</td>
<td>5-6-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Flotilla</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>Commodore William E. Goodenough</td>
<td>25-5</td>
<td>5-6-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Flotilla</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>Commodore William E. Goodenough</td>
<td>25-5</td>
<td>5-6-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Flotilla</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>Commodore William E. Goodenough</td>
<td>25-5</td>
<td>5-6-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Flotilla</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>Commodore William E. Goodenough</td>
<td>25-5</td>
<td>5-6-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Flotilla</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>Commodore William E. Goodenough</td>
<td>25-5</td>
<td>5-6-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Flotilla</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>Commodore William E. Goodenough</td>
<td>25-5</td>
<td>5-6-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th Flotilla</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>Commodore William E. Goodenough</td>
<td>25-5</td>
<td>5-6-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th Flotilla</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>Commodore William E. Goodenough</td>
<td>25-5</td>
<td>5-6-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th Flotilla</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>Commodore William E. Goodenough</td>
<td>25-5</td>
<td>5-6-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Flotilla</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>Commodore William E. Goodenough</td>
<td>25-5</td>
<td>5-6-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th Flotilla</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>Commodore William E. Goodenough</td>
<td>25-5</td>
<td>5-6-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th Flotilla</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>Commodore William E. Goodenough</td>
<td>25-5</td>
<td>5-6-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th Flotilla</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>Commodore William E. Goodenough</td>
<td>25-5</td>
<td>5-6-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th Flotilla</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>Commodore William E. Goodenough</td>
<td>25-5</td>
<td>5-6-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th Flotilla</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>Commodore William E. Goodenough</td>
<td>25-5</td>
<td>5-6-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th Flotilla</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>Commodore William E. Goodenough</td>
<td>25-5</td>
<td>5-6-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th Flotilla</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>Commodore William E. Goodenough</td>
<td>25-5</td>
<td>5-6-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19th Flotilla</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>Commodore William E. Goodenough</td>
<td>25-5</td>
<td>5-6-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th Flotilla</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>Commodore William E. Goodenough</td>
<td>25-5</td>
<td>5-6-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st Flotilla</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>Commodore William E. Goodenough</td>
<td>25-5</td>
<td>5-6-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22nd Flotilla</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>Commodore William E. Goodenough</td>
<td>25-5</td>
<td>5-6-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23rd Flotilla</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>Commodore William E. Goodenough</td>
<td>25-5</td>
<td>5-6-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24th Flotilla</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>Commodore William E. Goodenough</td>
<td>25-5</td>
<td>5-6-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th Flotilla</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>Commodore William E. Goodenough</td>
<td>25-5</td>
<td>5-6-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26th Flotilla</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>Commodore William E. Goodenough</td>
<td>25-5</td>
<td>5-6-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27th Flotilla</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>Commodore William E. Goodenough</td>
<td>25-5</td>
<td>5-6-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28th Flotilla</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>Commodore William E. Goodenough</td>
<td>25-5</td>
<td>5-6-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29th Flotilla</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>Commodore William E. Goodenough</td>
<td>25-5</td>
<td>5-6-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30th Flotilla</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>Commodore William E. Goodenough</td>
<td>25-5</td>
<td>5-6-16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**British Cruisers: Act. Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty.**

- Londesborough
- Southampton
- Lion

**British Destroyers: Capt. Lionel Halsey.**

- Arethusa
- Druid
- Indomitable

**British Frigates: Capt. Hon. Herbert Meade.**

- Aurora
- Princess Royal
- Tiger

---
**APPENDIX D.**

**GERMAN FORCES: DOGGER BANK—JANUARY 24th, 1915.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship</th>
<th>Speed Designed Full-speed</th>
<th>Speed Designed Full-speed</th>
<th>Gun Armament</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1st Scouting Group.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full speed, Knots (from G.0.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Seydlitz&quot;</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Moltke&quot;</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Flotilla&quot;</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Lützow&quot;</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Stralsund&quot;</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Brandenburg&quot;</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Kolberg&quot;</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship</th>
<th>Speed Designed Full-speed</th>
<th>Speed Designed Full-speed</th>
<th>Gun Armament</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>2nd Scouting Group.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stralsund</td>
<td>20.75</td>
<td>12-4.1-in.; 12-4.1-in.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grunewald</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>12-4.1-in.; 23-8-12-4.1-in.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rostock</td>
<td>27.25</td>
<td>12-4.1-in.; 12-4.1-in.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kolberg</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>12-4.1-in.; 23-6 N.T.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**APPENDIX E.**

**BRITISH SUPPORTING FORCES: DOGGER BANK—JANUARY 24th, 1915.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship</th>
<th>Gun Armament</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iron Duke (flag of C-in-C), Oxford</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Battle Cruiser Squadron</td>
<td>12-5-6-in.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Lion&quot;</td>
<td>243-18-5-in.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Tiger&quot;</td>
<td>240-18-5-in.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Princess Royal&quot;</td>
<td>176-15-5-in.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Kolberg&quot;</td>
<td>176-15-5-in.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Solent&quot;</td>
<td>176-15-5-in.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Francis Drake&quot;</td>
<td>176-15-5-in.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Queen Elizabeth&quot;</td>
<td>176-15-5-in.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**APPENDIX F.**

**AMMUNITION EXPENDED.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship</th>
<th>Gun Armament</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Light Cruiser Squadron</td>
<td>12-5-6-in.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Artemis&quot;</td>
<td>12-5-6-in.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Aurora&quot;</td>
<td>12-5-6-in.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Molten&quot;</td>
<td>12-5-6-in.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**APPENDIX G.**

**POSITIONS IN TEXT OF WIRELESS.**

MEMO. H.P. 915 of December 22nd, 1914.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distinguishing Letter</th>
<th>Latitude</th>
<th>Longitude</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>25° 10' N</td>
<td>3° 49' E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>24° 50' N</td>
<td>2° 59' E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q</td>
<td>24° 35' N</td>
<td>4° 29' E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>55° 40' N</td>
<td>2° 36' E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td>55° 45' N</td>
<td>2° 36' E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>56° 00' N</td>
<td>4° 29' E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>56° 06' N</td>
<td>4° 29' E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U</td>
<td>57° 00' N</td>
<td>4° 29' E</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**DISTINGUISHING LETTERS FOR W/T MESSAGES.**

1. When ships of the Grand Fleet are engaged in operations in the North Sea, all positions occurring in W/T messages (other than those in cypher) are to be fixed by true bearing in degrees and distance (in miles) from certain lettered rendezvous.

2. Distinguish by letter and latitude and longitude of these rendezvous will be communicated from time to time on a separate page.

3. Positions fixed in this manner are to be transmitted by W/T, in a single group, which is not to be coded or transposed, and, being self-evident, requires no prefix.

4. This group is to be transmitted as follows:—

   (i) Numerals indicating the true bearing in degrees of the position from the lettered rendezvous.

   (ii) The distinguishing letter (or letters) of the rendezvous from which the bearing and distance of the position is measured.

   (iii) Numerals indicating the distance in miles of the position from the lettered rendezvous indicated in (ii) above.
### APPENDIX D.

#### GERMAN FORCES. DOGGER BANK—JANUARY 24th, 1915.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>German Ship</th>
<th>Speed</th>
<th>Designated</th>
<th>Armament</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Helm</td>
<td>26° 10'</td>
<td>10-11-in.</td>
<td>20 A.P.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Derfflinger</td>
<td>26° 5'</td>
<td>9-12-in.</td>
<td>22 A.P.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blucher</td>
<td>24° 9'</td>
<td>9-12-in.</td>
<td>22 A.P.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kolberg</td>
<td>22° 6'</td>
<td>9-12-in.</td>
<td>22 A.P.C.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 2nd Scouting Group.
- Helm
- Derfflinger
- Blucher
- Kolberg

### APPENDIX E.

#### BRITISH SUPPORTING FORCES. DOGGER BANK—JANUARY 24th, 1915.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>British Ship</th>
<th>Speed</th>
<th>Designated</th>
<th>Armament</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iron Duke</td>
<td>23° 10'</td>
<td>10-11-in.</td>
<td>19 A.P.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moltke</td>
<td>22° 6'</td>
<td>9-12-in.</td>
<td>20 A.P.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gneisenau</td>
<td>21° 9'</td>
<td>9-12-in.</td>
<td>20 A.P.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rodney</td>
<td>24° 9'</td>
<td>9-12-in.</td>
<td>22 A.P.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kettle</td>
<td>21° 3'</td>
<td>9-12-in.</td>
<td>22 A.P.C.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 2nd Scouting Group.
- Iron Duke
- Gneisenau
- Rodney
- Kettle

### APPENDIX F.

#### AMMUNITION EXPENDED.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship</th>
<th>Caliber</th>
<th>Torpedoes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lion</td>
<td>13-5-in.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wren</td>
<td>A.P.C.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scharnhorst</td>
<td>6-in.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birmingham</td>
<td>6-in.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### German Ships
- About 320—11-in.
- Kolberg
- About 100—4-1-in.
- Moltke
- Derfflinger

### APPENDIX G.

#### POSITIONS IN TEXT OF WIRELESS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Letter</th>
<th>Latitude</th>
<th>Longitude</th>
<th>Letter</th>
<th>Latitude</th>
<th>Longitude</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>57° 15' N.</td>
<td>6° 30' E.</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>57° 15' N.</td>
<td>9° 10' E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>57° 15' N.</td>
<td>6° 30' E.</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>57° 15' N.</td>
<td>2° 45' E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>57° 15' N.</td>
<td>3° 30' E.</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>57° 15' N.</td>
<td>2° 45' E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>57° 15' N.</td>
<td>3° 30' E.</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>57° 15' N.</td>
<td>3° 15' E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>57° 15' N.</td>
<td>3° 15' E.</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>57° 15' N.</td>
<td>3° 15' E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>57° 15' N.</td>
<td>0° 45'  E.</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>57° 15' N.</td>
<td>2° 45' E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>57° 15' N.</td>
<td>0° 45'  E.</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>57° 15' N.</td>
<td>2° 45' E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O</td>
<td>57° 15' N.</td>
<td>2° 45' E.</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>57° 15' N.</td>
<td>3° 15' E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q</td>
<td>57° 15' N.</td>
<td>3° 15' E.</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>57° 15' N.</td>
<td>3° 15' E.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### POSITIONS OCCURRING IN THE TEXT OF W/T MESSAGES.

1. When ships of the Grand Fleet are engaged in operations in the North Sea, all positions occurring in W/T messages (other than those in cypher) and including those occurring in emergency reports of the enemy, are to be fixed by true bearing (in degrees) and distance (in miles) from certain lettered rendezvous.

2. In cypher messages the position is to be ciphered in accordance with the present practice.

3. The distinguishing letter and latitude and longitude of these rendezvous will be communicated from time to time on a separate page.

4. Positions fixed in this manner are to be transmitted by W/T in a single group, which is not to be coded or transposed, and, being self-evident, requires no prefix.

(i) Numerals indicating the true bearing in degrees of the position from the lettered rendezvous.

(ii) The distinguishing letter (or letters) of the rendezvous from which the bearing and distance of the position is measured.

(iii) Numerals indicating the distance in miles of the position from the lettered rendezvous indicated in (ii) above.
H. APPENDIX II.

CASUALTIES.—DOGGER BANK, JANUARY 24th, 1915.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship</th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>C.P.O.'s, P.O.'s, and Men.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>Wounded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>Wounded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lion</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiger</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meteor</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Compiled from A.O.G. return. "Killed" includes "died of wounds."

J. APPENDIX J.

NOTES TO PLAN 360/15.

1. Aurora Deck Log gives "0655, sighted 3 "funnelled cruiser, challenged, 0700, enemy opened fire", enquired him at 0,000 yards; 0715, enemy turned away and fired five." But Aurora's report (Bcol. No. 15) gives "0714, enemy opened fire," which the best "fixes" during the range of sighting and of break-in fire, and the movement of the German B.C.'s which turned at 0747 and 0752, makes the enemy battle cruiser turn to port after 0730 and not to starboard as stated. Moore's report says: "When 0730, enemy fired 4 5.5-in. guns, but was only 200 rounds of ammunition left and her two after turrets were out of action; consequently the intention to go to the assistance of the Princess Royal was abandoned. Admiral Hipper considered it doubtful in any case whether his B.C.'s would have been in time to prevent our light craft from finishing off the Wichita."

2. As to track from 0730 to 0745. It has been plotted from Lieutenant's notebook; at 0730, German enemy B.C.'s were estimated away, following course of Aurora, no. "ghosts." Unadorned track is based on Lookout, Lt.(N)'s notebook. Certain times in the latter have been adjusted in the light of other evidence, particularly between 0800 and 1100, where the times as given appear to be five minutes slow.

3. There is not sufficient evidence to plot the exact positions of Aurora and Unfrocked at 0745, when the former sighted the Kieler; and the tracks of the flotillas prior to 0830 are necessarily approximate.

4. 1st B.C.—The track plotted is that of the Lion, and is largely based on Lion's Deck Log, the correct allowance being made for difference in times of turning of Lion and Princess Royal respectively when altering course in succession. 27 knots has been allowed for "almost stopped."

5. From about 0830 to 0900, when Lion moved to 26 knots, Tiger was the only ship which kept station, and she was probably 5 cables astern. New Zealand kept up fairly well with Princess Royal, but both the latter dropped considerably, and at 0900 were almost out of normal supporting distance. (Admiral Beatty.)

6. From about 0900 onwards, B.C.'s are largely based on range and the rate of change of angle and range of fire, but the times given in Lion's Deck Log have been adjusted, as these are liable to be slightly inaccurate.

7. The 11.05 C.O.S. turned to N. 40° E. at 0733 and to S. 0° E. at 0737, presumably in conformity with the movement of the German B.C.'s which turned at 0747 and 0752, but it has not been possible exactly to reconcile the times of turning of the two forces.

8. The German B.C.'s. —The courses of the enemy prior to 0830 are necessarily approximate. They are based upon a selection of the available evidence, and the best "fixes" during this period are considered to be at 0730 (A 28) and 0744 (four German B.C.'s bearing 23° 56' E., 0.97 E. of Cowper's High Sea Fleet, p. 77) makes the enemy battle cruisers turn to port after 0739 and not to starboard as shown in plan 2; but this point cannot be definitely settled until further evidence (e.g., the account in the German official history) becomes available. Scheer's diagram (German Official History) shows, in S. 65° E., the Spanish cruiser turn to port after 0739 and not to starboard as shown in plan 2, but this point cannot be definitely settled until further evidence (e.g., the account in the German official history) becomes available. Scheer's diagram, p. 82, makes the Squalus, Dorfish, and Malte at 0740 turn to port by W., for some minutes to engage the Princess Royal and New Zealand, and to 0745 to starboard. Admiral Moore's report says: "When 0752, our track (corrected time 1145) the other enemy B.C.'s were distant about 121 miles, consequently the German ships (if they turned at all) could not have held on by W., course for more than two or three minutes, or they would not have increased their distance from some 12,000 yards at 1100 to 20,000 yards at 1145. From information received from I.D. it appears that the German B.C.'s at 1100 actually turned to S. by W. for a short time; but the Squalus had only 300 rounds of ammunition left and her two after turrets were out of action, consequently the intention to go to the assistance of the Bliicher was abandoned. Admiral Hipper considered it doubtful in any case whether his B.C.'s would have been in time to prevent our light craft from finishing off the Wichita."

C.B. 917 (octavo).

C.B. 917a (octavo).

C.B. 1585 (foolscap).

C.B. 1597 (octavo).

C.B. 1597a (octavo).

LIST OF NAVAL STAFF MONOGRAPHS (HISTORICAL) ISSUED TO THE FLEET.

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APPENDIX H.

APPENDIX J.