

SOUNDINGS



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Philippines Naval Reserve Support to Disaster Response

Ariel Halasan

As one of the countries most vulnerable to the effects of climate change, The Philippines faces numerous natural hazards which carry implications to national peace and security.¹ As The Philippines will continue to encounter stronger typhoons, coupled with rising sea levels and heavy precipitation, there is a need to strengthen efforts to mitigate and/or respond to crises caused by these natural hazards. As climate change exacerbates existing pressures on national security issues by bringing these new challenges, the operational responsibilities of the Armed Forces of The Philippines (AFP) also expands in the event of large-scale climate-driven disasters.²

Under this premise, the AFP will be involved in addressing the security issues associated with global warming, especially responding to natural hazards, for the foreseeable future. This paradigm shift will further complicate the ability of the AFP to operate across the spectrum of operations with its limited resources and may even tip the scale towards its non-traditional role of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), rather than its traditional role of defending the nation's territorial integrity and sovereignty.

However, the AFP and the Philippine Navy (PN) in particular, has the advantage of maintaining a reserve force that can be mobilised during war, rebellion, national emergency and when national security is in jeopardy, and that can be committed to support HADR operations and disaster risk reduction when necessary.³ But the reserve force as an integral part of the AFP has never been mobilised, especially during large-scale climate-driven disasters and notwithstanding that it is well-organised and possesses talents, skills, expertise, experience and resources that can supplement and complement AFP/PN capabilities. Hence, this paper proposes legal and policy amendments to establish quick-effective mobilisation of the reserve force during HADR operations.

Reserve Forces

The underlying principle of a reserve force is to allow rapid expansion of the regular force. It is commonly anchored on strategic, financial, social, and political justifications.⁴ Although technological developments modified the architecture of warfare, the elementary concept of having reserves remains constant but their role may vary depending on the country's domestic legislation. At present, countries like the United States, United Kingdom, Australia and Israel maintain their reserve force to provide a base for expansion and for support to the regular forces.

The formal establishment and organisation of Philippine Reserve Force is embodied in the *National Defense Act of 1935* which obliged all Filipinos to render military or auxiliary service. In 1991, the *Citizen Armed Forces of the Philippines Reservists Act (RA 7077)* was enacted that mandated the organisation of the Philippine Army, Philippine Air Force, Philippine Navy, and AFP-wide support and affiliated reserve components. These organisations mirror that of the regular force.

The importance of the reserve force and reservists has long been recognised. The *Active Archipelagic Defense Strategy* embodies the integration of reservists and mobilisation of the reserve force which entails organising, training, equipping, deploying and sustaining fleet and marine reserves in order to be seamlessly integrated and employed within the regular force to address the wide spectrum of challenges from peace to a potential war scenario.⁵ This includes providing support to the AFP non-traditional role of HADR operations and disaster risk reduction.

As of 2014 there were four Naval Reserve Force and three Marine Reserve brigades that were formally activated nation-wide and satisfied the personnel and facilities requirements for a mission capable reserve unit. These line reserve forces are composed of 383 officers and 25,837 enlisted personnel. There are 10 Philippine Navy affiliated reserve units (PNARU) with 102 officers and 2980 enlisted personnel that are affiliated from private sectors and organisations engaged in fishing, stevedoring services, yachting, engineering, port engineering, and medical responders.⁶

Under RA 7077 article X section 59, the reserve force will be used in times of emergency and to meet threats to national security through full, partial and selective mobilisation. Ironically, there is no instance when a reserve force has been mobilised especially during large-scale natural disasters, for example during the aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan that decimated the country in November 2013. The colossal loss of life and property damage along its path wherein over 20 million people were affected, 6300 confirmed dead and 1061 missing, 28,698 recorded injuries, and US\$2.1 billion in damage to personal property, agriculture and key infrastructure should have necessitated the mobilisation of the reserve force.⁷ Unfortunately, it did not happen although 345 reservists assisted in the repacking and hauling of relief goods and nine PNARU vessels were involved in sealift operations. Such participation is only short, limited, unpaid and purely voluntary.

Impact of Climate Change and implications to the Armed Forces of the Philippines


Called the 'crossroads of the Pacific', the Philippine archipelago is strategically located in the heart of the Asia-Pacific region. It is surrounded by vast bodies of water: the Pacific Ocean in the east, and the South China Sea in the west. Its geographical makeup consists of more than 7100 islands, and the fifth largest coastline in the world. Part of its geological challenge is that the country is situated along the Pacific ring of fire and the typhoon belt. Thus, it is inherently vulnerable to natural calamities and disasters such as typhoons and earthquakes. This vulnerability will further be aggravated by climate change.

For the past decade, the leading natural disaster phenomena have been earthquakes/tsunamis, typhoons, floods, and extreme weather temperatures. However, in 2013 floods became predominant, followed by typhoons, extreme temperatures, including droughts and wildfires, and earthquakes.⁸ These are clear indicia that climate change is happening and that its impact might lead to natural disasters. Recent studies also indicate that the frequency and intensity of tropical cyclones originating in the Pacific have increased over the last few decades. The damage caused by intense typhoons has risen significantly in the affected countries, particularly India, China, The Philippines, Japan, Vietnam and Cambodia, Iran and the Tibetan Plateau.⁹

Significant warming will also occur in The Philippines by the middle of the 21st century as outlined in the climate change scenarios for 2020 and 2050 developed by the Philippine Atmospheric Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration. The increase in annual mean temperature, precipitation and sea level rise are projected to level-up the risk of flooding, inundation and storm surge. The projected impacts of a 1m sea level rise in many areas of the country show vast areas being inundated, affecting coastal settlements and livelihoods. According to the estimates of the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority, a 1m sea level rise might translate to an estimated land loss of 129,114 hectares, about 0.43 per cent of the country's total land area of 30,000,000 hectares.¹⁰

Meanwhile, the increasing frequency and intensity of typhoons originating in the Pacific Ocean and traversing the Philippine area of responsibility is the most precarious effect of global warming. The country's long-term average of 20 typhoons per annum with 8 landfalls is expected to rise, thus endangering the majority of Filipinos as 55 per cent of its municipalities are located in coastal and low-lying areas. Its perilous effect is evident from the typhoons that have made landfall since 2008 and devastated parts of the country: typhoons Fengshen (2008), Ketsana (2009), Parma (2009), Washi (2011), Bopha (2012), and Haiyan (2013), causing 13,168 deaths, 38,989 injuries, and damage estimated at US\$3.9 billion.¹¹

Climate change exacerbates the existing pressure on national security issues as well as bringing new challenges. The operational responsibilities of the defense sector could also expand in the event of large-scale climate-driven disasters.¹² This implies that the AFP will be involved in addressing the security issues associated with global warming, especially in response to natural hazards, for the foreseeable future.



The names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

Map Ref: OCHA_PHL_Hazard_v1_070308

Figure 1: Philippines natural hazard risks¹³

The AFP support role in HADR and disaster risk reduction

Recognising the vulnerability of the Philippine archipelago and its local communities to the potential impacts of climate change as shown in Figure 1, the Philippine Congress enacted the *Climate Change Act of 2009 (RA 9729)* that provides mainstreaming of climate change into government policy formulations, establishing the framework strategy and program on climate change, and the creation of the Climate Change Commission.

The commission formulated the *National Framework Strategy on Climate Change 2010-2022* to ensure and strengthen the adaptation of country's ecosystems and human communities to climate

change. The framework highlights the critical aspect of adaptation which is meant to be translated to all levels of government alongside coordinating national efforts towards integrated ecosystem-based management which shall ultimately render sectors climate-resilient. Further, disaster risk reduction is incorporated as part of the climate change adaptation measures that will be implemented especially in identified hazardous areas around the country.

Consequently, the *Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction Management Act of 2010* (RA 10121) was enacted for coherent and cohesive policies, systems and procedures on disaster risk reduction management and to develop, promote, and implement a comprehensive *National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan 2011-2028* that aims to strengthen the capacity of the national government and the local government units together with partner stakeholders, to build the disaster resilience of communities, and to institutionalise arrangements and measures for reducing disaster risks, including projected climate risks, and enhancing disaster preparedness and response capabilities at all levels.¹⁴

Anchored on these aforementioned laws and as part of the whole of government approach in responding to disasters and calamities, the AFP is at the forefront during HADR operations because of its inherent capabilities that are not available to other government agencies. In fact HADR is currently one of the mission areas of the AFP due to the inadequacy of local government units to respond after wide-scale disasters and calamities.¹⁵ Thus, all stakeholders including the PN should take a proactive stance of preparedness or readiness especially in responding to climate-related disasters and institute measures for disaster risk reduction. The reserve force as an integral part of the AFP should be mobilised for HADR operations and disaster risk reduction. Use of the reserves will ease the existing pressures of the PN in performing its traditional role of safeguarding the country's territorial integrity and sovereignty.

Naval Reserve Force: Australian Model

The Philippines can learn a lot from other navies on the optimal utilisation of its reserves. The Royal Australian Navy is an interesting case study that has lessons directly relevant to the PN.

The integration of the Royal Australian Naval Reserve (RANR) with the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) resulted in the refocusing of reserve output into genuine navy capability delivery. The shift from strategic to operational reserves further buttress the importance of the reserve force in supplementing and complementing the Navy's capabilities hence it is necessary to examine how the RAN integrated and manages its reserves effectively.

The formation of the Australian Naval Reserve is provided for under Section 19 of the *Naval Defence Act 1910*. It consists of officers appointed to, and sailors enlisted in it; and officers and sailors transferred to it from the permanent force. It is structured to provide for predictable augmentation of the permanent force upon call out for defeating attacks on Australia and assistance to the permanent force in defending Australia's regional and global interests.¹⁶

Since the reservists are integrated with the permanent navy under the Navy's One Team approach to its workforce, there is no separate organisation for the reserve units. All the naval reservists are embedded within the chain of command, allowing them to stand on equal footing with their permanent force counterparts in terms of delivered capability. The conditions of their service are determined at the departmental level by the Defence People Group in the same way as the permanent navy personnel and associated personnel policies are managed by the Navy People Branch, which issues corresponding posting orders. The Director General Australian Navy Cadets and Reserves provides strategic management and oversees naval reserve policy development in support of Navy People Branch.¹⁷

Reserve service is covered under the provisions of the *Defence Reserve Service (Protection) Act 2001*. It places legally binding obligations on employers when reservists undertake ordinary reserve service or when volunteering for continuous full-time service (CFTS) and criminalised discrimination of reserves in employment. Similarly, the employers are also protected under the

Employer Support Payment Scheme that provides financial support to employers who discharge their obligations to release reservists to undertake CFTS. This scheme is a recognition by the Australian government that the requirement for reservists to undertake CFTS will result in absences from the civilian workplace, and create difficulties for employers who are called on to absorb the resulting cost and possible loss of productivity.¹⁸

The reservists are likewise classified into active and standby reserve. The latter is a pool of trained reservists, with prior Australian Defence Force (ADF) service who have no training or readiness liability but who may volunteer to render service. Though most of the RAN standby reserves come from the permanent navy they have no service obligations except during call-out during war or conflict, national disasters and aid to civil authorities upon State government request.¹⁹

The active reserves, on the other hand, work with the permanent navy under a variety of possible arrangements: funded reserve commitment (FRC) billets, short term reserve position (STRP), CFTS, and permanent force vacancies (reserve days).²⁰ Active reservists on CFTS are required to meet all aspects of permanent navy service, but reservists on reserve days do not have to be individually ready but undertake a health examination every five years and submit an annual health declaration indicating any change in status. They are provided with uniforms, have flexible work arrangements or work remotely from home, but are required to undertake annual mandatory training.²¹ They are also subject to the *Defence Force Discipline Act 1982* and covered by workplace compensation schemes while on duty.

Funding for the reserve is separated from the permanent force along the following lines: 75 per cent FRC, 13 per cent permanent force vacancies, 11 per cent STRP for their salaries and allowances only. Active reservists on CFTS are paid the full rate of salaries and allowances as the permanent navy, while reservists on reserve days receive a scaled salary as determined by the Defence Force Remuneration Tribunal, which is tax free and any member may work up to 240 days per year. However, reservists on reserve days have no leave entitlement, long service leave, and medical and dental treatment except during an emergency.

Naval reserves provide two fundamental types of capability. The first is the supplementary capability providing sustainment in traditional, primary military qualifications and categories. The majority of reservists supplement the shortfall in the permanent navy work force, working part-time or on CFTS in the supply, engineering, and seaman categories across all ranks and specialisations. This supplementation role is a first priority to ensure that the RAN can fulfil its mission 'to fight and win at sea'.²²

The second capability is complementary, where expertise can be accessed in niche areas that the permanent force does not possess, possesses in small members, or does not need in a full time capacity, such as health, chaplain and legal services, and intelligence.

One of the RAN's primary advantages in having reserves is that this increases the available manpower in a short period of time, unlike the time it would take to train new recruits or conscripts. This is since reservists who are past permanent members are already trained. Likewise, reservists who have operational experience can also increase not only the quantity, but overall the quality of forces. Having a strong standby reserve is more economical as they will be called up only when they are needed.²³

The RAN has encountered no major issues integrating the reserves with the permanent navy, and has filled the organisation's capability gaps by optimising the full potential of individual reservists at the same time sharing such talents and skills with their respective communities. Having standby reserves who are former members of the permanent force also enables the organisation to surge its capability at a lesser cost and in shorter time since these reservists are well trained and committed individuals who are willing to serve when called-out during conflicts and disasters.²⁴

Because the reserve component of the ADF was able to transition from a strategic reserve to an operational reserve, it made significant contributions to operations ANODE, ASTUTE, SLIPPER

and RESOLUTE, and domestic security during the 2012 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Perth and humanitarian assistance missions during Brisbane floods in 2011.²⁵ The RANR, in particular, were actively employed during cyclones Tracy and Yasi which struck Australia in December 1974 and 2011 respectively.²⁶ They were also involved in combat support, peacekeeping, and HADR operations overseas as integral members of the RAN.

Addressing the Challenges facing the Reserve Force in HADR operations

The detrimental impacts of climate change necessitates the optimal utilisation of the reserve force and reservists. However, there are adjunct issues and challenges that need to be addressed and if resolved will benefit both the PN and the AFP in general.

1. Mobilisation of the reserve force. The issue on the utilisation of the reserve force in HADR operations and disaster risk reduction emanates from the statute itself - *Citizen Armed Forces of the Philippine Reservists Act 1991* (RA 7077) that provides for the organisation, mission, classification, manpower development, training, maintenance, management and utilisation of the reserve force.

The reserve force can be utilised in times of emergency and to meet threats to national security through full, partial and selective mobilisation. Full and partial mobilisation requires the joint act of the President as the Commander in Chief and Congress. While selective mobilisation only requires the authority of the President to meet local threats or emergency situations, only selected units of the Ready Reserve of the localities involved are activated and the reservist assigned to them are called to active duty or active auxiliary units are organised and volunteer reservists are called to active auxiliary service (locality principle).

Requiring a joint act of the President and Congress during full and partial mobilisation apparently constricts the utilisation of the reserve force or even renders the law nugatory. The President, as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, should have the sole power to mobilise the reserve force in times of emergency or in meeting threats to national security, since the reserve force is an integral part of the armed forces. Likewise, the law is silent on what acts of Congress are needed to mobilise the reserve force. However, it can be deduced that it requires a law since it involves appropriation of public funds for the salaries, support and mobility stocks of the reservists. Further, a law for the mobilisation of the reserves could not be easily enacted because it will pass a tedious process of deliberation and debates in Congress; thus delaying or even preventing the utilisation of the reserve force. This is contrary to the intent and purpose of having a rapid base of expansion to meet the threats to national security or emergency situations.

Further, even if the President through the Secretary of National Defense is allowed to utilise the reserve force or reservists through selective mobilisation to meet local threats or emergencies, the locality principle practically prevents him from doing so especially during large-scale disasters; since most the reservists in the affected locality are also victims of such disasters or when there is no organised reserve force in the affected locality that can be mobilised.

Thus, there is a need to revisit RA 7077 and harmonise it with other pertinent laws particularly RA 9729 and RA 10121. The only role of Congress during mobilisation of the reservists is to ensure that funds and resources are available prior to and during mobilisation.

Further, a good framework for the mobilisation of the reservists is the process of ‘call-out’ of the ADF for defence force aid to the civil authority.²⁷ The governor-general, on advice from the authorising ministers may ‘call-out’ the ADF or Reserve Forces. The exception is ‘expedited call-out’ during instances when the prime minister, or the defence minister and attorney general jointly may order ‘call-out’ because of the existence of sudden and extraordinary emergency, and the ADF is required to protect the states or territories from domestic violence and to ensure Commonwealth interests. The ‘call-out’ procedures do not constrain the Chief of Defence Force in prepositioning ADF assets prior to ‘call-out’.

2. Employment status of the reserve force/reservists during mobilisation. Reservists as ‘civilians in uniform’ are employed primarily in public/private entities or practicing their respective professions other than military service. When called to active duty their present employment, seniority, and rank prior to mobilisation or voluntary service should be protected and retained. In fact a reservist will be subjected to court martial and imprisonment if they failed to respond to mobilisation. However, RA 7077 only provides security of tenure of the reservists in government or private employment while undertaking military training. The aforesaid law is silent regarding the status of employment of the reservists during mobilisation. It is also silent about the obligations and reparations of the employers who may suffer losses due to the absence of reservist-employee.

Thus employment status needs to be clarified because it may render mobilisation futile since the reservists will be forced to select between their permanent civilian employment or render temporary military service. Human nature would suggest choosing the former without any regard to possible legal consequences, since reservists have their families to support and employers generally will not allow them to be absent from their job for a considerable period to render military service.

By contrast, the RAN Reservists and their employers are protected under the *Defence Reserve Service Protection Act 2001* and Employer Support Payment Scheme respectively, which aim to enhance employer support for reserve service thus increasing the availability of reservists to undertake defence service and to assist recruiting and reduce wastage of reserve personnel.

3. Availability of funds to support the salaries or remuneration of the reservists when called to render service. The availability of funds for compensation or salaries of the naval reservists during integration is one of the major issues that need to be resolved among the departments of Budget and Management, and of National Defense (DND). The PN, through the representation of the AFP and the DND, may ask for the inclusion of funds for this purpose before Congress in the annual *General Appropriations Act*. Likewise, the annual budget for personnel services funds is based on authorised troop strength which is usually 90 per cent filled and the 10 per cent difference may be a good option as a source of salaries/compensation for the reservists when integrated with the regular force.

4. Availability of funds to support the Reserve Force and PNARU assets. Under the PN Annual Plan and Budget for 2014, an amount of PhP162.8 million was allocated to support and build-up the capability of the PN Reserve Force. The President can also allocate funds through the military assistance fund that is available from any source to augment the appropriation of the Reserve Force. However a close examination of the 2013 and 2014 *General Appropriations Act*, shows the military assistance fund is neither included in any line budget item of the Office of the President, or of the DND.

However, the disaster risk reduction management fund amounting to PhP13 billion is a line item in the 2014 *General Appropriations Act*. As stated in RA 10121, it can be used for disaster risk reduction or mitigation, prevention and preparedness activities such as, but not limited to, training of personnel, procurement of equipment and capital expenditures. It can be utilised for relief, recovery, reconstruction and other works and services in connection with natural and human-induced calamities that may occur within the budget year or in the previous two years. Thirty per cent of the fund is also allocated as a quick response or standby fund for relief and recovery programs to include the prepositioning of goods, emergency response units, and other allied support items and equipment in order that the situations and living conditions of people living in communities or areas stricken by disasters, calamities, epidemics, or complex emergencies maybe normalise as quickly as possible.

These funds can also be funnelled to support the Reserve Force and affiliated reserves when mobilised.

5. Determination of the role of the reserve force in the PN and AFP organisation. Naval reservists possess a variety of talents, skills, expertise and resources acquired and harnessed through education, training and experience in pursuit of their individual professions or in civilian

employment. The Navy can use these talents, skills and expertise if the reservists are given the opportunity to serve in the Navy together with the regular members thereby complementing any gaps the organisation may have at a lower cost since the need to invest in their training and pay for leave, pension and other expense are no longer required for doctors, lawyers, musicians, researchers, divers, journalists, public relations officers, historians and managers.

Likewise, the benefits will also accrue to the community at large, because the reservists, upon termination of their training and services, will go back to the community and apply what they learned from the Navy, especially the military values of honour, dignity, patriotism, service, leadership, honesty, integrity, and courage. This symbiotic relationship will continue to benefit both the Navy and the community through proper management and implementation, and the support of all stakeholders.

Furthermore, the standby and ready reserves serve as the base for expansion (force multiplier) in case of war, rebellion, invasion, national emergency, and when national security is in jeopardy. Thus regular forces can be augmented in the shortest possible time. These reservists who previously served in the Navy, together with graduates of the naval reserve officer training corps and civilian recruits, can also be trained in HADR operations, disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation, as part of the Navy's proactive approach in dealing with climate-related disasters and disaster risk reduction, thereby helping the community to be disaster resilient.

Conclusion

Natural disasters such as Typhoon Haiyan are a painful reminder of our vulnerability to climate change. It also reminds us of the need to act fast and institute robust and tangible measures to mitigate the impacts of climate change since it is expected that many countries will experience more and intensified typhoons, floods, drought and landslides and the military will be called upon to respond to such events.

This necessitates a whole-of-government response, but the AFP and in particular the PN, should implement a proactive stance of preparedness and readiness not just during disaster response and humanitarian assistance but also for disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation that is sustainable and viable in helping the Filipino communities to be disaster resilient.

The naval reserve force, as an integral part of the PN, is an important asset with the potential to fill capability gaps or even surge its capability in a short period of time. Thus, it is necessary for the PN to re-examine the policies, rules and procedure pertaining to the reserve force and come up with a more robust and inclusive policy that will benefit the whole AFP and The Philippines in general.

Recommendations

The following are the remedial actions that need to be undertaken to strengthen the Philippine Naval Reserve Force:

1. The Philippine Navy, through the representation of the DND and the AFP, should pursue statutory amendments that will strengthen and empower the reserve force to give flesh to the intent and purpose of RA 7077, particularly on the provisions of mobilisation, utilisation, recruitment, organisation, training, budget or funding, compensation, protection of reservists and its employers. The law should not only seek to maintain a standing or regular military force in times of peace for its security that can be rapidly expanded by a well-disciplined citizen armed force in the event of war, invasion, rebellion and national emergency, but also during disasters or calamities and disaster risk reduction considering that the country is most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change.
2. Recognising further the rigidity of amending Philippine domestic laws, the DND, in coordination with the AFP and the PN, should revisit the implementing rules and regulations of RA 7077 to harmonise it with other pertinent laws, particularly RA 9729 and RA 10121, taking

into consideration the importance of the reserve force in socio-economic development, HADR operations, disaster risk reduction, and climate change adaptation.

3. The spectrum of challenges that the PN and the AFP face is very wide; from territorial defence, internal security, and maritime security through to HADR operations. Thus, this requires popular support. Ordinary Filipinos who are willing to render military or auxiliary service should be recruited as reservists and be involved in disaster risk mitigation and climate change adaptation. The stringent requirements and processes of becoming a reservist should be reviewed and streamlined to fit the needs of the times, thereby allowing individuals who not only possess good standing, skills and talents, but also have a passion to serve the country, to be members of the reserve force.
4. As stipulated in the *Active Archipelagic Defense Strategy*, the PN should develop an implementing strategy for integration of the reserve force with the regular force, in order to supplement and complement existing PN capabilities in maritime operations: situational awareness; maritime cooperation with emphasis on HADR, disaster risk mitigation and climate change adaptation. The ADF policy of integrating the naval reserves with the RAN is a good framework to maximise the potential skills and talents of the reservists that consequently supplements and complements existing capabilities and diminishes capability gaps.
5. Further, pursuant to its human capital strategy, the PN should have an inclusive personnel management which includes the reserve force as an integral part of the Navy and identify the different positions that can be manned and filled by qualified reservists even on a part-time basis to enhance PN personnel readiness and address the perennial problem of lack of personnel. As part of the integration of reservists with the PN, they should be allowed to participate in all of its activities that will bring new perspectives on maritime issues, research and development, history and strategy.
6. The PN should develop the necessary plans and programs that will strengthen the capability of the reserve force or reservists in terms of doctrine, organisation, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities so that it can deliver its desired output, particularly in HADR, disaster risk mitigation, and climate change adaptation.
7. There are policies and procedures for annual active training and unit training where the Naval Reserve Force, Marine Reserve Brigades and PNARU are trained individually and as a unit. However, such unit training should also focus on HADR operations, disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation so that the reserve force will be relevant in peace-time utilisation.
8. The PN should continuously conduct nationwide assembly tests and annual fellowship programs for the reserve force in order to muster all the reservists and update their personnel profile for proper management and monitoring.
9. Naval bases and facilities are and will be established around the country in accordance with the PN basing strategy. The impacts of climate change should be anticipated considering that all naval bases/stations are located near coastal areas and are thus vulnerable to rising sea levels, floods, landslides, and intensified typhoons. Reservists, as an integral part of the PN, should be allowed to use such bases and facilities for training, mobilisation, recreation and other activities that will continuously encourage them to render part-time military service to the country.
10. The PN should recruit architects, engineers, masons, carpenters, draftsmen, builders, manual labourers, and construction and engineering companies that will supplement and complement the organisation in its engineering, adaptation of climate change, disaster risk reduction and HADR operations.

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- ¹⁸ Information on the Employer Support Payment Scheme can be found at www.defencereservessupport.gov.au/resources/publications/.
- ¹⁹ Defence Instruction (General), Operations 01-1, *Defence Force Aid to the Civil Authority*, Canberra, 18 June 2010.
- ²⁰ FRC billets are part-time positions embedded throughout the Navy contributing to the capability output, and CFTS are contractual undertakings for a specific period. This is akin to re-entering into the permanent navy; STRP are non-recurring project work within the fiscal year only; permanent navy vacancies are those who are filling the short term gap on reserve days.
- ²¹ These include security awareness, workplace health and safety, drug and alcohol awareness, suicide awareness, fraud and ethics, and equity and diversity training.
- ²² Richard Phillips, 'The Naval Reserve: Helping Navy Reach Further into the Community', in Andrew Forbes (ed), *The Naval Contribution to National Security and Prosperity*, Sea Power Centre - Australia, Canberra, 2013, p. 238.
- ²³ Phillips, 'The Naval Reserve: Helping Navy Reach Further into the Community', p. 238.
- ²⁴ Phillips, 'The Naval Reserve: Helping Navy Reach Further into the Community', p. 238.
- ²⁵ Department of Defence, *Defence White Paper 2013: Defending Australia and Its National Interest*, Canberra, 2013, p. 40.
- ²⁶ Cyclone Tracy struck Darwin, Australia on 24 December 1974, destroying 80 per cent of housing and infrastructure, with 47 dead and 97 injured. Cyclone Yasi struck Queensland in February 2011 causing severe flooding and destruction of property.
- ²⁷ Defence Instruction (General), Operations 01-1, *Defence Force Aid to the Civil Authority*.

SOUNDINGS